Living on the edge : relocating Kazakhstan on the margins of power by Hoggarth, Davinia
warwick.ac.uk/lib-publications
A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD at the University of Warwick
Permanent WRAP URL:
http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/81134
Copyright and reuse:
This thesis is made available online and is protected by original copyright.
Please scroll down to view the document itself.
Please refer to the repository record for this item for information to help you to cite it.
Our policy information is available from the repository home page.
For more information, please contact the WRAP Team at: wrap@warwick.ac.uk
University of Warwick
Politics and International Studies Department
Living on the Edge: Relocating Kazakhstan
on the Margins of Power
Davinia Hoggarth
A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for
the degree of Doctoral of Philosophy in Politics and
International Studies
Submitted September 2015
II
IContents
Acknowledgements V
Declarations VII
Abstract VIII
Abbreviations IX
Introduction 1
The Birth of ‘Central Asia’ 5
Classical Geopolitics and the Great Game 10
Structure and Scope of the Thesis 20
Chapter 1 – Methodology 28
Theory versus Practise 34
Chapter 2 – Literature Review 41
Geopolitics and Marginality 42
Strategic Culture 58
Central Asia 66
Chapter 3 – Eurasia: Marginal States and Great Powers 81
Entanglement of Security, Grand Strategy and Energy 85
Competing Eurasianisms 94
Energy as Foreign Policy and Strategy in Kazakhstan 108
Chapter 4 – Kazakhstan: Oil and Governance 114
Introduction to Kazakh Energy industry 117
Explaining KMGs Strategy and Performance 123
Relationship between Government and IOCs 136
Relationship between KMG, IOCs and the Government 139
II
Relationship between KMG and the Public 141
Prospects for Reform 143
Kazakhstan; An Assessment 147
Chapter 5 – Old Friends? Living on the Margins of Russia 155
Conceptualising Kazakhstan, Russia and Eurasia 159
The Kazakh Post-Soviet Identity 166
Economic Relations between Kazakhstan and Russia 172
Pipeline Politics; Russia, Kazakhstan and post-Soviet Energy
Security 177
Kazakh Military Dependence 185
Chapter 6 – Kazakhstan and China: Is Mercantilism ‘Going Out’
in Kazakhstan? 198
China the Global Actor 202
China the ‘Mercantilist’ 206
China Going Global… in Kazakhstan 212
Kazakhstan’s Engagement with China 214
Squeezing Out Russia 221
Contrasts with Western Approaches 224
Chapter 7 – Mirage on the Steppe: Kazakhstan, the EU, Europe
and the US 228
Cultural Exchange and Historical Ties 232
The American Government and the Battles for the Silk Road 235
US Involvement and Lessons Learnt 245
European Firms, the EU and European states in Kazakhstan 253
Should Kazakhstan’s Industry be a Bit more European? 258
Separation Success? 263
III
Conclusion 272
Future Research 288
Primary Sources and Bibliography i
IV
VAcknowledgements
When I eventually plucked up the courage to leave the hotel on my first day in Almaty it was -
20°c. I dressed myself up like the Michelin man and, navigating the foot of ice on the pavement
as gracefully as a giraffe on skates, I set off into the night. I think I wondered around just long
enough to become slightly hysterical for lack of food, for my face to go purple and blotchy, and
a general panic about my life choices to set in. Luckily for me, Kamilya Omarova saw me and
took pity. She was the first person I met in Kazakhstan and she guided me about the city,
prevented my imminent starvation, and took me ice skating in the Tien Shen Mountains.
This pretty much sums up my entire experience of the PhD and of Kazakhstan. I’ve wildly
flailed about on the ice rink of academia, propped up by incredibly kind and generous people.
And now I finally get to say thank you.
The University of Warwick Politics and International Studies Department has been more than
my place of work, it’s been my home for five years and I’m incredibly grateful to all the staff
and academics who have made it such a wonderful place to inhabit. Quite honestly, I don’t
know if I’m ever going to have this much fun anywhere else. The department has produced
some outstanding nutters in its time, and I have had the pleasure of meeting some of its finest.
Zakia Shiraz, Andrew Hammond and Simon Willmetts you have been the best friends I could
have hoped for on this journey and you have changed me for the better; we’ve hunted for
freedom in California, Amsterdam and New Orleans, and I wouldn’t change a goddam minute
of it. Stoned, naked Frisbee anyone?
Other members of what some other politics departments apparently refer to as the Warwick
Mafia have inspired me too. Chris Browning in particular came in at the eleventh hour to bring
me back from the edge of a theoretical faux pas. Peter Ferdinand, as my second supervisor,
has helped test my ideas about a subject I was horribly unfamiliar with upon starting. Others
in the department deserve mention for what they represent; Matthew Watson you lead by
example and in doing so inspire us all to live by what we write. Through the PhD community I
have met some incredible and incredibly interesting people, and some of you have even
suffered through being my house or office mates. Lauren Tooker, you have not only helped
me when I was falling apart but also when I needed a dance in Wilde’s, and for doing both so
well I will always be grateful.
It’s not really possible to thank an entire country, but Kazakhstan has shown me great
kindness and this thesis is my wordy and dense love letter to the most beautiful of all the
Central Asian states. It’s also produced some of the worst food on the Eurasian continent and
if I never eat another plov again it won’t be too soon. It has been a pleasure and a privilege to
have studied at KIMEP University, Almaty and I especially want to acknowledge the generosity
of the Politics Department who have provided me with a sanctuary within which to work. I got
to meet some fantastic people from all over the world who made the year something to
remember, and the best bit is I’ve got to see so damn many of them again. Thank goodness
it’s a small world. Special mention should go to Cobus Block for managing six months in a
confined office space with only me for company. Jon Jay, you opened my eyes to the beauty
of the Kazakh Mountains, and so much more besides, so thank you for all the adventures.
Saranna, Abe, and Julia, you guys were juuuuust wonderful companions through
extraordinary times.
VI
Not everyone I want to thank is still about, but Alexandros Peterson know this, you are the
reason I chose this damn subject, you inspired me to go traipsing across the Steppe, but that
doesn’t mean I’ve forgotten you owe me a bottle of Bishkek cognac. I miss your company so
very much.
What a family: ‘eccentric’ just doesn’t do them justice. Mum, I don’t say thank you often
enough. If I have achieved anything, it is because you have made it happen. You even proof
read the damn thing. Dad, thank you for your unwavering support and interest in my work,
even when I’m difficult, which is most of the time. Most people spend time with their
grandparents because they have to, but I hang out with mine because I just really, really enjoy
their company. Gan and Gum, thank you for always being my port in the storm.
Is there anyone I’ve forgotten? The library café staff? The post room maybe? Mmm, who else
is there? Ah yes. Prof Richard James Aldrich. Richard, quite frankly it’s been like having
Batman, Frank Underwood and Mary Poppins all rolled into one supervisor. You have not only
shaped this thesis but I can honestly say that I feel a more confident and creative person
because of your wisdom and encouragement over many years. There are very few people, let
alone supervisors, that go to the lengths you do to help those you care about. When you call
in the debt it’s going to be messy. I’ll get the shovel.
I have never felt luckier than I do right now, so one last time, all of you, thank you.
Holy smokes, she’s only gone and done it.
VII
Declaration
I hereby declare that the work contained in this thesis is my own, that the thesis contains no
published material that did not arise from work on the thesis or material that has been used
in another thesis, and that the thesis has not been submitted for examination for a degree at
another university.
VIII
Abstract
Living on the Edge: Relocating Kazakhstan on the Margins of
Power
In contrast to the Great Game narrative, this thesis demonstrates the extent and limitations of
Kazakhstan in generating autonomy. It provides a detailed account of the tactical and strategic
choices that the state has made, particularly through its energy industry, to improve its position
relative to Russia, China and the West. Using the innovative marginality literature, this thesis
reimagines the Central Asian state as more powerful regional actor than has previously
envisioned. Moreover, it explores how Kazakhstan is able to effect change in Russian and
Chinese foreign policy, and exemplifies a marginal state affecting the centres of power. To
demonstrate this, the thesis examines the strategic choices of the Kazak state, its governance
structure and the changing identity politics. As geopolitics becomes increasingly antagonistic
in Europe, it is vitally important that we understand how these large states are ‘playing’
overseas. It is suggested that Kazakhstan is not a “small” or a “weak” state and from its
position on the periphery has exercised remarkable leverage: it is a prism thought which we
can see the truly multi-polar nature of world politics in the second decade of the twenty-first
century.
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1Living on the Edge: Relocating Kazakhstan on the Margins of
Power
Introduction
Kazakhstan’s trajectory, from its existence to its present success, has been improbable.
Despite being surrounded by powerful ambitious states, inheriting a weak economic system,
an authoritarian state structure, and having little continuity of identity upon which to build
nationhood, Kazakhstan has survived and prospered. Following independence, its demise has
been routinely announced and its collapse widely anticipated. And yet, for the chosen few, life
in Kazakhstan is a sensational parade of fast cars and restaurants paid for by oil money and
bribery, controlled by a reclusive and recalcitrant leadership. For the rest, life is growing slowly
but steadily more comfortable, opportunities for employment are being created and the
expanding middle classes are growing accustomed to their new lifestyles.
In this country of haves and have-nots, there are tensions left unchallenged by the populous,
civil society is unformed and there are few mechanisms to affect change within the patrilineal
state structure. Whilst we in the West know this country best through the “Great Game”
narrative, Kazakhstan has been gradually, quietly renegotiating its relationships with the more
powerful and watchful states of Russia and China, and the more prominent countries of the
West. This particular trajectory was far from predictable: other states have wrestled
themselves away from the margins of Russia, or from other former colonisers, and not
produced such economically prosperous or peaceful results. How has Kazakhstan escaped
such a fate?
2‘The Russian nation is one of the biggest, if not the biggest ethnic group in the world to be
divided by borders.’1 These are the words of President Putin spoken in March 2014 in the days
after the referendum on Crimea’s transition to Russian territory. The speech held the world’s
attention at a time when tension over Russian intentions remained unclear; Russia had already
annexed part of its former empire, but would Russia wholly invade Ukraine or other Former
Soviet Union (FSU) states? For Putin, the break-up of the Soviet Union has been a disaster,
the end of a civilisation, and has bequeathed a historic legacy that many feel is in need of
restoration.
Importantly, the speech clarified the criteria of what constitutes ‘Russia’. Russian territory is
not defined by the current political structures, but by the ethnicity and language spoken by an
individual and historical legacy, regardless of the state which they inhabit. Since
independence, many of the FSU countries have had to live in the shadow of the Bear, with
large internal Russian populations, and some have managed the power imbalance in the
relationship better than others. Quite whether the Ukraine crisis was brought on by Western
over-confidence or Russian nationalism is debatable, but Russian disdain for the legal
sovereignty of its former colonies remains clear.2
Kazakhstan, like many states on the margins of Russian power, was acutely aware of its own
precarious position. In a recent battle of media statements, President Putin emphasised that
Nazarbayev had ‘done a unique thing. He created a state in a territory that had never had a
state before. The Kazakhs had no statehood.’3 Whilst this may seem like praise for the nation-
1 Vladimir Putin, ‘Address by President of the Russian Federation’ The Kremlin, Moscow, 18 March, 2014.
2 For the full Foreign Affairs debate see John Mearsheimer’s article and the responses: John Mearsheimer,
‘Why the Ukraine is the West’s Fault’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 93, No.5 (2014), pp.77-89; Elizabeth Pond,
‘Germany's Real Role in the Ukraine Crisis’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 94, No.2 (2014), pp.173-76;
Michael McFaul, ‘Moscow’s Choice’, Foreign Affairs, Vol.93, No.6 (2014), pp.167-171; Stephen Sestanovich,
‘How the West has Won’, Foreign Affairs, Vol.93, No.6 (2014), pp.171-75.
3 Vladimir Putin interviewed by Anna Sazonova, 10th Seliger-2014 Youth Forum of Russia, 2014.
3building that the Kazakh President had undertaken, Nazarbayev recognised the statement for
what it was - a thinly veiled threat to Kazakh sovereignty – and responded in defence of his
state. ‘Our independence is our dearest treasure, which our grandfathers fought for,’
Nazarbayev said. ‘First of all, we will never surrender it to someone, and secondly, we will do
our best to protect it … Kazakhstan will not be part of organisations that pose a threat to our
independence.’4 These are strong words for a state that sits on the edge of a notably
aggressive neighbour – they are also striking, given Kazakhstan’s normally benign outward
relationship with the former coloniser.
There are many ways in which this relationship between the margin and centre could have
been played out. Unlike Ukraine, whose relationship with Russia has been distinctly more
challenging, Kazakhstan has operated with some furtiveness, gradually developing its
autonomy and distancing itself from its former coloniser since independence. It has been a
largely ignored and ultimately benign presence on Russia’s borderland, even after the
discovery of massive reserves of natural resources. Subsequently, it has generated the idea
of a nation out of the remnants of its Soviet legacy and created a largely integrated and
peaceful society despite the complex ethnic mixes present within its boundaries. By contrast,
Ukraine has never found nationalism to be a sufficient adhesive to bind its internal factions
together. Since independence, political rivalries have come to the fore as the distinct ethnic
groups and districts have struggled against each other. Russia became a useful trope here to
bind together diverse domestic interests, a bogeyman that would help to preserve
independence.5 Furthermore, Ukraine has created an image of itself in the international arena
of being the last remaining barrier between Europe and Russia. This geopolitical statement
informs Ukraine’s relationships on the margins of Russia. This is underlined by the way in
which the Ukraine retained its nuclear weapons for the first few years of independence, whilst
4 Nursultan Nazarbayev, Khabar Television Broadcast, August 27, 2014.
5 Eugene Rumer, ‘Eurasia Letter: Will Ukraine Return to Russia?’ Foreign Affairs¸ No.96 (1994), pp.129-145.
4Kazakhstan was quick to remove its arsenal, thereby removing its strategic threat to Russia
and China immediately.
These three factors contributed to Ukraine’s difficult relationship with Russia from the
beginning of independence and kept Ukraine as a high security priority on the Russian security
agenda.6 Ukraine may have had a longer, historical exposure to Russian cultural practises,
but both countries have been scarred by the experiences of the Soviet era through the
devastating famines and forced collectivisation that the Soviet-era imposed upon them.
Kazakhstan was also subject to the forced settlement of its nomadic peoples with serious
consequences for the population. Despite the shared historical framework, both states have
developed in contrasting paths allowing us to begin to understand the present experience of
Kazakhstan as neither inevitable nor foreseeable.
Geopolitics offers many frameworks with which to understand the interplay between states of
differing power structures. To be a state on the margin of a larger power state is to be
considered weak or even “small” in the classical understanding of geopolitics. Whether by
political influence, population or economic impact, all the countries of Central Asia are “small”
states. But it is also about position, being seated between two geopolitical spaces: one
Russian and one Chinese.7 After years of subjugation, these states were keen to overcome
their size and the dangers that are inherent in being small. Thus, the Central Asian States
have gone beyond what might be expected of small states in international politics by engaging
globally to negotiate with the former imperial metropole.8
6Ibid.
7 Michael I. Handel, Weak States in the International System (London: Frank Cass, 1981); Baldur Thorhallsson,
The Role of Small States in the European Union (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001).
8 Christos Kassimerisa, 'The Foreign Policy Of Small Powers', International Politics, Vol.46 (2009) pp.84–101;
Matthias Maassa, 'The Elusive Definition Of The Small State', International Politics, Vol. 46, (2009), pp.65–83;
Asle Toje, ‘The European Union as a Small Power’, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol.49, No.1, (2011) pp.
43–60.
5“Small”, “weak” and “marginal” – even “peripheral” - are separate concepts, but they often hunt
together as a pack. This understanding presents marginality as being unable to influence the
centre of power which is contained within the governments and cities of more important states,
leaving the margins to receive little attention in international relations and assumed to have
little autonomous power, influence and decision making capabilities. Kazakhstan has long
suffered from this understanding of its position within international relations.9 There is however
compelling evidence to suggest that Kazakhstan’s autonomy has been underestimated, and
through its energy industry it has actually been able to influence its relationship with larger
powers, rather than being merely a passive recipient of international transactions. Before
examining the mechanisms that have enabled this, it is first necessary to reconsider the birth
of an independent Central Asia and the obfuscating frameworks that have impeded our
understanding of the role and importance of Central Asia in geopolitics.
The Birth of ‘Central Asia’
Central Asia has attracted far less attention than the European FSU states, leaving it shrouded
in apparent mystery, and therefore open to misinterpretation. After the dissolution of the Soviet
Union, there were few writers who were specialists in Kazakh SSR, and fewer still in the other
Central Asian states.10 Much of the literature has been analysed in those earlier years of
independence through the lens of Post-Soviet Studies and it is only relatively recently that
Central Asian Studies has begun to emerge as a field of study in its own right. This field has
a small following but an expanding remit, growing with the leverage of the states themselves.
The states are beginning to be studied in their own right; rather than as an appendage of their
colonial history. This led to a somewhat dualistic understanding of Central Asia, in which the
1991 independence from Russia had either completely resisted Russian cultural influence, or
9 Christopher Browning and Pertti Joenniemi, ‘Contending Discourses of Marginality: The Case of Kaliningrad’,
Geopolitics, Vol. 8, No.9 (2004), p.700.
10 A notable exception and leader within area studies is Martha Brill Olcott, see for example Martha Brill
Olcott, The Kazakhs, (Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University, 1987).
6had been totally subsumed by it.11 This in turn led to predictions of violent conflict occurring
upon independence, even by the more experienced voices such as Martha Brill Olcott.12 It
also created a narrative of subservient populations well suited to, or even requiring,
authoritarian rule.13
What was left after 1991 were five states unprepared for independence; Turkmenistan,
Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. The states had been created by Josef
Stalin under communist rule, a fresh collection of states where there had previously been
none. Whilst Russia had had a presence in the region, these lands were not occupied by a
Westphalian state system, no state as such was conquered, and instead there were a series
of khanates across the region. Two distinct groups co-existed here, nomads and sedentary
groups, and not always peacefully. In an attempt to pacify, demarcate and administrate the
territory, the five states were created with a predominant ethnic group (i.e. Tajik, Kazakh etc)
but with a mixture of each of the ethnic groups in each of the states, creating a potentially
uneasy mixture of the myriad tribes.14 As they exist today, these republics follow the same
boundaries. What is interesting to note is that the experience of Soviet rule has had a profound
effect upon the public and elite populations of Kazakhstan, but it did not create either ethnic
tension or overt nationalism.15
Kazakhstan has a vast array of natural resources to offer, signalling the potential for economic
viability, and yet it was reluctantly an independent state in 1991. Gold, oil, natural gas, copper,
aluminium, chrome, uranium and rare earth minerals are all found within Kazakhstan. This
11 Pauline Jones Luong, The Transformation of Central Asia, (New York: Cornell University, 2004), p.4.
12 Martha Brill Olcott, ‘Central Asia on its Own’, Journal of Democracy, Vol 4, No. 1, (1993), pp. 92-103.
13 For a discussion of this in each of the five states, see the edited volume Sally Cummings (ed.), Power and
Change in Central Asia, (London: Routledge, 2002).
14 Luong, The Transformation of Central Asia, p.6.
15 Mark Beissinger, ‘Elites and Ethnic Identites in Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics’, in Alexander Motyl, (eds.) The
Post-Soviet Nations: Perspectives on the Demise of the USSR, (New York: Colombia Press, 1992).
7should have made a promising start to independence, and yet Kazakhstan was the last FSU
state to declare independence, after Ukraine and Belarus. The leader of the Kazakh SSR,
Nursultan Nazarbayev, had argued strongly for the continuation of the USSR as a wider
federal structure, going so far as to attempt to persuade President Gorbachev to create a
looser inter-state structure rather than accept a full dissolution of the union.16 To be a new
state with limited economic power and ethnic divisions would have left Kazakhstan vulnerable
and at risk of becoming subsumed by Russia should the republic prove unstable. As the
independence became an inevitability, Nazarbayev looked to integrate the Central Asian
states in an attempt to sure an alliance in the face of future provocation. His work in search of
stability in these early days was genuine, and his achievements in securing the future of the
Kazakh nation were sizeable.
Despite these attempts, integration has not been achieved, or desired, by all. Initially, the
inherited integrated market model meant that the CIS states predominantly traded with each
other, but by 1996, the majority of their foreign trade was with states outside the FSU.17 Within
Kazakhstan, the need to improve regional integration to advance economically was widely
accepted in foreign policy circles. Umirserik Kasenov, former foreign policy advisor to
Nazarbayev noted that it would in fact reinforce the precarious sovereignty of all, but this
enthusiasm from Kazakhstan did little to persuade the other states.18 Instead, Kyrgyzstan,
Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan chose to embrace their newly found autonomy and
cultivated different economic models and national identities, each choosing to emphasise a
different aspect of the region’s shared culture. As a result the region operates on the basis of
non-discriminatory multilateralism, and chooses to trade with the least-cost supplier and
16 Martha Brill Olcott, Kazakhstan: Unfulfilled Promise, (Washington DC, Carnegie Endowment for Peace,
2002).
17 Richard Pomfret, ‘Trade policies in Central Asia after EU enlargement and before Russian WTO accession:
Regionalism and integration into the world economy’, Economic Systems, Vol.29, No.1, (2005), pp.32–58.
18 Gregory Gleason, ‘Inter-State Cooperation in Central Asia from the CIS to the Shanghai Forum’, Europe-Asia
Studies, Vol.53, No.7, (2001), pp.1077-1095,
8selling exports at the best prices, as opposed to pursing a politically motivated agenda.19 Many
attempts have been made by regional leaders to bring them together in pursuit of regional
integration including the Shanghai Forum and the Eurasian Economic Community. By the
early 2000s, with Russia and China becoming WTO members, the need to integrate regionally
or accede to the WTO was becoming more pressing.
The role of President Nazarbayev in the early days of transition cannot be overstated. Through
the inherited soviet legacy he became the self-appointed Leader of the Nation, and has
enjoyed almost complete devotion, initially through popular support and later through
institutional structural change. When viewed in soft focus, as Johnathan Aitken does in his
recent biography, Nazarbayev appears as the architect of the new state, forging international
relationships and encouraging nuclear non-proliferation in his role as an emerging
statesman.20
It is true that he has worked to ensure the success and survival of the Kazakh people, but it
has come at a cost. There is no real opposition party, no protest against the president is
allowed, the country has a failing human rights record. Perhaps more worryingly, there is no
successor named to follow the current leader, who is entering his late seventies, and who has
steadily concentrated his grip on power since 1989. He has consistently stood in the way of
democratic progress and embezzled money from state funds, to the tune of many billions of
dollars, whilst basic infrastructure and sanitation is missing from most towns.21 His vanity has
led to the creation of a new capital city to show off his legacy, and he shamelessly promotes
himself by emblazoning his face across giant posters in every village. When he eventually
19 ibid. p.55.
20 Johnathan Aitken, Nazarbayev and the Making of Kazakhstan, (London: Continuum Books, 2009).
21 Ron Stodghill, ‘Oil, Cash and Corruption’, The New York Times, 5 November 2006.
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/05/business/yourmoney/05giffen.html?pagewanted=all, (accessed 1st July
2015).
9succumbs to illness or death there is no structure in place to ensure stability, only a power
vacuum waiting to be filled by the greedy circling elites. There is no strength in the
parliamentary or judicial system to ensure the rule of law, only a group of men that Nazarbayev
has paid and placated into submission by equal turns. When the inevitable occurs, they will
seek to increase their stake in the financial spoils of the energy and financial industries.
The history of the country, including the rich cultural detail of its past, helps us to formulate the
subject matter of this thesis. There is no ‘Central Asia’ to study as such; there are disparate
countries that have a shared past, but much as with the other FSU states, there is no obvious
commonality in their future. Kazakhstan, of all the states has pursued the most active foreign
policy whilst Turkmenistan has chosen to almost entirely close itself to the outside world.
Uzbekistan has a similar political mentality with its authoritarian leadership, unlike Kyrgyzstan
which has managed to become the only democratic multi-party Central Asian republic. Central
Asia has been called Central Eurasia, Greater Central Asia and Inner Asia – even Greater
Turkey. Kazakhstan in relationship with Russia has been included in Central Asia and as a
southern ‘part’ of Russia. Furthermore, at different times Afghanistan and Pakistan have been
added into the division of Central Asia. Indeed, such difficulty in defining Central Asia reminds
us of the artificial qualities of regional geography. But in this region of recent states, categories
are more fluid than almost anywhere else.
With this is mind, as tempting as it would be to write a ‘Central Asian geopolitics’ thesis, the
unique relationships that each state cultivates with external forces renders this an ill-advised
approach. The purpose here is not to compare how the republics have interacted with Russia
– since we know this already, but to understand how states can gain autonomy and become
important actors from the position of the margin. Quite simply, the other Central Asian
republics are either not in a position to achieve this influence, and/or, simply have no interest
10
in doing so. Furthermore the purpose of the thesis is to understand these relationships as
reciprocal interactions with the margins affecting the centre.
Rather than focus purely upon the power states, the purpose is to understand the domestic
considerations and drivers that are affecting changes in inter-state relationships on a unilateral
as well as regional basis. This inherited energy industry is the foundation of the Kazakh state,
economically and strategically, and it what creates the legitimacy for the continuance of the
authoritarian government. Understanding these larger international relationships can only be
achieved by examining the detail of these state-state interactions through trade and diplomacy
with a different collective of international actors. To do justice to this, separate accounts or
“single country studies” are required to capture the unique perspective of each republic. To
employ area studies to understand why this is so important, to understand why this
individuality has been masked, we must next consider how the grand narratives of empire
have affected our understanding of Central Asia as a whole, and Kazakhstan in particular.
Classical Geopolitics and the Great Game
Kazakhstan has been subject to a barrage of geopolitical frameworks. This process of framing
and re-framing began many decades before its achieving statehood. The colonial, orientalism
agenda that these framings have generated have had real consequences for how this ‘space’
on the map has been discussed, divided and dissected. Wars and invasions have scarred
these lands in the cause of achieving a strategic advantage through the occupation of this
place, and through the domination of the millions of people who live there. Elsewhere there
has been a virtual cost in terms of how others think about Kazakhstan. The two ideas that
have had the most influence upon the Central Asian states are the Heartland Theory of Halford
Mackinder and the Great Game of Rudyard Kipling renown.
11
Mackinder wrote at the beginning of a new century through epoch defining events; the Sino-
Russian War, the defeat of the British in the final Boer War, the death of Queen Victoria and
the Roosevelt Corollary. It was during these last years of empire and retreating British power,
that Mackinder addressed the Royal Geography Society with a lecture on what he termed the
‘Geographical Pivot of History’.22 It was to become an iconic presentation that marked the
beginning of geography as an academic subject at the interface of international relations and
it continues to influence geographers and political scientists over a century later. His work
was not particularly ground breaking, there had been a shift in attention away from the sea-
based warfare of the 19th century to the land-based battles that would come to define the 20th
century, but it was viewed as timely in its discussion of the need to contain German
expansionism.
Central Asia fitted into what he termed the ‘pivot’ or the ‘heartland’. This section of what he
termed the ‘world island’ would be the centre of historical and geographical change. The
heartland - once dominated - would provide a ‘natural seat of power’ from which to propagate
a ‘world empire’. This was all a component of a wider attempt to proselytise a democratic world
vision with a Christian message in the hope of achieving a sanitised empire, and to bring an
end to the anti-imperialism that was taking hold in Britain. Central Asia features prominently
in Mackinder’s work. The particular argument advanced for Britain focused on its importance
to securing India and also as the place to stop Bolshevik advances.
22 Halford Mackinder, ‘The Geographical Pivot of History’, The Geographical Journal, Vol.8, No.4 (1904),
pp.421-37.
12
Figure 1. The Natural Seats of Power. From Halford Mackinder, ‘The Geographical Pivot of
History,’ The Geographical Journal, Vol.23 (1904), p.21.
Mackinder‘s speech to the Royal Society is the start of an imperial and strategic vision of
geography that lingers within the realist tradition to this day. It is the perpetuation of a belief in
a world politics that can transcend our culture and ideology: the assertion that geopolitics is
the work of a few men of power creating policy places Mackinder in a long line of classical,
realist geopolitical thinkers. From Alfred Mahan before him, through to later work of Rudolf
Kjellen, Karl Haushofer and Nicholas Spykman, it is a deterministic attitude toward the impact
of geography upon the destiny of states that defines this traditional geopolitics. The paradigm
implies that it is resources and the geographical location of a state relative to another that will
determine the state’s political agenda, with little or no focus upon the ramifications of these
actions for the othered territory.
13
There is an element of truth here – factor endowment does create natural advantages and
boundaries, which in turn can both impact upon and form lineages of thought. Space in the
imperial context is understood through the ‘gaps’ on the Western maps which were closed as
the marginalised territories were appropriated, rebranded and colour-coded on the maps of
empires. As a physical representation of imperial vision, the map represents the othering of
space. To this extent, the map depicted above, The Natural Seats of Power, represents an
imperial judgment on the spaces which the Great Power states sought to dominate. Yet it
dislocates the ‘human’ in the territory, and instead emphasises a geological interpretation of
the concept of empire. It creates a series of assumptions built on the ‘innocent’ promise of
liberation and a cultural reimaging for a perceived inferior other in pursuit of base material
interest.
The second of the two policy defining narratives is the Great Game. Again this is a historical
trope, with the longevity to be of continuing relevance to Western interpretation of the region.
In its earliest Central Asian context, the Great Game first appears in the letters of Captain
Arthur Conolly (1840), who refers to a ‘great game, a noble great game’ in order to highlight
what he perceived to be the ‘humanitarian’ endeavours of the British to ‘civilise’ Afghanistan.23
The modern understanding of the phrase describes two different aspects of imperialism.
Firstly, it refers to the network of agents from Britain and Russia that were sent across the
region in an attempt to gain intelligence with a view to securing/antagonising British India and
to find local allies in the region. In this period, espionage was a form of secret statecraft and
realpolitik as opposed to the intelligence gathering of the modern era. Pursued by a motley
band of geographers, travellers, journalists and military attaches, the Great Game nurtured a
cultural concept of a covert empire in the Middle East and Asia that was sustained as much
by fancy footwork as by real power. The Great Game was a reinterpretation of the British
23 M. Yapp, The Legend of the Great Game; Elie Kedourie Memorial Lecture, (Proceedings of the British
Academy, 2001), p. 181.
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Empire at a moment of decline and used geography to offer nothing less than a new cultural
interpretation of the British state and its projection of power at the end of the nineteenth
century.24
The second meaning refers to the rivalry of great powers acting out their interests in Central
Asia, either using it as ‘buffer region’ or as a pool of natural resources to be annexed. The
phrase has traditionally been used to describe a period of Russian and British froideur
between the Treaty of Guillistan of 1813 and the Anglo-Russian Entente that preceded the
First World War in the wake of mounting German imperialism. This school often sees the Great
Game as a proto-Cold War with conflict played out by means short of war and through the use
of proxy forces. While this vision is compelling it is fundamentally flawed by its strong
dependence on historical hindsight and anachronistic longitudinal comparison.
Pervading our consciousness, the phrase ‘The Great Game’ has been in use for over a
century, reapplied to new contexts, regardless of change. In the literature it has been given
life through the work of Rudyard Kipling, but it has since become a short-hand for the region
and the complex dynamics that make up the regional relationships in historical and political
writing. Peter Hopkirk and Robert Johnson describe how, at the time of the Great Game a
constant fear of the Central Asian ‘other’ created the perception of a vacuum that must be
subsumed, whilst Alexander Morrison notes the same fear of Central Asia’s vast space and
the conception of hidden dangers lurking in the emptiness were also present in the Russian
Imperial imagination.25 In fact, as John Heathershaw notes, the Great Game created a
24 Priya Satia, Spies in Arabia: The Great War and the Cultural Foundations of Britain's Covert Empire in the
Middle East (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). See also M. Lynn, Review of Cain, P.J. and Hopkins, A.G.
‘British Imperialism’, The English Historical Review, Vol. 111, No.441 (1996), pp.501–3.
25 Peter Hopkirk, The Great Game: The Struggle for Empire, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990);
Robert Johnson, Spying for the Empire: The Great Game in Central and South Asia, (2nd Ed, New York, Simon
Schuster, 2006); Alexander Morrison, Russian Rule in Samarkand, 1869-1910: A Comparison with British India,
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008); S. Chakravarty, Afghanistan and the Great Game, (London: New
15
‘discourse of danger’ that still exists today and is widely used in contemporary discussions of
the region.26 The lurking fear that was started in the Great Game discourse, he writes,
continues to this day with ‘the ethnic violence in the late Soviet and Tajik civil war seem[ing]
to confirm these fears, leading to an analysis of the region within a conflict prevention…
framework’.27
This has not been a phenomenon limited only to literature and academic writing. The Council
on Foreign relations Calming the Fergana Valley has been a major geopolitical text used to
inform US government policy in the region, yet area studies specialists have refuted the claims
it made concerning empirical as well as cultural norms as portrayed in the paper.28 Here we
see empirically uninformed work operating within a forced and over-simplistic Great Game
understanding – an intellectually limited great power model used to understand a complex
region. This has obscured the ability of Central Asian states to confront the imperial legacy
attributed to them and legitimated discourses alien to the realities of Central Asia. Once the
discourse of danger permeates current thinking by policy makers it generates the need for a
disciplinary force. The inherent danger of Central Asia requires that the US as the hegemon
conducts surveillance of the region, to have knowledge of Central Asia without a reciprocating
exchange of information. The realist view beloved of US policy makers perceives world affairs
as an extension of American foreign policy in any case, and the Great Game mentality
exacerbates this. Although fluctuating between isolationism and a ‘world’s policeman’
perspective, the appeal of the realist critique has withstood, further contributing to the enduring
Century Publications, 1996); M. Edwards, Playing the Great Game: A Victorian Cold War, (London: Hamish
Hamilton, 1996).
26 John Heathershaw and Nick Megoran, ‘Contesting Danger: A new Agenda for Policy and Scholarship on
Central Asia’, International Affairs, Vol.87, No.3 (2011), pp.589-612.
27 ibid. p.592.
28 See John Heathershaw and Stina Torjesen, 'Discourses of Danger', Central Asian Survey, Vol. 24, No. 1,
(2005); Stina Torjesen and S Macfarlane, Kyrgyzstan: A Small Arms Anomally in Central Asia? Small Arms
Survey, Geneva, 2004.
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appeal of traditional geopolitics. With this approach however, there can be no Central Asian
security policy, only an American security policy towards Central Asia.
Simplistic analysis has pervaded not only policy papers but also the public consciousness
especially through the surge of literature generated in the wake of the War in Afghanistan, one
of the longest conflicts of the last hundred years. Pseudo-academic/popular literature, handed
out on the UK foreign office reading lists for Central Asia, includes writing such as Taliban:
Islam, Oil and the New Great Game in Central Asia and The New Great Game: Blood and Oil
in Central Asia. 29 As the two titles suggest this is a journey through modern Central Asian
geopolitics, but with the simplistic treatment of the region, given an ‘authority’ through the
historicisation of current events supposedly replicated from the Imperial Great Game. This is
not a persuasive comparison. The landscape of the 19th century and the present incarnations
of the Great Game are not comparable, yet it is often presented as a reincarnation. Some
basic elements remain the same; the competition over resources and power projections from
the West, and the geographical and historical adjacency of Russia. However, as area
specialist Shi Yinhong points out, the Central Asian States are ‘not passive pieces on a
chessboard, they participate and influence the region in a way not understood or even
recognised by the great powers, sometimes playing a crucial role in the game’.30
The Great Game is now a tired narrative that has been dredged up in procrustean fashion
from the past and then applied to subsequent events; the Soviet War in Afghanistan (1979-
1989) and the present War in Afghanistan (beginning 2001) represent the three most popular
historical encapsulations. It increasingly provides a lazy paradigm replete with ethnic
29 Ahmed Rashid, Taliban, Oil and the New Great Game in Central Asia, (London: IB Taurus, 2002); Lutz
Kleveman, The New Great Game: Blood and Oil in Central Asia, (London: Grove Press, 2004).
30Shi Yinhong, ‘Great Power Politics in Central Asia Today: A Chinese Assessment’, in Elizabeth Van Wie Davis
and Rouben Azizian (eds.) Islam, Oil and Geopolitics; Central Asia After September 11 (Plymouth: Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2007), pp.161-71.
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stereotypes and serves to prevent fresh thinking about the region. This latest ‘epoch’ of post
September 11 is considered in much of the realist geopolitical literature to be the third wave
of the Great Game and is therefore known as the ‘New Great Game’.31 In the time between
the supposed Imperial and New Great Games, the division of borders has changed
significantly. The arbitrary creation of the Central Asian states, not present in the pre-Soviet
space, has created a mixture of ethnic groups spilling across borders and dividing multiplicities
of language, culture and religion. As a result, the ethnic groups still present in Central Asia
flow within and across into neighbouring states creating tensions. Allegiances extend beyond
these borders and are not appreciated by the Great Game analysis; the Uyghur population
has a strong presence in China, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan which creates
powerful allegiances that belong not to a state but to a pan-regional vision. The spread across
the borders therefore further conflates the difficulty of the simplicity of the Great Game.32
During the Cold War, Central Asia was enveloped in the Soviet Union’s wider identity. The
Great Game narrative here is replaced by the understanding of USSR; that of the brooding
rapist looking to attack Western Europe that requires a masculinised US to intervene.33 This
homogenous narrative and representation of the FSU states made the USSR appear as a
predictable, homogenous and entirely known entity based upon a shared history of retaliation
and mistrust. This dichotomised theoretical understanding becomes a mainstay for political
action during the Cold War and rendered opaque the multitude of cultures within the fifteen
union republics. Cultures that had been developing for centuries were largely ignored by the
West, presumed to have been sleeping whilst under seventy years of Soviet rule. As a result,
the Great Game literature speaks of Soviet Central Asia as opposed to making the distinction
of Central Asia under Soviet rule. Soviet culture also transformed during that time, with notable
31 Eric Walberg, Postmodern Imperialism: Geopolitics and the New Great Game, (Atlanta: Clarity Press, 2011).
32 John Erickson, ‘Eurasian Manoeuvres’, in Sally Cummings (ed.) Oil, Transition and Security in Central Asia,
(London: Routledge, 2003), pp.256-62.
33 Gearóid Ó Tuathail and John Agnew, ‘Geopolitics and Discourse: Practical Geopolitical Reasoning in
American Foreign Policy’, Political Geography Quarterly, Vol.11, No.2 (2002), pp.190-204.
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differences in the intensity with which culture was imposed upon Central Asia both through
legislative change and the mass evacuations during the Second World War. During the
Second World War in particular, Stalin sought to harness both religion and local nationalisms
to the cause of the wider struggle against Germany and so policies towards nationalist in the
Soviet period were by no means uniform.
We can also see the connectivity between the Great Game, classical geopolitics and the
political classes. Brzezinski, a former National Security Adviser to President Jimmy Carter and
now an informal advisor to President Obama, lays out his vision of American geopolitics for
the approaching century in The Grand Chessboard, and the influence of Mackinder is striking
- with direct references to the ‘Heartland’, he goes on to describe the region as the ‘pivotal
springboard for the attainment of continental domination’.34 For Brzezinski, as for Mackinder,
the yielding of Central Asia is the basis of an imperial platform from which to maintain a global
hegemonic position, which since the collapse of the Soviet Union created the opportunity for
the US to become ‘simultaneously the first and only true global superpower’.35 The imperial
occupation of this space is not the military conquest of Mackinder’s time, but instead is a
sanitised version comprised primarily of economic intervention, made palatable for the modern
generation of neoclassically inspired politicians and policy prescriptions. Interestingly, China
is not considered to be of primary importance to the century’s growth, and is written-off as
unable to generate enough GDP to generate soft bargaining powers, whilst Russia is
dismissed as ‘third world’.36 Instead, through an alliance with NATO offering a bridge into
central Europe and Japan offering a platform in Asia, America can achieve dominance over
Eurasia and the impending alternative of ‘international anarchy’ can be avoided.
34 Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives, (New York:
Basic Books, 1998).
35 ibid., p.11.
36 ibid., p.38.
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The Great Game narrative has also imposed a sentimental humanitarian agenda upon Central
Asia. Rudyard Kipling, who would bring the Great Game into the public consciousness with
Kim37, described the justification for imperialism as the ‘White Man’s Burden’ in which the cost
of colonising becomes the moral responsibility to ‘help’ the colonised.38 This theme resurfaces
in the percolation of geographical determinism from Mackinder through to Brzezinski, and in
the continued portrayal of Central Asia as consisting of orientalised others whose wishes are
considered subservient to the civilising/humanitarian missions of successive waves of regional
interest. The liberal projection of philanthropy through democratic reform and economic
liberalism can be seen in the mission statements of countless NGO and Third Sector Bodies.
It is exemplified by the European Union’s 2003 ‘Security Strategy’ which changed its funding
policy from project-based support to the funding of democratisation and security concerns.39
This is not merely an exercise in arguing over definitions; there is much at stake when we
misrepresent Central Asia. In this interpretation of the republics, so prominent in the public
consciousness; we hide their voice and agency in regional and international affairs, we
homogenise their identity and ‘other’ their experiences. This has ramifications, for how these
states are perceived on an international stage, and affects the everyday lived experience of
geopolitical decision making. For the ‘great powers’ such mislabelling and misunderstanding
means that intervention in the region can be more easily justified, indeed becomes a moral
imperative to uphold security, and any deleterious consequences can be more easily
dismissed. Through reducing the experience of Central Asia to a tired imperial trope we are
not only acting upon inaccurate information and thereby producing poor policy. We also find
that the discourse of danger that is enacted through the Great Game and the civilising
37 Rudyard Kipling, ‘Kim’, (London: Puffin Classics, 2011 ed, 1901).
38 Rudyard Kipling, The White Man’s Burden: The United States and the Philippine Islands, (London: McClures.
1899).
39Ertan Efegil, ‘Analysis of the EU’s Central Asia Policy: From a Project-Oriented Approach to a New Strategic
Partnership’, in Knowledge, Creativity and Transformations of Society, (Vienna, INST: Research Institute for
Regional and Transnational Cultural Sciences, 2007), pp. 115-28.
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missions that have accompanied it, force us to envisage Central Asia through a security
paradigm in within we must ever be on alert for an imagined enemy.
There is a growing body of literature that seeks to counter this understanding of the region
and it is to this literature that the thesis speaks. Within the literature review there is space to
consider the ways in which this has been attempted, and find some room to consider that if
the Great Game narrative is not acceptable, then how instead can we find the correct tools
with which to understand the interplay of states and people in the region.
Structure and Scope of the Thesis
The thesis is informed by one over-arching question and six linked sub-questions. These in
turn inform the structure of the thesis and overall research design and methodology which is
set out below -
Lead Question
How has Kazakhstan achieved autonomous foreign policy capability?
1 What are the new dynamics of the relationship between Kazakhstan, Russia, China
and the West?
2 To what extent is Kazakhstan capable of utilising marginality, and which tactics of
marginality does Kazakhstan use to achieve this?
3 What role does China, Russia and the West play in Kazakhstan post-Afghanistan
and what have been the challenges to this goal?
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4 How has Kazakh strategic culture developed its own structure? Is it still ‘Soviet
culture’?
5 Where can Kazakhstan develop next in its foreign policy goals? What are its
strengths and weaknesses?
In contrast to the Great Game narrative, this thesis asserts that Kazakhstan has relative
autonomy in its foreign policy capability. Far from being the weak pawn on the chessboard of
international games, this Central Asian state has been quietly asserting its authority in the
region for over a decade through its energy industry. Escaping this imperial and orientalist
construct of the region reveals a plethora of rich and rewarding alternative avenues of
research. It calls for a locally rooted analysis of the regional dynamics. The actors in this region
are the largest and most powerful states that are currently operating in world politics; Russia,
China and America. As geopolitics becomes increasingly antagonistic in Europe, it is vitally
important that we understand how these large states are ‘playing’ overseas. If we remain
burdened by the assumptions of an imperial game, we misperceive the international political
order. Kazakhstan, if it indeed has autonomous decision-making capacity, and indeed ‘game-
changing’ capabilities, will have implications for the future of Eurasian geopolitics. Kazakhstan
is not a “small” or a “weak” state and from its position on the periphery has exercised
remarkable leverage: it is a prism through which we can see the truly multi-polar nature of
world politics in the second decade of the twenty-first century.
In order to fully appreciate this position of strength we must not only create an alternative
meta-narrative through marginality, but also explain the underlying dynamics of how this has
occurred. The three most crucial aspects of this project are considered throughout the thesis;
oil, identity and state strategy. Three of the core chapters explore the central role of the oil and
gas industry to this strategic process. Oil forms a case study throughout this thesis as itis
through this industry that the state has been able to wield power and influence and without the
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discussion of marginality would not be applicable. The energy industry accounts for around
30% of GDP rents and as the thesis shows, secures billion dollar investment contracts with
foreign states. Oil is central to the development of Kazakhstan and therefore central to this
thesis.
In looking at different layers of analysis, from metanarratives to micro approaches the thesis
is not creating an opaque top-down understanding of marginality and expression of
Kazakhstan but is instead creating an interdisciplinary, rounded appreciation of the current
regional dynamics. This requires understanding of competing international and national
strategies, domestic identity politics, state governance, international markets. In doing so the
thesis borrows from, and contributes to, political geography, international political economy
and energy security, bound together with the rich data of area studies.
As such this thesis has a number of claims by way of its contribution to knowledge. This the
first time that Kazakhstan has been considered through the prism of marginality, and it is the
first time that the marginality literature has been applied to an oil-based case study. It also
appears to be the first study on Kazakhstan, whose purpose has been to re-align the
relationship with Russia and China through a systematic review of the energy security and
strategic culture of the state. Its claim to originality therefore lies in deploying an area studies
approach in order to examine real world geopolitical questions that are generated from the
locality itself. In this sense it answers the call of earlier geographers who encouraged the
building of knowledge from a single location. This is not the story of Kazakhstan as told by
Russia and China, instead it is rooted in Kazakhstan’s own history, environment and future
trajectory. The results, field of study and parameters of this thesis have been decided ex poste,
rather than squeezing the Kazakh experience into a formula derived from the international
system.
Chapter Plan
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To this end, the thesis begins with a short Methodology Chapter. This outlines the techniques
and methods that were used to extract the information, and the often arduous and frustrating
process that this created. Because oil dominates much of the thesis a lot of time was spent
trying to find interviewees, some of who were forthcoming, some went to extraordinary lengths
to remain hidden, all added in one way or another to the creation of an area studies approach
to a thesis that could easily have remained concerned with metanarratives and post-colonial
literatures.
Chapter 1 seeks to position the thesis relative to the growing body of literature that examines
the changing position of Central Asia in international relations. It begins by examining the
geopolitical framework that will guide this thesis – marginality – and the strand of geopolitics
that this position stems from. Marginality draws out the tactics and methods that marginal
states use in order to gain power from the centre and to influence the regional and international
agenda. It is a positive perspective; it takes as a central assumption the premise that marginal
states, those on the periphery of great powers, have the ability to influence the locus of power,
and indeed generate their own form of power. As this concept of marginality has yet to be
applied to Central Asia, the literature review then examines the alternative explanations that
have been put forward by the area studies literature and draws out those which are closest
and furthest from helping to achieve this goal of understanding autonomy. Understanding how
these foreign policy goals have been achieved requires understanding of the strategic culture
of the Republic, and constructs an understanding of strategic culture that is compatible with
marginality, to begin to explain the domestic actors and strategic choices that have impacted
upon the form of marginality that is present in Kazakhstan.
The chapter then goes on to look at the literature on Strategic Culture. If the marginality
framework provides an alternative metanarrative to the Great Game, and the articulation of
strategic and tactical choices undertaken by the state, then there needs to be an appreciation
for the underlying referent changes that have allowed the meta-narrative of the Game Game
to be disrupted. Throughout the thesis, this is considered a strategic choice that is born of
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decision-making process made by individuals operating within a given cultural environment.
In order to explain how these strategic choices are made the review considers how we must
conceive of strategic culture and the way it will influence the ability of the state to become
‘marginal’.
The thesis argues that there is a desire on the part of the Kazakh state to have achieved
enhanced autonomy. Once we understand marginality, and how autonomy is achieved, we
need to explain where the leverage to achieve this occurs, focusing on the Kazakh economy.
Understanding this is crucial to understanding the domestic dynamic impetus for power, and
the strategic choices that have been made to achieve this.
Accordingly, Chapter 2 examines the powerful constructions of Eurasia. This chapter draws
together the competing metanarratives that seek to encompass Central Asia and provides an
account of the emerging Kazakh narrative that seeks to unbalance the status quo. Multiple
forms of Eurasianism seek to hold Kazakhstan within a particular power structure and although
generated by domestic politics, they subvert the autonomy of the region. The chapter
considers the impact, shape and scope of these powerful narratives in contrast with the
alternative ‘Kazakh Eurasian vision’, and the capacity of Kazakhstan to use oil as a tool of
foreign policy to strategic advantage within this Eurasian ideal. This explanation of the impact
of Eurasianism on the strategic narratives of the state, sets the stage for the detailed political
economy analysis of the mechanisms through which the state achieves these larger strategic
goals.
If Chapter 2 is interested in metanarratives, Chapter 3 considers the granular details of the
Kazakh oil and gas sector. This chapter is effectively a case study that establishes a detailed
account of the mechanisms that have enabled the strategic visions to be enacted; the people,
the legislation, the governance structures of the oil industry that have enabled marginality to
take place. Analysis of the changes that have been made since independence, laying the
ground work for the country based analysis that will follow. It seeks to understand the individual
actors that have been prominent in the changes; which political leaders and industry figures
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have brought about change? What are the unique features of the oil and gas industry that
have made Kazakhstan successful, and what are the hindrances to development? This
chapter lays the ground work to understanding the local level practises that have changed the
regional dynamics and in doing so provides the political economy detail that drives the
marginality explanation. In doing so it answers some of the questions raised in previous
chapters, namely how has Kazakhstan achieved so much under the radar of the Great Game
narrative? It also poses new questions for the following chapter, such as, what has been the
regional super power response to such autonomous changes in ‘their backyard’?
Following this is the first of three chapters that examine the specific relationship between
Kazakhstan and the great powers, the purpose is to correct a visible imbalance in the
literature. Again, these are centred upon the energy industry but also looks at the cultural and
identity changes that have taken place within Kazakhstan that has the Previously, Russia has
been given too much prominence in the republic’s domestic politics. It has been assumed to
have been a consistent force within domestic affairs since independence. Chapter 4
reappraises this relationship, and suggests that this has been over-stated because of the
historical connection, and because of the propensity for Russian specialists to become
interested in Central Asia, creating an epistemological bias within the literature that derives
from Kazakhstan’s particular position with the sub-disciplines of area studies. Russia has been
incredibly important in the Kazakh development, and the strategic culture that it now exhibits
is still tightly bound by the Soviet legacy. However, Russia’s infringement upon Kazakh
sovereignty is through the threat of military power, rather than through a more productive
economic power. It has gradually lost control of its stake within the Kazakh energy industry
and as a result, it is less able to influence politics, and only able to exert power through threats.
Kazakhstan has deliberately developed the industry specifically in a way that reduces
dependence upon Russia to improve its marginal position.
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Chapter 5 looks at the changing relationship between China and Kazakhstan. China is typically
viewed as an apolitical actor, with state controlled international energy firms operating at the
dictate of the Chinese government. So to do we normally see case studies of China acting in
resource acquisition in Africa. This study provides a useful counterpoint to this, forcing us to
question how we understand the ‘resource grabbing’ that we have come to understand in
Africa. The proximity forces us to ask how apolitical China’s energy strategy can continue to
be when it is so invested in its neighbour’s energy industry. It teaches us about the practises
of one of the world’s most important and influential actors, and how this state treats those on
its margins. From Kazakhstan’s perspective what has been lost and gained through this
changing relationship, has it been wise to trade one overbearing neighbour for another? To
what extent has Kazakhstan forced any unique practises to occur in its energy industry that
would show autonomous practises at play?
If Russia and China have been powerful, interested parties in the region, what can we say of
America and the European states? Chapter 6 seeks to understand where the promises of the
Afghan War era have taken this relationship. To what extent is there an American diplomatic
presence in the region? The remarkable WikiLeaks release of secret level Diplomatic Cables
here provide invaluable insight into the changing relationship between the states, giving
unfettered access to the opinions of the leadership and central figures in the Kazakh
government. There are technical aspects of the Kazakh energy industry that require the
presence of Western firms. However, there are different levels of engagement with Western
energy firms, and this appears to be connected to the level of transparency expected by the
host country of the energy firms that are present in the region. The Central Asian states
experience the manifestations of the Great Game most strongly through their interaction with
the Western states, so how has Kazakhstan managed this relationship?
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The thesis draws to a conclusion by considering the way forward for Kazakhstan. What has
been achieved so far by the Republic? What is hindering the development of one of the world’s
largest oil states? What lessons can be learnt from other powerful oil states? What can
marginality teach us about oil politics? To what extent has the US project in Central Asia been
a civilising mission or a true humanitarian effort? Ultimately, whilst other studies have sought
to understand Kazakh geopolitics, none has explicitly asked this question of marginality and
autonomy. It is this that makes this thesis a worthwhile endeavour and the start of a fruitful
discussion of autonomous practises in Central Asia and the FSU at a time when old power
rivalries are igniting.
28
Chapter 1
Methodology
The rise of multi-polarity and the decline of marginality are occurring across a wide range of
locations and regions; indeed, there have been examples on almost every continent. However,
by examining these trends in just one region, Central Asia, and focusing on one nation with a
particular political culture and institutional arrangements, this thesis seeks to offer some insight
into particular questions about the manner in which “small” states can subvert the discourse
of the Great Game. It therefore deliberately chooses an area-studies approach, focusing on
the particular in order to capture changing attitudes and approaches to the margin and
periphery at a local level. Limiting itself to a single case study also facilitates more detailed
consideration of specific strategies and also a degree of process tracing around recent key
events.
This thesis interests itself in the way in which groups of individuals within Kazakhstan,
relatively small in size, respond to the landscape of marginality, which is itself shifting rapidly
as a result of new economic realities focused on oil. The focus on elite interviews and micro-
level ‘thick descriptive’ accounts of individuals’ everyday experiences of the Kazakhstan
experience is an attempt to get beneath the skin of institutional attitudes and responses.
Accordingly, my methodology is grounded in work-a-day traditions of area studies, stemming
from a year spent in Kazakhstan, rather than the rarified nostrums of international relations
theory. While it sees some value in borrowing from critical security studies as first conceived,
especially its focus on the ideas of “securitization”, I am mindful of the need for methodological
innovation to capture the complexities of local forms and types of government that are
emerging in Central Asia and have sought to leverage the time-honoured traditions of area
studies to achieve this.
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Accordingly this study will employ semi-structured elite interviews with officials, former
officials, security journalists and NGOs in central Asia, and to a lesser extent the engagement
states of the USA, China and Russia. The interviews constitute the lead research function
rather than merely serving a corroborative purpose. They are important in establishing what
the key actors think about the changing nature of Central Asia, as well as their more general
attitudes, values, and beliefs towards government strategies. While it is possible to obtain
some of this information from policy documents, the emphasis on interview has allowed me to
draw out the respondents at length regarding their thoughts on key issues. It has allowed me
to ask open-ended questions and permitted the respondent to talk more freely. It is appropriate
for a project in which I wished to gather rich area studies detail about the attitudes of elites
(broadly defined) concerning the future of Kazakhstan. It is especially appropriate given that I
wished to reconstruct a number of specific events around responses to the political economy
of oil and undertake a degree of process-tracing.40
The desire to undertake a degree of process tracing not only informs the emphasis on elite
interviews in order to establish the decisions and attitudes that underpinned responses to
particular events, it also explains the decision to restrict the thesis to a single country, albeit
with multi-national comparisons in terms of its overseas relations. Within this focused inquiry,
I have been able to reconstruct specific episodes on the basis of the interview testimony and
then compare accounts to give us a sophisticated picture of particular phenomena. Elite
interviews are especially appropriate to the examination of a subject that can involve a degree
of confidentially since they can illuminate hidden elements of political action that are not clear
from analysis of political outcomes using documentary materials.41
40 Kenneth Goldstein, ‘Getting in The Door: Sampling And Completing Elite Interviews’, Political Science &
Politics, Vol.35 No.4 (2002): 669-72.
41 J.D. Aberbach and Bert A. Rockman, ‘Conducting and coding elite interviews’, Political Science & Politics,
Vol.35, No.4 (2002): 673-76.
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It also allows greater insight into the fascinating matter of nation-building. As others have
argued, the existing literature on Central Asia is fragmented and predominantly focused on
the formal, legal and informational rather than social aspects of nation-building. The emphasis
on semi-structured interviews distinguishes between formal and informal processes and seeks
to unpick some of the social patterns within organizations.42
I have therefore deployed two main methodologies, of which semi-structured interview is the
most important:
1 Semi-structured Interviews: Interviews with stakeholders that have been involved in
developing or challenging Kazakhstan’s international position. Where permitted, interviews
were recorded, transcribed and coded in order to allow a comparative analysis of the new
logics of marginality.
2 Critical Area Studies Analysis: Collection and analysis of primary (reports,
documents, legislation, policy assessments) and secondary (academic/other) materials, with
a focus on process-tracing issues of oil and political economy in the local region.
Semi-Structured Interviews
The best approach in terms of locating an appropriate methodology for any research project
must focus on the core research question. We need to ask ourselves what sort of methods
are most promising in terms of reveal the data that addresses the chosen core questions. The
methodological tradition that underpins qualitative research tends to concentrate on power:
more specifically on understanding and explaining the thoughts and behaviours of decision
makers in complex situations in which policy shift can be opaque and incremental. The main
questions that drive this research — how has Kazakhstan and its elites addressed the
42 J. Costas & C. Grey, 'Bringing Secrecy into the Open: Towards a Theorization of the Social Processes of
Organizational Secrecy', Organization Studies, Vol.35, No.10 (2014): 1423-47.
31
questions of its marginality, and what particular strategies have they used in terms of the
political economy of oil to escape great power politics — seems eminently suitable for a
qualitative research programme. Extended interviews with politicians, officials, business and
specialist journalists proved essential to understanding the complex relationships between
formal and informal policy in a country where documentation can be rather uninformative and
bland.
Answering this question requires extensive descriptions of the attitudes of elites in Kazakhstan
to Russia, China and the West, as expressed through the medium of the political economy of
oil, an analysis of the similarities and differences between these attitudes, some explanation
as to what factors might explain any discernible patterns in attitudes toward these
relationships, and most importantly, some understanding of the opinions and views of
overseers themselves. Notably, the research interviews were aimed at obtaining descriptions
of events and inter-actions, at determining the extent of an individual’s involvement in
decisions, and at evaluating the meaning of various decisions and activities. However, the
purpose of an interview is not only to obtain descriptions of the views and perspectives of
interviewees regarding a particular event or activity, but to use this as a prism into wider
notions of strategic culture.43
Self-evidently, an interview can assist researchers to understand and interpret the meaning of
a particular political event or phenomena. Given the nature of this particular research, the
decision was taken to opt for interviews that are semi-structured with some open and closed
questions allowing the interviewee to guide his account of various activities. Interview subjects,
or interviewees, were in the category of elite or specialised interviews, including former and
current government officials, diplomats, executive branch leaders as well as their aids, staff,
and staff directors.
43 Hilary Arksey and Peter Knight, Interviewing for Social Scientists: An Introductory Resource with Examples
(London: Sage Publications, 1999), p.1.
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To a great extent, semi-structured interviews do allow the interviewees to introduce their own
notions of what is relevant to the question at hand. This is, of course, the great advantage, but
the disadvantage is that the non-standardised responses then make comparisons across the
various interviews rather more difficult. Nevertheless, each interview was designed to address
broadly the same subjects and some of the same questions were addressed in each instance
to the various officials and actors. Accordingly, the task before the researcher is to define the
question and the parameters set by the presuppositions around the design of the thesis.
Therefore the majority of interview responses will come within the boundaries of the main
research question or at least one of the sub-questions. At times an interview went far beyond
the boundaries of the question, but was pursued for its own sake, becoming more a piece of
oral history, but valuable for its own sake.
In Kazakhstan elite interviewing is difficult. Many officials, in this case the majority of those
approached, do not wish to be interviewed and some will offer deliberately bland responses.
They are sometimes reluctant to reveal important information which they think might be
damaging or detrimental to the reputations of their office or section. For this reason, interviews
must be particularly diplomatic and non-aggressive. Sometimes friends, intermediaries and
letters of introduction have to be employed. Sometimes, if a subject is not available then talking
to someone who knows their views on a subject has to stand as a rather unsatisfactory
substitute. Some careful thought about the reaction of superiors to the interviewees is also
necessary. Therefore my interviews were not set up as a series of tough questions, but as an
engaging conversation between an area studies person and someone from the region who
could evoke the style of how things happen, but more importantly how geopolitical relations
were being received. These sorts of elite interviews are difficult to access and are conducted
rather differently than survey interviewing, because the main purpose of the endeavour is not
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to get a large number of interviews for comparison, but instead to collect granular attitudes
relevant to the research question.44
Where possible (and it was not always possible) to ensure accuracy and to judge how
representative the interviews are, each interview was recorded. A wide sample of views within
Kazakhstan’s executive branch was attempted to make sure that any claims about each group
are valid. Accordingly, this research relies on responses to semi-structured questions, mixed
with the area studies nexus and documentary analysis. In order to counter interviewer bias
and to allow for the elite status of the interview subjects, the interviewees’ frame of reference
was also noted. I felt it was important to capture with wider context in order to understand
where these people stand or sit on wider issues. This is because the interviews are partly
intended to assist in deciding whether the primary motivations are cultural, institutional,
individual, or international.
Area studies style interviews are by their very nature impressionistic. The reliability of this sort
of qualitative research is more authoritative than much other social science and so it will
always be regarded as problematic, partly because individual interpretation and subjective
intuition are an instinctive part of the results. Inevitably, the research cannot be as precise as
quantitative analysis using coding, statistics and mathematics. It can, however, offer insights
into more interesting and elusive questions. For this reason, it can be just as valuable as long
as the researcher remains objective, systematic, and focused on the general questions of the
thesis. Importantly, the researcher must pursue appropriate, non-leading, objective
questioning and sustain a degree of transparent thinking.
44 Lewis Anthony Dexter, Elite and Specialized Interviewing (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1970),
p.5.
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Things that need to be borne in mind during research design are of course reliability and bias,
replicability, and verification of data. Reliability is a slippery term but might best be defined as
how “reality” is measured. We need to ask ourselves constantly, does the method used for
conducting the research invalidate or bias the data in any way? Sadly some researchers can
damage or corrupt the results of their own research by asking leading questions or observing
the multiple sources of data collection that then extend false confirmation or emphasis to their
results.
One of the best antidotes is triangulation. Triangulation of sources can compensate for
inevitable weaknesses or undulations in various research methods or specific pieces of
collection. Some of the problems in interview methods stem from the imprecise and imperfect
nature of human beings and are unavoidable. Sometimes interviewees simply mis-remember
to a remarkable degree and reconstruct events from something they have read, honestly
believing it to be a memory. By the same token, memory decay, lack of candour, failure to
reveal true motivations or latent values and biases, as well as exaggerated or even false
answers on the part of the interviewee can make interview data less than ideal. Even without
this phenomenon, an interviewer’s irrelevant questions, a failure to understand the meaning
of an interviewee, or poor research design can all make interviews a poor research method.
Above all the desire to fit data into pre-existing suppositions can also result in poor interview
execution.
Theory versus Practise
There is an enormous difference between the theory and practise of interviewing. When I set
off I assumed that there would be tough times but that there would always be a way around
most problems. This was not the case. There are many different ways in which the best laid
plans can go awry and I experienced most of them on this research trip. Some were climate
based – I just didn’t want to be moving around very much in seriously sub-zero conditions with
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howling wind in a capital city resting on a completely flat Steppe which had once been known
as ‘White Death’ for good reason. Moving around a developing country with limited
infrastructure by my self was sometimes challenging, arduous and lonely. Clumsy and forgetful
at the best of times, issues with language and culture would sometimes get the better of me.
Kazakhstan is an incredibly safe country and I was never in an unsafe position or felt
threatened during my time there. I was able to move freely and did not experience harassment
beyond the odd overly persistent cab driver. There were however some uncomfortable
experiences related to interviews and situations that would have been advantageous to
participate in, but that I ultimately had to turn down. Often interview requests for coffee would
be scheduled then moved to dinner in a restaurant and then dinner at the male interviewees’
house. These offers then had to be turned down for obvious reasons. Similarly, offers to visit
the oil refineries in a helicopter involving overnight stays etc.
often did not feel quite right. I have always been safe in all my overseas travel but it is perhaps
because I have risked ‘missing out’ that I have an ‘unblemished’ good track record. This wasn’t
my first time travelling alone and I have learnt that when something doesn’t feel right, there is
seldom an advantage to testing this gut reaction.
Kazakhstan has one of the highest rates of education for women in the world. This is an
incredible achievement that has allowed some women to gain access to the work place in
many different levels of management. However, there are still gendered dimensions within the
society and for the female researcher. There were few local women that I interviewed over
the course of the research trip, and this was despite my actively trying to find women to
interview. Mostly these interviews were conducted within the conference context and
participants were in lower-graded positions than male colleagues. There are few visible
female voices in the patriarchal public and social life.
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To give an example of how the best laid plans can go awry in the field let me explain the efforts
I went to interview the Chinese energy firms in Astana. I wanted to interview the Chinese
energy firm, CNPC. I had tried to track them down at large energy conferences in Almaty but
they were not to be found and at $2000 tickets for the bigger fairs, these events were not
accessible on a researcher’s budget. I therefore decided to try and track them down via
telephone. There is, amazingly, only one phone number for CNPC on the internet and that is
to a central office in Beijing. Weeks of research yielded no other telephone number or email
addresses. The receptionist on the other end of the line speaks no English, understandably,
but this meant trying to track down a local Mandarin speaker to find a contact. After exhausting
local contact and wild goose chases, I found a friend from home to make contact and explain
the narrative to be passed on to the firm. I was then informed that they had no offices in
Kazakhstan and they weren’t really too sure what the request for a contact was related to. I
wasn’t going to give up so I made the journey by train to Astana which is relatively cramped,
long and uncomfortable in 35 degrees. Then arriving in the capital I went to the head office
there where again the receptionist did not speak English or Russian. There is a similar
scenario when I try to visit the Chinese embassy. The concept of research being conducted
for a PhD was an almost alien concept which proved to be a major stumbling block to the
process of gaining access to the firm. Finally, in a last desperate attempt I hung out in what I
was told was a Chinese restaurant frequented by CNPC staff. This was my final attempt.
Weeks had gone by and now I am standing in a restaurant appearing slightly unhinged by
asking random men if they work for an oil firm. This is one of many strange and often frustrating
examples of the interview process.
Sometimes it was not the other person or circumstances that held me back from the interview
process, sometimes it was me. I think a lot of researchers both male and female will recognise
‘imposter syndrome’ creeping into their thoughts. Often I did not feel like I was ‘doing real
research’, that I was play acting a long way from home and not really a valuable or intelligent
enough person to have been taking part in the study. There was always the model of an ‘ideal
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researcher’ that I was never quite measuring up to. Finishing the thesis has helped to resolve
some of these issues but they linger on, holding me back from undertaking new projects and
hindering my ability to reflect upon the relevance of this research to other bodies of literature.
Area Studies versus Social Science
This thesis has tried to meld an area studies approach with the social sciences, and this in
part explains the single country focus. Area studies specialists tend to prioritise a detailed,
even forensic, knowledge of a people, their culture, values and the way this impacts on their
political system. Area studies specialists tend to be multi-disciplinary not only by training but
also in spirit. Therefore, over and above understanding the politics of a region, they also seek
to embrace its history, literature, languages and above all society. While a social scientist
might feel it is entirely proper to study a society at a distance, it would be unthinkable to an
area studies specialist to work a country without immersing themselves in the society for a
prolonged period of time. Immersion is central and whatever their core discipline, area
specialists are spiritually close to ethnographers. Good research, they believe, must be based
upon time spent in the field. This has its down side and a gathering of area studies specialists
often degenerates into a competition for “authenticity” with researchers from many disciplines,
each of whom has devoted their scholarly life to work on the region, vying with each other to
show which them has gone more native. The results can, at times, be delightfully absurd.45
The obvious problem here is homogenisation. For a social scientist comparing data on the
political economy of oil in seven countries, an SME, or displaced peasant, or a family unit, is
45 Kirsten Hastr, A Passage to Anthropology: Between Experience and Theory (London: Routledge, 1995), pp.2-
9, 13-14; Amanda Coffey, The Ethnographic Self: Fieldwork and the Representation of Identity (London: Sage,
1999), pp.3-14.
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the same in all seven countries, or at least a way must be found to make it so in order for
comparative data to be operationalised. Therefore the social scientist will approach specific
data extracted from any region with alarming confidence and, some might say a degree of
deliberate ignorance. Too many questions about context render comparison increasingly
difficult. There are huge assumptions here about the extent to which political phenomena are
either specific and area-bound or else universal. This thesis has considered a comparative
approach across the different states of central Asia and has rejected this avenue for precisely
this reason. Researchers who approach the study of the far abroad as a comparative exercise
do not seek to understand region but instead seek to become masters of methodology and
rulers by regression. They seek to impress the audience of fellow social scientists, not with
the understanding of the subject, but with ever more arcane approaches and tend to sit with
those who share similar theoretical concerns rather than any profound understand of that
regions.46
Specifically in political science, Asianists are often drawn from the subfield of comparative
politics, which has changed on the corridors of universities. Area specialists, often generated
by the Cold War, for example Soviet specialists, are making way for the masters of data. Mud
on boots is less important now than an understanding of Derrida or Bourdieu. This is of course
in itself a generalisation, but the trend across Western academia is unmistakable and the
implications are important. The general drift over the last twenty years from a more Area
Studies approach to "social scientific" methods when studying regions abroad has changed
the way in which we view the world. Would American policy-makers, twenty years ago, have
been so naive as to say that democracy can be inculcated in Iraq because it has been
successfully inculcated in Indonesia?
46 Mario Luis Small, 'How to Conduct a Mixed Methods Study: Recent Trends in a Rapidly Growing Literature' ,
Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 37, No.1 (2011) pp.57-86.
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The danger is that ‘political scientists’ begin to view the world in the same way that it is viewed
by the state. Whilst this is a generalisation of the social sciences, this trend will surely
accelerate as we move into a century that has more and more quantitative data and the
temptation to compare and to make superficial judgements that lack sensitivity and cultural
depth become stronger. Moreover as the social sciences increasingly marginalise area
specialists, graduate students, whose resources are limited, increasingly shift from the study
of a region to a new role as trainers in theory and methods. When confronted by a choice
between a course in central Asian society or one in econometrics, those who are keen to
achieve professional success choose the latter, albeit with a sigh.47
There can be no doubt that the trend away from area specialisation towards generalised
political science has changed the balance of power within universities. In the distant past,
politics departments in the UK were a uniquely inter-disciplinary grouping, with their staff
spread out across area studies, philosophy, history and geography. What has changed?
Possibly, research councils, which preach inter-disciplinarity, have in practice driven a dry
approach that is increasingly about big science and big projects. This certainly explains the
declining resource base for Area Studies. Mid-career scholars now rush to master a new
vocabulary and techniques that they believe will deliver grants.48
But there are bigger issues at stake here other than money. The arguments as to whether to
use social science methodologies or anthropological approaches reflects deep tensions
between area studies programmes and social science. Historically, area specialists prize a
detailed knowledge of a people and their political systems. They are not only multi-disciplinary
and eclectic in their approach, but also value the ethnographer’s sense of the unique and the
empirical. By contrast, the over-arching aim of a social scientist is not to examine the particular
47 Jaime R. Pagán-Jiménez, 'Is all Archaeology at Present a Postcolonial One? Constructive Answers from an
Eccentric Point of View,' Journal of Social Archaeology, Vol.4, No.2 (2004), pp.200-213.
48 R. Bates, 'Area Studies and Political Science: Rupture and Possible Synthesis', Africa Today, Vol. 44, No. 2
(1997), pp.123-131.
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but to develop general explanations, often through comparison. What this actually creates for
academics is a generalisation of values and opinions. This thesis quite deliberately seeks to
examine the particular. It seeks to capture the specific and the unique, moreover it asserts
that the complexity of social terrain is lost as the result of social science imperatives that seek
to ‘copy and paste’ from one exotic landscape to another.49
49 M. Foucualt, The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discovery of Language (New York, USA: Pantheon, 1972).
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
This thesis is inherently interdisciplinary in nature. Understanding the changes that have taken
place in Kazakhstan’s cannot be captured with a single perspective. In turn, there are many
disciplines in political science that have the explanatory power to reveal previously hidden
phenomena, and in this case it is geopolitics, international political economy and energy
security that are critical. If the metanarrative of the Great Game is a tired trope and an
irrelevant/defunct explanatory tool, then we need to redress this and ask ourselves what the
current geopolitical framework reveals itself to be. This is not a search for a positivist truth, but
for a framework that better communicates the international relationships as understood and
internalised from the perspective of the Kazakh state. In doing so, the thesis corrects a gap in
the literature.
‘Marginality’ is the key geopolitical concept which this thesis will pursue to explain international
and regional interaction. As a geopolitical framework it seeks to understand how states that
exist on the periphery of larger states can become powerful actors in their own right, contrary
to the mainstream preoccupations of geopolitics and IR. Its application to Kazakhstan, of all
the Central Asian states, is a natural fit for the framework through its close spatial proximity to
Russia and China, once again reconfirming oil and gas as the fundamental driver of these
relationships. In applying this framework to Kazakhstan, this chapter creates a unique
opportunity to reveal the ability of the Kazakh state to gain autonomy in these perceived
dominant relationships.
However, there are also limits to its explanatory capabilities. Firstly, it is concerned with
international relationships, and its purpose is to suggest a criteria of tactics and strategies for
states to achieve autonomous capabilities, but does not provide a secondary framework with
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which to approach the underlying causal factors that create these ‘conditions’ for change. As
such we need to explore how these dynamics are produced through area studies knowledge
and political economy analysis.
Secondly, the marginality literature emphasis upon codifying creates a static understanding of
history and therefore fails to account for change. As a result there is a need to introduce an
explanatory device that explains the ability of states to ‘change’ and ‘perform’ marginality. This
is explored through the strategic literature which seeks to understand how cultural practises
can seemingly change and yet retain strong ties to historical practise.
With the framework for the thesis explained, the literature review goes on to trace the lineage
of area studies attempts to understand the social phenomena of Kazakhstan and Central Asia.
The literature review guides the reader through the previous questions that have driven
research and in doing so the importance of the thesis contribution to area knowledge becomes
apparent.
Geopolitics
Famously, Ó Tuathail once argued that we might rethink geopolitics using the concept of
discourse. He suggested that geopolitics might be defined as a ‘discursive practice’ by which
those interested in statecraft ‘spatialize’ international politics, focusing on particular types of
places, peoples and dramas.1 The new geopolitics does not seek to offer a strategy manual
to practitioners of statecraft or to predict the nature or timing of events. Instead, geopolitics
provides a conceptual framework that allows us to think through the geographical features
affecting international relations and challenging political interactions. While it can serve to alert
policy makers to the ramifications of their decisions and focus attention upon the changing
physical conditions that are likely to be induced in the current political framework, it is
1 G. Ó Tuathail, 'Geopolitics and Discourse: Practical Geopolitical Reasoning In American Foreign Policy',
Political Geography, Vol.11, No.2 (1992): 190-204.
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increasingly about ideas of geography as well its reality. Accordingly, Geopolitics has had to
overcome its imperial roots as a deterministic geography in order to become a more self-
aware, and more reflexive but essentially still a practical, interdisciplinary field of study. It is
defined through its construction, and as such whilst it may appear to encompass a broad range
of fields and to be generously inclusive it is, at the same time, a highly contested and sensitive
label that is located within the time and space of its production.
John Agnew has been a fierce adversary of the essentialist interpretations of geopolitics.
Agnew argues that geopolitics has been characterised by a reification of the state, an artificial
division between foreign/domestic policy and the use of territorial space as a ‘container’ for
society.2 Instead, he suggests, through the end of the Cold War, the complexity of population
movements, the information economy and new military technology, there is no longer a need
to fall into ‘territorial trap’; the diffusion between space and place began to be explored and
recognised within geography, and the state was no longer the ‘natural’ unit of analysis.3 We
should now, he continues, see the state as a series of processes in which policies are enacted
through the entity of the state.4 In doing so, critical political geography considers the
conceptualisation of the state as occurring through a series of state-making practises which
are contributed to through actors, imaginaries and cultures and reinforced by internal/external
dynamics. Furthermore, the aim is not simply to analyse the internal mechanisms of the state,
but also the external actors that contribute to the building and maintenance of the state, while
at the same time integrating what is inside and outside the state in a fluid and holistic way.
Accordingly, this creates an international, or indeed global understanding, of actors, further
blurring the boundaries of where the state begins and ends. Followed to its natural conclusion,
2 John Agnew, ‘The Territorial Trap: The Geographical Assumptions Of International Relations Theory’, Review
of International Political Economy, Vol.1, No.1, (1994): 53-80.
3 Agnew, ‘The Territorial Trap’, pp.53-80.
4 M. Kuus and J. Agnew, ‘Theorizing the State Geographically: Sovereignty, Subjectivity, Territoriality’, in K. Cox,
J. Robinson, and M. Low (eds.) The Handbook of Political Geography (London: Sage 2008), pp. 95, 117–32.
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this becomes an exploration of the production of borders, their creation and their use.5 This
critical turn has opened geopolitics to new mediums, methods and objects of study. Most
notably, through the introduction of popular geopolitics, these writers were showing the
prevalence of geopolitics in all spheres of life, from the elite to the everyday interaction, and
therefore the performative nature of geography began to be explored.6 Within the geopolitics
of Central Asia literature, as within the discipline more broadly, there has been a tendency for
writers to focus upon either the popular or the formal.7
However, while this enrichment and diversification has been valuable to the discipline it has
also created discord. Amongst the founding writers of critical geopolitics, many have
expressed concern at the direction of the discipline and its ability to serve a useful analytic
device. Geróid Ó Tuathail suggests that whilst much progress has been made, the subject has
moved off course from its original remit and one detects in his critique of more recent writings
a familiar tension between the positivist and the post-postivist:
…any serious effort to develop a more geographically responsible
geopolitics requires the supplement of regional expertise and fieldwork.
Two distinct forms of intellectual labor [have] to be connected, that of ‘big
picture’ foreign policy analysis and that of ‘regional expertise’ based upon
in-depth knowledge of a particular region or state, its scholarly literature,
and its contemporary affairs’…This is understandable in that the name of
5 See for example for discussion on nationalism and borders, conceptually and in relation to Central Asia: David
Newman, ‘Boundaries’, in J. A. Agnew, K. Mitchell and G. Ó Tuathail, (eds.) A Companion to Political
Geography, (Malden: Blackwell 2003), pp.123-137.
Nick Megoran, ‘The Critical Geopolitics of the Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzstan Ferghana Valley Boundary Dispute, 1999-
2000’, Political Geography, Vol. 23, No.6 (2004), p. 731.
6 Jason Dittmer, ‘Cold War Geopolitics’ in Jason Dittmer and Joanne Sharp (eds.), Geopolitics: An Introductory
Reader (London: Routledge, 2014), pp. 89-91.
7 Examples of the popular focus would be John Heathershaw and Nick Megoran, ‘Contesting danger: A New
Agenda For Policy And Scholarship On Central Asia’, International Affairs, Vol. 87, No. 3, (2011): 589-612.
For the more formal interpretations see for example, Alexandros Peterson and Katinka Barysch Russia, China
And The Geopolitics of Energy in Central Asia (London: Centre for European Reform, 2011).
http://www.cer.org.uk/
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the initial critical geopolitical game was the critique of power/knowledge.
Nevertheless, in eschewing the regional fieldwork found in some earlier
forms of political geography, critique was largely reactive, theoretical and
political instead of also being empirical, regional and geographically
embedded in the places preoccupying decision makers in major power
centers.8
For Ó Tuathail, critical geopolitics has removed the homogenous practises of the Cold War
era and removed geopolitics from being simply a tool of the state, but it has failed to recognise
that critical geopolitics is a form of geopolitics itself.9 Instead Ó Tuathail suggests a return to
a more localised understanding of geopolitics based upon area knowledge and the generation
of a more locally generated geopolitics, inspired by the localities and patient scholarship
grounded in the region, rather than born of a purely theoretical pursuit.
For Simon Dalby, this dissonance between the project of critical geopolitics and its current
practice can be solved through issues, rather than the locality, studied.10 Dalby suggests that
critical geopolitics had had twenty years in which to impact upon formal geopolitical discourse,
which has stubbornly retained Orientalism and empire at its core, and the status quo has
persisted. His alternative is to acknowledge the proliferation of ‘critical geopolitics’ but then
turn once again to ‘challenge the geographical reasoning’ that enabled the legitimization of
warfare.11 Nick Megoran goes further in his critique of the discipline and suggests that “critical
geopolitics can be criticised for providing a weak normative engagement with the social
8 Gearóid Ó Tuathail, ‘Localizing Geopolitics: Disaggregating Violence And Return In Conflict Regions’, Political
Geography, Vol.29, No.5, (2010), p. 257.
9 Ó Tuathail, ‘Localizing Geopolitics’, pp. 256–65.
10 Simon Dalby, ‘Recontextualising Violence, Power And Nature: The Next Twenty Years Of Critical Geopolitics?’
Political Geography, Vol.29, No.5 (2010), pp.280–88.
11 Dalby, ‘Recontextualising Violence’, pp. 282–88.
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institutions and practices of warfare.12 Acknowledging this, and moving forwards, Jennifer
Hyndman also recognises the juncture at which critical geopolitics finds itself, and instead
‘probes the possibility of a post-foundational ethic as the basis for ‘the political’ in critical
geopolitics and beyond.’13 Her solution is to look again at the cleavage between normative
and the critical geopolitics and look for devices with which to create ‘political commitments in
specific struggles’.14
These critiques and reformulations of critical geopolitics cannot be resolved here but underline
the intellectual vibrancy of the current debate around geopolitics and the excitement this is
generating. Nevertheless, close attention to these debates must condition the parameters of
this thesis. If geopolitics is to be re-reconceptualised for the next generation of scholarship it
must be mindful of the orientalising and empire-building conceptualisation hidden within the
formal geopolitical landscape; de-align the demarcation of the state boundaries; return
geopolitical objects of study to the earlier, more materially concerned subject matter; and
finally to introduce political engagement into critique. Within the ambit of these geographical
reflections however lie many inconsistencies and unanswered or unexplored avenues of
research which demand examination. How best to advance this field of inquiry? One answer,
building upon Ó Tuathail, is to look to the locality itself and, as he exhorts us, to ground
ourselves in the reality of the textured experience: in effect an appeal to embrace area
studies.15 If we move in this direction then what are the core questions affecting Kazakhstan?
What is currently having the most impact upon the Kazakh geopolitical imagination?
12 Nick Megoran, ‘Militarism, realism, just war, or nonviolence? Critical geopolitics and the problem of
normativity’, Geopolitics, Vol.13, No.4 (2008), pp. 473–97.
13 Jennifer Hyndman, ‘The Question Of “The Political” In Critical Geopolitics: Querying The “Child Soldier” In
The “War On Terror” ‘ Political Geography, Vol.29, No.5 (2010), pp.247–55.
14 Hyndman, ‘The Question Of “The Political”’, p.247.
15 James D. Sidaway, 'Geography, Globalization, and the Problematic of Area Studies', Annals of the Association
of American Geographers, Vol. 103, No.4 (2013), pp.984-1102.
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Marginality
Kazakhstan rests upon the periphery of two of the last century’s most powerful Cold War
states: the Soviet Union and Communist China. The ‘marginality’ literature provides a useful
perspective on this through its explanation of the relative position that obtains between ‘small’
states and the global centres of power. It therefore assists our understanding of the Kazakh
approach to its own position within the Great Game and Eurasian narratives, which are
typically generated by more powerful states and elite communities. Marginality helps to explain
the interactions that occur between Kazakhstan and its geographical neighbours (Russia and
China) and, furthermore, between its political neighbours (the US and Europe). Yet, even
within this narrow context it is not always clear; who is on the margin of whom? Paradoxically,
at one time or another each of these states has perceived itself in a position of marginality
relative to another state, sometimes simultaneously to each other; America to Europe, Russia
to Europe, Europe to America. In this sense, marginality, rather like size, is subjective and
somewhat relative to the situational environment, and could be measured by myriad criteria.16
Marginality, the state of being on the periphery of a central power, need not be a negative
association or problematic. Instead, it can be conceived of as a positive space to occupy as it
emphasises the ability of the ‘margin’ to impact upon the ‘center’. It is possible to conceive of
a marginal state as being akin to a free-rider within a cartel, leveraging benefits from the
relationship at relatively low cost.17 Whilst it would be tempting in this case to take a post-
colonial route to understanding Kazakhstan in Central Asia, and thereby to challenge the
‘centrality’ of Russia, instead this thesis will deploy the idea of marginality to facilitate a
different approach. It will leave Russia’s centrality intact and instead question the challenges
and impacts that Kazakhstan has made upon its former colonial power, as well as its
16 C. Browning & Pertti Joenniemi, 'Contending Discourses of Marginality: The Case of Kaliningrad', Geopolitics,
Vol. 9, No.3 (2004), pp.699-730.
17 Stephen W. Salant, 'Exhaustible Resources and Industrial Structure: A Nash-Cournot Approach to the World
Oil Market', Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 84, No.5 (1976), pp.1079-1094.
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relationship with new regional actors including China and the US, because they form part of
the alternative narrative of change in Kazakhstan. In this way, the study of Kazakhstan
contributes to our deeper understanding of not only of a seldom discussed region of the world,
but also to the knowledge of the central power states of Eurasia themselves, and perhaps
even International Relations more broadly.
Marginality is an area of study that belongs to the geopolitics literature, and as such it is
focused upon understanding the origins and ramifications of how we shape space on the
periphery. Its origins lie within the universal geopolitics literature that emerged from the critical
turn which Yves Lacoste and Peter Taylor developed within this sub-discipline during the
1970s and 1980s.18 However, it was during the 1990s that critical geopolitics began to develop
greater sophistication and complexity, driven by the wider cultural turn in the social sciences
that was in part a product of the end of the Cold War.19 The cultural turn was also marked by
by a growing dissatisfaction with behaviourist and postivist approaches and a search for more
interpretive modes of inquiry that were reflexive, open-ended and innovative in their theoretical
foundations.20 This new perspective seeks to present a fractured perception of reality, and
challenge the state dominance of geopolitics, reengineering its focus upon a more ‘everyday’
geopolitics. John Agnew and Geróid Ó Tuathail in particular strove to challenge the old
orthodoxy and the power structures that were implicit within the state-centric model using the
influential work of Robert Cox on historical structures and their role within world order.21 This
18 Yves Lacoste, ‘Editorial: Les Geographes, L'Action et la Politique’, Herodite, Vol.33, (1984), pp.3-32;
P. Taylor, Political Geography (Harlow: Longman Scientific and Technical, 1989).
19 Jessica C. E. Gienow-Hecht, ‘Shame on U.S.? Academics, Cultural Transfer, and the Cold War: A Critical
Review’, Diplomatic History, Vol.24, No.3 (2000), pp.465-494.
20 Trevor J. Barnes, 'Retheorizing Economic Geography: From the Quantitative Revolution to the “Cultural
Turn”', Annals of the Association of American Geographers, Vol.91, No.3, (2001), pp.546-65.
21 G. Ó Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics. (London: Routledge, 1996); R. Cox,Social Forces, ‘States and World Orders:
Beyond International Relations Theory’, Millenium, Vol.10, No.1 (1981), pp.126-55; J. Agnew, Geopolitics: Re-
visioning World Politics (London: Routledge, 2003).
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more critical approach provided a welcome critique of classical geopolitics, addressing its
weaknesses while providing an emancipatory alternative.22
Meanwhile, feminist geopolitical writers, such as Dowler, Gilmartin and Hyndman, rather than
simply highlighting the inadequacies of classical geopolitics as critical writers have tended to
do, instead worked to produce a new perspective that stood well apart from traditional
geopolitics.23 Here, the demarcations between political spaces are obscured to produce more
complex understandings of interaction, rather than engaging with the classical framework of
the critical writers. This performs a more radical deconstruction of the top-down approaches
that have hitherto been offered, but also presents us with a normative model.
Marginality, is itself a marginal discipline of geopolitics and as such many of the same debates
are replicable here. Classically, there has been a presumption that to be a marginal state is
to be situated away from the centre, to be in a position of disenfranchisement, to be in need
of escape.24 Here, power is attributed to the centre, and the margin is perhaps better
understood as a periphery, rather than simply a locus of a different conceptualisation of
power. Noel Parker neatly summarises this perspective by arguing that this thinking has been
generated through the common position of writers as remarkably diverse as Tilly, Foucault,
Wallerstein and Lefebvre. He suggests that in each of these positions ‘something - a
sovereign will, the state the market – has been imagined at the center, extending outwards
to engulf the space on its periphery’.25
22 Phil Kelly, 'A Critique of Critical Geopolitics', Geopolitics Vol. 11, No.1 (2006), pp.24-53.
23 L. Dowler, ‘And They Think I'm Just a Nice Old Lady’, Gender, Place and Culture, Vol.5, No.1 (1998), pp.159-
176; M. Gilmartin, & E. Kofman, Critically Feminist Geopolitics’, in L. Staeheli, E. Kofman, & L. Peake, (eds.)
Mapping Women, Making Politics (London: Routledge, 2004); J. Hyndman, ‘Mind the Gap: Bridging Feminist and
Political Geography. Political Geography’, Vol.23, No.3 (2004), pp.307-22.
24 Browning & Joenniemi, ‘Contending Discourses of Marginality’, p.700.
25 Noel Parker, A Theoretical Introduction: Space, Centers, and Margins in (ed.) Noel Parker, The Geopolitics of
Europe’s Identity: Centers, Boundaries and Margins, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). p. 6.
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However, we also need to note that, as Parker suggests, through the cultural turn that has
affected geopolitics and IR more broadly, the question has now changed somewhat. The
issue before us is increasingly how best to understand the ‘exact relationship between
territorial ‘centres’ and what lies on the edges of their territory; hence the need to pursue a
geometry of centers and margins”.26 Here Parker fragments the formal boundaries and
negative positioning between states, reclaiming a stronger position for the marginal state
relative to the centre power.
Marginality in this form has found a home on the cusp of the ‘border studies’ literature, by
providing much needed insight into the space-time of borders.27 In turn borders help
marginality to find the location of the margins and offer us some indications of how to
understand how possibility and potential can manifest itself in a space where transgression
and resistance are often present. Marginality in this sense is related to geometry in as much
as it represents an arrangement of objects and parts. Unless there is “perfect equality
between entities, some of the positions in the geometry and around them will be central and
some will be marginal.”28. Within the marginality literature there is an extensive
debate/discussion on how far this approach should be pushed.
Therefore, for Christopher Browning, there is a fluidity missing in Parker’s conceptualisation
of the margin; accordingly he argues that it remains rigid despite its inquisitory nature:
26 Noel Parker, ‘A Theoretical Introduction: Space, Centers, and Margins’, in Noel Parker, (ed.) The Geopolitics
of Europe’s Identity: Centers, Boundaries and Margins, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), p. 6.
27 Noel Parker and Nick Vaughan-Williams, ‘Lines in the Sand? Towards and Agenda for Critical Border Studies’,
Geopolitics, Vol.14, No.3 (2009), pp.582-587.
28 Noel Parker, ‘A Theoretical Introduction: Space, Centers, and Margins’ in (ed.) Noel Parker, The Geopolitics of
Europe’s Identity: Centers, Boundaries and Margins (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008). p. 4.
51
Despite Parker’s positive understanding of marginality, Parker actually shares
with modernism a sociological preoccupation with defining, fixing and
categorising just what the attributes of margins are. In contrast, we adopt a
post-structuralist discursive and more fluid approach. Instead of trying to
define what is and is not a margin, or what capacities and opportunities
margins do or do not possess as a category, we take ‘margin’ to be a
discursive concept, the meanings attached to which are constantly open to
challenge and change.”29
Yet, precisely because this thesis is not trying to produce a post-structural account of the
‘problem’ of Kazakhstan, Parker’s work proves to be rather more useful to the thesis, even if
Parker himself would not necessarily acknowledge the tensions that Browning has uncovered
in his work. Parker is engrossed in the extensive project of the wider understanding and
interpretation that post-structuralism embraces, but like Yves Lacoste before him, he walks up
to the gates without entering, perhaps sensing uncomfortably what lies within? In the same
way that Lacoste is criticised for ultimately producing a defence of normative principles within
geography, both writers learn from their journey, working within this understanding whilst still
creating a geographic concept with decision-making capabilities.30 It is the ‘defining, fixing and
categorising’ that Parker shares in common with Lacoste that proves so beguiling and that
ultimately informs this thesis.31
29 Christopher Browning & Pertti Joenniemi, ‘Contending Discourses of Marginality: The Case of Kaliningrad’,
Geopolitics, Vol.8, No.9 (2004), p.700.
30 R. Woodward, ‘From Military Geography To Militarism's Geographies: Disciplinary Engagements With The
Geographies of Militarism and Military Activities’, Progress in Human Geography, Vol.29, No.6 (2005), pp.718-
740.
31 J. Fall, ‘Lost Geographers: Power Games And The Circulation Of Ideas Within Francophone Political
Geographies’, Progress in Human Geography, Vol.31, No.1 (2007), pp.195-216.
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As such, the ‘center’ that is used here is the definition that Parker provides and provides the
foundation for our understanding between Kazakhstan and its neighbouring states. The center
is distinguishable by, or what makes a center ‘at’ the center, ‘is their capacity to organize space
around them to enclose other entities’.32 Going on to define the margin through the idea of the
center, Parker continues to suggest that ‘any capacity has its limits, however, and the margin
is where the center’s ordering capacity begins to ebb.’33 Here it is the ability, rather than the
necessity, to exercise power, that constitutes the key component of this understanding of
margin-center relations. This, in turn, allows what we might think of as a looser understanding
of the relationship between the center and the margin, and re-establishes the relationship
between the two without returning to the classical negative interpretation of this dynamic.
As part of this interest in more nuanced classification, Parker has codified the practises of the
margin state. He identifies seven tactics that the margin state can utilise in order to induce
positive marginality, aspects of which are clearly observable in the case of Kazakhstan, and
indeed also visible in its desire to shift from one center to the next.34
1. Obtaining loyalty rewards – The marginal state benefits from the centre by not
moving to another centre. This is not something that can be discerned in the Kazakh strategy.
Kazakhstan has not positioned itself as the loyal companion of Russia, and increasingly has
displayed opposition to Russia’s perception of the ‘Near Abroad’. This resistance is explored
in Chapter 4.
2. Obtaining intermediation rewards – Here the marginal state becomes important
through its role as an intermediator or interlocutor between other states/regions. This is not
32 Noel Parker, ‘A Theoretical Introduction: Space, Centers, and Margins’, in Noel Parker (ed.), The Geopolitics
of Europe’s Identity: Centers, Boundaries and Margins (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008). p. 8.
33 ibid., pp.8-9.
34 ibid., pp.13-14.
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something that Kazakhstan has achieved, though there is substantial evidence for its attempts
to cultivate this relationship. Chapter 5 on Kazakh-Western states relations examines the
breakdown/ downgrading of these relationships and asks what role Kazakhstan can now fulfil
that will engage their interests in the center.
3. Competing for rewards – This is somewhat similar to no. 2 (above), but with the
addition of competing with other states for the role of intermediary, such as Finland’s claim to
being able to facilitate dialogue with Russia. Kazakhstan has sought to utilise this position,
seeking to become the ‘voice’ of Central Asia. Chapter 3, Strategy, considers this in the
context of how Kazakhstan has taken on a ‘crossroads of civilisation’ narrative.
4. Playing one centre off against another – The aim of this strategy is to create an
auction of benefits. Whilst Kazakhstan has not achieved this in a direct sense, the increased
interest in Kazakhstan following large scale Chinese investment in the region suggests that
there has been an awakened sense of competition – much to the benefit of Kazakhstan. What
is more difficult to calculate is whether this has been a deliberate strategy on the part of the
state or an externality of China’s interest. This question returns intermittently throughout the
thesis, but is explored in depth within Chapter 6 on China. To what extent is this a ‘balancing
strategy’ and to what extent is this simply a strategy or expedience that involves eating from
what’s available at the time?
5. Manifest emulation – Here, the margin state seeks to emulate the characteristics of
the centre power to appear more appealing and familiar in order to attract
investment/opportunity. Kazakhstan has definitely paid much attention to the Western media
game, and has spent considerable sums to make itself appear palatable to the West.
Examples include the addition of Tony Blair’s Public Relations team to improve its image
overseas. This is explored in chapter 3 in the context of strategy and throughout the other
chapters as a recurring theme in which Kazakhstan tries to appear as the perfect partner for
whomever it negotiates with.
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6. Rent-seeking – Here is the possibility that a state seeks payment for moving in or
out of a state’s periphery. Kazakhstan does not seem to emulate this behaviour, beyond its
obvious desire to indulge in rent-seeking behaviour more generally.
7. Guaranteeing order – This tactic is designed to act as the guarantor of security for
the centre state by suggesting it can control the edges of the centre’s political space. This is
interesting the context of Kazakhstan because traditionally Russia has presented itself as the
‘guarantor’ of stability in Central Asia for Europe and the US. In the past, in the immediate
aftermath of September 11th, Russia used this ability to ground its relationship with the US.
Kazakhstan, in its role as the most affluent of the states has sought to take on this function to
a certain extent but lacks the military or economic influence to be able to adequately perform
this supposedly/perceivably important range of duties.
Accordingly, even a cursory survey suggests that Kazakhstan has used many of the tactics of
Parkers theory of marginality. What will be drawn out repeatedly and throughout the thesis is
the ways in which Kazakhstan has fulfilled/ partially fulfilled/ used these tactics in order to
overcome the negative connotations of its marginality, and the consciousness implicit within
these choices. However, there are some difficulties entailed in Parkers codification of power
behaviours which the case of Kazakhstan simultaneously helps to uncover. There is an
assumption of power symmetry or uniformity within these classifications that ignores the
differences between the types of power that the centre holds. In Kazakhstan, in its ambition to
move between centers, there is a difference between the types of power that the centers, in
this case Russia and China, exude. Most commentators agree that Russia has the military,
aggressive power base, whilst the nominally apolitical China instead confers an economic
power dynamic.35
35 Shaun Breslin, ‘Understanding China's Regional Rise: Interpretations, Identities And Implications'
International Affairs, Vol.85, No.4 (2009), pp.817–35.
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Again Parker helps us to understand the internal manifestations of marginality; how does
Kazakhstan perceive/internalise its marginality? Using Parker’s analysis of marginal identity
we can ascertain that; Kazakhstan is passively in a marginal position through its geographical
and political location, it consciously acknowledges this position, is aware of the potentiality of
this position and uses them to an advantage.36 Furthermore, Kazakhstan sees the potential to
redefine the received patterns of its experiences from the centers and is aware of the need to
redefine itself in terms of the very idea of the centre, even if it cannot fully realise these
achievements. Kazakhstan’s marginality is open to modification.
Parker goes on to discuss the further potentialities that are available once the margin’s identity
is understood, and create a list of identity strategies.37 If the centre and the margin act upon
the way in which shared/ unilateral understandings of marginal identity are understood - then
the identities of both actors are altered. Therefore we can identify and examine a series of
‘expressions’ of marginality and identity through the discourse and actions of the state.
Table 2.1 Expressions of Marginality
1 Asserting relative autonomy on the margin – The greater the extent to which a state
can be said to be autonomous, the greater the extent to which the state, in this case
Kazakhstan, can be to utilise the tactics described above.
36 Parker asserts that there is a six part scale to understanding the basic identification of being considered a
margin; I – Being in a marginal position; II – Seeing oneself in a marginal position; III – Being conscious of
potentialities that are implicit in being marginal; IV – Using those potentialities to advantage; V – On the basis of
one’s marginality seeing a potential to redefine received patterns and; VI – including other’s identities in such a
redefinition. Taken from Noel Parker, ‘A Theoretical Introduction: Space, Centers, and Margins’, in (ed.) Noel
Parker, The Geopolitics of Europe’s Identity: Centers, Boundaries and Margins (New York: Palgrave Macmillan,
2008), p. 15.
37 Noel Parker, ‘A Theoretical Introduction: Space, Centers, and Margins’, in Noel Parker, (ed.) The Geopolitics of
Europe’s Identity: Centers, Boundaries and Margins (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). p. 15.
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2 Competitive emulation – This implies that the marginal state adopts some of the
identity traits of the center in order to enter into competition with the center.
Kazakhstan can be understood as emulating through the stickiness of the historical
institutionalised connection between the Russia and itself, but this is not present with
China or the Western states
3 Developing oneself as an alternative center - The aim of this identity is to enhance
the margins position through creating uncertainty as to the future capabilities of the
center.
4 Legitimising oneself by difference – Here the marginal state assumes an identity
based upon being different to the center. Kazakhstan performs this to a certain extent
with China, vis-a-vis Russia.
5 Redefining others – Marginal states take on this identity to determine their own
identity via anothers, and in this sense is parasitic and destructive to the center.
Examples of this would be the changing Russian identity to Europe.
These two paths, tactics and identity, to understanding and interpreting margin states presents
a positive understanding of marginality. They represent a series of strategies and action-
reaction cycles that can be enacted by the states and help to understand the positions and
possibilities that a marginal state can undertake. This theoretical list provides a starting point
with which to examine the nature of marginality in Kazakhstan. It does not serve as the basis
for a complete explanation of the development of the young nation, nor should marginality be
seen as the sum of Kazakhstan’s development trajectory or its identity politics. Instead this
framework helps to shape and provide direction, in conjunction with the strategy, geopolitics
and energy literature to understand how a small nation can operate amongst great powers.38
38 Kent E. Calder, The New Continentalism: Energy and Twenty-First-Century Eurasian Geopolitics (Yale: Yale
University Press, 2012).
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To conclude this section, Parker, and the marginality literature as a whole, tells stories about
the construction of the international and regional environment. Parker’s core contribution is
that he acknowledges and codifies the ways in which marginal states are able to influence the
centres of power. In doing so he has uncovered the complexity of the relationship between
the boundaries of the state, borders and territory. He has clearly shown that borders and
territory are not only constructed by central powers, but that there is a symbiotic system that
exists beyond these binary distinctions. Kazakhstan, as a margin state has influenced the
construction and understanding of its political spaces, it has not all been the work of centre-
born power. It is the realities of how this has been achieved, and the extent to which this has
been a conscious choice of the state, industry and civilian population that this thesis seeks to
understand. How has a small nation manoeuvred itself in this power relationship, what has it
influenced in these centers of power, what has it gained and lost, how far can it use the
potentiality of its position?
This framework has its lens of analysis firmly fixed upon the metanarrative which is its greatest
strength but also its weakness. Marginality allows us to understand ‘what’ is occurring, but
doesn’t provide us with a toolkit for understanding ‘how’ this outcome has been achieved. We
must go elsewhere for explanatory tools, which allow a plurality of approaches to interact with
its framework, broadening its applicability. For this thesis, the space that marginality creates
allows us to explore political economy ‘solutions’ through the study of the energy industry in
application to Central Asia.
However, this approach is problematic precisely because it focuses upon creating a codified
set of principles which effectively creates a hidden tautology: though the framework sets out
to display previously hidden and fluid power dimensions it cannot easily account for change
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within its static presentation of the status quo. The rigidity of the structure created by the tactics
and strategies creates a ‘snapshot’ effect in which the referent object is considered to be part
of a rational actor model. This problematically creates a linear understanding of history and
indeed progress as being inevitable and, importantly, rationally created and enacted in the
best interests of the actor. This gives the impression that marginality, either as a tool of the
state or as an explanatory device, is able to be analysed in a decontextualized context, leaving
change unaccounted for. Therefore, an additional explanatory function within marginality to
explore how change occurs we can look for literatures that consider the necessity of change
within strategy through the literature of Strategic Culture.
Strategic Culture
Strategic culture, in its current fourth generation form, acts as an independent variable to
explain how power subverts institutional decision-making and strategic capability.39 It is
fundamentally a lens with which to examine gaps between state rhetoric and the emerging
reality, to create a theory of process of how critical players such as political elites, parties and
institutional power struggles construct and interact with norms.40 As a result, the strategic
culture literature provides a neat counterpoint and connection between the meta-narrative
concerns of marginality, which are focused upon an internationally driven agenda, and allows
a practical method of understanding how change can occur within a policy making context to
be explored. It is not enough to understand the relationship between Kazakhstan and ‘Great
Power’ states; we must understand the extent to which these changes have been strategically
planned, the extent to which they are ‘accidents’ and the methods that have been developed
to create this current geopolitical position. How can we account for change?
39 Michael Desch, ‘Culture Clash: Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security Studies’, International Security,
Vol.23, No.1 (Summer 1998) pp.141-170.
40 Alex Burns & Ben Eltham, ‘ Australia’s Strategic Culture: Constraints and Opportunties in Security Policy
Making’, Contemporary Security Policy, Vol.35, No. 2, pp.194.
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Studying Kazakhstan not only returns us to the very origins of strategic culture by attempting
to understand what remains of a ‘Soviet strategic culture’ and what has become of the new
‘Kazakh strategic culture’, but it also develops this oldest tradition with the fresh new eyes of
a modern and innovative international relations theory. What makes this study different to the
earlier case studies of the discipline is the short to medium-term timeframe that Kazakhstan
has been independent. Whilst a lot of strategic cultural studies has been very much concerned
with the long-term, historical analysis (in the classic strategic texts of Johnston this is for
hundreds of years of Chinese strategy), here we only have thirty-three years of independence
to get excited about.41 It is important to ensure that this thesis avoids some of the pitfalls of
earlier research – namely that strategic culture is assumed to be too coherent; have too much
continuity; and lacking in critical reflection. Classically, strategic studies has been concerned
firstly with political-military strategy, war and conflict and secondly with a realist understanding
of the state ruling above its population and confronting the anarchic international order,
particularly when it infringes upon domestic sovereignty.42
The relevance of strategic culture to this thesis and our understanding of the power potential
of the Kazakh energy industry is formed in multiple ways. Most simply, oil is a strategic
commodity. Its combination of everyday consumption, exposure to global market pricing, its
wealth-making capabilities and transnational transportation make oil a uniquely valuable
commodity. It may not be a military weapon but the energy industry is the single most important
tool that Kazakhstan has to manipulate its political position and is its leverage in interactions
with China and Russia, beyond its strategic location. It has no independent military to speak
of which is independent of either the president or Russia, as discussed later in the thesis.
41 Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1995).
42 Ann Swidler, ‘Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies.’ American Sociological Review Vol.51, No.2 (1986),
p.284.
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Therefore there is a high strategic value placed upon oil by not only an individual state but
also the population and international community. Oil and war have a close and repetitive
historical relationship; the Chaco War between Bolivia and Paraguay; the oil campaigns of
World War II; the Iran-Iraq War; the Gulf War; the Iraq War; Conflict in the Niger Delta; and
the Sudan-South Sudan Border Conflict are all examples of the speed and alacrity with which
oil can begat conflict. Kazakhstan has been lucky enough to avoid the resource curse, and its
thirty years of independence has not brought conflict, but it has experienced tensions that the
natural resource has created both within the Kazakh state apparatus and with its external
relationship with Russia.43
Let us consider the broader approach to methodology in understanding the strategic culture
of Kazakhstan. In the early stages of the discipline the emphasis was to move beyond the
mono-culture of realist explanations of inter-state interactions and to explore the varieties of
strategic culture. Scholarship of strategic studies has been dominated in last decade by the
debate between the positivist Alistair Johnston and interpretivist Colin Gray.44 Johnston
belongs to the first generation of scholars to respond to the call for individualisation in strategic
thinking through divergence from norm behaviours.45 He did not treat culture as an
independent variable, nor as a causational tool, but rather cited culture as the cause of
strategic behaviours rather than actions per say. Johnston used a longitudinal study of
Chinese grand strategy to describe patterns of behaviour as being a school of Chinese realism
43 Luong & Weinthal, ‘Oil Is Not a Curse: Ownership Structure and Soviet Successor States’, p.10.
44 The debate can be summarised as Colin S. Gray, ‘Strategic Culture As Context: The First Generation Of
Theory Strikes Back’, Review of International Studies, Vol.25, No.1 (1999), pp.49-69; Alastair Iain Johnston,
‘Strategic Cultures Revisited: Reply to Colin Gray’, Review of International Studies, Vol.25, No.3 (1999), pp.519–
23; Stuart Poore, ‘What is the Context? A Reply to the Gray-Johnston Debate on Strategic Culture’, Review of
International Studies, Vol.29, No.2 (2003), pp. 279–84; Edward Lock, ‘Refining Strategic Culture: Return of the
Second Generation’, Review of International Studies, Vol.36, No.3, (2010), pp.685-708; Alan Bloomfield, ‘Time
to Move On: Reconceptualizing the Strategic Culture Debate’, Contemporary Security Policy, Vol.33, No.2
(2012), pp.437-461.
45 Alastair Iain Johnston, ‘Thinking about Strategic Culture’, International Security, Vol. 19, No. 4 (1995), pp.32-
64
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that had been in practise throughout China’s history.46 However, as Alan Bloomfield is right to
point out, this recreates the problem of too much ‘continuity’, leaving no room for there to be
change at all to the strategic culture – as soon as one exception is found to the rule, then the
model crumbles as Bloomfield shows with his analysis of Maoism.47
The constructivist turn of Colin Gray, corrects this problem. Instead of the positivist its attempts
to quantitatively measure and weight ideas against material variables, this ideational turn in
the literature ideas act as ‘intervening variables to provide meaning to material independent
variables’.48 This contextual reading understands strategic culture to be a component of
strategic behaviour and yet also the by-product of strategic behaviour. Or as Colin Gray
himself acknowledges, ‘culture is everywhere and… in a practically researchable sense,
nowhere’.49 Bloomfield here again steps in to correct the tautology. This strategic cultural
model rules out human agency through its emphasis on the coherence of cultures role in
affecting behaviour. If culture determines the context, how can differences be created?
Bloomfield prioritises the need to recognise human agency and the independent effect of
material variables such as geography.50 If we were to attempt to correct the problems created
by too much continuity and too much coherence in our preparation of strategic culture we
would be confronted by a continuously ebbing and flowing interpretation of strategic culture,
providing too little consistency with which to attach IR theory to. We know that this is not an
ideal position because, despite argument over its nature, culture exists. Instead to get around
46 Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1995).
47 Alan Bloomfield, ‘Time to Move On: Reconceptualizing the Strategic Culture Debate’, Contemporary Security
Policy, Vol.33 (2012) p.444.
48 ibid., p.445.
49 Colin Gray, ‘Strategic Culture as Context: The First Generation of Theory Strikes Back’, Review of
International Studies, 25:1 (1999), pp. 49–69.
50 Alan Bloomfield, ‘Time to Move On’, p.448.
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this problem we can take the position that ‘culturally situated humans (including strategic
decision-makers) approach challenges and opportunities of the external environment with
some degree of culturally unique interpretative bias’.51 Social context when understood from
the position of the decision maker is the weight that that is assigned to the variable material.
The weight, the importance of a given piece of information, of how it is interpreted is what
defines strategic culture. Bloomfield gives a useful analogy of the gun to help define strategic
culture as how we view a gun depending upon who holds it.
[A] gun does have some inherent meaning – it is an object that kills,
unlike a water-pistol – but its full meaning is only clear when the social
context it is being used in is determined. Put in terms of international
politics, if one state considers another a ‘friend’ and that other state is
close (the geography variable), powerful (relative power) and
advanced (technologically) then the first state will feel generally
reassured. But when a ‘foe’ is close, powerful and advanced, this is
likely to elicit apprehension and perceptions of threat.’52
In a bid to create an understanding of strategic culture that allows for change and
inconsistency Bloomfield uses the work of sociologists and psychologists to support his
methodology, using the concept of cognitive schemas to conceptualise the various
subcultures and groups that are present within the state apparatus competing for influence
and power. Which subculture have been in control can be observed through the policy choices
of the state over a given period of time. At the beginning of any decision the most cultural of
the strategic decisions – defining states as friend or foe, can be recognized through the speech
51 ibid., p.449.
52 ibid., p.450.
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acts of the state. In the case of Kazakhstan, as we shall see throughout, there is a marked
difference between the public speeches of President Nazarbayev towards different states and
the policy options that follow. Understanding the international-social context helps develop the
understanding of strategic culture beyond these initial judgements. What are the technical
details that form part of this decision; perceived cultural similarity, historical agreements and
past behaviours etc of states. The technical strategies and options that are then presented as
reactions to both the domestic and international environments begin to show how different
subcultures form within the state apparatus. These strategic subcultures contain an integrated
mix of ‘social /cultural and material/technical concepts’.53 The point of the development of
subcultures within the methodology of strategic culture is to find compromise between the
positions of Gray and Johnston. Gray gives us the idea that culture provides the contextual
interpretation, and Johnston allows us to build towards a falsifiable standpoint. At this point,
strategic culture becomes something more relevant to policy to build towards understanding
possible future outcomes. This is not to suggest that an accurate future can be predicted, but
rather that a series of possible outcomes can be factored into present understanding.
What does this methodology review of the literature teach us? That any method of
understanding strategic culture must avoid the considerable tautologies that lurk in the depths
of IR theory to include space for competing subcultures. This is more than a neat analysis
designed to avoid tautologies, it is instead a formula that as Bloomfield points out, is most
closely replicated by cultural and behaviour psychologists; it most closely resembles the
human decision making process that we are fundamentally trying to conceptualise and
extrapolate from in order produce meaningful results. If there is a fault in Bloomfield’s work, it
is created by the paradigm with which he emerges himself within and one that this seeks to
speak to. He synthesises the ‘correct’ understanding of strategic culture as being a ‘weak
53 ibid., p.453.
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interpretivist model’, which aims to overcome the positivist tropes without altering the lens with
which it views the problem. This is to say, his vision is still very much concerned with a singular
direction of learning and influence, in which the state is responsible for shaping policy choices,
without acknowledging how the state is affected by and learns from its policy choices. It is this
understanding of the causal relationship as a behavioural and strategic change between the
states experience and its policy choices that are fundamental to conceptualising strategic
culture.
Like Bloomfield, Edward Lock seeks to move the debate beyond the oscillation between
Johnston and Gray’s positions. For Lock, the key problem with the Gray-Johnston debate is
not in the tautologies that Bloomfield draws to attention. It lies in the need to not only
understand how strategic culture gives meaning to strategic behaviour (as Gray does) but
goes further to try and understand how changes occur in the actors engaged in strategic
behaviours.54 He draws to attention the work of Bradley Klein (who is clear in his dismissal of
both Gray and Johnston) and uses his analysis of American strategic culture to emphasise
the reciprocal nature of learned behaviour and how this forms state identity.55 And so it is that
the present developments in strategic culture studies have provided the clearest methodology
so far with which to engage with the study of strategy in cultural context. Through Bloomfield’s
synthesis of the Gray-Johnston debate, taking the best of both arguments and using an
understanding based upon competing subcultures to overcome continuity/consistency
tautologies we have a clearer methodology with which to begin to approach the complexities
of modern Kazakh strategic cultures post-transition. Using the revival of the second generation
scholarship of Bradley Klein, Edward Lock has drawn attention to the over-reliance upon
54 Edward Lock, ‘Refining Strategic Culture: Return of the Second Generation’, Review of International Studies,
Vol.36, No.3 (2010) pp.685-708
55 For Klein’s treatment of Colin Gray in particular see Bradley Klein, ‘Hegemony and Strategic Culture:
American Power Projection and Alliance Defence Politics’, Review of International Studies, Vol.14, No.1 (1988)
pp.133-48, p.139. For the best articulation of Klein’s position see Bradley S. Klein, Strategic Studies and World
Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p.4.
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realist understandings of the state within the earlier scholarship to reimagine the reciprocal,
immersive nature of the relationship between policy and actors.
To turn the analytical lens of strategic culture in upon itself, it is worth noting that there is
indeed a strategic culture of academia. As Colin Gray notes in a more recent article, the
enthusiasm for cultural study may soon fade both because of fashions for policy makers and
theorists alike and because new explanatory frameworks will more accurately explain the
impending zeitgeist.56 In the age of cultural IR, he argues that we must hope that ‘when this
occurs ‘some nuggets of lasting value will be left on our intellectual and institutional beaches’.57
Because strategic culture creates an understanding of actor behaviour in a framework that
encapsulates the human decision-making process we are able to use it to reconnect the meta-
narrative of marginality with the micro-level area studies analysis. This helps to create a more
rounded explanation that incorporates macro, meso and micro levels of understanding. These
distinctions are of course artificial, and not to be treated as inherently discrete properties, but
more as guidance for understanding ‘problems’ in their whole, much as Lacoste advises.
Furthermore, because strategic culture allows for a sense of continuity and change we can
begin to appreciate that through the transition between Soviet to post-Soviet there will remain
a lasting legacy but also in parallel there will be the emergence of new strategic practises. As
the thesis moves between large strategic narratives, Eurasianism in the next chapter, and
detailed country and industry specific chapters (e.g. chapter 3 on Kazakhstan’s energy
industry), strategic culture helps to connect these two layers of analysis.
56 Colin S. Gray, ‘Out of the Wilderness: Prime Time for Strategic Culture’, Comparative Strategy, Vol.26, No.1,
(2007), pp.1-20.
57 ibid., p.4.
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Central Asia
The birth of the Republic of Kazakhstan spurred a flurry of writing on the new era of
independence. Whilst those from outside areas studies have tended to emphasise a generic
Great Game narrative, the area studies community have looked to explore and explain the
unique. In the early years after the fall of the Soviet Union, area studies writers sought to pick
up the threads of the newly emerging identities, often highlighting the struggle between the
pre-Russian and Soviet identities, looking for signs continuity or change between them. In fact,
understanding what it means to be Kazakhstani, or Kyrgyz, or Uzbek, has been a consistent
and pervasive theme over the last twenty-five years of scholarship. This first generation of
geopolitical writing after independence was quick to test theories of international relations
against this newly created region. Banuazizi and Weiner suggested that the breakup of
empires would lead to conflict between the successor states, using the Ottoman Empire and
Austro-Hungarian Empire as examples from which we might learn.58 Mehrdad Haghayeghi
emphasised the role of Islam in shaping the society and the future of international and regional
relations, debating the potential role of religious violence in the southern CIS states.59 What
has persisted since this initial generation of writing is the apparent stubbornness of the Central
Asian states to fit neatly into the existing theories; they often become the exception that proves
the rule. As a result, over the years, many authors have been too eager to foresee the
imminent failure of the region.
Research on Central Asia has changed as new inter-disciplinary perspectives have come
through from neighbouring subjects and cognate areas of research, bending and shaping the
way we interpret the region. As is fitting for an area studies approach, the changing pace of
life in Central Asia has altered the subject matter considered by the literature. As would be
expected, the writers over-lap and extend beyond generational boundaries and classifications,
58Banuazizi and Weiner, The New Geopolitics of Central Asia and its Borderlands (London: I.B. Tauris, 1995).
59Mehrdad Haghayeghim, Islam and Politics in Central Asia (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1995).
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nevertheless there are some broad demarcations that present a useful device for
categorisation and analysis. The scholarship can be broadly conceived of as having moved in
waves: from transition; then to balancing; and then to identity and reconnection:
Transition in Central Asia
The post-independence scholarship, from the mid-1990s onwards, can be divided into trends.
Initially the focus was upon the transition and potential of the region. There was a clear need
to try to understand what kind of regimes would be generated through independence, and to
understand the different factors that would influence the choices of these states as they
developed unique identities.60 Oliver Roy sought to understand the rhythms of continuity and
change through the horde/ clan system that was prevalent in the pre-Soviet era.61 He
understood the direction of transition in Central Asia through the role of the clan and tribe in
shaping the development of socialism in the region and as generating a stronger form of loyalty
than the nation state in the independence era.62 Henry Hale tried to understand why the FSU
states had not all experienced conflict in the decade after independence, looking for
differences between the regimes that might explain the new emerging regional order.63
Martha Brill Olcott, one of the leading writers on Central Asia for more than thirty years, has
charted the changing development dynamics of the region in her work. The lineage of her
writing shows the development of Kazakhstan and a strong record of the political forces that
were active in the region. Her 1996 publication, appearing in the early post-Soviet era, Central
Asia’s New States; Independence, Foreign Policy and Regional Security stressed the still
60 See for example Sally Cummings (eds.), Power and Change in Central Asia (London: Routledge, 2002).
61 Oliver Roy, The New Central Asia: The Creation of Nations (New York: IB Taurus, 2000).
62 Henry E. Hale, ‘Regime Cycles: Democracy, Autocracy, and Revolution in Post-Soviet Eurasia’, World Politics,
Vol.58, No.1 (2005): 133-65.
63 Pauline Jones Luong, The Transformation of Central Asia: States and Societies from Soviet Rule to
Independence (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004).
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powerful reach of the Russian federation in the region and speaks of the potential that could
be achieved through stronger regional integration.64 She rightly explores the unwillingness/
unreadiness of the Central Asian to assume their independence in such rushed and uncertain
circumstances. This view point is in accordance with much of the scholarship produced at the
time; Russia was the dominant and most explored partner/predator and the one that
academics knew best.65
In Kazakhstan: Unfulfilled Promise, published in 2002, Olcott firmly lays the blame for a
perceived imminent failure of the project of the Republic of Kazakhstan at the hands of the
state.66 She suggests that whilst Soviet corruption meant that money flowed to Russia and
then was redistributed to the CIS states, now the Kazakh elite were syphoning state funds
with no palliative redistributive mechanism in place to offset the possibility of future civil unrest.
Olcott goes on to comment that there needs to be an alternative method of achieving
allegiance in order to prevent a doomsday scenario for the state, especially what she
perceives as being the potential cleavages over ethnicity and religion. Her concluding chapter
suggests that it is the presence of Russia’s historical, structural and cultural legacy in the
Republic that is holding it together, that this Soviet era legacy is what forms the structural
underpinnings of what the state and people have become. She goes so far as to suggest that
‘if anything, these regimes have become less rather than more democratic since the United
States began its military presence in the region’.67 What Olcott does not do is articulate the
64 Martha Brill Olcott, Central Asia’s New States; Independence, Foreign Policy and Regional Security
(Washington DC: United States Insitute of Peace Press, 1996).
65 Neil Melvin, ‘Russia and the Ethno-Politics of Kazakhstan’, The World Today, Vol.49, No.11 (1993), pp.208-
10; Stephen Blank, ‘Energy, Economics and Security in Central Asia: Russia and its Rivals’, Central Asian Survey,
Vol.14, No.3 (1995), pp.373-406; Stephan Blank, ‘The Creation of a Sphere of Influence’, International Journal,
Vol.49, No.4, (1994), pp.788-813; Anatoly M. Khazanov, ‘The ethnic problems of contemporary Kazakhstan’,
Central Asian Survey, Vol.14, No.2, (1995); Andrei Kortunova, Yuri Kulchika & Andrei Shoumikhina, ‘Military
Structures In Kazakhstan: Aims, Parameters, And Some Implications for Russia’, Comparative Strategy, Vol.14,
No.3 (1995).
66 Martha Brill Olcott, Kazakhstan: Unfulfilled Promise, (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, 2002).
67 Martha Brill Olcott, Central Asia’s Second Chance, (Washington DC, Carnegie Endowment for Peace, 2006).
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parameters of her argument, nor does she thoroughly consider the role of China in the region
at this time. In this sense she has failed to show the alternative strategies that would have
been available to the Kazakh state in pursuing an alternative development path in
independence. What were the other options?
By 2006, in Central Asia: Second Chance, Olcott is documenting the state of the region and
its achievements after fifteen years of independence.68 Her book is a review of the poorly
managed international development community’s attempts to intervene in Central Asia, the
short-sighted singular attention on Afghanistan and the ineffective systemic development of
the region’s potential as a whole. Her work as a former special consultant to the US Acting
Secretary of State means that her analysis of the role of the US government in the region is
both skilful and incisive, however, again there remain a number of unanswered questions.
What would be the alternative means of interaction? Should the development community have
taken action in order to better facilitate change? And how should they have interacted with the
authoritarian regimes of the region?
The morphology between these three books, and what they do and do not reference, serves
as a leitmotif for the general transition of Central Asian scholarship. The early years were
dominated by Russian scholarship, both in terms of the people writing from Soviet Studies
backgrounds and the emphasis placed upon Russia in the writing itself. This has perhaps
played a role in masking some of the earlier signs of China’s integration into the regional
dynamics, and is examined in the proceeding chapters on the region. It also highlights the
representation of Kazakhstan as forever hovering on the brink of internally generated
68 ibid.
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destruction, or as Olcott warns, ‘a fish rots from the head down’.69 Despite the rather dramatic
predictive claims and doom-laden warnings, this has not yet come to pass.
Balancing Kazakhstan
In the second decade the ‘balancing’ competencies of the state evolved as a counter-narrative
to the Great Game, and in the third decade of independence the scholarship has focused upon
the need to reconnect Kazakhstan to the broader international community, and away from the
Pentagon-driven 9/11, Afghanistan-centric, Central Asian research. Coming under different
labels, much has been made of the ‘balancing’ foreign policy that the Kazakh state has
adopted. Reuel Hanks used the terminology ‘multi-vector’ to describe the propensity of the
Kazakh state to deftly move between different foreign actors for cooperation opportunities.
Multi-vectorism could be applied, and is, to many other states, especially those seeking a
neutralist position.70 His work highlighted the successes of the policy as it increased leverage
with foreign investors, elevated Kazakhstan to regional hegemon; improved its terms of trade
in oil industry agreements; and the investment strategy of the state.71 In fact, the term multi-
vectorism was integrated into all facets of the Central Asian literature.72 At the same time, clan
politics began to be seen as a less important internal dynamic than the role of corporate groups
in the distribution of wealth and power, signalling a transition from an older style of operating
to a new system in Kazakhstan.73 Quite whether Kazakhstan displays opportunism or true-
multivector policy-making is a theme that this thesis returns to throughout.
69 Martha Brill Olcott, Central Asia’s Second Chance (Washington DC, Carnegie Endowment for Peace, 2006),
p.2.
70 Gregory A. Raymond, 'Neutrality Norms and the Balance of Power', Cooperation and Conflict, Cooperation
and Conflict, Vol.32 , No.2 (1997), pp.123-46.
71Reuel Hanks, ‘Multi-Vector Politics and Kazakhstan's Emerging Role As A Geo-Strategic Player In Central Asia’,
Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, Vol.11, No.3 (2009): 257-67.
72 See for example Sally Cummings, ‘Eurasian Bridge Or Murky Waters Between East And West? Ideas, Identity
And Output In Kazakhstan's Foreign Policy’, Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol.19, No.3,
(2003), p.139; Paul Domjana and Matt Stone, ‘A Comparative Study of Resource Nationalism in Russia and
Kazakhstan 2004–2008’, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol.62, No.1 (2010), pp.35-62.
73 Barabara Junisbai, ‘A Tale of Two Kazakhstans: Sources of Political Cleavage and Conflict in the Post-Soviet
Period’, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol.62, No.2, (2010) pp.235–269.
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From 2000 to the present day, critical geopolitics has been applied to Central Asia. This has
had the welcome effect of challenging the interpretation of Central Asia by Western geopolitics
as ‘obscure, oriental and fractious’, and deconstructing the ‘discourses of danger’ that were
often present, even dominant at times, within the learned experience of the region.74 The aim
was to understand the persistence of the Great Game narrative by ‘security analysts, the
practices of governments, the activities of international aid agencies and numerous lurid films,
documentaries and novels’.75 These aren’t imagined injustices; this literature has engaged
with the policy implication of this outmoded analysis. A classic example is the study by Central
Asian specialist John Heathershaw on the Council on Foreign Relations publication, Calming
the Fergana Valley. This research paper has been a major geopolitical text used to inform US
government policy in the region, yet its central empirical and culturally normative claims have
been refuted.76 This paper represents the classic forced Great Game understanding – a
simplified great power dimension used to understand a complex region. In short, while the
“Great Game” narrative has frequently been disproved, it is, in journalistic parlance, simply too
good a story to die.
The literature has also generated new attention upon the crude identity politics that are
displayed by the state in its quest for independence and international recognition. Erica Marat
looks at the importance of nation branding for the new republic, helping to understand the tools
that the state has used in terms of slogans and branding devices to communicate its
message.77 Edward Schatz develops these themes in order to analyse the difference in the
74 John Heathershaw, and Nick Megoran, ‘Contesting Danger: A New Agenda For Policy And Scholarship On
Central Asia’, International Affairs, Vol.87, No.3 (2011), pp.589-612; John Heathershaw and Stina Torjesen,
‘Discourses of Danger’, Central Asian Survey, Vol.24, No.1 (2005), pp.1-96.
75 John Heathershaw and Nick Megoran, ‘Contesting Danger: A New Agenda For Policy And Scholarship On
Central Asia’, International Affairs, Vol.87, No.3 (2011), pp.589-612.
76 John Heathershaw and Stina Torjesen, ‘Discourses of Danger’, Central Asian Survey, Vol.24, No.1 (2005),
pp.1-96; Stina Torjesen and S. Macfarlane, ‘Kyrgyzstan: A Small Arms Anomaly in Central Asia?’ Small Arms
Survey, 2004.
77 Erica Marat, ‘Nation Branding in Central Asia: A New Campaign to Present Ideas about the State and the
Nation’, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol.61. No.7 (2009), pp.1123-36.
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behaviour of the different Central Asian states in terms of their propensity to use violence, and
in the ‘Westernisation’ of their authoritarianism.78 Sally Cummings explores these central
themes more thoroughly in her book on the process that the elites of Kazakhstan have used
to legitimise their regime and the identities, institutions and interests that have kept them in
power.79 This research lends itself to the thesis because it illustrates and reinforces the
interplay between international forces that are shaping the domestic agenda and domestic
messages being projected outwards.
Identity and Reconnection
The latest generation of scholarship has focused upon the identity politics projected by the
state, reflecting trends in geopolitics and also in the changing preoccupations of the Central
Asian states. It also concerned itself with reconnecting Central Asia to broader understandings
of international relations. It is the latter research that this thesis speaks to, but the former have
been instrumental in providing rich historical and theoretical frameworks with which to
understand Kazakhstan and the region. In particular there are two recent publications that are
also attempt to unpack the prominent Geographical Pivot and Great Game narratives, and it
is to these that the review now turns its attention.
Globalising Central Asia by Marlene Laruelle and Sebastian Peyrouse, two leading Central
Asian area studies writers, analyses the strategies of external actors and local developments
through the legal frameworks and cultural processes that have contributed to the globalisation
of Central Asia.80 The first part of their study examines the strategies and outcomes of external
actors in the region, Russia, China, America and Europe (and is therefore the most relevant
78 Edward Schatz, ‘Transnational Image Making and Soft Authoritarian Kazakhstan’ Slavic Review, Vol.67, No.1,
(2008), pp.50-62.
79 Sally Cummings, Kazakhstan: Power and the Elite, (London, I.B. Tauris, 2005).
80 Marlene Laurelle &Sebastian Peyrouse, Globalising Central Asia: Geopolitics and the Challenges of Economic
Development, (New York: M.E. Sharp, 2013).
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to this thesis).81 Laurelle assumes the same starting position; the metanarrative of the “Great
Game” is inaccurate as it insinuates that the Central Asian states are passive rather than
strategic actors; it homogenises the Central Asian states rather than accentuating their unique
qualities; and that the long-term trends favour Russia and China, with a second and third tier
of external actors including the US, Turkey, Iran and India.82 Her work therefore supports the
need to understand the ‘little games’ that are enacted in Central Asia on a unilateral basis,
rather than through the lens of ‘Central Asia’ as a unitary actor.83 Here too there is
acknowledgement of the multi-vector approach that Kazakhstan has taken as being the only
successful balancing foreign policy in the region.
The ‘little games’ framework is a shared starting point, but there are differences between
Globalising Central Asia and this thesis. Laurelle states that ‘Russia is still the main power in
Central Asia through its role as an interface with the West’ through its ‘continuity of processes
of Soviet integration in economic infrastructure and institutional mechanisms.’84 Furthermore
Laurelle suggests that Russia has a role as a cultural mediator and enjoys political legitimacy,
with the ability of Russia to be successful in the region being dependent upon Russian
domestic strategy concerning non-traditional security threats from Central Asia. Any changes
in Central Asian stability may push Russia towards the West, in an effort to share the
‘responsibility’ of Central Asia with NATO members.85 This view of Russian regional
supremacy and influence is tempered by an acknowledgement that Moscow is ‘not prepared
for generational change in the region, … has failed to cultivate soft power legitimacy […] and
lacks a constructive image of Central Asia’s future.86
81 The second part of Globalising Central Asia considers the economic realities of Central Asia, and the
implications that this has had for each Central Asian state.
82 Marlene Laurelle and Sebastian Peyrouse, Globalising Central Asia: Geopolitics and the Challenges of
Economic Development, (New York, M.E. Sharp, 2013), pp.3-7.
83 Laurelle & Peyrouse, Globalising Central Asia, p.7.
84 ibid p. 22.
85 ibid, p. 22.
86 ibid, p. 24.
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This is clearly an opposing view to the arguments put forward in this thesis. Here Russia is
considered as a once indifferent, but now aggressive neighbour, with a strong military
presence over the border from northern Kazakhstan, and its use as a cultural mediator with
the West is questioned. This is not to suggest that Russia is irrelevant in the region, but that
there is more work to be done to uncover the extent to which Kazakhstan has carefully
manoeuvred away from Russian power. The strategies used, expressed as a positive form of
marginalism, are explored in the following chapters to understand how the Kazakh has
distanced itself from Russia, and enhanced its ability to make autonomous foreign policy
choices over its energy sector. Furthermore, in Laurelle and Peyrose’s study, they
acknowledge the need to understand the local states’ perspective, but the majority of the
analysis is written from the Russian conceptualisation of its relationship with Kazakhstan
rather than on the interplay between the two foreign policies. There is also conflation between
the five Central Asian states: Russian policy towards each state is treated separately, but
analysed collectively.
Of all the writing that sought to unpack the Great Game within Central Asia, a recent collection
of essays perhaps undertakes this task most skilfully. Central Asia in International Relations:
The Legacies of Halford Mackinder is the most complete study of the writings of a man who
has cast a shadow over the region for more than a century.87 The book begins by exploring
Mackinder’s theoretical framework, before analysing how these ideas have ‘travelled’ around
the globe and become embedded in world affairs. Thereafter, the book applies these theories
to different countries and issues in Central Asia to assess the extent to which this ‘framework’
can actually explain contemporary dynamics.
87Nick Megoran & Sevara Sharapova (eds.), Central Asia in International Relations: The Legacies of Halford
Mackinder, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), pp.11-15.
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Of these various theoretical applications it is the chapter that concerns Kazakhstan’s place
within international relations that speaks to this thesis. Gulnara Dadabayeva and Aigul
Adibayeva argue that Mackinder’s heartland theory is not without pertinence to Central Asia,
and that a better formulation would be to consider Kazakhstan a ‘gateway to the heartland’.88
The heartland theory facilitates our understanding of the relationship between Kazakhstan and
it neighbours, particularly helping to explain why Kazakhstan decided to give up nuclear
weapons after the fall of the USSR. They suggest that the movement of the weapons was
born of the Kazakh state’s identification as a gateway state, rather than a heartland state, and
that this, coupled with regular US non-military interventions in Kazakhstan, fits comfortably
with the heartland framework of global politics.89 They are not suggesting that we should
wholly embrace Mackinder’s framework because there are important inconsistencies. They
acknowledge that Mackinder’s work is concerned with the anxieties of his age and therefore
there is a limit to its application. Furthermore, the US invasion of Afghanistan shows that its
importance has been underestimated by Mackinder, and he did not foresee the age of soft
power and its application to the US presence in Kazakhstan.90
Whilst the authors see room to gain insight from Mackinder, it is because they are willing to
bend the framework. It is not enough to suggest that because certain aspects of his study,
when viewed in isolation, and then altered for the current epoch, provide a framework that is
manageable and applicable. What they do offer is the more accurate and detailed
understanding from a domestic, internal perspective as to why the prevailing framework has
proved to be inadequate. Furthermore, there are some deductive aspects to the argument in
support of Dadabayeva and Adibayeva’s propostions, particularly in reference the decision to
credit a pre-Soviet, nomadic patrilineal system as the root cause of the current semi-
88 Gulnara Dadabayeva and Aigul Adibayeva, ‘Mackinder’s Legacy Today: New Challenges for Kazakhstan’, in
Nick Megoran & Sevara Sharapova (eds.), Central Asia in International Relations: The Legacies of Halford
Mackinder, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), pp.262-5.
89 ibid. p.263.
90 ibid. p.264.
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authoritarian governance structure that exists today. Perhaps what really makes this
publication poignant is the analysis of how Central Asian scholars in the region have taken on
the “Great Game” identity in a misguided search for a way to raise the profile of the region.
Embracing Mackinder has created a recognisable formula that has currency with the West
and thereby provides a useful trope for securing a more powerful identity, albeit problematic
in its nature.
As such this research seeks to shape the thesis through its highlighting of the continued need
to unpack the ‘problem’ of Central Asia and Kazakhstan in International Relations. If
Mackinder’s framework remains a procrustean bed, then we must find an alternative that
works from below, uncovering the mechanisms that are generating change and autonomy in
the CIS. Using marginality as a framework and a tool for approaching this task appears to be
a better geopolitical tool as it is suggesting avenues of study rather than forcing an answer
upon the area. To understand the techniques and dynamics used by the state to improve upon
its marginal position requires us to understand its energy industry. This is a core industry of
Kazakhstan, its main source of income and a core component of its foreign policy strategy.
Until there is a greater diversification of the economy, this will remain the case. Therefore, the
evidence for understanding Kazakhstan’s changing relationship with its neighbours needs to
be partially, perhaps even predominantly, understood through its energy industry. It is to the
interpretations of this energy dynamic that the literature review now turns.
Central Asia and the Global Energy Market
The “resource curse” literature has dominated our understanding of the impact of oil upon
developing countries. In much the same way that Central Asia has been assumed to be the
pawn of geopolitics, and so experiences a silence in the IR literature, so the story of its energy
reserves had been left unexplored, but assumed relevant to the resource curse literature.
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Pauline Jones Luong, a Central Asian specialist, has been at the forefront of reconnecting
Central Asia with international relations. Not only has her work shone new light onto Central
Asian transition in the Western literature, but it has also served to use the example of Central
Asia to challenge accepted orthodoxies within international relations literature. In particular,
her work with Erica Weinthal on the experience of Soviet successor states and the resource
curse has been particularly important in this regard and seeks to challenge the prevailing
understanding of an inevitable and prevailing ‘Dutch Disease’.91 Broadly, it is in part of this
new tradition of reconnection that this thesis would seek to emulate, but there are points of
difference between this thesis and the views of Jones Luong.
In Oil Is Not a Curse, Jones Luong makes two central claims. The first is that oil is not the
cause of the ‘curse’ but the ownership structures that the state employs, meaning that even
weak states can be successful in their oil ventures. The second claim is that weak institutions
are not inevitable in oil rich states. This challenges the central claim of the traditional “resource
curse” literature, which supposes that an energy producing state cannot build strong
institutions, using the fiscal regimes as the basis of its conclusions.92 The study uses
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan to explore
how the same legacy encourages divergent fiscal regimes. It is not that states derive income
from oil, it is the manner in which in it extracts it that is important.
Globalising Central Asia also considers the role of hydrocarbons in globalisation. After giving
a précis of the different states assets and position within the global and regional industry,
Laurelle and Peyrouse go on to describe the Russian domination of the industry, the critical
91 Pauline Jones Luong & Erica Weinthal, Oil Is Not a Curse: Ownership Structure and Soviet Successor States
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
92 Pauline Jones Luong, 'After the Break-up: Institutional Design in Transitional States', Comparative Political
Studies, Vol.33, No.5 (2000), pp.563-92.
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role of Russia in the export markets in the 2000s, and the recent incursion by China into the
region. In answer to the question of whether the great powers are dominating the ‘game’, they
reach a similar conclusion to this thesis.93 However, they do not reach a conclusion as to the
autonomous capabilities of the Central Asian states, and because this is a small portion of
their overall research project - only 8 pages - the strategic detail and challenges are not fully
explored. Furthermore, although the study is rich in detail, and helps to finalise some avenues
of research in the post-great game literature, their thesis does not fully explore the connection
to the globalisation literature in the context of the oil and gas industry through appeals to the
broader IR/IPE literature, beyond the analysis of the international actors in the region.
Ultimately, Globalising Central Asia concludes that its landlocked position ensures it is subject
to ‘geographical preconditions’ and that the Central Asian states will not be a driver of
‘economic dynamism’ in Eurasia.
All of these books have provided a foundation to the research encapsulated within this thesis.
The scholarship on Identity and transition by Sally Cummings and Martha Brill Olcott helps us
to understand changing identity politics that have at times constricted and reinvented what it
means to be Kazakhstani. Within the thesis this creates a platform to discuss the nation-
branding and nation-building exercises contained within state strategy, again building on the
work of Erica Marat. The international relations focused literature of Globalising Central Asia
and energy-led Oil Is Not a Curse provided a number of questions which this thesis attempts
to provide some answer for; both are concerned with identifying the drivers of Kazakhstan’s
geopolitical relationship through the energy industry.
93 Laurelle & Peyrouse, Globalising Central Asia, pp.165-89.
79
There is one study in particular of the energy market that has contributed to the thesis and
that is analysed in each of the thesis chapters. Understanding how energy has transformed
the capability and capacity of the Kazakh state is fundamental to understanding the question
of how Kazakhstan has increased its autonomy, and achieved a positive marginality.
Throughout the thesis the role of strategic culture intersects with each of these previously
discussed literatures.
Conclusion
This chapter has sought to present a review of the most pertinent literature on Central Asia
and geopolitics. Within it a methodological framework for understanding Kazakhstan has been
put forwards as an alternative to the Great Game or Mackinder’s heartland. As the thesis
progresses, it is the marginality work by Parker that will help to bind the themes and research
in order to understand the capacity of the state to overcome its previously insufficiently
marginal position. At a time when Russia is seeking to return to an earlier style of politics and
aggressive interventions in neighbouring states, knowing how states can successfully
negotiate between relations with larger powers is an increasingly important puzzle. If
Kazakhstan, a middle income and developing country has manoeuvred itself to a position of
positive marginality, we should be asking how this has happened.
Critical geopolitics and the subsequent work on identity has illuminated the tactics that states
use to appear more or less benign. The literature discussed here that examines the identity
politics of the state will be incorporated into the thesis to help ascertain some of the tactics
that Parker and the marginality literature discuss to come to a resolution on the Kazakh state’s
capacity. In doing so, this thesis helps to progress the literature. Following on from the
previous scholarship on Central Asia, it continues to find ways to express the importance of
Kazakhstan to International Relations without resorting to the old tropes of the Great Game or
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using Mackinder’s worn-out framework. It also hopes to be part of the newer waves of the
literature that aims to reconnect Central Asia to International Relations as a discipline, without
creating a narrative of either danger or of romance. As yet, the most common explanatory
framework that has been used repeatedly in the literature is the ‘multi-vector’. Whilst this is a
powerful and useful device, it does not tell the full story of Kazakhstan’s place in world affairs;
the state may not be as capable as it depicts.
So far, the marginality framework has not been applied to Kazakhstan. It is hoped that this will
provide new insights and framing of our understanding of how small states can interact with
large, and in this case, assertive powers. Laurelle and Peyrose come close to anticipating the
question through their work by asking how globalisation has affected the interplay between
the region and international markets, but there is still space to pursue this further.
Understanding the strategic and energy dynamics in more detail are crucial to understanding
how these ‘little games’ play out in Kazakhstan. Within each of these studies, whether about
identity or transition or local politics, the centrality of the energy industry to understanding
Kazakhstan is reinforced; oil defines the progress of the nation, for better or for worse. In order
to explore ‘how’ Kazakhstan’s transition is manifesting we need to understand the strategic
culture that has generated this transformation. What is driving change, and how is it being
enacted within institutions? How is it performed for the international and domestic audiences?
It is to this last question that the thesis now turns. Returning to geopolitics, the following
chapter examines how large competing narratives of the role of Central Asia in the political
imagination of larger states. What is the Kazakh state seeking to communicate to the global
audience, and how does this interrupt the narratives of those states that seek to subvert
Kazakh autonomy.
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Chapter 3
Eurasia: Marginal States and Great Powers
If space is constructed, it can be reconstructed. Central Asia has historically found its territory
reconstructed, reconstituted and reordered by myriad audiences simultaneously crafted into
the image of the creator and disrupting the lived experience of Kazakhstan. By existing as a
marginal state surrounded by centers, its presence stands to delineate the limits of
surrounding centers; it inherently defines the limits of power. It is where the top-down
structures and process of centers are at their most ‘stretched’, thinning towards an edge.94
This does not mean the creation of borders in the sense of a territorial checkpoint, but instead
suggests temporal, fluid markers that extend and blur the changing power structures acting
within a space. Indeed practises that occur beyond the margin’s borders can disrupt and/or
proliferate internally generated conceptualisations from within; globalisation, imperialism and
enlargement are all examples of this.95
Power and marginality is built into the strategic narratives of many states at times creating
seemingly inevitable path dependencies. We can see this manifest itself in the events of the
preceding seven years, since the global financial crisis, in which a disturbing global trend of
increased militarisation and conflict, combined with a decline in safety and security in
international society has developed.96 In the South China Sea, old fashioned power-plays
between China and Japan are driving increased regional military budgets which are re-
enacted through public narratives from both sides with aggressive posturing. Similarly, in the
Middle East, the flames of long standing rivalries have been fanned by the emergence of new
regional actors and their sectarian supporters via proxy wars. In Europe, our attention has
been drawn to Ukraine’s clash between supposedly unmarriageable Russian and European
94 Noel Parker, ‘A Theoretical Introduction’, p. 10.
95 Nick Vaughn-Williams and Noel Parker, ‘Line in the Sand’, p.585
96 Global Peace Index: Measuring Peace and Assessing Country Risk, (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2014).
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values via a constant stream of news and propaganda. Indeed the 24 hour news cycle and
state-led discourses of both sides would have us believe in an almost inevitable ‘return to the
Cold War’.97 Fuelling these military developments are the nationalistic narratives spurred by
the worsened economic climate.
As Joseph Nye notes, these should be prime conditions for a traditional balance of power of
the US vs China and Russia. Instead “when it comes to a Sino-Russian alliance challenging
the West, history is not likely to repeat itself. Contrary to Putin’s hopes, 2014 will not be
remembered as a year of successful Russian foreign policy.”98 The expansionism of Russia
and China, and the reawakened interest of Turkey, are all evident in the foreign policy
strategies of each state, but to what extent are these strategic choices translating into an
‘advantage’? As this thesis will show, Russia is achieving power through aggressive colonialist
tactics; China through economic encroachment; and the US is increasingly withdrawing overt
interests in the political stability of the greater Central Asian region.
This chapter is concerned with the unpacking the entanglement of competing strategic cultures
and power narratives. It uses a broad lens to analyse the strategic trajectory that the Kazakh
state uses to assert relative autonomy against great power narratives that seek to present it
as weak/peripheral. What are the strategic narratives and cultures that it presents, what are
they predicated upon, and in doing so, what competing narratives does it disrupt by its
97 For examples from the media in the UK, Russia and Germany see: Simon Tisdall, ‘The New Cold War: Are We
Going Back To The Bad Old Days?’, The Guardian, Wednesday 19 November 2014 accessed 18 September 2015,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/19/new-cold-war-back-to-bad-old-days-russia-west-putin-
ukraine ; RT (Russia Today), ‘Gorbachev: It’s up to Europe to Prevent New Cold War between US and Russia’,
Russia Today, December 01, 2014, accessed 18 September 2015, http://rt.com/news/210463-gorbachev-us-
russia-europe/ ; Markus Becker, ‘Nuclear Specter Returns: 'Threat of War Is Higher than in the Cold War', 13
February 2015, article accessed on 18 September 2015 http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/munich-
conference-warns-of-greater-threat-of-nuclear-conflict-a-1018357.html
98 Joseph Nye, ‘A New Sino-Russian Alliance?’ Project Syndicate, 12 January 2014, accessed 18 September
2015, http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/russia-china-alliance-by-joseph-s--nye-2015-
01#RrOYshwisMrDSM3U.99
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assertions of marginality? To answer this, the chapter begins by untangling the threads of
security, energy and grand strategy. This requires examining the government’s wholly
ambitious plan to transform the economy through the energy industry which interacts with the
more ephemeral, but equally as politically important, grand narrative of the President. This is
then compared and contrasted with the great power narratives that claim Central Asia in their
foreign policy narratives through Eurasianism. It is increasingly Russian and Turkic narratives
of Central Asia that dominate the dialogue on Central Asia, and in the case of Russia,
potentially threaten its future independence and statehood. What do these strategic narratives
of great powers mean for the marginality of Kazakhstan? In order to consider the Kazakh
state’s options for using the energy industry to make a strategic level change to its marginality,
the chapter finishes by considering how able the state is to alter its oil and gas strategy to
affect change in its regional context at the strategic level. In doing so, this chapter lays a
foundation for the following chapter which look upon the actors and mechanisms that are
creating the current strategic culture in the energy industry as a whole.99
Discussing ‘strategic cultures’ and their orientation towards Central Asia is not without its
difficulties.100 Firstly, it is problematic to assess the extent to which these proclamations have
gained traction within the political and public discourse, and in turn what the ‘real’ influence of
this ideology has been upon political decision-making. Similarly, the work of polemicists such
as Alexsandr Dugin has come to dominate much of the academic literature on Russian
Eurasianism.101 But to what extent can we say that he is truly an influential figure, rather than
99 S. Esenova, ‘Soviet Nationality, Identity, and Ethnicity in Central Asia: Historic Narratives and Kazakh Ethnic
Identity,’ Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, Vol.22, No.1 (2002), pp.11-38.
100 On the frustratingly elusive nature of strategic culture see Colin S. Gray, ‘National style in strategy: the
American example’, International Security, Vol.6, No.2 (1981), pp.21–2; Alastair Iain Johnston, ‘Thinking about
Strategic Culture’, International Security, Vol.19, No.4 (1995), pp.36–43; Colin S. Gray, ‘Strategic Culture as
context: The First Generation Of Theory Strikes Back’, Review of International Studies, Vol.25, No.1 (1999),
pp.49–69; Alastair Iain Johnston, ‘Strategic Cultures Revisited: Reply To Colin Gray’, Review of International
Studies, Vol.25, No.3 (1999), pp.519–23.
101 For his own works see Aleksandr Dugin, ‘Osnovy geopolitiki: geopoliticheskoe budushchee Rossii, Arktogei︠a︡ ,
1997. For his work in academic context see Dina Khapaeva,‘Triumphant memory of the perpetrators: Putin's
84
a useful trope of the pariah of geopolitics?102 His ideas and council are routinely sought within
the fringes of policy and academia, but to what end are his ideas setting a policy agenda?
This debate echoes some of the central struggles that exist within geopolitics as to the form
and methodologies that should be deployed by the discipline. To what extent are we
propagating the myths of grand strategic thinking through the reportage of the subject matter,
and how can we be mindful of the consequences of propagating the classical inconsistencies
that exist within the discipline? Similarly, whilst these strategic visions are articulated in
different forms by the state and public figures, it becomes difficult to accurately measure their
influence upon the individual policy decisions. In this chapter, a balance has been sought
between the propagation of ideas without critical reflection and the knowledge that the grand
strategy discourse is often perpetrated in its classical form, behind closed doors or in smoke-
filled rooms. To this end, evidence for the Kazakh brand of Eurasianism comes from the centre
of power and its detractors; the President regularly releases books of his grand strategy. Much
of the academic legitimation for these proclamations comes from the Gumilëv University’s
Eurasianist Center which in turn is counselled by state directives.103 The majority of the content
is illogical and ill-considered, and at times makes difficult reading. For instance, the
President’s expressed surprise and horror at the global wealth smuggled into tax havens is
particularly difficult to countenance in light of the President’s exposed millions in Switzerland.
politics of re-Stalinization’, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, online edition 2016,
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2015.12.007 ; Anton Barbashin and Hannah Thoburn, ‘Putin's Brain
Alexander Dugin and the Philosophy Behind Putin's Invasion of Crimea’, Foreign Affairs, 31 March, 2014. For
evidence of the permeation of Dugin into popular Western news narratives see for example Jake Gilber, ‘We
Spoke to the Man Who's Been Labelled 'Putin's Brain', Vice, 28 April, 2014,accessed 28 03/2016
https://www.vice.com/en_uk/read/aleksandr-dugin-russian-expansionism
102 Marlene Laruelle, ‘Larger, Higher, Farther North… Geographical Metanarratives of the Nation in Russia,’
Eurasian Geography and Economics, Vol.53, No.5 (2012), pp.557-574.
103 Marlene Laruelle Russian Eurasianism: An Ideology of Empire (Washington DC: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 2008), p.181. On the centre see Leo Gumilëv, Ethnogenesis and the biosphere (Moscow: Progress
Publishers, 1990).
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However, within this portentous presidential literature sits the ideological underpinnings of the
state and its action points for the future of Kazakhstan.
Entanglement of Security, Grand Strategy and Energy
Kazakhstanis are today experiencing their highest ever per capita standard of living. Over the
last five years oil production has risen to just below that of the United States, and with it the
development trajectory of this fledgling nation has continued to rise.104 With this accelerating
growth has come a changed foreign policy orientation and an increased autonomous capacity.
Whilst in the early 2000s experts were investigating the new relationship that the Central Asian
states were developing with the United States, now it is China that is ingratiating itself within
these advancing economies and this is impacting upon the strategic future of Kazakhstan and
its future development in a number of complex ways.105
Foreign direct investment and technological innovation are the twin drivers of transformation
since the 1990s, for both Kazakhstan and for the global energy industry. Shale gas has
resulted in something of a world commodity bouleversement, turning importer nations into
exporters, albeit with currently high extraction costs, altering the supply and demand energy
dynamics between the North and South American states. In Europe, consternation is building
as a mercurial Russian foreign policy begins to intertwine with energy policy as sanctions
begin to affect the Russian economy, with every possibility that Moscow will seek to use oil
and gas as a weapon.106 Meanwhile European international oil firms continue to pursue new
investment destinations in order to diversify risk. African energy producers are challenged by
104 UNDP, Human Development Report 2014 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014).
105 Pauline Jones Luong and Erica Weinthal, ‘New Friends, New Fears in Central Asia,’ Foreign Affairs
(March/April 2002), pp.61-70.
106 Christian Dreger et al, ‘Between the Hammer and the Anvil: The Impact of Economic Sanctions and Oil
Prices on Russia’s Ruble’ Journal of Comparative Economics, available online 13 January 2016,
doi:10.1016/j.jce.2015.12.010
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domestic and regional conflict, presenting major challenges to their efforts at attracting the FDI
needed to improve the supporting industrial infrastructure. 107Middle Eastern powerhouses of
energy production are facing their own energy challenges, predominantly through the
exorbitant and rising costs of their inefficient industries and growing domestic consumption,
as well as the increasing regional instability and conflict that has been accelerated as the result
of the “Arab Spring”.108
All of these regional shifts challenge the existing international market structure, and as a result,
the operating environment of the actors within the Kazakh energy industry. Whether through
the long-term strategic interests of the state or the investment choices of the international firms
operating on the Steppe, the ramifications of this complex interconnectivity cannot be
underestimated in this most capital-intensive of the extractive industries. The 2050 strategy
that is designed to address the inefficiency of the industry and thereby increase the oil
available for sale by reducing domestic, subsidised oil consumption is under direct threat from
the aggressive Russian Eurasianism. In turn this creates an unpredictable operating climate
for foreign investors and also for the domestic development path which has significant
consequences for the Kazakh population.
How to untangle these challenges in the domestic energy developments and their complex
connections to international developments is partially a matter of defining energy security.
Here, the understanding of energy security is meant to convey the importance of obtaining
secure access, supply and affordable energy for both producer and consumer states. It also
conveys meaning to the energy security needs of not just the state, but also the distribution
107 See for example Victor Asal et al, ‘Political Exclusion, Oil, and Ethnic Armed Conflict’, The Journal of Conflict
Resoloution, (Feburary, 2015), pp.1-25; David Harris, Civil War and Democracy in Conflict Resolution, Elections
and Justice in Sierra Leone and Liberia, IB Tauris, 2015.
108 A. Malik and Bassem Awadallah, ‘The economics of the Arab Spring’, World Development, Vol.45, No.2
(2013), pp.296-313.
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network for populations. Importantly, the objective of being considered ‘energy secure’ should
not come at the expense of the other domestic strategic objectives whether they be military,
economic, development or political. This understanding provides a more holistic approach to
energy security, which acknowledges that true and meaningful energy security can only be
achieved if it does not hinder other strategic objectives. By using this perspective as a holistic
energy security test, can we say that Kazakhstan this is energy secure?
For the basic purposes of its own domestic needs, Kazakhstan is secure.109 It has the capacity
to supply to all citizens at a subsidised rate, although this would be better if it were sold to
other countries, while more renewable resources might be used at home. As a result the core
component for Kazakh energy security is to secure demand, rather than supply, as is normal
for most other commodity-producing nations. Kazakhstan also has some advantages to its
landlocked position. China, the largest net importer of oil, is its nearest neighbour and through
the pipeline there is a security of supply, similarly there is an increasingly secure supply to
Europe through the soon to be completed pipeline.110
However, to be uncompetitive on price is also to be ‘insecure’. As the previous chapter shows,
the budgets of the largest Kazakh oil fields are rapidly rising which dramatically increases the
price-per-barrel. Furthermore, the Kazakh state’s economic reliance upon the oil industry to
meet its domestic development targets hinders its ability to be energy secure. This
dependency is generated through these high operating costs in some of its biggest oil fields
(such as Kashagan) that are trying to function in an era of increasingly volatile medium-term
109 For government generated data on the state of energy security in Kazakhstan there has been much
information published on the back of an attempt to hold a UN non-permanent Security Council membership
position in 2017/18. Kazkahstan UNSC, Energy Security In Kazakhstan – Powering The Future (Astana:
Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2014).
110 P. Andrews-Speed, Xuanli Liao, and Roland Dannreuther, The strategic implications of China's energy needs,
(London: Routledge, 2014), p.35.
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market prices. This translates into the uncompetitive pricing of Kazakh products on the
international market and also further revenue loss from the already heavily subsidised
domestic markets. Indeed, domestic consumption is so remarkably inefficient that it hinders
the ability of Kazakhstan to capitalise on its natural resources to the fullest extent.
Furthermore, whilst China is becoming an increasingly important destination for Kazakh oil,
Kazakhstan remains energy insecure through the shared historical energy network with
Russia. Until the pipelines and refineries can be brought under the exclusive physical
protection of the Kazakhs, Kazakhstan will remain energy insecure throughout the
transportation stage of its supply cycle.111 Kazakhstan will not be energy secure until it has
realised its ambition to protect its geographical borders with Russia and its supply capabilities
in the face of a changing geopolitical climate and Russian expansionism. In this sense,
Kazakhstan’s quest for security is confounded by Russian hard power in the region, and whilst
the Kazakh state has taken substantial steps towards this goal, the shadow of Moscow’s
military power still looms over all the Central Asian states.112
Presented with this conundrum, it becomes apparent just how closely the ideas of energy and
security are intertwined; how they operate in parallel; and how energy forms part of the broader
strategic interests of the state. In effect, the grand strategy of the state is an interplay between
local, regional and international actors informing and responding to the national power
structures and institutions, working to achieve defined policy outcomes. This should provide a
grand narrative with which to unify all other policy decisions and to communicate the vision for
the state to citizens, and a framework of understanding with which to define diplomatic
111 Edward Chow & Leigh Hendrix, Central Asia’s Pipelines: Field of Dreams and Reality, NBR Special Report no.
28, (The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2010).
112 Younkyoo Kim and Fabio Indeo, ‘The new great game in Central Asia post 2014: The US “New Silk Road”
strategy and Sino-Russian rivalry’, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Vol.46, No.2 (2013), pp.275-286.
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communication with other states. Obviously, the lucidity of this vision and the extent to which
it is clarified and communicated to the intended audiences depends upon the state in question
and the sophistication with which all this is operationalised.113
In Kazakhstan there is an added complication. The future vision and attendant aspirations that
the state has for itself - and the version of this that it communicates to other regional actors -
has to be expressed in a non-threatening manner. For example, to express a strong pro-
Western vision of Kazakhstan would compromise its relationship with Russia.114 As we can
see from the Ukrainian example, the political and military ramifications of expressing such a
position that could aggravate or alarm Russian interests in the region could prove calamitous
for President Nazarbayev. Despite being a European state, this aggression has largely gone
unchecked by the international community and the ‘legal’ rationale of the attacks has remained
unchallenged despite over 6000 dead at the time of writing.115 Aware of the gravity of the
situation, formal articulations of strategic objectives by Astana are sometimes opaque on these
sensitive matters. The clarity of Kazakh grand strategy is further obscured by the mercurial
characteristics of the authoritarian leadership, with its propensity for ambitious plans and
announcements, and also by the presence of corrupt political factions that require placating
with business deals.
113 C. Wasinski, ‘On making war possible Soldiers, strategy, and military grand narrative’, Security Dialogue,
Vol.42 No.1 (2011), pp.57-76.
114 N. Jackson, ‘The role of external factors in advancing non-liberal democratic forms of political rule: a case
study of Russia's influence on Central Asian regimes, ‘ Contemporary Politics, Vol.16, No.1 (2010), pp.101-118.
115 See for example the military, geopolitical and legal justifications for the intervention by Russia in Ukraine.
Roy Allison, ‘Russian ‘deniable’ intervention in Ukraine: how and why Russia broke the rules’, International
Affairs, Vol.90, No.6 (2014), pp.1255–97.
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In part, we can perceive the vision that the Kazakh state wishes to communicate through a
series of PR and nation-branding exercises that have been in progress since independence.116
As the Central Asian states are born of a post-Soviet era land-division, the return to a pre-
Soviet era identity would have been both confusing and problematic for each of the Central
Asian states because of the multiple ethnicities and cultures that criss-cross the land over the
political borders. As is so often the case with post-colonial entities, in the new era of
independence, each Central Asian state has sought to promote itself as autonomous of its
neighbours, rather than building a collective regional identity and in the process has not
necessarily chosen the path of maximum economic development. In a bid to make itself
distinct, Kazakhstan in particular has embarked on an ambitious program of nation-branding,
choosing to bill itself as the ‘Heart of Eurasia’ and the ‘Crossroads of Civilisation’, accentuating
the importance of its geopolitical position. The image of a crossroads also helps to link Central
Asia to Europe and is therefore usefully suggestive of openness and a commitment to
reform.117
This logic should appear similar to the strategic positioning of the UK by Prime Minister Tony
Blair during 1999-2003. Blair saw the position of the UK as a ‘bridge’ between the US and
Europe, using the unique legacy of the British diplomatic connections bequeathed by its former
colonial presence, together with its highly professional foreign service, to facilitate peaceful
negotiations or otherwise address the major crises of the day.118 Whilst the effectiveness of
this strategy for Britain is debateable, it is perhaps not a coincidence that Kazakhstan’s
authoritarian leader has drafted the former British Prime Minster to facilitate strategic planning.
116 See for more information Sally Cummings (ed.), Symbolism and Power in Central Asia: Politics of the
Spectacular (Oxon: Routledge, 2013), pp.2-13. Also R. Isaacs, ‘Nomads, warriors and bureaucrats: nation-
building and film in post-Soviet Kazakhstan,‘ Nationalities Papers, Vol.43, No.3 (2015), pp.399-416.
117 E. Marat, ‘Nation Branding in Central Asia: A New Campaign to Present Ideas about the State and the
Nation,’ Europe-Asia Studies, Vol.61, No.7 (2009), pp.1123-36.
118 Michael Harvey, ‘Perspectives on the UK’s Place in the World’, Europe Programme Paper 2011/01, Chatham
House, December 2011, accessed 18 September 2015,
http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Europe/1211pp_harvey.pdf
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Tony Blair has been working with the Kazakhstan leadership since 2011 through Tony Blair
Associates, a geopolitical and strategic consulting firm he founded once leaving parliament.
During this time he has offered advice to President Nazarbayev on the best methods with
which to handle the Western media, most controversially on the subject of the Zhanaozen
massacre in 2011.119
This strategic vision of Kazakhstan as the benign facilitator and economic crossroads has
been solidified through a series of political projects. After slowly stalking the OSCE leadership
seat, Kazakhstan secured the position in the same year that allowed it to lead the Organisation
of the Islamic Conference (OIC). The Kazakh government described the OSCE leadership as
‘present[ing] a unique chance for Astana to further promote one of its major foreign policy
goals, that of fostering greater understanding and cooperation between the East and the West’
whilst also insisting that ‘large-scale inter-institutional cooperation between the OSCE and the
OIC has been long advocated by Kazakhstan.’120 This provided the Kazakh leadership with a
unique diplomatic position. Not only could it achieve its ambitions of becoming more widely
recognised in Europe, but it could also use its previously underplayed Muslim identity to forge
connections with wealthy states as Kazakhstan began its foray into Islamic finance.121 It also
continues to project the strategic vision of “the crossroads”. So too did Kazakhstan’s role in
the Iranian nuclear negotiations at which it hosted the international community during the 2013
P5+1 talks (after they were previously and unsuccessfully held in Baghdad, Istanbul and
Moscow). Furthermore, Kazakhstan has also chaired the Collective Security Treaty
Organisation and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, both of which operate as
119 The Economist, ‘Democratic reforms, still TBA’, The Economist, 16 November 2013, accessed 16 September
2015, http://www.economist.com/blogs/banyan/2013/11/tony-blair-kazakhstan
120 Embassy of the Republic of Kazakhstan in Helsinki, ‘Kazakh Leadership in OSCE, OIC to Help Promote East-
West Dialogue’, Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan, accessed 16 September 2015,
http://www.kazembassy.fi/en/press-information/press-releases/73-kazakh-leadership-in-osce,-oic-to-help-
promote-east-west-dialogue.html
121 Davinia Hoggarth, ‘The rise of Islamic finance: post-colonial market-building in central Asia and Russia’,
International Affairs, vol.92, no.1, pp.115-136.
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alternative organisations to NATO, and outside of Western influence.122 All these
achievements add up to more than the sum of their parts and are suggestive of effective
diplomacy implementing a coherent strategy.123
Two more strands of national strategy, namely development and energy, have accentuated
this grand narrative of Kazakhstan as the benign facilitator. The Kazakhstan 2050 vision lays
out the leadership’s strategy and goals for the next 35 years, with energy at the centre of the
development scheme. The ultimate ambition is to catapult Kazakhstan into the top 30
economies through considered changes to economic, social and political structures. The chief
aims of the package are described as follows;
• ‘Preserving Independence and the development of Astana
• National unity, peace and accord in the society
• Secular society and high spirituality
• High economic growth achieved on the basis of industrialisation and innovation
• General Employment Society
• Unity of history, culture and the language
• National security and participation of our country in resolving global and regional
problems’.124
122 S. Aris, ‘The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation: “Tackling the Three Evils”. A Regional Response to Non-
traditional Security Challenges or an Anti-Western Bloc?.’ Europe-Asia Studies, Vol.61, No.3 (2009), pp.457-82.
123 R. Allison, ‘Virtual regionalism, regional structures and regime security in Central Asia,‘ Central Asian Survey,
Vol.27, No.2 (2008), pp.185-202.
124 Office of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, ‘Kazakhstan 2050’, Government of the Republic of
Kazakhstan, accessed 12 May 2015, http://www.akorda.kz/en/page/page_poslanie-prezidenta-respubliki-
kazakhstan-lidera-natsii-nursultana-nazarbaeva-narodu-kazakhstana-
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Certain aspects of the project are more feasible than others; the top level visionary goals are
vague and not well defined, perhaps even deliberately opaque, and are therefore difficult to
assess or evaluate. Indeed, the same might even be said of some of the mid-level goals such
as the aim to decentralise the government structure, and certainly the current authoritarian
leadership structure would have few incentives to dismantle its powerbase. Conversely, the
aim of increasing Kazakhstan’s international profile has already been impressively
materialised, most obviously through the aforementioned Iranian negotiations and chairing the
myriad international organisations within the region. This has similarly been achieved through
the continued work by the state on global nuclear non-proliferation.
This mercurial pattern of state behaviour continues within the all-important energy sector.
Along with health care and education, energy and efficiency-savings make up the majority of
the ‘priority projects’ in Kazakhstan 2050. The construction of a nuclear power plant, building
an additional oil refinery, the creation of an ecologically focused transport sector and low
rainfall crop creation are all set as goals for the state to be achieved within the next 20 years.125
In 2013 the state-run Biaterek Fund pledged $100 million towards reaching these renewable
goals with the state pledging 1% of GDP to renewable energy.126 Just one year later and
President Nazarbayev announced ‘I personally do not believe in alternative energy sources,
such as wind and solar’ and also explained that ‘oil and gas is our main horse, and we should
not be afraid that these are fossil fuels.’127 These are strange words for the leader of a country
preparing to host the next World Fair, Expo 2017, which is focused upon renewable energy.128
125 Office of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, ‘Kazakhstan 2050’, Government of the Republic of
Kazakhstan, accessed 12 May 2015, http://www.akorda.kz/en/page/page_poslanie-prezidenta-respubliki-
kazakhstan-lidera-natsii-nursultana-nazarbaeva-narodu-kazakhstana-
126 Interfax, ‘Baiterek Holding Creates Investment Fund to Support Green Energy Projects’, Interfax, 17
December 2013.
127 Paolo Sorbello, ‘Kazakhstan: Nazarbayev Signals U-Turn on Alternative Energy’, Eurasianet.Org 17 October,
2014, accessed 16 September 2015, http://www.eurasianet.org/node/70501
128 A. Mukasheva, Guldana Sharapatova, and Muslim Khassenov, ‘Problems of Renewable Energy Sources Use
in the Republic of Kazakhstan (within EXPO 2017)’, Global Journal on Advances Pure and Applied Sciences
Vol.1, No.2 (2013).
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Whilst this fractious response could be dismissed as the whim of an authoritarian leader, the
changing sentiment is also suggestive of a reaction to the changing regional geopolitics. The
comments were made at a meeting with President Putin and reflect the Kremlin’s attitude
towards renewable energy and the official position on shale gas, but it also shows the nature
of the relationship between the two states. Kazakhstan is under pressure from Russia here to
demonstrate that it is not succumbing to ‘Western values’ and its attendant obsession with
ethics. Here the broader ideas of grand strategy come into focus. Within the Russian vision of
Eurasianism, there is no room for the supposed multi-vector foreign policy, there is only the
growing expansion of a Russian-led regional alliance. When President Nazarbayev is with
Western leaders in order to discuss renewables the rhetoric is substantially different; during a
press conference with Prime Minister David Cameron there were warm invitations for British
firms working in the field of renewable energy and green technologies to come to
Kazakhstan.129 It is autonomy and marginality, as opposed to peripheral status, that is being
sought. It is this complex tangle of competing visions of Kazakhstan and its place in Eurasia
that we will now turn.
Competing Eurasias
Eurasianism and its Origins
“Eurasianism” is an articulation of grand strategy for the political boundaries of the Eurasian
landmass. Eurasianism seeks to equalise and draw together ethnicities and cultures whilst
also promoting the centrality of a single nation over the collective group. It originates from the
early days of classical understandings of geopolitics but has, with time, been adapted and
129 David Cameron, ‘Kazakhstan visit: Prime Minister's press conference with Nursultan Nazarbayev’, Atyrau
City, Kazakhstan, First published: 1 July 2013, accessed 18 September 2015,
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/kazakhstan-visit-prime-ministers-press-conference-with-
nursultan-nazarbayev
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reformulated not just by Russia but also within the political imaginations of Turkey and
Kazakhstan. Many iterations of the project have been proposed over the last two centuries
which either support or deny marginality to the FSU incorporating a series of artificial
connection between Central Asia, Russia, Mongolia, the Baltics states and Eastern Europe
and sometimes including Turkey and/or China too. The proposition of Russia moving a wider
public consciousness away from Europe and towards Asia began in the early 1900s in Russia,
at a time when Japan was entering a period of strength and their ally, China, was in decline.
Prominent academics of the age, such as Pytor Savitsky and Nikolai Trubetskoi, used political
and linguistic discourse to try and dissuade Russia from succumbing to Western influence and
instead to embrace a benevolent imperialism, similar to that espoused by Halford MacKinder.
More recently, this combination of a classical geopolitics lens focusing upon direct control of
other territories, together with more modern understandings of permeable space incorporating
technological or socio-economic dimensions, has led to the creation of neo-Eurasianism.130
Since 1991, Russia’s relationship to the FSU has been articulated as part of a foreign policy
agenda, albeit with a nationalistic orientation.131 At the same time as these more general
narratives were being developed during the Yeltsin era, Natalia Morozova suggests three
distinct brands of neo-Eurasianism/geopolitics were formed with differing implications for
Kazakhstan’s marginality; a traditional geopolitics which treats Eurasianism as a ‘tool in the
growing repertoire of possible means of territorial control’, and a modernist geopolitics of
Russia which splits to view Russia as either a ‘Heartland’ in charge of peripheral states or as
a geopolitical ‘Island’ removed from its regional neighbours.132 Reflecting the time in which
she was writing, 2009, Morozova suggests that under Putin, ‘Eurasianism has turned into a
130 David Kerr, ‘The New Eurasianism: The Rise of Geopolitics in Russia's Foreign Policy’, Europe-Asia Studies
Vol. 47, No. 6 (1995), pp. 977-988.
131 See for example Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott, Russia and the New States of Eurasia: The Politics of
Upheaval, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp.44-58; Neil McFarlane, ‘Russia, the West and
European Security’,
132 Natalia Morozova, ´Geopolitics, Eurasianism and Russian Foreign Policy Under Putin’, Geopolitics, 14:4,
2009, pp.676-683.
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metaphorical dog that did not bark’.133 In light of current events with Ukraine, dialogue with
Kazakhstan and the rise of Eurasianism into the national discourse, we will see that this
silence may no longer be present. Instead these forms of modernist geopolitics she highlighted
are perhaps more pertinent now than Morozova anticipated.
The ‘Heartland Russia’ narrative is most associated with Alexander Dugin and encompasses
a compassion narrative. Here Russia is presented as a unique civilisation; it alone is able to
harness the powers of Christian Orthodoxy to create a ‘Eurasian system of values’.134
Kazakhstan and the FSU are peripheral, rather than marginal, and are subsumed within the
Russian power-base. Dugin’s obsession with ‘Atlantacists v Eurasianists’, we have seen neo-
Eurasianism re-enter the public consciousness and the political discourse in Russia.135 The
current bout of Eurasianism has been the subject of much attention in the Western political
press, with growing fears about a new sense of imperialism rising in Russia generated through
the conflict in Ukraine, and indeed the earlier conflict in Georgia in 2008. Since the beginning
of Putin’s tenure at the Kremlin he has aligned foreign policy goals with domestic nationalist
politics, prioritising the need to ‘be more attentive, balanced and persistent in defending the
interests of both its compatriots living in Russia and of those who chose CIS countries’. 136
Over the last few years we have seen Putin deploy a mixture of paranoia and patriotism in
order to bolster his domestic power-base; but with the economic foundation of his own project
crumbling, there are real uncertainties here for both Moscow and Astana. Putin has
133 Ibid., pp.683.
134 Ibid., 682
135 Alexander Dugin, Eurasian Mission: An Introduction to Neo-Eurasianism, (London: Artkos Media, 2014). See
also Alan Ingram, ‘Aleksander Dugin: geo-politics and neo-fascism in post-Soviet Russia’, Political Geography
Vol.20, No.8 (2001), pp.1029-35.
136 T. Bukkvoll, ‘Putin’s strategic partnership with the West: The domestic politics of Russian foreign policy,‘
Comparative Strategy, Vol.22, No.3 (2003), pp. 223-242. See also Igor Torbakov, Russia in Search of New
Paradigm: Eurasianism Revisited, 23 March 2000, [available from]
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav032400.shtml
97
increasingly focused the Russian population on an agenda of resentment focused on the
tragedy of Russia’s reduced international status. His prescription has been a return to imperial
ambition combined with a cultural rejection of the values of pluralist open societies, who in
turn are openly encouraging regime change in Russia. Putin’s shift from a somewhat
improvised but nevertheless legal-rational administration to charismatic leader as a form of
political authority in Russia presents the Central Asian states with alarming problems which
are likely to get worse. As their economic entanglement with Russia weakens their own
development, so they will become more vulnerable to coercion from Russia.137
In the second of the modern geopolitical narratives that Morozova presents, ‘Island Russia’,138
a more isolationist narrative that is unwittingly more closely aligned with Kazakh Eurasianism’s
vision of the role of Russia in the FSU. Vadim Tsimburskii is the leading figure of the
movement, and he creates a vision of Russia as being a single ethno-civilisation that is
protected from other civilisations by the Eastern European nations, Ural mountains and the
Steppe.139 This is a return to the idea of a Russia that exists in isolation, harking to an era
before Peter the Great and his desire to create a ‘Europeanised Russia’ from St Petersburg.
Rather than ‘going out’, this is a vision of Russia revelling in splendid isolation, with the FSU
acting as a barrier to pernicious Europeanisation and preserving the integrity of the ethno-
civilisation. This is a future-looking, ideologically-driven foreign policy that aligns more closely
with the foreign policy strategy of the President Putin of today, but that also allows space for
the autonomy and marginality of the FSU.
137 Marlene Laruelle, Russian Nationalism, Foreign Policy and Identity Debates in Putin's Russia: New
Ideological Patterns After the Orange Revolution (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014).
138 Natalia Morozova, ´Geopolitics, Eurasianism’, pp.680-681.
139 Ibid., 680.
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Neo-Eurasianism
Competing with this aggressive Russian Eurasianism are the neo-Eurasianisms.
Independence from the Soviet state has allowed the reimaging of what it means to identify as
‘Russian’, and in doing so has created the space for the Turkic heritage of the many peoples
and cultures that occupy the former-Soviet space, either from within Russia or in Central Asia.
Whilst this creates an opportunity for the exploration of oft-repressed identities it also engages
with competing understandings of what it means to be ‘Russian’ and therefore raises different
understandings of what it means to be loyal to Russia. The rise of the aggressive Russian
Eurasianism has (in its modern incarnation) has its roots in the reunification of territory, and
yet the Russian Federation is home to many diverse ethnic, religious and cultural groups that
envisage their own allegiances, not just the Slavic groups that were present in Rus. Russian
Muslims are presumed natural allies and components of the Dugin-styled Russian ideology of
its ‘civilisation’. Because of this persistent presentation of the Slavic Orthodox population as
the epicentre of culture and politics, separatist movements have continuously appeared to
distort the united conceptualisation of ‘Russia’. This has led to the creation of a Muslim
orientated ‘brand’ of Eurasianism, intent upon redressing the balance between Muslim and
Orthodox leadership within government, most prominently by Russian Muslim member of the
Duma, Abdul-Vakhid Niazov, in 1998.140
From here, the beginnings of discussion of Kazakh and Turkic Eurasianism start to emerge,
with distinct lineages of thought. Both disrupt the Russian narrative and see alternative locus
of power. Turkic Eurasianism shares a similar ideological background to the Russian variety;
both were born of opposition to rising competing imperial visions in Europe at the turn of the
last century, and as such are opposing as well as complimentary visions.141 As with Russian
Eurasianism, the trajectory of the broader Eurasian project has been broken and reformulated
140 Laruelle, Russian Eurasianism: An Ideology of Empire, pp.186-7.
141 ibid. p.188.
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and redistributed through new mediums. Similar to the changing nature of the Great Game
rhetoric, the term ‘Eurasianism’ has lost much of the cohesion and definable qualities. In
Turkey, Avrasyacilik, as it is known, has been used to display a conception of the unification
of states across the ethnically Turkic countries. In its different incarnations it has been based
upon ethnic identity and at other times cultural or religious signifiers to produce Kemelism,
Turkism, pan-Turkism and Turanism. Its revival in the 1990s has been attributed to either the
result of the rise of political Islam and the multi-polarisation of global politics or the
radicalisation of foreign policy.142 Ultimately it remains similar to Russian Eurasianism as both
represent a post-imperial nation struggling to reconcile its identity with its past perceived glory
and current apparently diminished present state.143
Kazakh Eurasianism – ‘Evolution not Revolution’
Weaving between these two strategic cultures rests Kazakhstan’s own particular form of
Eurasianism. Whereas Russia and Turkey pursue a realist zero-sum strategy, Kazakhstan’s
position within international relations is markedly different. Kazakhstan is seeking to become
the catalyst and gatekeeper to a new prosperous Eurasian economic network, to create itself
as an alternative center in the region, and stressing its autonomy/marginality. President
Nazarbayev wants to be personally at the centre of a resurgent Kazakhstan, which in turn is
leading the region into economic growth and development, with recognition from the
international community. Simultaneously, this also incorporates a project to elevate Kazakhs
statehood beyond a Russian-centric or Turkic-centric space, giving the Kazakh Eurasianism
an anti-imperial message by emphasising the benefits for all concerned through mutual
economic growth. And yet, there remain elements of cultural and ethnic supremacy that are
found in the other imperial-styled Eurasianisms, and it retains some aspects of its Soviet
142 Emel Akçalı and Mehmet Perinçek, ‘Kemalist Eurasianism: An Emerging Geopolitical Discourse in Turkey’, 
Geopolitics, Vol.14, No.5 (2009), pp.550–569.
143 M. Suslov, ‘Geographical Metanarratives in Russia and the European East: Contemporary Pan-Slavism,’
Eurasian Geography and Economics, Vol.53, No.5 (2012), pp.575-595.
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legacy both in its theoretical underpinnings and its practical application. However, it wholly
supports the centrality of Kazakhstan in deciding its own future and in this sense does not
define itself by previous imperial understandings of Central Asia.
Kazakh Eurasianism can be understood in two ways. Firstly through the Russian Muslim
Eurasianism that gained traction within Kazakhstan, supported by intellectuals, such as
politician and activist Olzhas Suleimenov, and was supported on religious and cultural
grounds.144 This is still similar to the Russian Orthodox-led understanding of Eurasianism that
positions itself as a way of creating a multi-polar world order, but unlike the Russian view, this
would enable China and India to act as counter-weights to US power in the region.145
Ultimately, the intention would be to generate an anti-Western agenda, retold through the
narrative of Islamic unification based upon the large Muslim population of Russia.146
The second (and more important) imagining of Kazakh Eurasianism is generated from within
the country, and is espoused by the state and forms part of the narrative of public policy.147 In
this sense, Eurasianism has escaped its Russophile origins and now incorporates broad
themes of regionalisation, helping to incorporate Kazakhstan into the wider geopolitical
constructions outside itself as a former colony. By drawing these two powerful brands of
Eurasianism, Kazakh Eurasianism is joining together two very powerful regional narratives.
144 D. Shlapentokh, ‘Islam and Orthodox Russia: From Eurasianism to Islamism’, Communist and post-Communist
Studies, Vol.41, No.1 (2008), pp.27-46.
145 Shlapentokh, ‘Islam and Orthodox Russia: From Eurasianism to Islamism’, pp.29-42.
146 E. Braginskaia, ’”Domestication” or Representation? Russia and the Institutionalisation of Islam in
Comparative Perspective,’ Europe-Asia Studies, Vol.64, No.3 (2012), pp.597-620.
147 There is a form of literary Kazakh Eurasianism that speaks to the political Eurasianism through its
understanding of the relationship between the past and present identity structures, but is ultimately
independent in practise. For a good example see the work of Olzhas Suleimenov such as AZ i IA: Kniga
blagonamerennogo chitatel (The Book of the Well-Intentioned Reader) or a critique of his writing Harsha Ram,
‘Imagining Eurasia: The Poetics and Ideology of Olzhas Suleimenov's Asia’, Slavic Review, Vol.60, No.2 (2001),
pp.289-311.
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President Nazarbayev’s vision is made more ephemeral by the myriad Eurasianist institutions
that have been formulated, joined or encouraged at his behest. Some of these institutions are
more credible than others and include but are not limited to; the Turkic Council; OSCE;
Shanghai Cooperation Organization; Conference of Interaction and Confidence Building
Measures in Asia; Organization of Islamic States; the Eurasian Economic Union; the Eurasian
Union; Eurasian Development Bank; and the Eurasian Club of Scientists. When these
sprawling activities are combined with the aforementioned ‘cross roads of civilisation’ nation-
branding it becomes increasingly difficult to distinguish between object and audience. Who is
this Eurasianism for and what is its focus?
In answer to this question, Marlène Laruelle suggests that ‘Kazakh Eurasianism fits into the
current post-Soviet fashion for nationalist historiography, and it seems incapable of proposing
a different interpretation of colonial history, one that would be less centred on conflict and
victimhood.’148 Laruelle, writing in 2008, was basing this upon the claims in which the then
current generation of Kazakh nationalist historians emphasised a connection to the 1500s in
order to create a cultural linage that would appease a modern nationalist rhetoric of the
subjugation of the cultural rights of the Kazakh people to self-actualisation. What this means
in practise is the creation of a narrative of a long resistance to Russian influence that goes
beyond the 18th century, and instead is ultimately tied to a Siberian legacy. This has been
incorporated into the political framework of the 2000s policy of the state. It is the unequal
treatment of ethnic Russians within the cultural and political spheres of Kazakhstan that
provide Laurelle’s proof; the Assembly of Peoples is supposed to be comprised of the different
ethnicities of the nation, but provides ethnic Russians with neither political parity to ethnic
148 Laruelle, Russian Eurasianism: An Ideology of Empire, p.181. See also L. March, ‘Nationalism for Export? The
Domestic and Foreign-Policy Implications of the New “Russian Idea”,’ Europe-Asia Studies, Vol.64, No.3 (2012),
pp.401-25.
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Kazakhs nor recognises their status as a protected minority.149 This has, Laurelle suggests,
translated into an ambivalence on the part of the state towards Russians living in
Kazakhstan.150
Laurelle is right to engage with Kazakh Eurasianism as an attempt to legitimise Kazakh
nationalism and a useful narrative for statehood. This call to previous centuries, however,
appears to be as much about demonstrating that a concept of Kazakhstan existed prior to the
Soviet era in an attempt to downplay or erase Russian influence as it is about a call to maintain
victim status. This maybe a characteristic of the precise moment in which Laurelle writes that
has since changed, as this repetition of the victim narrative is no longer such a central theme
of the rhetoric of the state-led Eurasianism. Furthermore, Laurelle’s view is more pessimistic
than some of the more locally generated literature. Golam Mostafa speaks of Kazakh
Eurasianism as designed to serve multiple goals,
externally to improve relations with Russia and other regional countries
based upon Eurasian solidarity, balancing relations with Asia and Europe
by playing the role of the bridge… and claiming [to be a] bastion of peace,
stability and neutrality, and domestically to create a successful multi-ethnic,
multinational peaceful and harmonious nation with stability and harmony.151
Although both writers are engaging with different aspects of the Eurasian project, Laurelle with
the more conceptual aspects and Mostafa more with policy issues, they both acknowledge the
149 Laruelle, Russian Eurasianism: An Ideology of Empire, p.180.
150 ibid., p.182. See also M. Laruelle, ‘The Ideological Shift on the Russian Radical Right: From Demonizing the
West to Fear of Migrants,‘ Problems of Post-Communism, Vol.57, No.6 (2010), pp.19-31.
151 Golam Mostafa, ‘The concept of “Eurasia”: Kazakhstan’s Eurasian Policy and its implications’, Journal of
Eurasian Studies, Vol.4, No.1 (2013), p.166.
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perils of presidential rhetoric. Mostafa also gives us a sense of how the Eurasianist vision is
interpreted by local academics, and although it is an endorsement of the sentiments of the
project, it does not mean an endorsement of the state. This is not to suggest that the Kazakh
state is a liberal democracy, or that state rhetoric and action are matched, but instead that the
framing of Kazakh Eurasianism borrows more from its Western contemporary politics than is
acknowledged by the state. There is no historical imperial legacy, instead there is the narrative
of the new and emerging state which is focused upon creating a narrative of autonomy, and
in doing so relocates the boundaries of Russian influence in Kazakhstan. This is enacted to
the extent that there is very little expression of the brutal repression experienced by the ethnic
Kazakhs in Soviet-era history.152 This gruesome and threatening period of recent history is
absorbed but not dwelt upon; there is no narrative of the oppressed, only of a future-focused
‘rising star’.
Competing Eurasianisms
Although there remain strong elements of the Soviet-legacy in Kazakh state Eurasianism, it
speaks of a European influence. Kazakhstan sits between not only three power states, but
three revisionist power states, and even more startling, two of these states are increasingly
nationalistic power states. Russia, China and Turkey are all increasingly agitating their
neighbours as part of a rising nationalistic political rhetoric. Each of these three states has a
foreign policy that is driven by rising nationalist domestic concerns; China is increasingly vocal
in the Senkaku/Diaoyu debate,153 Russia is active in Crimea, and Turkey’s foreign relations
are suffering under the increasingly erratic President Erdogan.154 Despite these increasingly
152 For more information on the absorption of Kazakh historical legacy into modern narratives see Taras Kuzio,
‘History, Memory and Nation Building in the post-Soviet Colonial Space’, Nationalities Papers, Vol.30, No.2,
2002, pp.241-264.
153 Min Gyo Koo, ‘The Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute and Sino-Japanese political-economic relations: cold politics and
hot economics?,’ The Pacific Review, Vol.22, No.2 (2009), pp.205-232.
154 Walter Russell Mead, ‘The Return of Geopolitics: The Revenge of the Revisionist Powers’, Foreign Affairs,
(May/June 2014), pp.69-79. See also C.A. Crocker, ‘The Strategic Dilemma of a World Adrift’, Survival, Vol.57,
No.1 (2015), pp.7-30.
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powerful nationalist agendas percolating through Central Asia, there remains a strong liberal
narrative of mutual growth and positive externalities throughout the Kazakh Eurasianism.
The relationship between these states is also complex, but appears to be thawing. Russia and
China have a tenuously positive relationship, hinging upon the improved energy agreements
signed in the last two years.155 Turkey has increasingly received support from Russia during
the Medvedev era, and despite the continued recognition of the Armenian Genocide, this has
progressed during Putin’s second term. China and Turkey’s relationship has been strained
through the treatment and repression of Uhygur in Xinjiang province, but is gradually
improving, again, through economic interest. Where their interests do coincide is over
American influence in the ‘East’ and general distaste for Western interest and interference in
their domestic ambitions. Despite the weakened economic position of Russia, the ‘Bear’ has
successfully frustrated Western efforts in Eastern Europe, China is dissatisfied with a
secondary position in Asia since America’s ‘pivot to Asia’, and Turkey is turning its back on its
former EU dream and igniting old feuds with Egypt over the Muslim Brotherhood.156
However, warming relations and a common enemy between three fractious power states does
not necessarily translate into an alliance, nor into a good environment for the burgeoning vision
of Kazakh Eurasianism. There is no basis for integration here between the states, no shared
legacy, and nothing beyond economic interest to inspire group loyalty or cement economic
cohesion. Across Asia (and indeed in much of Europe) we are seeing the rise of nationalism
to support the solidification of regime figureheads and party interest. This creates a potential
framework for cooperation but also for more of the zero-sum competition that is dominating
155 Gregory Shtraks, ‘Sino-Russian Relations and the Lessons of 1996 A watershed year for Russia’, 13 April
2015 http://thediplomat.com/2015/04/sino-russian-relations-and-the-lessons-of-1996/
156 Ziya Öniş, ‘Turkey and the Arab revolutions: boundaries of regional power influence in a turbulent Middle 
East,’ Mediterranean Politics, Vol.19, No.2 (2014), pp.203-19.
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their domestically driven agendas; is there room for each power state to pursue its own
narrative of Central Asia?
The simple answer is no; these are zero-sum assertions of regional control to present a
unifying concept of Eurasianism. The three represent very different grand strategies each
constructed around a distinct basis for legitimacy. As a driver, ethnicity is most prominent in
the Turkic vision, for Russia an imperial-nationalist messianism is key and for Kazakhstan the
emphasis is upon the elevation of its fledgling statehood and creating a regional leadership
position. Russia is concerned with advancing its influence in the region through a claim to
supremacy over the Kazakh state, and indeed Central Asia. As a result these dominant
narratives present a threat to the Kazakh autonomous process and ultimately represent a
return to colonialism through their projection of otherness onto Central Asia. Turkish
Eurasianism has at times incorporated Central Asia into its vision for Central Asia and vice
versa, such as through the creation of the Turkic Council by President Nazarbayev. On the
other hand Russian Eurasianism is resisted.157
This contrasts with the more companionable strategy ideals of Kazakhstan. Furthermore there
are differences between the foundational necessity of each of these visions; each state has
its own justification for a Eurasian project. As naïve and illogical and riddled with
inconsistencies as some aspects of the Kazakh grand strategy are, it provides the most benign
(if decidedly nationalistic) grand strategy for the region, and incorporates Western-centric
schemes within a recognisably post-Soviet framework. It is a more positive and progressive
vision of regional development in which the underachievement of the region is acknowledged
157 Dmitry Shlapentokh, ‘Turkey and Kyrgyzstan Deepen Ties’. Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Analyst (2012).
106
in what Nazarbayev terms the ‘belt of anticipation’ of states between India and Russia, always
on the cusp of achieving economic security.158
This pandering to supporting states generates a continuously oscillating relationship between
religion and politics, Islam and Russia, society and the state. In the autumn of 2003,
Nazarbayev presided over the "Convention of Worldwide and Traditional Religious Leaders”
and announced a construction project called the "Palace of Nations". This remarkable-looking
building contained a mosque, an orthodox church, a synagogue and a Buddhist temple and
has now been designated the “Temple of Peace and Harmony". No-one could miss the overt
symbol of commitment to religious diversity. By glossing over domestic strife, Kazakhstan has
generated a first-mover advantage through its early adoption of a ‘regional hub’ strap-line,
which could just as easily be afforded any of the other Central Asian states. The claim to be
at the crossroads of continents, cultures and religions, dilutes the over-all image, making it a
less easily identifiable target, but also permits Kazakhstan to retain the ability to align itself
with religiously conflicting states. The ‘Palace of Nations’ therefore projects an image of
religious tolerance – something Kazakhstan will need if it is to continue to project itself as the
‘Crossroads of Civilisations’. In doing so, it not only advertises to the Ummah that Kazakhstan
is no longer under Soviet-styled oppression of religion, but also to the West where religious
tolerance is accorded the status of being a basic human right.159
Religious, and especially Islamic, groups within Russia explicitly reject any association with
the extremism and express loyalty to secular ideals, yet through their factional infighting and
158 Golam Mostafa, ‘The concept of “Eurasia”: Kazakhstan’s Eurasian Policy and its implications’, Journal of
Eurasian Studies, Vol.4, No.1 (2013), p.166. See also T. Ambrosio and William A. Lange, ‘Mapping Kazakhstan’s
geopolitical code: an analysis of Nazarbayev’s presidential addresses, 1997–2014’, Eurasian Geography and
Economics, Vol. 55, No.5 (2015), pp.537-55.
159 Rico Isaacs, ‘”Papa”–Nursultan Nazarbayev and the Discourse of Charismatic Leadership and Nation‐
Building in Post‐Soviet Kazakhstan,’ Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism, Vol.10, No.3 (2010), pp.435-452.
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power-struggles they are unable to control the fringes of their congregation from agitating the
state.160 Sunni Islam, along with Protestantism and Catholicism, is seen as a naturally
disruptive religion, able to be penetrated by Wahhabism and therefore a threat to the exercise
of Russian Eurasianism.161 There is therefore, no space within the Russian framework for
allegiance to any entity beyond ‘Russia’, and the growing alliance between Putin and the
Russian Orthodox Church reflects this increasing use of the Church to justify statist policies
and political authoritarianism.162 This again is a direct contradiction to the Kazakh position on
the tolerance of promotion of religious difference. Furthermore, Pan-Turkism is another
rejection of the unique religious and cultural identities within Eurasia; instead each is brought
under the banner of being a Turkic people, rather than the multiculturalism that the Kazakh
Eurasianism espouses, and the leadership requires/desires, in its bid to improve its young
statehood.
This chapter began by analysing the unique operating environment of Kazakhstan. It has
shown how the state has been ambitious in its goals for the development of Kazakhstan and
the vitality of the oil industry to achieving its development projects. Kazakhstan has long seen
itself as a ‘benign facilitator’, a leader for regional economic development and through its
nation branding, a gateway between East and West. However, the competing Eurasianisms
of Russia, Turkey and Kazakhstan exemplify the difficulty that the Kazakh state faces in trying
to assert its ambitious plans for development. This represents a clash between its desire to
be autonomous and marginal, whilst being presumed peripheral in the narratives of power
states. The goals of preserving independence, economic prosperity and the security of Kazakh
160 Laruelle, Russian Eurasianism: An Ideology of Empire, p.155.
161 Marlene Laruelle, ‘Alexandre Dugin: A “Eurasianist” View on Chechnya and the North Caucasus’, North
Caucasus Analysis, Vol.8, No.6. See also M. Laruelle, ‘The two faces of contemporary Eurasianism: an imperial
version of Russian nationalism,’ Nationalities Papers, Vol.32, No.1 (2004), pp.115-36.
162 See the following for different yet converging analysis of the role of the role of the church in the rise of
nationalism in Russia today: Sean Cannady and Paul Kubicek, ‘Nationalism and Legitimation for Authoritarianism:
A Comparison of Nicholas I and Vladimir Putin’, Journal of Eurasian Studies, Vol.5, No.1 (2014), pp.1–9; Brian
Rourke & Andrew Wiget, ‘Pussy Riot, Putin and the Politics of Embodiment, Cultural Studies, (2014) DOI:
10.1080/09502386.2014.974644
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culture articulated by the President's ‘Kazakhstan 2050 plan’ are under threat from power
states’ plans for the region. With this in mind, the chapter will now turn to the ways in which a
state can use oil to bring about a foreign policy agenda, and the extent to which Kazakhstan
has been able to achieve these goals. How does Kazakhstan manage its position with large
powers, relative to other states in the same conundrum of unwanted interference?
Energy as Foreign Policy and Strategy in Kazakhstan
For Kazakhstan, energy policy is a means to achieving strategic goals for the state,
autonomy/marginality, rather than an end goal in itself. Rather more energy is used as a tool
with which to achieve foreign and domestic policy objectives, shaping the environment in
which Kazakhstan finds itself operating and indeed there are many historical examples of the
overt use of oil to secure strategic or foreign policy goals. Russia has frequently favoured
Armenia, Belarus and (under President Kuchma) Ukraine, whilst Georgia, Moldova, and the
Baltic States have been frequently targeted with supply disruptions and punitive price regimes.
In the Middle East, during the Suez Crisis, Saudi Arabia withdrew oil from sale to Israel, France
and Britain, similarly, oil was withdrawn from the Allies during the Six Days War to encourage
the withdrawal of Israel, and again OPEC removed oil during the Yom Kippur War. In Latin
America, Bolivia has refused to supply gas to Chile, and has wrangled over prices with
Argentina and Brazil. 163
The strategic difference between these examples is generated through the composition of the
commodities. Oil is relatively easy to distribute and redistribute when a supply state cuts the
supply. In the Middle Eastern examples there was no shortage in supply to the demand
163 Randall Newnham, ‘Oil, carrots, and sticks: Russia’s energy resources as a foreign policy tool’, Journal of
Eurasian Studies, Vol.2, No.2 (2011), pp.134–43. See also E. Kropatcheva, ‘He who has the pipeline calls the
tune? Russia's energy power against the background of the shale “revolutions”,’ Energy Policy, Vol.66, No.1
(2014), pp.1-10.
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countries because they were able to select another supplier, and without globally uniform and
enforced sanctions, as we have seen with states such as Iran, there are usually alternative
suppliers. There are some small sticking points, such as the type of oil (sweet, sour, light etc)
and the need to match this to a refinery, but these are relatively minor considerations. With
gas, the situation is different. There is more pipeline and supply-line dependency, leaving the
demand state more vulnerable to the policy of the supply state. Russia therefore has more
strategic leverage as a gas exporter than as an oil exporter, and Kazakhstan’s oil-centric
energy industry is less able to wield its resources as a foreign policy tool.
Meghan O’Sullivan suggests that there are three factors that determine a state’s ability to use
oil as a foreign policy weapon. The first is the condition of the oil market, the second is the
willingness of the producing state to actually reduce its production rather than reroute it, and
the third is the level of risk that the producing state is willing to incur.164 The current oil market
is a buyer’s market; low prices, high production costs, increased global supply and rising
shareholder expectations are contributing to a considerably lower price per barrel than in the
previous decade. OPEC, attentive to consumer requirements has sought to gradually increase
production whilst simultaneously devaluing the price per barrel in order to stimulate demand,
and commit to this package for the next few years.165 For Kazakhstan with its high breakeven
point on major fields, this is bad news. Its ability to build economic and political value through
wealth is encroached upon, and this moves Kazakhstan into competition with regional and
global states for consumer contracts.
164 R.N. Haass and Meghan L. O’Sullivan, ‘Terms of Engagement: Alternatives to Punitive Policies’, Survival,
Vol.42, No. 2 (2000), pp.113-35. See also Meghan L. O'Sullivan, 'Iran and the Great Sanctions Debate', The
Washington Quarterly, Vol.33, No.4, (2010), pp.7-21.
165 Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, OPEC Monthly Oil Market Report, 16th April 2015
Vienna, accessed 18 September 2015,
http://www.opec.org/opec_web/static_files_project/media/downloads/publications/MOMR_April_2015.pdf
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Connected to this is O’Sullivan’s second assertion on the willingness of a state to reduce its
production to achieve a strategic goal. Domestically, this would be political suicide for the
leadership of Kazakhstan in the face of an economic downturn based upon the state of the
Russian rouble. It would also compromise the development goals that the state has publically
declared. Kazakhstan has built up reserves (financial reserves) to stimulate the economy
through sovereign wealth funds, but this is not enough for a long-term, trench warfare-type
strategy. The privatisation within the sector makes this difficult to enforce without losing
investment in the industry. Furthermore, it would be nigh on impossible to attract FDI from
alternative, qualified oil partners in the current global market if there was also a decline in the
condition of the rule of law. Whereas states such as Iran can exert considerable influence
through their geographical location on strategic oil choke points, such as the Strait of Hormuz,
Kazakhstan is hindered, not enabled, through its location. Instead, its inability to exercise
control over its landlocked position, nestled within states such as Iran and Russia reduces its
strategic choice.
Where Kazakhstan has shown itself to be more willing is in the third criteria; the strategic risks
that it has been willing to take. The countries at the beginning of this section that were
described as using oil as a foreign policy tool (the OPEC states, Russia and Bolivia) use their
oil to achieve a positive outcome; conversely, Kazakhstan is using oil for to extricate itself from
its given environment. These other states derive strength from their oil foreign policy through
the upstream delivery of oil to the consumer, whilst Kazakhstan has to use the downstream
and midstream sections of its industry. Kazakhstan cannot use the threat of reducing supply
to the end user; this is an unacceptable outcome in the current climate and does not suit its
strategic agenda. As we shall see from the proceeding chapters, Kazakhstan uses the
midstream aspects of its industry to secure its foreign policy goals. By removing itself from the
stranglehold of the Russian oil refinery network, it is still using the oil industry as its foreign
policy tool, the focus is just not upon the liquid resource itself. As Chapter 4 will show,
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Kazakhstan has pursued alternative supply routes to take Kazakh oil to market in the face of
Russian aggression and opposition. As Chapter 5 will show, Kazakhstan has used its oil
revenue as a way to build alliances with China in order to secure its national security and
foreign policy objectives. There will be limitations to the willingness of China to take on this
role, but the use of oil as a method of fortifying relationships has long been a strategy of the
Cold War era, and the same actors are once again involved.
Conclusion
Central Asia is subject to many narratives that seek to define its purpose and position. For
modern Russian political dialogue, Kazakhstan is either a buffer for Island Russia, part of the
civilising mission of Dugin, or the natural extension of Putin’s ‘Power Vertical’. Turkish
Eurasianism sees Kazakhstan as a younger sibling joined by a common but waning Turkic
connection. Kazakhstan’s President has created an alternative narrative of what he perceives
as his country’s position within international relations based upon the strength afforded by
natural resources. Here Kazakhstan is the benign leader of regional affairs, a peaceful haven
able to reach out to multiple nations, cultures and religions. In doing so there is an
acknowledgement of Parker’s principles of marginality, namely that the state has internalised
this conception of autonomy and is seeking to act upon this is order to gain autonomous
advantage. Kazakhstan’s perceived power, its marginality, is drawn from its location on the
edges of power states; a benign alternative center and a gatekeeper to other countries.
Strategically we can see oil as simultaneously providing a source of conflict, development,
cooperation, vulnerability and strength. It has produced the framework within which
Kazakhstan is able to drive economic development and assert independence, but yet, through
the geopolitical context in which it finds itself there is great vulnerability through the aggressive,
powerful neighbours. As a young state with ambitious plans, oil has enabled a determined
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strategy to be enacted through the complicated and obtuse mechanisms of the Kazakh state.
For the time being, rather than allowing its marginality on the edge of large powers to mean
dependence, it has begun a process of disassociation. Although in its infancy, Kazakhstan is
moving towards using its marginality as a tool for action and influence. It is Kazakhstan’s
conscious ownership of its position on the edges of the polarities that makes it able to utilise
its position for influence; rather than this being a symptom of vulnerability. This position of
strength and potential is generated through the national oil industry and forms the basis of
understanding for its changing international relationships. But underneath this, the Manichean
tactics of the state interrupt the implementation of strategy.
Kazakhstan has generated its own form of Eurasianism, at once accepting and subverting the
idea from its original colonial context. It is an altogether more benign model of Eurasia, less
interested in undermining other regional actors, but it ultimately remains a self-aggrandising
project. In a certain light it can be viewed as a stronger form of Eurasianism than the Russian
project. Where the Russian model is weakened by its forceful, hyper-masculinised, predatory
approach, the Kazakh understanding of Eurasianism is more inclined towards positive
inclusion of surrounding states. Carrot rather than stick.
This does not make ‘Kazakh Eurasianism’ a desirable or even achievable construct. Many
states position themselves as the ‘crossroads of civilisation’. Macedonia and Cyprus already
have similar projects, and so to what extent is Kazakhstan’s approach unique? Or indeed are
any of the nation-branding exercises able to make a claim towards uniqueness? Nation-
branding is a liberal project, born of the perceived need to communicate a vision to an
international audience in the hope that it will improve the integration of the state into the
international system. It is a performance by the state, not necessarily grounded in any
particular reality, nor is there a ‘true’ vision of the nation to be uncovered. With so many states
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competing to create artificial explanations to improve their status, Kazakhstan’s message is in
danger of being lost amongst a cacophony of voices.
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Chapter 4
Kazakhstan: Oil and Governance
Kazakhstan is a small power that faces significant strategic challenges on its door step.
Creating a unique identity as an independent country that is able to operate autonomously
and influence its environment is indeed a challenge given the competing narratives for Eurasia
that the previous chapter presented. To achieve this, Kazakhstan has, according to former
Prime Minister, Imangali Tasmagambetov, moved from a ’strategy of survival to a strategy of
prosperity’, via a period of rapid privatisation and by riding the wave of an investment boom.166
Today there are many strategic choices that are available to the state, and yet the myriad daily
decisions taken to construct the reality of this prosperity narrative sit in the gap between action
and rhetoric, restricted by the strategic choices of structures, actors and ideas contained within
the microcosm of the political landscape. The Soviet legacy is still visible in the decision-
making processes of government; high-level corruption and a revolving door of leadership
between National Oil Company (NOC) and government positions compromising the search
for an ‘authentic’ Kazakh state.This balancing act between state and industry, development
and identity, is not unique to Kazakhstan, but its choices are. NOCs control ninety percent of
the world’s oil reserves and two thirds of world oil production. This mass nationalisation of the
oil fields came about through the desire to not only unlock the profit of the oil fields for the host
nation, but also to reveal the technological secrets of the processes, technology and personnel
that were encased within the industry and yet each NOC operates entirely differently. Norway’s
Statoil and Russia’s Gazprom are both highly profitable organisations but they fulfil entirely
different functions within the industry and with their relationship to their home countries, crafted
by entirely opposite strategic cultures at state and industry level. The political processes that
led to their creation are evident in their modern functions; Statoil is overseen by multiple
166 Imangali Tasmagambetov, ‘Kazakhstan: From a Strategy of Survival to a Strategy of Prosperity’, American
Foreign Policy Interests: The Journal of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy, Vol.27, No.1,
(2005) p.33.
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committees and total separation between the regulator, the state and the firm, whilst Gazprom
operates as a wing of the state in matters of domestic and foreign policy. KazMunaiGas
(KMG), the Kazakh national oil firm is just as unique, shaped by the powerful geographical
and cultural forces that led to its creation and it is through understanding these relationships
that we can begin to understand the everyday mechanisms and moments of strategic culture
that are meeting the ideational narratives of the leadership. This is as much driven by forces
external to the government as it is to the individuals operating from within, and this chapter
aims to identify these actors and events that are creating the current climate knowledge.
Building governance is more than merely creating structure. It is the fluid, dynamic processes
and strategy that multiple actors engage with in order to steer, control and organise the
practises of the state operating together.167 Crucially there is not ideal or ultimate model of
governance, no singular definition of ‘good governance’, and therefore, measuring the
normative qualities of state governance is not a useful pursuit. More useful, is understanding
the practical manifestations of marginality through the governance strategy of the state. How
is marginality being achieved through strategic practises in Kazakhstan, and what role does
governance play in the formation of positive marginality?
To answer these questions, this chapter examines the relationship between the state and the
energy industry. Using a framework for understanding governance developed by Victor, Hults
and Thurber, it creates a systematic analysis of the many relationships and audiences that
are present in the Kazakh system of oil governance.168 Using their method of analysis , we are
able to identify key features of the Kazakh industry; historical legacy, government
relationships, International Oil Company (IOC) contracts, strategy, and prospects for reform.
167 J. Pierre and B. Peters, Governance, Politics and the State (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000), p.5.
168 David Victor, David Hults & Mark Thurber, Oil and Governance: State-owned Enterprises and the World
Energy Supply (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010).
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The chapter focuses upon the internal dynamics and mechanics of the project for marginality
rather than the wider geopolitical relationships which are addressed in the following chapters.
This is a study of the development of the Kazakh industry in its own right, rather than being
viewed through the lens of another state, and generates the basis for understanding how the
Kazakh state has responded to and negotiated its relationships with power states and retained
independent process.
The chapter begins by providing a brief overview of the industry to provide context, before
explaining the strategy of the state oil company. The purpose of the chapter is to dissect and
disentangle the web of relationships between the local population, the state oil company, the
government and the International Oil Companies (IOCs). Doing so provides a complete picture
of the governance style and features that are in place, but more than that it allows us to identify
the practical steps that have been taken by the state to develop the industry. Who defines the
objectives of the NOC, if indeed there are clearly defined objectives at all? Who are these
goals attempting to satisfy; the domestic population or political elite? Finding answers to these
questions creates a study of the Kazakh oil industry that is immediately applicable to wider
research on the global oil and gas industry. The chapter will conclude by contrasting the results
of the Victor, Hults and Thurber study on governance to contextualise these findings against
the industry norms.
Introduction to Kazakh Energy Industry
Key features of the modern Kazakh industry are defined by its geography. As a littoral state
on the Caspian, large portions of its 30 billion barrels of proven reserves are on disputed
sea/lake that share borders with unstable states; namely Iran, Russia, Azerbaijan and
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Turkmenistan. Its climate makes oil extraction exceedingly difficult through a combination of
offshore rigs and extreme summer/winter temperature swings and regularly impacts upon
production and development. Getting oil to market requires a combination of tankers, trains
and pipelines from this central point on the Eurasian landmass to the consuming countries
around the edge of the continent which further causes a bottleneck in export capability.
Domestic consumption is high, around similar levels to that of Russia, but it is nowhere near
the efficiency of western European countries, or the extreme inefficiency of China and Saudi
Arabia.169 The onshore fields Tengiz, Karachaganak, Aktobe, Mangistau, Uzen and off shore
fields Kashagan and Kurmangazy generate the majority of Kazakhstan’s oil, and is supplied
to Italy, China, Netherlands, Austria and France as the main consumers of Kazakh oil. In this
sense, geography is determining Kazakhstan’s geopolitical tools rather than its strategy,
technique or goals.
The Kazakh oil strategy has catapulted it into the top 12 oil producers in the world and as of
2011 it has tripled its exports compared to its Soviet-era production rates. This has not been
achieved in isolation, and there are a great many international oil companies that have helped
to develop the sector including KMG, Eni, ExxonMobil, Shell, and Total. When the ‘supergiant’
Kashagan field eventually reaches fruition, Kazakhstan will be in the top ten of world oil
producers. The national oil company KazMunaiGas is an integral part of the industry and
operates as an integrated oil company (meaning it has operations in exploration, development,
refining, transportation, distribution and servicing through a series of subsidiary companies).
KMG holds a 50% stake in all production-sharing agreements which are the favoured contract
format of the Kazakh government. It has only been established a relatively short while, since
169 For more information about comparative rates of consumption the US Energy Information Administration
has a wealth of easily accessible data. See for example US Energy Information Administration, ‘International
Energy Outlook 2014’, (Washington DC: US Department of Energy, 2014).
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a 2002 merger between Kazakhoil and Oil and Gas Transportation, and according to
Transparency International’s report on the national oil companies, it is making progress
towards international standards even if there is still considerable work left to achieve.170 It
publishes comprehensive audited reports, which includes its subsidiary companies, and in
theory reports on revenue generation and collection as well as the full disclosure of the
management financial interests in the oil and gas industry. However, this does not translate
into full disclosure of transparent communication between the state and the public and has
provoked fatal riots between KMG management and communities in West Kazakhstan.
Development of the Industry
1991- Corporatism
With its first commercial production occurring in 1911, Kazakhstan has a long if not always
profitable place in the history of world petroleum. Production began in the Soviet era, when
the Republic of Kazakhstan was the Kazakh SSR, but inefficient production methods and low
oil prices meant that it was very underdeveloped compared to the Urals-Volga region until the
1990s. Its potential was known, but development was always seen as a future project. When
independence arrived overnight in1991, and Kazakhstan became the republic it is today, the
state did not expect to be in charge of its own industry and did not have sufficient funds to
170 Relative to other states in the region and more established and developed countries, Kazakhstan has made
more efforts towards transparency although the industry can still be considered corrupt. Kazakhstan scored 13%
for reporting on anti-corruption programmes (industry average 43%). This is based upon the reporting of
Kazakhstan on the anti-corruption programme UN Global Compact Reporting Guidance on the 10th Principle
Against Corruption. KazMunayGas scored 75% for organisational disclosure (industry average 63%).
Organisational disclosure means reporting the organisational structure, operations, partnerships and standards
used for financial accounts. This can be explained by the higher levels of accounting required in order to
participate on the LSE by KMG and its subsidiaries. Kazakhstan does not feature at all for country level disclosure
because it does have sufficient overseas operations to be included in this section of analysis. For the full report
see Revenue Watch & Transparency International, ’Promoting Revenue Transparency; 2011 Report on Oil and
Gas Companies’, Transparency International Secretariat, Berlin, 2010.
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develop the industry which was so essential to the country’s growth. As a result there was
confusion in these early years.
The first NOC was Kazakhstanmunaigaz, based upon Rosneft, and was plagued by struggles
within the government ministries. President Nazarbayev responded by disbanding the Soviet
era Ministry of Energy and ensuring that Kazakhstanmunaigaz would not be subordinated to
a ministry again, creating a centralised decision-making process, but failing to prevent further
political struggles for control.171 This consolidation of power was as much about the
continuation of the president as it was about the continuation of the industry. Wojciech
Ostrowski proposed that the early history of the Kazakh oil industry could be divided into three
distinct phases; Corporatism, Privatisation, and Post-Privatisation.
The early years, 1991-1994 are characterised by a phase of ‘corporatism’.172 This refers to the
series of formal networks of interested parties which allowed power structures to be generated
from below. The early Kazakh oil men benefited from the lack of a legal framework between
public and private ventures. This ill-defined mixture resulted in key positions in the industry
being allocated to formal institutions in the industry on the basis of personal relationships,
using them as intermediaries between the central power structures and the branches of the
industry. This was particularly apparent in the early Tengiz projects, when those who were not
involved in this project began to challenge the authority of the state, and take part in the battle
for control of KMG.173 The partial privatisation via the local elites only served to create
opportunities for politically interested groups to become powerful and challenge the
presidency, and ultimately the stability of the industry, resulting in Nazarbayev’s decision to
171 Wojeciech Ostrowski, Politics and Oil in Kazakhstan (London: Routledge, 2010).
172 ibid., pp.32-42
173 ibid., pp.33-34
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temporarily abandon this wave of privatisation in favour of a series of client-patron
relationships.
Creating a national oil company is not the only way to manage a national oil and gas industry,
so why should Kazakhstan choose this model in the post-privatisation years? Nolan & Thurber
effectively demonstrate the role of risk in the decision of the state to determine the role of the
IOC and the NOC in development of an oil industry.174 As discussed in the literature review
the decision to seek partnerships with IOCs is often the result of a risk assessment to ascertain
the level of exposure that the state is comfortable with. In the case of Kazakhstan, it was near
bankruptcy on the part of the Kazakh state that prompted the movement to create partnerships
with IOCs, and IOCs prefer the local knowledge provided by an NOC where applicable. There
were other models that the Kazakh state could have pursued. It need not have opted to create
its own national oil company and instead have developed a regulatory industry, made slow
and deliberate tenders to increase or decrease exploration, enforced local content quotas and
created a consortium of IOCs with strict production quotas. The UK government, for example,
has little connection to British Petroleum but it does retain a tight regulatory role over the
production of North Sea Oil. In the early days of a new state such as Kazakhstan, weak,
powerless and easily bullied, the terms of trade are difficult to negotiate in the states favour.175
174 Peter Nolan and Mark Thurber, ‘On the State’s Choice of Oil Company: Risk Management and the Frontier of
the Petroleum Industry’, 10 December 2010, Program in Energy and Sustainable Development, Stanford
University.
175 The one key advantage that the NOC model has over the regulation model is in the long term benefits. Once
the NOC has learnt from the IOCs it has partnered in the development of the local industry it can begin to apply
this knowledge to overseas production, and increase its revenue beyond its own reserves. Kazakhstan
production requires a very complex extraction process that few companies in the world had the capability and
R & D budget to develop, will soon be able to cast its eyes around the world as a developing partner in other
projects. And, as the new projects are increasingly hostile conditions, frontier exploration in offshore and artic
locations, so technological capability will increasingly be what secures project contracts. Kazakhstan is not yet
in a position to ‘go out’ as it does not yet have the requisite competencies or competitive edge in the market,
but with political will this is an opportunity for the future.
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1994 – Privatisation
In order to compete with Azerbaijan and undo the power of the local elites, Nazarbayev began
a program of privatisation in 1994. As Martha Brill Olcott notes, the presidential elections were
looming and the president’s popularity was beginning to wane as those who has not benefitted
from the privatisation sought to gain advantage.176 In order to rectify this Nazarbayev
appointed his family members to key positions and in a less than transparent set of moves,
allocated key figures to industry positions, essentially as clients of the president. A new Prime
Minister, Kazhegeldin, oversaw the transition and a new generation of young technocrats was
ushered in, above the positions occupied by the old generation of oil men who were openly
criticising the president. Local akims and intermediaries were used to keep an eye on these
‘oil men’ and were kept wealthy, but away from the seat of power.177 Foreign investors at this
time were weary. The president was able to change the constitution and issue decrees at the
drop of a hat and there was no rule of law with which to stabilise their investments, making
some of the president’s more strident contractual demands unrealistic.
2000s Post- privatisation
From 1997 onwards there marked a new period in the industry – the end of privatisation. No
new contracts were allowed to be signed as Nazarbayev declared it was time to think about
the third generation of Kazakhs and make sure there was something left for them. In 2002
KMG was established in order to create a unified state policy and a single authority with which
to present to foreign companies as a partner on the Caspian shelf. This would allow KMG to
take the lead on projects, and create a more authoritative bargaining power in negotiations.
Once again, all the leading figures were close to Nazarbayev. Assets that had once been
owned by international companies were slowly bought by local elites. For example Nelson
176 Marthe Brill Olcott, ‘Central Asia’s Second Chance’, p.138.
177 Wojeciech Ostrowski, ‘Politics and Oil in Kazakhstan’, p.52.
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Resources once owned a northern Mangistau field and began buying up assets across the
region. It was later revealed that the leadership figure of this company was Timur Kulibayev,
a local elite with close family ties to the president.178 The extent to which this process occurred
across the region is made harder to understand because of the myriad off-shore holdings.
2010s – Redefinition
This next phase has been characterised by renegotiation and redefining the role and contracts
of the foreign IOCs, the modernization of the industry and the wave of participation by Chinese
firms. A more robust policy with the international firms has begun to shape the industry and
the government has not been shy to push the role of KMG to the front of negotiations, whether
that’s insisting upon the majority shares in new projects, or the first refusal of KMG to purchase
any new holdings that become available. China has had an enormous impact upon the Kazakh
market both as a market for Kazakh oil through the opening of new pipelines, or as a large
partner in the Kashagan field, and also through the billions of dollars for infrastructure that
accompany each move by CNPC into the Kazakh market. It has also been a time in which the
IOCs have come under increasing scrutiny by the state as ENI discovered when it was
removed from the leading partner position at the wealthy Kashagan plant because of a poor
record on deliverables.
Explaining KMGs Strategy and Performance
As it stands today, JSC NC KazMunayGas is a large fully integrated oil company that has
subsidiaries operating in all stages of the industry. All shares of the JSC NC KazMunaiGas
178 Wojeciech Ostrowski, ‘Politics and Oil in Kazakhstan’, p. 58.
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belong to JSC National Welfare Fund Samruk-Kazyna. A board of directors and a
management board flow to 36 subsidiary companies that are operating underneath six core
areas, each with its own management team –Exploration and Production, Transportation of
Oil, Gas Project, Processing and Marketing of Oil, and Service Projects. This corporate
structure was implemented following the merging of Kazakhoil and Transport of Oil and Gas.
The aim was to create a vertically integrated oil company that would eventually become a
transnational company, or an INOC, similar to other NOCs today such as CNPC or Statoil.
The recentralisation of the oil companies was designed to consolidate the structures within
control of the government once more, bringing the oil industry back under command of the
state and as a result, the president. Currently, there are a series of shareholder arrangements
between the companies that keeps each segment fully integrated but there is the potential that
when a new president eventually succeeds Nazarbayev, they could separate out these firms,
dramatically altering the structure of the industry.179 This current structure also allows the
management of the parent company, NC KMG to exercise control over the members of each
board, giving final say on hiring, strategy etc. In turn, as we shall see below the close
connection between the board members of the parent NC KMG and the government leaves
KMG as a whole vulnerable to government coercion and the pursuit of commercially conflicting
agendas.
The long-term strategy of KMG is (as would be expected) intimately connected with the
government’s wider development projects of the industry. The core strategy of KMG
Transportation is to become the sole operator in Kazakhstan and expand capacity. Currently,
there are two completely separate gas networks operating across Kazakhstan.180 Crucially
this creates a problem getting locally produced gas from the Western region to the Southern
179 Martha Brill Olcott, ‘KazMunaiGas: Kazakhstan’s National Oil Company’, Carnegie Foundation, Rice
University, 2007.
180 KazMunayGas, ‘Company Strategy’, KazMunayGas, 2014, accessed 16 September 2015,
http://www.kmg.kz/en/about/strategy/
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Almaty to Shymkent industrial powerhouse of the country. Not only is this politically
undesirable from the perspective of the president, but it means that Kazakhstan has to rely
upon imported gas from Uzbekistan. The Beiney-Bozoi-Akbulak pipeline will go some way to
rectifying this as a long term plan as well as supplying China, but full reconnection of the
country is not an immediately financially viable project. Low domestic prices in the oil market
have perpetuated a similar problem in the refining sector. It is simply more profitable to export
the oil for refining than it has been to develop the refinery capacity at home. However the
development of Kashagan field, has forced some aspects of this to change and as such there
is currently an ambitious schedule of refurbishment and development of the refineries, led by
KMG. This is a significant achievement for the development of the the industry but not enough
to rectify the problem completely. Reducing oil pipeline dependence upon Russia is a
geopolitical goal that has become manifest within the KMG group and once again only possible
through changes in the refinery and pipeline stages of oil and gas delivery.
The upstream strategy of KMG is simply to expand in all directions. As a bold ambition, the
company has set itself the ultimate goal of becoming one of the thirty largest oil and gas
companies in the world. KMG want to expand its production both through increasing its current
market share through the accumulation of shares in existing projects and through exploration
of new ventures. Exploration of new fields in the Caspian (the pre-Caspian Depression, the
Caspian Sea Shelf and the Aral Sea Shelf as well as smaller areas in North, Central and South
Kazakhstan) will still require input from foreign firms for reasons of technical capability. The
low hanging fruit in Kazakhstan have all been taken or are in the process of being developed.
As a result these new fields available for development are exceptionally complex. There is
abnormal pressure in the reservoirs and it requires wells of seven thousand metres, which
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have a prohibitively expensive estimate price of approximately $50million per well.181 At the
moment KMG does not have the technology or financial capacity to construct this project
alone, or even as a controlling partner.
Internationally, the rebranding of the small Rompetrol Holding as KMG International is part of
the wider project to eventually expand overseas, and this is the first move towards achieving
a more unified and recognisable brand outside of Kazakhstan. At present, a quarter of all oil
refined in Romania is from Kazakhstan, and it is expected within the industry that this will be
the beginning of a transition towards becoming a minor INOC, although this may take some
considerable time considering the capacity restriction of the firm. Domestically the refinery
system needs extensive work. Currently much of the raw crude has be shipped to Russia in
order to be refined, increasing reliance upon its unstable northern neighbour, as well as
removing the flow of profit from Kazakhstan. After significant negotiation with Russia (see
chapter 6) there has been significant development of these refineries and this remains a core
part of the Kazakh energy strategy.
To achieve all of these goals KMG is part of a government funded strategy to develop the
industry and surrounding infrastructure. The project is worth $143.4 billion, of which KMG’s
share is $67 billion.182 A core part of this development will be the $6 billion to be spent on the
refineries. The financing for this project will be from bank loans and the issuing of Eurobonds
of which KMG has currently issued $7.25 billion. In order to meet these targets KMG will need
to overcome some major hurdles. Primarily, there will be issues with funding these deals. The
181 Dosym Satpaev, ‘The Main Problems and Opportunities of KazMunaiGas in its Realization of its Oil and Gas
Projects Wikileaks’, WikiLeaks, 2010, accessed 16 September, https://wikileaks.org/gifiles/docs/55/5514684_-
fwd-re-hello-dosym-.html
182 KazMunayGas, ‘KazMunayGas (KMG) Is The Vehicle For Kazakh Government Policy In The Oil And Gas
Industry’, 1 October 2013, accessed 12 September 2015,
http://www.kmg.kz/en/press/company_news/publication/10557#.VEZ4h_l4o7t
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majority of KMGs profits have been generated through KMG Exploration and Production but
this will not be enough to secure the capital for the project. Large contracts with the Chinese
government are being used in the development of infrastructure but in particular it is the $5-6
billion estimate for the development of the Kazakhstan Caspian System of transportation that
is particularly pressing.183 Furthermore, this expansion package of KMGs production and
ownership as well as overseas expansion is hindered by the lack of personnel qualified to
carry this out. From the oil rig workers to the top management, there is a dearth of plausible
local personnel. This sits in direct conflict with the President’s decrees on the number of locals
that must be employed by the state company. On a similar vein, there is a lack of equipment.
Although the industry has been completely modernized since the Soviet era, aspects of
planning remain, and a lot of equipment owned by KMG is not up to the international
standards.
Government Command Structure
The government structure in Kazakhstan is part of an all too familiar sight across Central Asia.
It is divided into a Senate and Majilis (lower house), with an executive branch controlled by
the dominant President Nazarbayev. The strong man presidency is supported by his party,
Nur-Otan, in the legislature which is voted into power in quasi elections. Opposition is not
tolerated and its members have at times been murdered or simply disappeared. But, for all
the strength of the presidency, it is unwise to discredit the lower house altogether. As Anthony
Clive Bowyer notes, the parliament is filled with educated men and women (10%) who are
there representing their localities, forming a powerful lobbying asset on behalf of their
‘constituents’.184 The political environment maybe dominated, but it is by no means dormant.
183 183Dosym Satpaev, ‘The Main Problems and Opportunities of KazMunaiGas in its Realization of its Oil and
Gas Projects Wikileaks’, WikiLeaks, 2010, accessed 16 September 2015,
https://wikileaks.org/gifiles/docs/55/5514684_-fwd-re-hello-dosym-.html
184 Anthony Clive Bowyer, Parliament and Political Parties in Kazakhstan (Washington D.C: Johns Hopkins
University, 2008).
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The government has control over KMG and the domestic industry in three key ways. The first
way in which the state has control is through the aforementioned Samruk national fund. The
fund does not have direct say in the operations of KMG but it does manage the shareholdings
and uses its powers to vote on the government’s behalf in key decisions. The chairman of the
fund, Richard Evans, is also the former BAE chairman which owns a large stake in the local
airline, Air Astana, along with Former Minister of Trade and Industry Suat Minbayev, an ally of
the President, and Timur Kulibayev, the President’s son-in-law.185 As we shall see below,
these appointments are part of a revolving door of people who have held offices close to the
president and allow him to retain close control over the decisions. The second method of
control is through the revolving door of management figures within the upper tiers of
management at KMG and associated industry positions. The third way is through the types of
contracts and legislation used in the industry. These last two forms of control, personnel and
legislation/contracts is where this analysis will now turn.
Relationship between KMG and the Kazakh government
The link between KMG and the state is extremely close, and as we shall see forms a revolving
door between the president, his supporters and KMG. It is also essential to realise at this point
how closely entwined the fortunes of energy sector are with the public’s compliance of
Nazarbayev’s presidency. As the history above has noted, there have been major changes to
the industry, and these can be subject to change with very little public discussion. Public
political participation is low, but there are signs of unrest whenever there are severe changes
to the economic environment and small protests occur. Keeping the economy well balanced
185 Martha Brill Olcott, ‘KazMunaiGas: Kazakhstan’s National Oil Company’, Carnegie Foundation, Rice
University, 2007.
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and the quality of life improving is imperative to the ability of the President to ensure his
authoritarian leadership continues and remains undisturbed by the international community.
There is also intense speculation as to the source of the President’s incredible personal wealth
which is widely speculated to have been contributed to by the oil industry, both from domestic
and international firms.186 Therefore, there are two key aspects of government to consider in
understanding the energy industry. First the formal institutions and bureaucracy of the
government and then secondly the patrilineal network that forms the true decision making
force behind the government, directly controlled and answerable to the president.
The key formal institutions are the main executive body, the Ministry of Oil and Gas, which
oversees all aspects of the industry from production to transportation. They work alongside
the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade which drives economic development, works
to secure international interests, sustainable development and the promotion of local
business. Health and safety issues are dealt with by the Ministry of Emergency Situations. It
is also worth noting what is not present; there is very little mentioned here in terms of a
connection to civil society and there is no formal route by which issues can be brought to the
industry for the local population. Assets from the oil industry are not controlled by the state
directly, but are held in the Sovereign Wealth Fund Samruk-Kazyna holding company that
manages state assets. This was formed off the back of a presidential decree, a form in which
most large changes to policy are often announced, from which Kaznya Sustainable
Development Fund and Kazakhstan Holding for Management of the State Assets Samruk
were created. As well as holding assets in the oil industry, this merged holding company now
has assets from all state firms across all extractive industries (uranium, coal, rare earth
minerals). This is in conjunction with the National Fund of the Republic of Kazakhstan which
holds the majority of oil profits. Its goals are more long term in focus – to try to reduce
186 Ron Stodghill, ‘Oil, Cash and Corruption’, New York Times, 6 November 2006, accessed 16 September,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/05/business/yourmoney/05giffen.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0
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dependency upon oil, storing resources for future use, decreasing the impact of market price
fluctuations on the Kazakh economy.
The lower house, the Majilis, makes its presence known to KMG through ‘environmental
issues’. This is not an uncommon tactic, the Russian use of environmental concerns as tactic
is notorious, but it is a route normally taken by governments to force IOCs, but instead the
Kazakh government has used the tactic with its own NOC. When the environmental issues
are raised against the IOCs it is with the purpose, very often, of gaining ground in contract
negotiations or indirectly for raising revenue. When these same allegations are levelled at
KMG Exploration and Production, the ultimate goal is not to raise fines, but to gain ground for
local concerns. This is not to suggest that there is no legitimate environmental concerns, there
are, but instead it is always worth considering that the timing or decision to pressure KMG can
often have wider political ramifications.187
The second key factor beyond the institutions is the patrilineal network that persists in
Kazakhstan and the elite groups that control the industry behind closed doors. This is not a
conspiracy theory of elites, but a group of majority males who have controlling shares in many
different government as well as industry positions, have generated great wealth and have
achieved their positions through family or systems using connections rather than on merit.
Each party is jostling for the attention and forming groups under the leadership. President
Nazarabyev’s personal grip on power is very strong through these informal networks, whilst
187 KMG EP has fought against fines very recently see Paddy Harris, ‘KazMunaiGas Avoids Heavy Environmental
Fine, Oil and Gas Technology Journal’, 2014, accessed 16 September 2015,
http://www.oilandgastechnology.net/health-safety-environment-news/kazmunaigas-avoids-heavy-
environmental-fine
For some of the most recent environmental damage issues see; Friends of the Earth, ‘NGOs Express Grave
Concerns About Environmental, Health And Social Impacts Of The Kashagan Oil Field Development’, Friends of
the Earth, 2014, accessed 16 September 2015,
https://www.foeeurope.org/press/2007/Sept13_DU_Kashagan.htm
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the official power of the office of the presidency is less. Partly what helps to hold the power
with the president is his refusal to acknowledge the question of a successor. This both
prevents power-plays derailing the president from these groups and it creates a useful rivalry
between groups whilst also creating market uncertainty. It is important to understand this
because the state’s decisions on the future of the industry are at times being based upon the
president’s needs to balance these different groups. Since the 1990s there has been a lack of
public mobilisation and stalled democratic dialogue has facilitated the ability of the president
to make personnel appointments as he chooses, and therefore, indirectly he is choosing
policy. The groups are fluid, and rumours abound.
President Nazarbayev has acknowledged the flaws in the organisational structure of the state
oil firm himself, and perhaps more importantly, he did so publicly in an interview with the
Kazakhstanskaya Pravda newspaper (December 25 2009). During the interview he criticized
the top management of KMG and its subsidiary organisations stating that "It is proven that the
existing management system is inefficient". Continuing, the President said that "KazMunaiGaz
has a four-level management system, and KazMunaiGas Exploration and Production (KMG
EP) has a five-level management system. In both companies, the number of support
departments and services is higher than that of the number of production units".
As a result of this, an inquiry was instigated to address the management practices of KMG.
The results showed that the companies did not comply with employment regulations; 40% of
KMG senior managers did not have the education or work experience in their job descriptions,
managers in the similar roles were supervising between four and thirty employers, and the
salaries of senior management was "unreasonably high". As per the requests of the President,
management were checked for nepotism. The results of the report showed that it was common
place within the organisation, with 7.5% of KMG being relatives of government officials, 17 of
131
which who were related to the heads of government agencies, 8 to members of parliament, 9
to directors of the KMG and its subsidiaries, and 7 to former heads of government agencies.
This report was only concerned in direct familial relations and did not begin to cover those with
clan or close family relationships. As a result, Aslan Musin, then Head of the Presidential
Administration was instructed to ensure the recommendations of the report were acted
upon.188
The Power Groups
There are four factions of elites jostling for power beneath the presidency.189 To return briefly
to Bloomfield, it is here that we can start to see the competing sub groups that affect the
strategic culture of the political environment. We can see the network of individuals who have
access and influence within the political elite and energy industry, by ‘charting their groups’
we can see changing presidential influences over time. These can be divided into four groups;
Kulibayev’s Group; Musin’s Group; Conservatives Group; Southerners Group. Kulibayev’s
group is headed by Nazarbayev’s son-in-law, Timur Kulibayev (late 40s) who works primarily
in the oil and gas sector, and despite protests that he wants to focus purely upon business,
he has regularly been touted as a successor to the President. Within his group is the Prime
Minister Karim Masimov (late 40s), who is a valued ally to the president.190 A fluent Mandarin
speaker he was integral in securing relations with China. Through his work on the customs
union with Russia, he has strong alliances with both Russia and China, making him a crucial
188 US Embassy, Astana, ‘Wikileaks Kazkahstan: The Big Three IOCs’, WikiLeaks, 15 January 2010, accessed 18
September 2015, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/10ASTANA41_a.html
189 The analysis that follows is based upon interviews with public and government affairs representatives from
different oil companies and is accurate as of 2012 and from the following source acquired during an interview
PFC Energy Solutions, ‘Russia and Caspian Service; Kazakhstan Elite Groups’, (PFC Energy, Huston, 2012).
190 According to WikiLeaks cables, Karim Masimov is a ‘tireless nightclub dancer’. US Embassy, Astana,
‘Lifestyles Of The Kazazhstani Leadership’, WikiLeaks, Thursday, 17 April 2008, accessed 16 September 2015,
https://wikileakskz.wordpress.com/2008/04/17/08astana760-lifestyles-of-the-kazazhstani-leadership/.
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link in geopolitical relations. Grigory Marchenko, heads the central bank, and his role is more
as a technocrat than as a political figure, but remains influential in matters of the economy.191
The second group is headed by Aslan Musin. As the president’s Chief of Staff and head of the
Presidential administration he is a formidable politician and a close personal friend of the
President’s. Through his work in the oil rich regions of Atyrau and Aktobe he has developed
close friendships with people in industry and suppressed political opposition movements. With
a nod to his outlook, he was the Head of Ideology during the Soviet era. His two key allies are
Baurzhan Mukhamedzhanov the akim of the Mangistau region, who has held various Ministry
of Justice positions and been second in command to Musin himself, and Amangeldy
Shabdarbayev a powerful figure from the security side of government having held positions
as Presidential Guard Commander and head of the National Security Committee.192 Musin
has been consolidating power through key appointments to prominent positions around him,
helping to secure his own position, covering much of the justice and security factions of the
government.
The third group is referred to as the Conservatives. This group is the key foundational support
group for the president and his continued position and longevity are directly in their best
interest. High up in this group is Nurtay Abykaev. He is a personal friend of the president but
191 Also in this group is Nurlan Balgimbayev, (mid 60s), is a former architect of Kazakh energy industry. He has
since been in lower positions, possibly as a result of his daughters marriage to an opposition figure. Other
powerful members of the group include Sauat Mynbayev, former deputy prime minister, current head of the
ministry of oil and gas; Aset Magauov former deputy minister of oil and gas, CEO of Mangistaumunaigaz; Bolat
Achulakov the Deputy Oil and Gas minister who was replaced as the CEO of KMG following the Zhanozen
massacre; Askar Balhzhanov the CEO of KMG who was also replaced during the massacre Askar Balhzhanov; and
finally Talgat Kulibayev who is his brother and a member of the security services and head of the internal affairs
Ministry Academy.
192 Also within this group are Kalmukhanbet Kasymov who headed the taskforce that saw off Rakhat Alieyev who
was launching an opposition bid and was later exiled, and managed to avoid being sacked following the
Zhanaozen massacre; Askhat Daulbayev, the Prosecuter General ; Serik Baymaganbetovis head of the cusotms
committee a lucarativ post with plenty opportunity for bribery and corruption; Lyazzat Kiinov who was put into
position of CEO of KMG NC by Musin himself.
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has been knee-deep in various scandals which have led to his demotion at different point.
These incidences include the failure of Abykaev to call off his staffer Yerzhan Utembayev from
the assassination of opposition leader Yerzhan Utembayev in 2006, as well as the selling of
MIG fighters to North Korea in 1999.193 He is currently Ambassador to Moscow. Imangali
Tasmagambetov has held a range of positions including the Prime Minister, head of the
Presidential Administration and State Secretary and is now a powerful and well liked politician
in Astana.194 Once the President eventually dies, this group will have to seek new patronage
and therefore are only stable in the short term creating serious concern for the culture strategy
choices of the leadership.
The fourth and final group is the Southerners Group headed by Kanat Saudebayev. A personal
friend of the president for more than 40 years, he is the Minister of State and Foreign Minister.
He was successful in his involvement with Kazakhstan’s OSCE chairmanship and the holding
of nuclear peace talks with Iran. He has been central to the President retaining power after
the dissolution of the Soviet Union which may explain why he has been kept in powerless but
close positions at times when he has been dismissed by the President. Umirzak Shukeyev is
the CEO of the sovereign wealth fund, Samruk Kaznya, as a replacement to Timur Kulibayev
when he was dismissed. He is also powerful in local politics having been the akim for three
provinces in Kazakhstan. Adding to the intrigue, the Southerners were investigated by the
National Security Committee which is controlled by the Aslan Musin, and their position was
temporarily weakened as a result, but with such close personal ties to the President, the group
has regained their standing.195
193 US Embassy, Astana, ‘Kazakhstan: New Cabinet To Maintain Policy Course’, WikiLeaks, January 16, 2007,
accessed 16 September 2015, https://wikileakskz.wordpress.com/2007/01/16/07astana125-kazakhstan-new-
cabinet-to-maintain-policy-course/
194 Also within this group are the Minister of Defence Adylbek Dzhaksybekov; Serik Akhmetov the deputy Prime
Minister; Serik Umbetov is the National chief Administrator in the Presidential Administration office.
195 Other members of this group include Kairat Mami who has previously held positions as the head of the
Supreme Court and as Prosecuter General.
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In these four groups we can see the strategic future of Kazakhstan’s strategic choices. The
younger, hungry son-in-law Kulibayev has the appetite for access to new markets and control
over much of the energy industry. This is in contrast to the other powerful ‘old guard’ groups,
the Southerners and Conservativesthat are based upon the current President’s position as the
leader, ubject to continued presidential approval, and provide support for the leadership within
the ministries. It is worth noting that the younger groups have less exposure to Soviet era
training than the older groups that form the President’s stalwarts. As these move and change,
as leaders jostle for positions and influence, so the cultural practises and strategic choices of
the state will alter.
Through this maze of interpersonal relationships, the WikiLeaks cables shed light on the extent
of, and problems caused by, industry corruption. In one such cable the first vice president of
KMG, Maksat Idenov, converses with the then Ambassador, Richard Hoagland, over dinner
in Astana between the two men. In this meeting, Idenov states that Timur Kulibayev has
received over $100 million in bribes from Chinese firms, and that his personal image is out of
touch with his predilection for bribery.196 He goes on to note that Kulibayev is “like a Buddha
with a Paris manicure”. Idenov also reveals he asked Kulibayev to “please watch your image
and your reputation. You have a real opportunity to improve your own image and the image of
the nation” following a dispute between the two over these issues of bribery. Furthermore,
Idenov alleges that the firms ENI and BG are corrupt firms and that Kulibayev has been
“salivating” to be attached to these deals. Idenov states that he has been chosen by the
President to run the major oil projects of Kashagan and Karachaganak in order that the
projects are run according to international standards. The cable also notes, in an obviously
196 US Embassy, Astana, ‘Kazakhstan: Money And Power’, WikiLeaks, 25 January 2010, accessed 16 September
2015, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/10ASTANA72_a.html
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unverifiable estimate, that Kulibayev owns 90% of the economy of Kazakhstan. Regardless of
this Idenov says that vice President Karim Masimov does not act without permission from
Kulibayev, showing how entrenched Kulibayev is in the decision making process of
government.
The issues here surrounding money and corruption give great insight into the workings of the
relationship between the government, KMG and industry. Corruption is rife, and there appears
to be a small handful of people at the top, such as Idenov, that are trying to create a new
culture within Kazakhstan to overcome the corruption and fulfil the development potential of
Kazakhstan. The President has surrounded himself with a group of rich men, who are left
almost unchecked by the system, and are able to syphon off not insignificant amounts of
money unchecked and until these leaks, unverifiable to the public. From the point of view of
governance it also means that there is a conflict of interest between choosing firms who bring
the most transparency and the most technology to a project, such as Statoil, and those that
less transparent. A triad of changes in legislation, rotating personnel, and formal structures
have thwarted attempts to modernize the industry creating fuzzy lines and blurring the chains
of leadership both within KMG and regulatory boards. Intra-elite conflict creates instability and
British firms complicity are well known through the actions of Mark Rawlings, the British Gas
Country Director for Kazakhstan, and his relationship with James Giffin who was charged for
bribery over oil deals all over the FSU in the 1990s. Furthermore, the men in this situation are
not old men, they are for the majority far younger than the President, in their 40s and fifties on
average, with many more working years ahead of them. Their rotating positions also speak to
the strategic culture of the management of the industry. Brought up in the Soviet era, they
received their training in Russian universities, or trained in Soviet institutions, and have
benefited from the Soviet system.
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Relationship between the Government and IOCs
The majority of the giant and supergiant fields in Kazakhstan are controlled by international
firms. This is because KMG is only able to develop the old fields in their entirety, and even
these projects require new technology to increase or continue the production yield. The rest
of the projects are too complex or require new technology that KMG is not yet able to operate
these fields. Furthermore, there is not the infrastructure available to be able to develop the
main Caspian shelf projects without outside assistance. As a result of this demand, and the
relative ease of doing business (compared with the Nigerian sector for example) competition
for access to the Kazakh energy market is high. As a result the preeminent task facing the
Kazakh government has been the management of foreign investment in the region, as
opposed to the attraction of foreign investment. Of the 250 plus subsoil contracts, and the vast
majority of those are concentrated in fifteen major fields, and these are majority-controlled by
foreign firms.197
As discussed in the short history of the industry, the Kazakh government pursues a strategy
which aims to maximise the Kazakh government and business involvement in the energy
industry. As a result the Kazakh government has periodically introduced special measures,
often with limited advance warning and little consultation, to reintroduce Kazakh control of the
industry. One of the key issues raised during interviews with the IOCs was that of personnel
quotas. The quotas are established annually by the government, but do not apply to workers
from Belarus or Russia because of the new customs union.198 The current requirement is that
as of 1 January 2012, Kazakh citizens should account for 70% of all first and second tier jobs,
197 Tengiz, Karachaganak, Kashagan, Uzen, Zhetybay, Zhanazhol, Kalamas, Kenyiak, Karazhanbas, Kumkol,
North Buzachi, Alibekmola, Central and East Prova, Kenby and Korolevskoye. Half of reserves are in Kashagan
and Tengiz.
198 The work is regulated by the Law of RK on Employment Population, 23 January 2001, Resolutions of the RK
Government on approval of Rules Defining Quotas for hiring Foreign Workforce in Kazakhstan, 13 January 2012,
and Rules and requirements for Issuing Work Permits to Foreign Employees and permits to Employers for Hiring
Foreign Workforce, 13 February 2012.
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and 90% of all employees in the third and fourth tier jobs.199 Some exceptions have been
allowed to theses quotas on the projects in Karachaganak, North Caspian and Tengiz, but
these will run out all too soon by 2015. Interestingly, these rules do not apply to government
firms or institutions, only to foreign companies. Tenders have also been subject to government
regulation, and as a result all companies must apply a 20% reduction in the bid price for
Kazakh manufacturers.200 To calculate the local content of manufactured goods and services
requires consultation with twenty one separate laws, who incidentally are currently the body
that decides if the Kazakh production is meeting international standards. Again this has been
an ongoing struggle between the IOCs and the government.
Even these basic regulations, which seem straight forward, are made more complicated by
the realities of the country. Firstly, visa regulations for foreign workers are subject to change
at any moment via a presidential decree regardless of what the law states.201 Five year visas
were issued in 2013 for foreign workers, but for no apparent reason they required the holder
to leave the country every month and re-enter the country with a new visa stamp or face
deportation. As is so often the case, this was introduced without public consultation and with
two weeks’ notice to visa holders. To give this perspective, this was one of three major
changes to foreign visa regulations made in that year alone. Secondly, the local content
requirement for 70-90% local workforce is made more difficult through the education and work
standards of the countries. For instance, during an interview at an IOC, the example was used
of the use of the term ‘foreman’. For the US and EU firms, a foreman is a skilled position on
oil rigs, it requires experience, involves key decision making functions and certain levels of
qualifications. Local quota enforcement assumed that the level of experience needed was
199 Energy Charter Secretariat, ‘Investment Climate and Market Structure Review in the Energy Sector of
Kazakhstan’, Energy Charter Secretariat, Brussels, 2013, p.53.
200 ibid., p. 59
201 Presidential decrees can emerge at a moment’s notice on a variety of different topics. Public holidays are
regularly moved and people’s working weeks altered with two days’ notice because of a decree, as is the case
for many other facets of ordinary life.
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much less, that this was a less skilled job, and the local quota of employees to work on the
project were not fit for purpose. This is wrong for a number of reasons. The individual is left
feeling inadequate and unaccepted in the work place. The firm either has to pay to train the
individual for many years or face the consequences of an unqualified employee risking the
lives of others in what can be a very dangerous operating environment. The issue here
becomes one of standards and definition.
Many of these legislative changes have had the effect of papering over the wider systemic
failures of the government. No amount of personnel quotas or local procurement legislation is
going to matter if the quality of recruitment and manufacturing does not meet international
standards, and this will not change in a matter of years. Inevitably this will be a generational
change and the result of a cultural movement away from the old Soviet model ingrained in the
present leadership. As with most other aspects of Kazakh decision-making, the results would
be improved through increased transparency and consultation in the legislative process. The
IOCs would benefit from reduced costs and have greater certainty when planning expensive
projects if bureaucracy could be curbed and the rule of law strengthened to ensure against
changes to the hydrocarbon governance regime in the face of a leadership struggle. That said,
there are advantages to the current inefficient bureaucracy; difficulties can be channelled
informally rather than being made to be subject to public scrutiny; the lengthy delays in action
from the government allows IOCs to manoeuvre around legislation knowing that there will be
a lag in the government’s response; and the lack of true technical oversight means that despite
the growing presence of KMG in the market, the main oversight role will always have to be
taken by a foreign firm, away from direct government intervention.
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Relationship between KMG, IOCs and the Government
Kazakhstan has used Production Sharing Agreements (PSA) since the early years of the
industry’s development beginning 1997. The battle for Kazakhstan, as is the case for any
technically demanding new oil state, must find a relationship with IOCs that balances
hydrocarbon wealth distribution between sovereign ownership and the performance
enhancing capacity of a foreign oil company. Between that and a desire to avoid the resource
curse, PSAs have become increasingly sophisticated to protect both sides of the agreement
but are not infallible and are subject to the rule of law within that country. They were designed
as political tools; they provide a veil of authority for the state to show the public that it is the
controller of its industry, the name even sounds democratic and just, but in reality can cover a
number of different caveats which can leave the state impotent. The distinguishing features of
a PSA are: the profit from extracted hydrocarbons is shared amongst the cosignatories leaving
subsoil hydrocarbons the property of the state; they are often decades in length to allow
investment to be recouped; all profit thereafter is divided according to the contract; a firm can
assume a leadership role to settle disputes; and a distinction is made between technical and
commercial operation of the field.202
PSAs are anchored in common law, rather than civil or administrative law, and as such require
a functioning judiciary system which does not allow ex poste appropriation. As Kalyuzhnova
& Nygaard explain, these conditions are simply not present in Kazakhstan or even its
202 Soros Foundation, ‘How to Scrutinise a Production Sharing Agreement: A Guide for the Oil and Gas Sector
Based on Experience From the Caspian Region’, Soros Foundation; International Institute for Environment and
Development, London, 2012.
PSA agreements are by no means the only type of agreement that Kazakhstan has used or is available. Often the
key feature of what distinguishes between the types of contracts is who takes the burden of burden of risk and
also how the profit is extracted by the state and firms. Service Contracts are a limited form of contract in so
much as they are subcontract agreements in which an IOC offers technical capability that the state or local firms
do not possess. Joint Ventures are as they sound, are a jointly undertaken business venture as either an
incorporated or unincorporated firm. These require different levels of accompanying contractual agreements in
order to fairly apportion liability between shareholders, particularly in the case of unincorporated ventures.
Concessions and licenses grant the investor the sole right to the commodity and profit is taken through taxation.
PSAs and concessionary contracts place risk with the investor which is what makes them attractive to the state
but the sharing of future profits makes them attractive to investors and is why they remain a very popular type
of contract in the industry. The reality is that these contracts are tailored to the country/ industry in question
and they are rarely found in a pure archetypal form.
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administrative predecessor, Russia, meaning that although contracts that seem harsh from
the Kazakh perspective, they were partially built to ease the fears of long-term investors.203
Early agreements that Kazakhstan signed were the result of inexperience, when any contract
was better than no contract and the new regime had yet to prove itself as a stable leadership,
a time when IOCs were fearful of re-appropriation by the state, and they have all been
subsequently renegotiated.
To rectify this, amendments to the Tax Code and Petroleum and Subsoil Law began in 2004,
2005, 2007 and again in 2011. The focus changed to increasing the use of local content in
production, increasing government share of taxes, and increasing regulation and oversight on
the part of the state. Changes to the PSAs around this time varied from concrete challenges
to the allocation of profits and the centrality of KMG to projects, but others included nebulous
concepts. References to the Kazakh ‘national interest’, the ability of the government to define
what constituted and allowed intervention in matters of ‘strategic importance’, and the
expanded ability of the state to terminate or amend contracts all began to enter the PSAs.204
It is also at this time the Kazakh parliament begans to show its unhappiness with the PSA
model.
‘The specifics of the subsoil use in Kazakhstan (high
production cost, long transportation network, limited internal
processing facilities) make the production sharing concept
ineffective and difficult to manage and apply. The practise of
sharing existing production sharing agreements in the
Republic of Kazakhstan shows that the country does not
203 Yelena Kalyuzhanova & Christian Nygaard, ‘State Governance Evolution in Resource-Rich Transition
Economics: An Application to Russia and Kazakhstan’, Energy Policy, Vol.36, No.6 (2008), pp.1829-42.
204P. Pugh & C. Partasides, ‘New law endangers oil and gas contracts in Kazakhstan: what are foreign investors’
rights?’ Lexology Report 2007, Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP.
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receive adequate returns from these projects, even with the
prices for raw material being high.’205
Whilst these changes were partly to reflect the growing capacity and interests of the state, it
was also to correct the practises of some of the foreign companies. ENI failed to adequately
lead the Kashagan project in its early years of development, allowing KMG to acquire an equal
stake (16.18%) in the firm after renegotiation with the partners. It was KMG that led these
negotiations and in return for the state’s support in that, KMG has to perform certain social
functions in society. As of 2009, no new PSA contracts could be signed and instead a new
model called the Excess Profit Tax model was introduced. This ability to change the terms of
taxation is an important part of the Kazakh model of oil governance and has been a persistent
feature of the types of contracts offered by the state.206
Relationship between KMG and the Public
KMG is contractually obliged to perform social functions which creates unexpected problems
for the state. Along with the major IOCs operating in the industry, KMG has to incorporate a
CSR policy aimed at integrating the profits from the oil industry directly into social welfare
projects. Internally this manifests itself in a Centre for the Development of Personnel, and
through degree programmes to feed young graduates into KMG.207 Separate to this is their
outreach programme which builds orphanages, care home, medical centres etc. as part of a
legal agreement with local government. It is also interesting to note that signs of the soviet
legacy are still noticeable in some of the more personal benefits that they deliver including; 3
metric tonnes of coal per annum to retirees unable to afford heating as well as free
205 Parliament of the Republic of Kazakhstan (2009) Law on Subsoil Use.
206 Although the contracts are held privately by the Government of Kazakhstan, the legal frameworks is not and
it is from this that the consistency of this premise in Kazakh state industrial practises can be recognised.
207 Martha Brill Olcott, ‘KazMunaiGas: Kazakhstan’s National Oil Company’, 2007.
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newspapers, and sanatorium visit every three years; retired women receive $39 on
international women’s day, $78 dollars on Naruz (New Year); and every decade after
retirement and upon their death.208
Furthermore, KMG must provide an agreed percentage of its oil for the domestic market, at a
rate set through government quotas. When all the different KMG subsidiaries have been taken
into account it is approximately 49% of oil that is destined for the domestic market, and
therefore a lower, subsidised sale price.209 The majority of this passes through the Atyrau
refinery and, as part of a series of government quotas, a defined amount of the hydrocarbons
must be sold at cost. KazTransGaz also has certain obligations to provide gas to unprofitable
regions in the south of the country that would otherwise be serviced by the unstable reserves
of Uzbekistan. In the past the government has also made the decision to operate unprofitable
fields (eg the Armangeldy field) because of the issues of employment and to reduce
dependence upon Uzbekistan.210 Furthermore, the government routinely restricts and bans
the export of certain hydrocarbon products in order to protect domestic prices, something
which occurring at an increasing rate because of the current international restrictions on
Russia.211 KMG is contractually obliged to fulfil these requirements, with no apparent
provisions as part of the social obligations of the firm.
208 ibid.
209 Daniar Mukhtarov, ‘Kazakhstan’s oil and gas company exports over 70% of produced oil’, Trend News Agency,
26 October 2014, accessed 16 September 2015, http://en.trend.az/casia/kazakhstan/2325543.html
210 Martha Brill Olcott, ’KazMunaiGas: Kazakhstan’s National Oil Company’, 2007.
211Svetlana Antoncheva, ‘Kazakhstan Extends Export Ban on Light Oil Products to Year End’, Bloomberg, 12
August 2014, accessed 16 September 2015, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-08-16/kazakhstan-
extends-export-ban-on-light-oil-products-to-year-end.html
143
Prospects for Reform
Reform in the Kazakh economy is possible but by no means inevitable. A mixture of increased
capacity and improved transparency would have an enormous economic impact upon the
energy industry but it is a question of whether or not this suits the power-players. Increased
scrutiny of the tender process and selection criteria, transparency of the contracts signed,
public scrutiny of the forms of taxation arrangements made between the IOC, NOC and state,
independent revenue calculations and a public consultation process would all go a long way
to improving the industry’s efficiency and competency. However, this is part of a wider
systemic issue in which there is only a very small and impoverished civil society with little
access to government information or power and therefore unlikely to be solved in the near
future, along with a host of other state failures such as the lack of a political will to establish a
free media. When these features are drawn together then expectations of the state can begin
to be realised; the human and environmental costs of the extraction process can be properly
compensated.
Increasing export capacity will be fundamental to the growth of the Kazakh oil industry, but
can it be achieved in a productive manner? One of its key challenges will be in the expansion
of its refinery projects to improve its production of light crude products, not just simply for
economic reasons but also to reduce geopolitical dependence upon Russia. The three
refineries are located in Atyrau (refining domestic crude from the north west), Pavlodar (mainly
refining oil from Siberia) and Shymkent (domestic oil is refined from central Kazakhstan). Until
these refineries have finished their expansion stimulus Kazakhstan is even more dependent
upon Russia for oil. Ironically for an oil exporter it does not yet have the capacity to sell the
most lucrative value-added product to market – sweet light crude products. Russia accounts
for 1/3 (1.36 million tons) of all the petrol consumed in Kazakhstan and for about 14% (0.7
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million tons) of diesel fuel.212 As a result Kazakhstan is dependent upon Russian prices, which
have ‘hiked’ since the Ukraine crisis began in 2014.
Even the completion of these refineries does not spell the end of the woes for Kazakhstan’s
capacity crisis. Over production and spare capacity loom as the next Vice Chairman of the
Board at KazMunaiGas National Oil and Gas Company Daniyar Tiyessov stated that
When it comes to exports potential for petroleum products,
let us be frank, Russia is not interested, neither is China. We
share border with Azerbaijan and Iran, both of them being
self-reliant in terms of crude and petroleum products. The
only potential market available for our petroleum products is
that of other Central Asia states with a growing population
and a shortage of oil processing capabilities of their own.
And Afghanistan as well.213
Financing these reforms, regardless of capacity, is yet another aspect the refining process
that is made more difficult by the geopolitical implications of the choice of partnership. Foreign
firms have been reticent to become involved in financing the refineries because the domestic
market is not as lucrative as the international, leaving Kazakhstan with a funding gap until the
212 Tengri News, ‘Kazakhstan May Remain Dependent On Russian Petroleum Products Through To 2019’,
TengriNews, 25 August, 2014, accessed 16 September 2015, http://en.tengrinews.kz/markets/Kazakhstan-may-
remain-dependent-on-Russian-petroleum-products-through-to-2019-255680/.
213 Tengri News, ‘Following Overhaul At Three Oil Refineries Kazakhstan May Face Excessive Supply Of
Petroleum Products’, TengriNews, August 2014, accessed 16 September 2015,
http://en.tengrinews.kz/markets/Following-overhaul-at-three-oil-refineries-Kazakhstan-may-face-excessive-
supply-257310/
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recent acquisition of contracts by Chinese firms.214 It is interesting to note in this time of
Russian expansionism that media observations of Kazakhstan and its energy industry place
them firmly in the Russian sphere of influence, with blind expectation that Kazakhstan would
‘side’ with Russia, and that the Russian mind-set is that there is a zero-sum choice to be made.
No decision to reform the Kazakh energy industry can be seen as occurring with pure domestic
needs in mind, the ramifications of these choices now will have larger political consequences
for the balancing of Chinese and Russian interest.
With this in mind, the Kazakh government has had previous success of overhauling an
industry. The financial industry of Kazakhstan has undergone an enormous transformation in
under a decade through various measures including the founding of an independent regulator,
pension reform banking consolidation and the provision of deposit insurance.215 Three large
banks were nationalised during the financial crisis and the state stepped in as the lender-of-
last-resort to ensure the capital requirements of individual banks.216 However, the banking
industry is more heavily regulated through international norms and practises, and the nature
of the industry means that geographical challenges are less important than in the energy
industry making the challenges easier to overcome. Many of the major factors affecting the
overhaul of the industry are the result of a historical legacy and a system that suits the few.
Corruption was rife during the Soviet Union but it was in a very different form than in today’s
Kazakhstan. When the old structures were dismantled, so too were the joint-profit maximising
structures of corruption, only to be replaced by a new form of corruption in which the head of
214Oil & Gas Journal, ‘Kazakhstan lets contract for refinery modernization’, Oil & Gas Journal Online, Huston,
2014, accessed 18 September 2015, http://www.ogj.com/articles/2014/01/kazakhstan-lets-contract-for-
refinery-modernization.html
215 Harvard Centre for Development Studies, ‘Kazakhstan Strategy and Policy’, (Massachusetts: Kennedy School
Growth Lab, 2013).
216 For a full report on the banking sector of the Republic of Kazakhstan see International Monetary Fund, ‘The
Republic of Kazakhstan; Financial System Stability Assessment’, International Monetary Fund, Country Report
No. 14/258, International Monetary Fund, Washington D.C., 2014, accessed 16 September 2015,
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2014/cr14258.pdf
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the legislature and executive are in competition for bribes thereby increasing the economic
impact of corruption.217 Kazakhstan was not alone in this – it was common all over the FSU –
but it manifests itself in different forms in each region and country of this vast area of Eurasia.
It is not exposure to foreign trade or government intervention alone that is a root cause of
corruption in the FSU, other conditions must be present as well, most particularly poverty.218
The government recognises the disconnect between Kazakhstan’s position as one of the
world’s 50 largest economies whilst being 140th out of 177 countries on the Corruptions
Perception Index, least of all because of the impact upon foreign investment.219 In 2013
President Nazarbayev used a number of public statements to reiterate that fighting corruption
was becoming a government priority. New legislation is being crafted during 2013/14,
accompanied by changes to the judiciary to increase the number of judges and fire a large
number of those currently embroiled in scandal. However, as one would expect the bulk of the
anticorruption action is being taken at mid and low level administration, not the upper echelons
of the government. At lower levels daily working life is affected. At the higher tiers of
government whole economies suffer from the sheer scale of assets syphoned off from public
funds.
Altogether, there is a battle between the positive forces of reform and the weight of geopolitical
commitments which is slowing down the process of development. After acknowledging that
“generally speaking the country’s energy sector is in disarray”, President Nazarbayev
announced a leadership reshuffle and the reorganisation of the bureaucracy.220 Karim
217 A Shleifer and R Vishny, ‘Corruption’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol.108, No.3, (1993), pp.599-617.
218 Daniel Treisman Post-Communist Corruption Jan Fidrmuc and Nauro Campos, in D. Treisman, (ed.) Political
Economy of Transition and Development: Institutions, Politics, and Policies, (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2003), pp.201-
226.
219Transparency International, ‘Corruptions Perception Index’, Transparency International, 2013, accessed 16
September 2015, http://www.transparency.org/cpi2013/results
220 European Forum, ‘Kazakh Cabinet Is Reshuffled While Super Energy Ministry Is Created’, European Forum
for Democracy and Solidarity, August 2014, accessed 16 September 2015,
http://www.europeanforum.net/news/1983/kazakh_cabinet_is_reshuffled_while_super_energy_ministry_is_
created
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Massimov, the President’s strongest proponent of reform, re-assigned back to the position of
Prime Minister is symptomatic of Nazarbayev’s new focus upon legacy in old age. Further
changes in 2014 reflect the changing attitude away from the Soviet model of government.
Seventeen ministries have become twelve, including a re-evaluated Ministry of Energy, and
the number of committees has reduced from fifty four to thirty in an attempt to mitigate the
lower growth forecast that has dented the Kazakh economy.221 However, these positive
changes are offset by a series of government mistakes and geopolitical inevitabilities. What
we are seeing is the result of Government mistakes coming to fruition, including the February
2014 currency devaluation of 20% on the back of changes to the Russian rouble, announced
overnight and after much reassurance that devaluation would not be taking place. The
sanctions against Moscow are beginning to affect Kazakhstan through the state’s decision to
enter the Eurasian Customs Union, and Moscow is reducing purchases of Kazakh
hydrocarbons. Exports to Ukraine have fallen by 30% in 2014 already. Furthermore, the
consolidation of the Ministry of Energy has placed a close presidential ally at its head, further
consolidating presidential power over the industry. And all of this comes at a time when
Kashagan is closed for production yet again and the world’s most expensive oil field is yet to
get properly started.
Assessing the industry
The Kazakh state has created an energy industry where there was none. In this journey
towards independence a unique relationship between state and state-oil company has formed
but has this resulted in the most efficient and effective arrangement? How does Kazakhstan’s
compare to other governance strategies? The work of Victor et al overturned much of the
accepted wisdom; depletion rates of oil have no bearing upon performance; the management
221 Gavin Bowring, ‘Guest Post: Kazakhstan Reshuffle Stokes Devaluation Debate’, Financial Times, 11 August,
2014.
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team is not as important as state goals; the need for regulator and firm to have separate
functions is not as important as maintaining consistency within the arrangement.222 Instead
they outlined three key factors that affected the performance of the national oil company; state
goals, geology and management performance. Creating a well-functioning governance
strategy has the effect of improving the autonomous capabilities of the state, and therefore its
marginality, so how does Kazakhstan’s energy governance measure up to this triptych of
performance measures suggested by Victor et al?
The highest performing of the ten NOCs in the case studies were those that had clear goals
that allowed the state oil company to pursue only hydrocarbon tasks.223 The states that most
prevailed upon the oil companies were those of Nigeria and Mexico. Nigeria’s NNPC
management of the oil and gas sector has not moved beyond bureaucratic measures and
instead has become a neat mechanism for the President to syphon funds to patrons.224 In the
case of Mexico, it was the inability of Pemex to take control of its resources and use them for
long-term strategic gain that was the impediment to performance.225
We can see that in the case of Kazakhstan, KazMunaiGas is expected to fulfil only a small
number of non-hydrocarbon tasks. As the chapter highlights, the low domestic oil prices that
the state has set for the population lend a development and political aspect to the activities of
KazMunaiGas, blurring the role of the state firm. Similarly, the firm has a propensity to be
222 David Victor, David Hults and Mark Thurber, Victor, D., Hults, D., and Thurber, M., ‘Conclusions and
Implications for the Oil Industry’s Future’, in David Victor, David Hults and Mark Thurber (eds.) Oil Governance
and Governance; State Enterprises and the World Energy Supply (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2010). p. 900.
223 ibid., p. 902. The ten countries that were listed in the study were Saudi Arabia, Iran, Mexico, Kuwait, China,
Venezuela, Abu Dhabi, Brazil, Algeria, Norway, Russia, Nigeria, India, Malaysia and Angola.
224Mark Thurber, Ifeyinwa Emelife and Patrick Heller, ‘NNPC and Nigeria’s Oil Patronage Ecosystem’ , in David
Victor, David Hults and Mark Thurber (eds.) Oil Governance and Governance, p.715.
225 David Victor, David Hults and Mark Thurber, ‘Conclusions and Implications for the Oil Industry’, 2010, p.
902.
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involved in every stage of production, spreading its remit wider than simple extraction and
sales. The power of the leadership in this authoritarian country is clearly shown in the chapter.
The relationship between the president, the state, the state oil company and the regulator is
shown to be opaque at best and facilitating corruption at worst. Money is syphoned off into the
president’s personal banks, and although there is no direct link between the money and the
state firm, the amounts in question are into the billions of dollars with few other domestic
sources able to shoulder such revenue depletion. As a result the president is able to have
unfettered access to the oil company, and free from constraints, is able to intervene in the
state firm, altering its ability to focus upon long-term market objectives. The system of
patronage further exasperates the problem as money is channelled to these interest groups.
Victor et al’s study reveals that geology determines the likelihood of there being a national oil
company existing; the larger the endowment the more likely it is that the state will be interested
in creating a NOC.226 Because of the low-risk that has been attached to the Kazakh projects
(because of the size of reserves) the state has been able to financially invest in the creation
of KazMunaiGas and have leverage to seek outside investment. It is the technological
capabilities that has been the key drawback. It also helps to explain why Kazakhstan has
made minimal effort to become and IOC, because there are sufficient resources at home that
make the risk of operating overseas a less appealing prospect to the state. Furthermore the
study also suggests that easy geology enables poor governance and performance.227 In the
case of Kazakhstan this rings true to a certain extent. The extreme conditions of the oil fields
means that IOCs are required to intervene in the industry. The presence of Western firms
expecting international standards to be upheld on sites has influenced the way in which the
226 Peter Nolan and Mark Thurber, ‘On the State’s Choice of Oil Company: Risk Management and the Frontier
of the Petroleum Industry’, in in David Victor, David Hults and Mark Thurber (ed.) Oil Governance and
Governance, pp.161-167.
227 David Victor, David Hults and Mark Thurber, ‘Conclusions and Implications for the Oil Industry’s Future’, in
ibid, p.904.
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state operates. Furthermore, a culture of learning has been created through changes in
recruitment legislation. However, whilst it could be argued that operating with the international
firms has had an impact upon the state firm, the state has persistently sought to renegotiate
the relationship between them via the tax legislation.
Furthermore, Victor et al show that oil companies do not have the ‘normal’ separation of
regulation and management of other state sectors, and that management performance is not
the most important indicator of the performance of the NOC, rather it is uniformity that
matters.228 This chapter shows that the Kazakh model has taken some steps towards
separation of functions, by implementing the Samruyk fund and allocating tasks between
different government bodies. Again, the revolving door of personnel and the patrilineal links
between the state and other parties has the effect of dulling this separation. Kazakhstan does
not have the pure separation of state and regulator that Norway’s Statoil exemplifies, but it is
instead a hybrid regime. Kazakhstan’s NOC is the product of the state that created it - an
institutionally and originally a financially weak state. As a result, KazMunaiGaz sits within the
state apparatus, and because of its prominence within the economy, forms the backbone of
the state. To gain true separation would require a total reformation of the public administration
and the role of energy within the economy of Kazakhstan. The model that is created is
therefore unlikely to be that of a democratic liberal state.
If it is uniformity that matters, then the Kazakh energy firm has partially been able to fulfil this
criterion. Unified system control reduces change in the operating environment of regulation,
administration and corporate governance.229 As a result, evidence of this should be found in
the long-term planning capacity of the NOC. As the chapter shows, KazMunaiGas has long
term planning capacity; it has serious strategic vision for its future development and these
228 ibid., p.906.
229 ibid., p.907.
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goals are directly linked back to and supported by the state administration and government
agencies. However, there is evidence of a capricious streak within the regulatory framework.
The changes to the tax legislation suggest that there is uncertainty in the market and the
blurred lines between the president and NOC are similarly disconcerting. The predictability of
the environment, so crucial in lowering risk, is not entirely present in the current system.
Consolidation does not necessarily mean that the NOC will perform well. To give this
perspective, Kazakhstan does not have as consolidated a relationship between the state and
the NOC as Gazprom. This is because it does not have to perform the same non-hydrocarbon
tasks as Gazprom, which functions as an arm of state foreign policy, giving it stronger
performance potential. Furthermore, the authoritarian regime in this case helps with
consolidation. The close relationship between KMG and the state helps to ensure that changes
can be made in a fast and responsive manner to the environment, but what slows the progress
is an inefficient bureaucracy. As a semi-weak, semi-authoritarian state, Kazakhstan struggles
to implement the checks and balances within the domestic firm and with the IOCs.
Furthermore, the quality of reported evidence within the system of energy governance makes
it difficult to trust the reliability of the data received from government agencies. Do all the
figures add up? This negatively affects the ability of the state to plan and strategies with
confidence using its own intelligence. Furthermore whilst Kazakhstan has created a NOC in
order to have more control, the creation of KazMunaiGas does not necessarily guarantee this.
The state-within-a-state that is Gazprom should serve as a warning as to how much power an
individual arm of government can wield.
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Finally, the Victor et al study suggests that the role of management is not as important as
previously thought.230 Instead they argue that the ability of the state to create goals, geology
and the interaction between the state and the NOC is more important in determining
performance.231 The difference here is between the private firm and the NOC. In the latter,
there is much time spent by the managers conferring with the government. In the IOC in
Kazakhstan (and other countries) there exists a dedicated position/ department of political
advisors who communicate with the state, whilst in KazMunaiGas, this happens across the
departments.232 The ability of the NOC to attract the highest skilled workers should be
significant. In Kazakhstan the state oil company is the most significant employer, and one of
the most prestigious employers, enabling it to employ the most skilled management personnel.
However, this positive externality is tempered by the amount of nepotism present within the
NOC and the state. But, if we follow the logic of Victor et al, then the heavy state presence
within the NOC enables the state goals to be pursued even though there are high levels of
nepotism within the industry, providing continuity. Furthermore, the strong presence of IOCs
holding managerial stakes in the largest oil and gas projects reduces the administrative
pressure on the state oil firm to manage international projects.
Conclusion
The energy industry is at the heart of all Kazakhstan’s foreign policy decision-making capacity.
It is the source of its autonomy and the tool with which the state generates negotiating capacity
with international powers. As the thesis turns to examine the autonomous capabilities of
Kazakhstan with Russia, China and the West, it is important to remember that it is strategic
choices that are both driving Kazakhstan’s economic progress and holding it back through
230 David Hults ‘Hybrid Governance: State Management of National Oil Companies’ in in David Victor, David
Hults and Mark Thurber (ed.) Oil Governance and Governance, p.912.
231 ibid.
232 Interview, Shell Political Advisor, Astana, March 2013.
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corruption and inconsistency. There is nothing inevitable or destined about the current socio-
economic situation in which it finds itself, but neither is it completely controlled by the state,
and actors external to the state are integral to the process of creating a strategic culture. These
different actors and competing subgroups, whether Conservatives or Southerners, create the
subcultures that generate a strategic environment of the state and the energy industry. By
examining the relationship between the public, state, KMG, and the IOCs, it becomes apparent
that the choices of the state are constraining the ability of the energy industry to achieve the
goals that are in fact set by the state, and in turn the state is only able to partially fulfil its
criteria of increasing autonomous potential.
Tensions between the state, the IOCs and the public over the role of the IOCs in providing
CSR exemplifies the fragility created by corruption and authoritarian power structures. The
state needs to be seen to be providing so as to appease the domestic audience in return for
their compliance with the status quo, whilst simultaneously creating an environment in which
the IOCs can operate according to their own norms. The often changing operating
environment creates risk and volatility which is damaging for all parties and yet the state
appears to take on different types of risk. When we analyse these tensions in contrast with the
elements of successful governance drawn out by Victor et al, we can see that Kazakhstan’s
dilemma is a common tension in oil producing countries, but set in a unique context. The
centralised system of governance with a direct decision-making process led by the President,
combined with a mixture of monitoring and procedural regulation provides long term stability
in the industry. Independence left Kazakhstan in a position of low marginality, with little
autonomous choice but through the development of strategic practises: through governance
choices within the tax regime and carrot and stick approaches to regulation.
154
However as the President ages and rumours circulate of ill health, this will only compound the
problems that stem from the consolidation of power into the president’s office. The lack of a
clear successor is clouding the ability of investors to see beyond the immediate future, and
raising doubts about the longevity of the strategic plans for the NOC. Depending upon which
group the next leader emerges from will have a profound impact upon the strategic culture
and choices of the leadership, altering the future of the state strategy again. It will also have
significant implications for the relationships between Kazakhstan and its international partners.
If Kazakhstan has found ways to alter its domestic industry, it has also moved beyond its
enforced relationships lingering from the early days of independence, raising many questions
about the validity of the metanarratives that are generated to ‘explain’ Central Asia. What are
the ways in which this increasingly autonomous marginality manifested itself? And has it been
given or has it been generated from within? How has increased marginality and changes in
the energy industry affected the relationships with the great power states?
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Chapter 5
Old Friends? Living on the Margins of Russia
The Republic of Kazakhstan, as it stands today, was created by Soviet Russia. The
autonomous state that we recognise as an independent nation came into being following the
invasion of the khanates of Central Asia, the forced settlements of its population, and the
imposition of lasting borders during Soviet occupation. Today, Russia remains present in many
powerful cultural forms. The northern oblasts have a majority ethnic Russian population, the
language spoken by the majority of Kazakhstanis is still Russian, and from the mayonnaise-
laden salads present at every mealtime to the streets named for Russian poets, ‘Mother
Russia’ is still very much in evidence. And yet, behind these daily reminders of a colonial
heritage, there is mounting evidence that Russian influence is not what it once was, or indeed
what it purports it to be. Despite the portentous language of President Putin, the economic
relationship is not as stable nor as deep as it could be, and importantly, its influence is
weakened in Kazakhstan’s most important industry; the energy industry.
The relationship between Russia and Kazakhstan reminds us that marginality, and indeed
geopolitics, is a vacillating construct. Russia once fulfilled the criteria of a margin power on the
edge of Europe through its colonial history with Central Asia in the years after the breakdown
of the Soviet Union. As the European Union expanded it encountered new and unknown
territories that allowed Russia to improve upon its now marginal position to fulfil a position as
an interlocutor between the EU and these new states.1 This had the effect of making Russia
appear a stronger partner for NATO as a diplomatic actor with ‘complimentary rather than
1 Maxine David, ‘Exploiting Marginality: The Case of Russia’, in Parker (ed.) The Geopolitics of Europe's Identity,
p.68.
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unequal strengths’ at a time when Russia was internally in crisis over its handling of the
Serbian movement in Kosovo.2 As Russia’s former colonies acceded to the European Union,
so Russia was pushed further to the margins of Europe, but nevertheless was able to take
advantage of this new marginal position.
The significance of this positioning is threefold. Firstly, we can see once more the construction
of Central Asia as the dangerous ‘other’, playing a significant role in creating this
understanding of Russia as powerful protector of European policy. The now obviously
unfounded worry for the EU was that there was the potential for terrorist movements and other
forms of instability to be brewing in the new republics of Central Asia, Ukraine and the
Caucuses; Central Asia is the wild’ Steppe filled with unknown dangers. The framing of policy
may have elevated the relative position of Russia, but it also inhibited the understanding of
the place of Central Asia in international relations, relegating this region to an ‘unknown’ space
on the map, and labelling them a natural seat of Russian influence. Secondly, this illustrates
the potential for a state to generate power on the edges of a more powerful state, and more
importantly, that it is even possible at a time when the state and economy is in disarray if long-
term strategic thinking is applied. Thirdly, this scenario demonstrates the changing nature of
power; Russia is no longer the de facto intermediary for the region with the West, or indeed
between Kazakhstan and any other significant state.
This chapter seeks to understand how these relationships have changed, and suggest that
this has occurred through a combination of rising Kazakh strength and economic in capability,
together with a weakening of the Russian position. However, if this is the first time that this
relationship has been conceived of in terms of marginality, it is by no means the first time that
2 ibid., pp.75-81.
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it has been scrutinised. Indeed, the relationship between Russia and Kazakhstan has been of
continuous interest to the leading scholars from the region and abroad.3 In the introduction to
this thesis we considered the historic salience of the 'Great Game’ literature, but area studies
has picked this relationship apart from many different angles. The focus of the relationship
from a Russian angle has also continued this narrative of dominance.4 Gradually the role of
privatisation has been given prominence in understanding how Kazakhstan has managed its
transition away from its Soviet heritage5, particularly in the oil industry,6 and in the role that
this has played in creating the ‘balancing foreign policy’ between East and West.7 With time
the ‘Great Game’ has gradually diminished in the bilateral literature, but some have still woven
it into wider discussions of regional geopolitics.8 Similarly, the economic predominance of the
relationship between Russia and Kazakhstan has long been considered to be of prime
importance to Kazakhstan, and whilst some voiced their hesitancy over this position,9 it is only
now that we have a deeper analysis of how this transition is taking place.10 Some local writers
too have begun to distance Kazakhstan from the Soviet model of governance, emphasising
3 Sally Cummings, ‘Happier bedfellows? Russia and Central Asia under Putin’, Asian Affairs, Vol.32, No.2 (2001),
pp.142-152; Oliver Roy, The New Central Asia: Geopolitics and the Birth of Nations (New York: IB Tauris, 2000);
A. Bohr, ‘Regionalism in Central Asia: New Geopolitics, Old Regional Order’, International Affairs, Vol.80, No.3
(2004), pp.485–502; Andrei Kazantsev, ‘Russian Policy in Central Asia and the Caspian Sea Region’, Europe-Asia
Studies, Vol.60, No.6 (2008), pp.1073-88.
4 Bertil Nygren, The Rebuilding of Greater Russia: Putin's Foreign Policy Towards the CIS, (Oxon; Routledge,
2008); Roy Allison, Strategic Reassertion in Russia's Central Asia Policy, International Affairs, Vol.80, No.2, Mar,
(2004), pp.277-293.
5 Pamela Blackmon, In the Shadow of Russia: Reform in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, (East Lansing, MI:
Michigan State University Press, 2011).
6 Pinar İpek, ‘The role of oil and gas in Kazakhstan's foreign policy: Looking east or west?’, Europe-Asia Studies,
Vol.59, No.7 (2007), pp. 1179-1199; Reuel R. Hanks, ‘Multi-vector politics and Kazakhstan's emerging role as a
geo-strategic player in Central Asia’, Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, Vol.11, No.3 (2009), pp.257-
67.
7 Erika Weinthal and Pauline Jones Luong, ‘Energy wealth and tax reform in Russia and Kazakhstan’, Resources
Policy, Vol.27, No.4, (2001), pp.215–23.
8 Mazen Labban, ‘The Struggle for the Heartland: Hybrid Geopolitics in the Transcaspian’, Geopolitics, Vol.14,
No.1 (2009), pp.1-25; Sara O’Hara, ‘Great game or Grubby game? The struggle for control of the Caspian’,
Geopolitics, Vol.9, No.1 (2004), pp.138-60; Richard Weitz, ‘Averting a new great game in Central Asia, The
Washington Quarterly’, Vol.29, No.3, (2006), pp.155-67; Rajan Menon, ‘The New Great Game in Central Asia’,
Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, Vol.45, No.2 (2003), pp.187-204.
9 Andrei P. Tsygankov, ‘If not by tanks, then by banks? The role of soft power in Putin's foreign policy’, Europe-
Asia Studies, Vol.58, No.7 (2006) 1079-99.
10 Yelena N. Zabortseva, ‘Rethinking the Economic Relationship Between Russia and Kazakhstan’, Europe-Asia
Studies, Vol.66, No.2 (2014), pp.311-27.
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the uniqueness of the new republic, albeit with a voice that tows the party line.11 To describe
this as a consensus from the area studies literature would be too strong; there is still a wealth
of writing, and rightly so, that illuminates the strong and binding ties between Russia and
Kazakhstan.12 Furthermore, whilst these economic shifts are receiving attention in academic
literature and more sophisticated media reports, these views are not so well represented by
public opinion within Kazakhstan.
In an attempt to progress our understanding of these phenomena, this chapter advances the
following propositions; that it is possible for Kazakhstan to be both weak and strong through
its relationship with Russia; its position on the margins of Russia has brought, and continues
to bring, new opportunities to increase its autonomous capabilities; the extension/expansion
of Russian power in Europe has weakened its influence within Central Asia and dispersed its
power relative to Kazakhstan. As centres grow in size, they begin to experience new margins
and in that process they become vulnerable through the changes that they encounter in their
newly acquired sphere of influence.13 In order to explore the changing marginality of
Kazakhstan relative to Russia, the chapter will examine the tactics and strategies that have
developed between the two states. Building upon the arguments explored in Chapter 2 on
Eurasia and Chapter 3 on Kazakhstan’s energy industry, the indecisive Russian foreign policy
and weakening economy are identified as key components in the growth of Kazakh autonomy.
From the Kazakh perspective, very real steps have been taken to reverse the Soviet legacy
and reduce interconnectedness with Russia via the energy industry, providing evidence of the
Kazakh desire and capacity to develop autonomy.
11 Z. K. Shaukenova, Ideologicheskoe konstruirovanie v Respublike Kazakhstan. Almaty: KISI, 2012, 316 pp.
A. Sh. Teleubayeva, Gosudarstvennye uslugi v kontekste administrativnoi reformi v Respublike Kazakhstan:
opyt, problemy, resheniya (Almaty: Zheti Zhargy, 2012), p.172.
12 Aijan Sharshenova, ‘In the Shadow of Russia: Reform in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan’, Europe-Asia Studies,
Vol.65, No.7, (2013), p.1483.
13 David ‘Exploiting Marginality’ in Parker (ed.) The Geopolitics of Europe's Identity, p.69.
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The chapter begins by conceptualising our understanding of Russia. In order to understand
the claims that Russia makes over Central Asia and its territory, we must be able to conceive
of a wider ‘Russia’, and the mechanisms which are used to include Central Asia in that
definition. This clarification bring clarity to our understanding of what it is that Kazakhstan is
trying to ‘resist’ ; how does Kazakhstan seek to extricate itself from this narrative and what are
the limitations to its bid for autonomy. We can see this in the everyday practises of geopolitics
and cultural change, but the cement of the Kazakh project of marginality is in the economic
and industrial changes that have taken place and accordingly that the majority of the chapter
explores. Noel Parker reminds us that to be a margin, as opposed to a periphery, the state in
question must be of interest to at least two centers of power in order to prevent itself becoming
closed to the outside.14 With this in mind, the chapter concludes by building the foundations
for the proceeding chapter, Chapter 5, which examines the entrance of another centre of
power, China, into Kazakh sphere of influence.
Conceptualising Kazakhstan, Russia and Eurasia
In the great surge towards Eurasianism, it is easy to forget that Russia has experienced its
own position on the margins of a greater power. Today, Russia is once again ‘rediscovering’
its Eastern heritage for modern-day political gains. Russian conceptualisation of what it means
to be ‘Russian’ and what constitutes ‘Russia’ begins with the very origins of Russia, and the
imagined geography that has been created out of a real geography and geology. The
European vision of Russia, skewed by the Cold War, is of a vast state, too different to be ‘fully’
European, yet culturally elite enough to be accepted on Western terms. David
Schimmelpenninck van der Oye creates an alternative narrative; the cultural imagination of
14 Noel Parker, ‘ Integrated Europe and it’s ‘Margins’: Action and Reaction’, in Noel Parker and Bill Armstrong
(eds), Margins in European Integration, (Houndmills: Macmillan, 2000), p.7.
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Russia is a division between the people of the Steppe and of the forest rather than as a division
between the East and West, as modern Western discourses have tended to describe.15 In the
earliest stages of the birth of modern Russia, later distorted by Russian imperialism, Russia
experienced the fierce riders of the flatlands and Khanates who traded with the Russian
princes of latter-day Moscow. The legacy of the cultural exchange between Moscow and the
Golden Horde is still evident today through linguistic connections and this shared history
challenges our experiences and understanding of Kazakhstan today. As Eurasianism
becomes a watch-word once more in international relations, we must be careful not use our
lens of modern history and its ‘scientific’ gaze, to condense and simplify the relationship
between Russia, Europe and Asia.
To understand Russia’s relationship with its Asian identity we are forced to consider the
‘uniqueness’ of Russia; is it European or Asian, or must it be distinct? And how does its
categorisation and self-identification affect its modern day relationship with Central Asia, or
with China? Arguing against this notion of uniqueness, Adeeb Khalid describes the perceived
uniqueness of Russia as a function of Western European experience.16 In this understanding,
there is much to gain for the ‘West’ in interpreting Russia as a unique entity by emphasising
the cultural and geographical distance between Western Europe and Russia. This sits in
contrast to the universalist approach which emphasises the cultural closeness of Russia to
Europe, engaging with the literary, artistic and cultural traditions, particularly in the 18th and
19th centuries. Nathaniel Knight, eager to move away from these polarising positions, takes
the middle ground between the unique and the universal, suggesting that Russia has
‘distinctiveness’.17 Interestingly, in both these positions it is Edward Said’s Orientalism that
15 David Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, Russian Orientalism; Asia in the Mind From Peter the Great to the
Emigration, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011), p. 12.
16 Adeeb Khalid, ‘Russian History and the Debate over Orientalism’, Kritika: Explorations in Russian and
Eurasian History, Vol.1, No.4 (2000), pp.691-92.
17 Nathanial Knight, ‘On Russian Orientalism: A Response to Adeeb Khalid’, Kritika: Explorations in Russian and
Eurasian History, Vol.1, No.4, (2000), p.703.
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provides the basis for understanding, making the process of orientalism itself a universalised
experience and equal in its application. Maria Todorova neatly counterpoints the debate by
invoking the limitations of this ultimately hermeneutic discussion for application to modern
Russian politics and instead reminds us that it is the nobility of the pursuit of knowledge and
listening to the ‘other’ that should drive research.18 Modernising this debate, and ultimately
answering Said’s own questions on the applicability of his theory of orientalism on Russia,
Vera Tolz looks at the considerable influence that Russian orientalists have had on the work
of Edward Said.19
Therefore perhaps it is Knight’s understanding of ‘distinctiveness’ over ‘uniqueness’ that is the
most useful. We can appreciate Russia as both ‘orientalised’ as an ‘other’ to the West, and as
an ‘orientaliser’ to the East. It is important to understand that this rejection of Russia as
encompassing a ‘pure’ European identity is not itself a European construction; Russia has
periodically enjoyed distancing itself from Europe and revelling in the ‘exoticness’ of Chengis
Khan and the Kazakh Steppe, choosing to see itself as part of the other.20 Or, in special terms,
at times it is a centre of power and at others its creates a marginal power identity locating itself
on the edge through strategic choice. At times this lineage has chosen to associate itself with
the sophisticated government and cultural complexity of China, and the fierce horse-backed
warriors of the flatlands. Writers such as Tolstoy performed these ideas in writing, rejecting
the European traditions but using the same tools of analysis. During the Soviet-era, Kazakh
communists such as Sandzhar Asfendiarov explored the relationship between Islam and
communism, fuelling the development of Soviet orientalism and the legitimacy of Soviet
Union’s role within Islam.
18 Maria Todorova, ‘Does Russian Orientalism Have a Russian Soul? A Contribution to the Debate between
Nathaniel Knight and Adeeb Khalid’, Kritika, Vol.1, No.4 (2000), p.719.
19 Vera Tolz, Russia’s Own Orient; The Politics of Identity and Oriental Studies in the Late Imperial and Soviet
Periods (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), p.10.
20 Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, Russian Orientalism.
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This is important because although this may seem a largely historical discussion, it has
repercussions for the political narratives of the present. These layers of orientalism manifest
themselves in the Eurasianism of the Putin-led era of Russian politics, blurring the borders in
spatio-temporal terms. Kazakhstan becomes a ‘third space’, one that is defined within Russian
territory through the imposition of a Russian presence, but simultaneously is not fully
incorporated within Russian identity. It remains orientalised, and ultimately, distant. Actively
choosing to reposition Russia as a Eurasian state, as opposed to a European state, allows
Putin to legitimise a larger geographical sphere of influence, encapsulating its former colonies
and once more using historical justification for present day policy towards Central Asia and
FSU states.21 This expands the margins of Russian power, and Kazakhstan’s increasing
autonomy deviates from this position. Kazakhstan takes on some of this identity in what can
be understood as what Browning terms a ‘structural interpretation of marginality’; it takes on
the identity of the ‘defensive outpost defending itself against the other’.22
When President Putin’s stooge, the nationalist leader and Vice-Chairman of the Duma
Vladimir Zhironovskii, called for the ‘creation of a Central Asian Federal Region ruled by Verny
[Soviet name for Almaty]’ his words were not taken too seriously by mainstream media.23 He
has been described as both a clown and a neo-fascist, and has used his position to expound
anti-Semitic, racist and misogynistic speeches in a bid to rally the masses. Putin, it is reported,
uses him to test public opinion on his more radical ideas.24 He represents an extreme position
21 See for example Vladimir Putin, Putin, V., ‘Address by President of the Russian Federation’ 18 March 2014,
The Kremlin, Moscow, accessed 15 September 2015, available from
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603
22 Chris Browning and Pertti Joenniemi, ‘Gibralter, Jersusalem and Kaliningrad: Peripherality, Marginality and
Hybridity’ in Parker (ed.) The Geopolitics of Europe’s Identity, p.144.
23 Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty, ‘Kazakh Foreign Ministry Protests Zhirinovsky Comments’, Radio Free
Europe/ Radio Liberty, 24 February, 2014, accessed 15 September 2015,
http://www.rferl.org/content/kazakhstan-zhirinovsky/25275475.html
24 Ibid.
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within Russian politics, but none-the-less a position that has been popular with voters keen on
re-establishing the foreign policy power of Russia. Where the West sees much of the Second
World War as a reverse for the Soviet empire, it is remembered as a great era and celebrated
Victory Day by the Former Soviet Union and as a mark of Russian military power. President
Putin publicly laments the demise of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union as among the
greatest catastrophes of the 20th century, and has made many speeches as to the importance
of Eurasian reintegration as a way of creating a new era of Russian nationalist pride.25
Speaking in 2013, President Putin goes so far to suggest that:
The 21st century promises to become the century of major
changes, the era of the formation of major geopolitical zones, as
well as financial and economic, cultural, civilisational, and military
and political areas. That is why integrating with our neighbours is
our absolute priority. The future Eurasian Economic Union, which
we have declared and which we have discussed extensively as
of late, is not just a collection of mutually beneficial agreements.
The Eurasian Union is a project for maintaining the identity of
nations in the historical Eurasian space in a new century and in
a new world. Eurasian integration is a chance for the entire post-
Soviet space to become an independent centre for global
development, rather than remaining on the outskirts of Europe
and Asia.26
25 Vladimir Putin, Russia’s Diversity for the Modern World spoken at Valdai International Discussion Club 20th
September 2013 [transcript available from] http://valdaiclub.com/politics/62880.html
26 Ibid.
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This was spoken, rather ironically, at an event entitled “Russia’s Diversity for the Modern
World”. There is nothing pluralistic about this vision of Russian foreign policy, this is not a
manifesto for diversity, it is a pledge to bring to heal the former sphere of Russian influence.
Several references are made to the illustrious Soviet-era, to the need to regroup the ‘historical
space’ of Eurasia and importantly it speaks of the Russian paranoia of becoming irrelevant, of
‘remaining on the outskirts’ of history. This statement places Russia ‘the protector of the
Former Soviet Union’ firmly at the helm of a reintegration project to which the Central Asian
states are expected to acquiesce. The direct reference to geopolitics should especially be
heeded as it is upon the natural resources of the former Russian territory that this speech
focuses.
Despite this robust rhetoric, the inconsistency of Russian foreign policy has actually served to
empower rising Kazakh autonomy. In the early years of independence, the Central Asian
states were largely ignored, financially and administratively cut-off from the centre.27 This left
Kazakhstan virtually bankrupt upon independence, forced into a process of what was then
termed ‘de-statification’ to avoid further damaging the state debt28. President Putin’s first term
as leader was marked by the indifference towards Central Asia, as the Russian leadership
turned westward, in an attempt to embrace the geopolitical changes that occurred in the wake
of 9/11.29 It was during this time that Kazakhstan developed its expanded industrial base away
from the glare of Russian attention. During the era of President Medvedev, a soft-power
approach was adopted and focused upon the cultural ties between the two states, but without
the economic incentives to solidify the relationship, and a tendency to downplay its role as a
mediator in border disputes between the republics.30 By contrast, Putin’s second presidency
27 Martha Brill Olcott, Kazakhstan; Unfulfilled Promise, (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, 2002), p.31.
28 Sally Cummings, Kazakhstan: Power and the Elite (London: IB Tauris, 2005), p.31.
29 Roy Allison, ‘Strategic Reassertion in Russia's Central Asia Policy’, International Affairs, Vol.80, No.4 (2004).
30 Konstantin Yevgenievich Meshcheryakov, ‘Two Decades of Russia’s Foreign Policy in Central Asia: Trends and
Problems’, Middle-East Journal of Scientific Research, Vol.21, No.1 (2014), pp.63-5.
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has been characterised by aggressive Eurasianism that he has presided over since 2008, not
just in relation to the CIS but also to the majority of the FSU states.31 Again, this has not
produced tangible economic results, only military strength, as discussed further in this chapter.
Exacerbating this indecision has been the ineffectual foreign policy tool that is the Shanghai
Cooperation Organisation (SCO). The SCO was designed as a regional agreement to provide
economic and military support between China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and
Tajikistan. The politics behind the creation of this organisation was supposed to provide
Russia with a way to manage China’s entry into Central Asia and to re-establish a presence
in Central Asia. However, this does not appear to have delivered results for Moscow: none of
the other member states supported Russia over Crimea, nor in Georgia, and none has officially
recognised South Ossetia as an independent state. Similarly, there was no action taken
towards peacekeeping duties during the state-led violence that occurred in Kyrgyzstan in
2010. The events were perceived as being ‘internal affairs’, showing the centrality of state
security to the pact, and the outward-facing nature of the perceived security threat.32
The need to create this constitutional arrangement shows the inability of Russia to forge
cooperation between the Central Asian states without an architectural framework.33 Even
within this framework, the SCO has proved most effective at solving only minor border
disputes, whilst ‘trade and payments, common infrastructure arrangements, trans-border
natural resources, intra-regional migration, terrorism, and trafficking in people, drugs and
weapons’ have yet to be resolved.34 The limits of the extension of Russian power are keenly
31 Angela Stent, ‘Restoration and Revolution in Putin's Foreign Policy’, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol.60, No.6 (2008),
pp.1089-106.
32 Stephen Aris, ‘The Response of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation to the Crisis in Kyrgyzstan’, Civil
Wars, Vol.14, No.3, (2012), p.452.
33 Gregory Gleason, ‘Inter-State Cooperation in Central Asia from the CIS to the Shanghai Forum’, Europe-Asia
Studies, Vol.53, No.7, (2001), p.1079.
34 ibid., p.1093.
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felt in this instance; the SCO helps to define not only the reach of Russian authority, but also
to demarcate its limits, and the beginning of marginal power structures competing in the same
space.
The shallowness of the military agreement, and China’s opposition to introducing this, means
that one of the core purposes of the organisation is lost, and with it, a tool for Russia to
reconnect with Central Asia. Instead, China has used the SCO as an opportunity to promote
its ‘good neighbour’ policy and strengthen its economic and security sector integration into
Central Asia.35 Indeed, the secretariat for the SCO is in Beijing with a majority Chinese
workforce. Pakistan and India are officially joining the SCO from 2016, despite recent conflict
between Russia and India over arms sales to Pakistan and India’s close relationship with the
US.36 This may add to stability in Afghanistan in the long term, but that was never a goal of
the union. With so much discord between these states where does that leave the CIS states?
It is unlikely that the SCO will be useful for the flailing Central Asian integration project, but
potentially, the pivot of international attention towards the region may generate economic
gains, especially if it facilitates the building of more oil pipelines.
The Kazakh Post-Soviet Identity
The adaptive modern Kazakh identity is a challenge to the Russian state’s imagination of
Eurasia. The previous section examined the identity politics and foreign policy of Russia
towards Kazakhstan and the effects of this on modern political rhetoric, but we need to briefly
return to marginality to understand how this narrative is being challenged within Kazakhstan
35 Chien Peng Chung, ‘China and the Institutionalization of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’, Problems
of Post-Communism, Vol.53, No.5 (2006), p.4.
36Farzana Shaikh, ’India and Pakistan Bring Risks for Shanghai Cooperation Organization’, Chatham House, July,
2015, accessed 15 September 2015, http://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/india-and-pakistan-
bring-risks-shanghai-cooperation-organization#sthash.q8KApKZH.dpuf
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by the state and through the lived experience of being Kazakhstani. The literature review
showed the conditions by which Parker suggested identity can be a condition of marginality.
The seven degrees by which marginality can be internalised by the marginal state, can be
used here to determine whether Kazakhstan displays the necessary condition for its sense of
identity to be ‘open to consideration’ in the context of its relationship with Russia.37 In other
words, does Kazakhstan go beyond simple recognition of its marginal status and make efforts
to create an identity beyond the centre, Russia, and see the potential to redefine the existing
patterns of behaviour. Can it be argued that Kazakhstan has gone to the extent of asserting
relative autonomy through its identity, which would in turn lay the foundations for the use of
tactics aimed at relocating power?
The large Russian population, which lives predominantly in the North and North East regions
of Kazakhstan, is a point of vulnerability for Kazakhstan. In a bid to protect the northern territory
from Russian advances, the capital was moved from the Southern city of Almaty to a newly
created Astana. 38 The new capital’s geographically central location repopulated the sparse
central and northern region. To put this in perspective, Kazakhstan is the ninth largest country
on earth with a population of only 16.8 million. Of this, 23% are ethnically Russian, the second
largest group after Kazakh, with the vast majority living in the northern oblasts (districts).
According to the 2011 Gallup poll, the number of ethnic Russians who regard themselves as
37 I) Being in a marginal position; II) Seeing oneself in a marginal position III) being conscious of potentialities
that are in facet implicit in being marginal; IV) Using those potentialities to advantage; V) on the basis of one’s
marginality seeing a potential to redefine received patterns; VI) including other’s identities in such a
redefinition. Parker, ‘A Theoretical Introduction’ in Parker (ed.), The Geopolitics of Europe's Identity, p.15.
38 The capital was moved to Astana for many reasons. Firstly it provided a more central location for the capital
of an enormous country, making the bureaucratic infrastructure more accessible to the remote populations.
Secondly it provided a vanity project for the president to create a new vision for the future away from the old
soviet capital. And thirdly it did indeed populate an area of land that was predominantly Russian with a Kazakh
majority. However, the new capital is essentially defenceless, particularly in the event of a land invasion. It sits
on a flat plain, easily accessible from all sides, unlike Almaty which is protected by the Tien Shen mountain
range with its 7000m peaks. Astana is in this respect similar to the capital of Belarus, Minsk, with its position
on the flat plains of Eastern Europe. The core military bases of Kazakhstan have so far remained in the old
capital of Almaty and are all Russian trained troops.
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struggling or surviving in Kazakhstan is rising, despite GDP growth of 7.5 % in the same year
and those ethnic Russians hold a representative 23.7% of the seats in the Mazhilis
(Parliament).39 The perception of a declining standard of living is emerging, even if in real
terms the economic forecast is positive. Whilst the ‘Russian Problem’ has been over-stated in
the past, to the detriment of other matters,40 this increasing uncertainty is correlated with the
rising national rhetoric stemming from Russia. To isolate the Russian population would be
dangerous to the Presidency which depends upon popular support in order to perpetuate the
autocratic governance structure, and with growing Kazakh patriotism the de facto segregated
Russian Kazakhstanis would play into Putin’s hands. After all, it has been the defence of ethnic
Russians that the President in Moscow has used to legitimate annexing in Eastern Europe.
The sense of vulnerability of this large Russian population in the northern oblasts is not
unfounded. Consider the recent conflict in Ukraine where the speedy mobilisation of pro-
Russian supporters within Eastern Ukraine shows the strong connection between ethnic
Russians and Russia itself. The Russo-Georgian War in 2008 showcased the military
response that Russia was prepared to project – this included air strikes as well as ground
action, and again the mobilisation of the local population of separatist Ossetia already unhappy
with Georgian rule. Russia has used this desire to belong, and played with the definition of
what it means to be Russian in the build-up to the war by issuing Russian passports to South
Ossetians before invading to ‘protect’ them.41 Currently being debated in the Duma is a law to
grant citizenship to any fluent Russian speaker who lives in the FSU, or has family in the FSU.
Surely, Kazakhstan must be aware of the implications of Russian ‘protection’ occurring on
39 Gallup Poll, ‘Kazakhstan National Opinion Poll’ conducted by International Republican Institute 17-28th
February 2011, accessed 15 September 2015,
http://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/Full%20English%20Version%20Kazakhstan%20IRI%20Poll%20Feb%20201
1.pdf
40 Timothy Edmunds, ‘Power and Powerlessness in Kazakstani Society: Ethnic Problems in Perspective, Central
Asian Survey, Vol.17, No.3 (1998), p.463.
41 Andrei P. Tsygankov & Matthew Tarver-Wahlquist, ‘Duelling Honors: Power, Identity and the Russia–Georgia
Divide’, Foreign Policy Analysis, Vol.5, No.2 (2009) p.307.
169
their soil. This legislation would make many Kazakhstanis citizens of Russia and revoke the
citizenship of their host state, but would not require immigration upon application.42 This is a
dramatic change from current heavily bureaucratic legislation that requires 3 years of
residence in Russia. This effectively denigrates the sovereign rights of the FSU states to
determine the nationality of those that reside within their geographical border, and instead that
decision is made by Russia. However, the rising nationalism within Russia may be a thorn in
the side of the legislation as rising public fears of immigration and increasingly polarised
domestic politics may be unpopular with voters and override the desire of Putin to increase
immigration from the ‘near abroad’.
In recognition of the ‘problem’ created by the large northern Russian population to the long
term stability of Kazakhstan, the government has engaged in cultural engineering and has
taken considerable steps to repopulate this region. Because of the difficulties of learning
Russian, many oralman (Kazakh repatriates) would prefer to settle in the south rather than the
north. As a result, from the 1990s onwards the state has offered financial incentives and
established quotas to limit the number of oralman who can settle in each oblast in a given
year.43 Oralman resettled to this region are typically from Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan
and Persian and Turkic language neighbours, attempting to further establish Kazakh cultures
rather than Russian language in the north.44
During 2013, small acts of resistance against Russian cultural autonomy were observed by
the author across the country. These become popular everyday displays of interest and
42 Asel Kalybekova, Kalybekova, A., Kyrgyzstan Ponders the Impact of Russia’s Citizenship Law Amendments,
2014, EurasiaNet, accessed 16 September 2015, http://www.eurasianet.org/node/68309
43 Alexander C. Diener, ‘Kazakhstan's Kin State Diaspora: Settlement Planning and the Oralman Dilemma’
Europe-Asia Studies, Vol.57, No.2 (2005), pp.327-48.
44 UNDP, ‘Status of Oralmans in Kazakhstan’, UNDP, 2006, accessed 16 September 2015,
http://www.undp.kz/library_of_publications/files/6838-29587.pdf
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support for the Kazakh individuality as separate to and above the Russian enforced identity,
and represents a display of positive marginality. Roads signs that used to be displayed in
Russian and Kazakh are now displayed in Kazakh and English, no Russian translation is
shown at all, particularly in the south and around Almaty. Civil society organisations that
promote Kazakh culture have been encouraged by the state. More and more events displaying
traditional Kazakh culture through music, dance and song have all been sponsored by the
state as part of a larger attempt to reconnect citizens with their heritage. Local art galleries
showcase works by local artists, focusing upon the suffering experienced during the Soviet-
era by a new generation of ethnically Kazakh artists, as well as interaction with Western
mediums, whilst nostalgic scenes of warriors and yurts remains popular with buyers at local
auctions. Again, this is an assumed culture, one which focuses upon an imagined past of noble
nomads designed to encourage a collective Kazakh identity but also projects a lineage that
predates Russian influence in Kazakhstan.
What we see here is the artificial extension of the history of Kazakhstan, similar to the project
undertaken by Kaliningrad at the end of the Cold War.45 Kazakhstan has been working to
stretch its history back to the pre-Imperial and pre-Soviet eras of Kazakhstan in order to
establish a new identity, unrelated to the Russian-era. At a state level there has been an
introduction of new festivals and holidays to counteract Russian aggression since the
annexation of Crimea. President Nazarbayev announced a series of festivals over 2015 which
would reimagine history to celebrate the birth of Kazakhstan in 1465, albeit acknowledging
that the state would have been very different from the present day.46 Similarly, the project to
rename Kazakhstan as ‘Kazakh Yeli’ is a project designed to separate Kazakhstan from its
45 Chris Browning, ‘Contending Discourses of Marginality: The Case of Kaliningrad’, Geopolitics, Vol.9, No.4,
(2004), p.720.
46For more information see Joanna Lillis, ‘Kazakhstan Celebrates Statehood in Riposte to Russia’, EurasiaNet
January 6 2015, accessed 16 September 2015, http://www.eurasianet.org/node/71536.
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weaker neighbours to the south and to carve an individual identity.47 The name means ‘land
of the Kazakh people’ in the Kazakh language and is again a reflection of the project of
autonomy.
Yet, whereas the new Ukrainian government in Kyiv antagonised Moscow through its debate
on the role of Russian language, as well as turning to the EU and IMF for solutions,
Kazakhstan has remained neutral and seemingly unafraid during the crisis that unfolded.
Telephone calls between President Nazarbayev and President Obama and Chancellor
Merkel, as well as a visit to President Putin would suggest that the Kazakh government took
on a role of mediator, appearing as a voice of calm in the stormy sea. Such a prominent role
suggests that the Kazakh leadership was not, or at least did not want to appear, concerned
by the developments in Crimea. Domestically, President Nazarbayev has used a long held
policy of giving one speech in Russian and another in Kazakh. Kazakh is the official language
of Kazakhstan, and whilst the President’s bold plan to have 90% of Kazakhs speaking Kazakh
by 2025 is looking unlikely to be achieved, it is emblematic of the attempt to create a cleavage
with the Soviet past.
Economic Relations between Kazakhstan and Russia
Kazakhstan and Russia publicly acknowledge the importance of their trade partnership to each
other. President Nazarbayev has publicly spoken of the ‘closeness/naturalness’ of the
relationship and the ‘economic benefit worth millions’ to the Kazakh economy.48 Similarly,
when President Putin has felt more benevolent towards Kazakhstan he has acknowledged the
role that it plays in the economy of Russia, particularly in relation to the creation of the much
47 The Economist, ‘Don’t Call Me Stan’, The Economist, 2014, 22 February.
48 Nursultan Nazarbayev, ‘Ya by ochen khotel, chtobi nashy stranu uznavali po ludyam nashim’, 2008, available
from http://www.kp.ru/daily/24518/666930/, accessed 25/07/2015.
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anticipated Eurasian Economic Union.49 The relationship however is not quite as it seems,
particularly with regard to the Union.
During the construction of the customs union, the high tariffs appeared to be detrimental to
Kazakhstan and favourable to Russia. The reason the tariffs at first appear to have had the
most significant impact upon Kazakhstan is because of the increase from 6.5% in external
tariffs in 2009 to 10.3% in 2010 – a very large leap for the hitherto increasingly liberal Kazakh
trade regime. Russia and Belarus on the other hand saw only a small increase in external
tariffs. So whilst this suggests that the union was creating a trade diversion to Russia, upon
closer inspection of the total reorganisation of internal and external tariffs of the customs union,
it becomes clear that the protectionist policies introduced are those that favour the small
Kazakh material export market – wheat, livestock and manufacturing. Russia in fact lowered
its internal trade tariffs with Kazakhstan in order to offset the rises in the external trade tariffs
that Kazakhstan experienced.50 In other words, Russia was willing to experience a tariff
increase in order to generate an overall advantage for Kazakhstan joining the union.
Furthermore because a large part of the union concerns internal trade tariffs rather than
external tariffs there is a reduction in the cost of trade, since supply chains are more easily
integrated across the union.
This has been an unequivocal boost to the Kazakh economy as the effects of integration have
already been realised through the increase in goods being transported from China to Europe51
49 Russia Today, ’Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan sign ‘epoch' Eurasian Economic Union’, Russia Today, 29 May,
2014. Accessed 16 September 2015, http://www.rt.com/business/162200-russia-bealrus-kazakhstan-union/]
50 Arevik Mkrtchyan ,’The Customs Union Between Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan: Some Evidence from the
New Tariff Rates and Trade Flows’, European University Institute, 2013, accessed 16 September 2015,
http://freepolicybriefs.org/2013/10/07/the-customs-union-between-russia-belarus-and-kazakhstan-some-
evidence-from-the-new-tariff-rates-and-trade-flows/
51 Keith Bradsher, ‘Hauling New Treasure Along the Silk Road’, New York Times, 20 July 2013, accessed 16
September 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/21/business/global/hauling-new-treasure-along-the-silk-
road.html
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passing through Kazakhstan since the beginning of the union.52 The deflationary pressure that
resulted from Russian devaluation of the rouble designed to improve the competitiveness of
Russian exports outside the Union gave another opportunity for Kazakhstan to act in its own
interest rather than with the Union. Kazakhstan responded to Russian economic policy
changes early in 2014 by devaluing the tenge, effectively entering into a currency war with
Russia, in order to equalise its export market prices with that of its Northern neighbour.53 Here
we see a clear example of Kazakhstan’s ability to set its own economic policy, away from the
interests of both the Russian and the supposedly Russian orientated Eurasian customs union,
and rebalance itself towards its own economic agenda.
Russian investment into the Kazakh economy had increased slightly as a result of the customs
union, but is still far behind the investment levels of the Netherlands and China. Neither is
Russia the leading export market for Kazakh goods.54 However, this not enough to
significantly increase the volume of trade. In terms of export sales, Russia is still lagging
behind, as the table below demonstrates.
52 Arevik Mkrtchyan, ‘The Customs Union Between Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan: Some Evidence from the
New Tariff Rates and Trade Flows’ Forum for Research on Eastern Europe and Emerging Economies, 2015,
accessed 16 September 2015, http://freepolicybriefs.org/2013/10/07/the-customs-union-between-russia-
belarus-and-kazakhstan-some-evidence-from-the-new-tariff-rates-and-trade-flows/
53 The Russian devaluation was of course the result of the decision to lower the dollar. As a result of the
devaluation many countries across the globe were forced to lower their currencies in order to remain
competitive in global export market; Argentina, Turkey, Ghana and the Ukraine have all followed suite, with
India and South Africa raising interest to achieve a similar effect.
54 Tengri News, ‘Direct investments of Russia’s companies to Kazakhstan to make up $16 billion in 2013’, Tengri
News, accessed 16 September 2015, http://en.tengrinews.kz/markets/Direct-investments-of-Russias-
companies-to-Kazakhstan-to-make-up-16-billion-in-23645/
Tengri News, ‘RMK to invest $600 million in Kazakhstan’, Tengri News, accessed 16 September 2015,
http://en.tengrinews.kz/companies/RMK-to-invest-600-million-in-Kazakhstan-23920/
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Source material – UN ComTrade Database, United Nations, (2015) available from comtrade.un.org
Source material - UN ComTrade Database, United Nations, (2015) available from comtrade.un.org
Fig. 2 Top Imports Partners for the Republic of
Kazakhstan
China (17.86%)
Italy (16.76%)
Netherlands (8.11%)
Russia (7.31%)
France (6.10%)
Switzerland (5.38%)
Austria (5.37%)
Turkey (3.5%)
Canada (3.34%)
Romania (3.29%)
Others (22.98%)
Fig. 3 Top Export Partners for the Republic of
Kazakhstan
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Source material – Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan Government of the Republic of
Kazakhstan, ‘Invest in Kazakhstan Trade Statistics’, Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan.
Russian investment over the last decade has been limited, and as figure 4. shows it has been
investing little in the future development of the country. Furthermore, if we break this
investment down into sectors it becomes even more apparent as to how far Russia has moved
down in terms of investment. Russia is not the primary investor in any of the key industries –
wholesale and retail trade, communications, hotels, agriculture, transport, utilities, education,
health.55 It appears again, at first glance, that where there is a strong economic need for
Russia is in the import market, which between the two states is primarily petroleum products.
However, as we shall see below, the nature of the oil industry and the transfer of oil products
alters the statistics somewhat creating the impression of a single rather than multifaceted
exchange of goods.
55 Yelena N. Zabortseva, ‘Rethinking the Economic Relationship Between Russia and Kazakhstan’, Europe-Asia
Studies, Vol.66, No.2 (2014), p.314.
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Furthermore, as discussed in the introduction, the expansion of a center’s margins into new
territory, can lead to a weakening not a new strengthening of power. Following the annexation
of Crimea, in which the borders between Russia and Europe are redrawn, Russia has
experienced a weakening of its economy. The economic downturn experienced by Russia has
not only affected the Russian economy, and Kazakh investors but also the remittances of
migrant workers from across the CIS, who depend upon the strength of the rouble to feed their
families, with Tajikistan the worst affected.56 In Kazakhstan the opposite problem is occurring;
Kazakhstan’s tenge has held against the rouble creating a trade imbalance and pushing down
the price of domestically produced goods. This has translated into public discontent as
shopkeepers and farmers urge Kazakhstanis to ‘Buy Kazakh Goods!’ and the state to remove
Russian meat products from the market in the beginning of what appears to be a trade war.57
So far, we have sought to understand Kazakh-Russo relations through key historical and
narrative devices that have created the position of marginality, with Russia driving the
relationship until independence. We have re-evaluated the relationship between Kazakhstan
and Russia in terms of identity and scratched the surface of the economic relationship to reveal
that Kazakhstan has internalised the identity of a marginal state, as opposed to peripheral
state. More than that, it has sought to alter the identity that it has been ‘allocated’ by the center.
This now allows us to understand how this has been achieved; it supports the notion of tactics
used to become a margin, and to project power from a position of marginality. The two areas
that need to be examined next are the energy industry and the military. These two areas define
the relationship between Kazakhstan and Russia as the ‘bargaining chip’ of for each state
respectively and have the most impact upon the future of the state-state relationship.
56 David Trilling, ‘Remittances to Central Asia Fall Sharply, as Expected’, Eurasianet.Org, 21 April 2015, accessed
16 September 2015, http://www.eurasianet.org/node/73061
57 Joanna Lillis, ‘Kazakhstan and Russia Trading Punches in Import-Export Row’ Eurasianet.org, 16 April 2015,
accessed 16 September 2015, http://www.eurasianet.org/node/73006
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Pipeline Politics; Russia, Kazakhstan and post-Soviet Energy Security
We have seen the long-term of strategy of the Kazakh state, ‘Kazakhstan 2050’ and
understand the ambitions that the state has for future growth and the new identity that it wishes
to encapsulate. In order to attain this position, Kazakhstan has had to take advantage of the
reduced Russian economic capability to extricate itself from the Russian Eurasian policy
narrative. Adopting sophisticated tactics, and from the marginality literature, we know that one
of the tactics employed by marginal states is to play one centre off against another.58 We can
see evidence for this movement between two centers of power in the types of contracts that
are being signed between Russia and China, and also see the attempts of Kazakhstan to offer
itself as an alternative centre. But first we need to understand how Kazakhstan has
disengaged Russian interests in the energy sector.
Evidence of how far Kazakhstan has developed in its relationship with its colonial predecessor
can be seen in the surprising lack of Russian firms in major Kazakh oil projects; the increased
Kazakh ownership of refineries and pipelines; and infighting between Russian firms over
Chinese contracts have all contributed to the decline of Russian influence in the Kazakh oil
and gas sector. Together, as the following section will show, these amount to far fewer ‘hard
power’ opportunities for the Russian state to leverage control through its engagement with the
independent Kazakh energy industry, and increased autonomy on the margins.
Dwindling Soviet Legacy
58 Parker, ‘A Theoretical Introduction’ in Parker (ed.), The Geopolitics of Europe's Identity, p.13.
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Oil and gas export was as central to the survival of the Soviet Union as it is to present day
Russia. The vast reserves of natural resources powered the economic growth of the
communist machine, created political bargaining power in Soviet dealings with the West and
formed the basis of Soviet integration into world markets. For the Soviet republics operating
within the Union, there were no price variations (they were illegal during this period) and all
industry directives were planned through the State Committee for Oil.59 As a result of the quota
system, as opposed to a profit-based system, there was weak efficiency of production and
poor responsiveness to changing local demands. The cost of developing oil in what was then
the Kazakh SSR was prohibitively expensive because of the weakening technological
capabilities of the Soviet Union. Kazakhstan was not unique in this regard, the fields of the
Russian Far East and Siberia were equally as under-developed, and attention was not drawn
to Kazakh reserves until the 1970s. As a result of this technological failure, the decline in the
production of oil and its falling contribution to GDP was as much a cause of the dissolution of
the Soviet Union as the structural inefficiencies and defence build-up, resulting in the poor
condition of the industry upon the independence of the FSU states.60
Consequently, during the last years of Soviet Union, Western firms with higher expertise were
welcomed into the Kazakh SSR with production contracts that allowed direct control and
ownership over the projects.61 At this time it was the American firm Occidental Petroleum
59 It should be noted that this committee has been subject to multiple name changes throughout the Soviet
period of Russian history.
60 Douglas B. Reynoldsa & Marek Kolodziejb, ‘Former Soviet Union oil production and GDP decline: Granger
causality and the multi-cycle Hubbert curve’, Energy Economics, Vol.30, No.2 (2008), pp.271–89.
61 Foreign investment in the Soviet Union was common throughout its existence. However, the extent to which
firms were able to integrate into the FSU was limited during periods for political and economic reasons. During
the first half of the Soviet Union there was high levels of easily accessible oil and gas which required low levels
of technological capability or investment in the industry. In the 1920s foreign companies has direct access and
rights of ownership in the Soviet Union, but this later changed according to the mandatory autarky advocated
by Leninism. Gradually as the need for foreign technology occurs, in the second half of the Soviet Union, foreign
intervention in the domestic industry is increased. It is not however until the late 1980s that there are contracts
which allow foreign controlled projects and the profits share for foreign firm’s increases in the Soviet Union, and
it is not until 1987 that these projects are seen in Kazakhstan.
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Corporation, the Japanese firm Marunbeni, and the Italian firm Montedison that formed a
consortium to extract sulphur and gas from the Tengiz field on the Caspian Sea.62 By 1990,
the final years of the Soviet Union, in a bid to remain the world’s largest energy producer,
production sharing agreements were being signed at a rate of one a month.63 So at the end of
the Soviet Union, Russian control of its core industry was deteriorating, its technological
capability was relatively low and it possessed a diminished ability to become a stable source
of investment into the newly independent Republic of Kazakhstan.
Enter the new decade, the new era of independence and freshly liberalised Russian firms
enter the Kazakh market – tentatively. To begin with the only projects that attracted attention
from Russian firms were the Karachaganak gas field and the Tengiz-Novorossiysk oil pipeline
project. As President Putin came to power so interest in the oil and gas fields of Kazakhstan
increased modestly with rising investment in the industry, but it was limited to Kazakhstan:
there was little interest in the other Central Asian states and there was little reciprocal
investment by Kazakh firms in Russia. Small investments continued to be made; Moscow
approved the Caspian Consortium Pipeline in 2001 and the borders of the northern sector of
the Caspian Sea were decided; Atash and Tub-Karagan were sold to Lukoil in 2003.
Small Market Share
What is significant is not only the amount of money which Russian firms are investing in, but
also the type of projects. Currently the three major Russian oil companies – Lukoil, Rosneft
and Gazprom - have a small market share and are invested in smaller maturing oil fields. In
theory there is a strong level of Russian involvement in the industry; Russian firms are involved
62 Mazen Labban, Space, Oil and Capital (Routledge Studies in International Business and the World Economy)
(London: Routledge, 2008).
63ibid.
180
in 18 different projects in Kazakhstan including two large fields; Tengizchevroil and
Karachaganak. Rosneft owns shares in Kurmangazy (3rd largest Kazakh oil field) and 50% of
the small Aday Block in Atyrau. Similarly, Gazprom and Lukoil have an active interest in the
gas fields of Khvalynskoye, Tsentralnoye and Imasevskoye. These are sizable projects. In
fact, by 2006 the total Russian investment in the whole of Central Asia was approximately $4-
5.2 billion.64 Current Russian investment into Kazakhstan has barely increased with the 2012
investment being $5.3 billion; in fact this is a paltry amount when we consider the investment
of China of $ 23 billion in 2015 alone. Russia lacks the vast reserves of capital at the disposal
of some of its rivals.65
Whether Russia can improve its position in the Kazakh energy industry depends upon its
ability to retain existing contracts, invest in production capacity and efficiency, and gain a
larger market share. As of writing Kurmangazy, Khvalynskoye and Tsentralnoy are not yet
proven to be commercially viable projects. Because of their potential, if they do become viable
they will increase Russia’s market share, especially in the natural gas sector as their combined
output is predicted at 14-36m tons and 9-24bcm of natural gas by 2020. 66 However, as we
can see from the Kashagan projects, with the best efforts of the world’s leading companies
they cannot produce oil at the quota or efficiency predicted. In fact Lukoil withdrew from a
previous contract at the Zhumbai oil field because of poor returns. As a result the recent
Production Sharing Agreements (PSAs) signed between Russian firms and the Kazakh state
have reflected the uncertainty of the relationship. However, some of these projects present
64 Vladimir Paramonov and Aleksey Strokov,‘Russian Oil and Gas Projects and Investments in Central Asia’,
Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, 2008.
65 Shannon Tiezzi, ‘China and Kazakhstan Sign $23 Billion in Deals’, The Diplomat, 28 March 2015, accessed 16
September 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/03/china-kazakhstan-sign-23-billion-in-deals/
66Kazakh Chamber of Commerce in the USA, Russian Energy Projects In Kazakhstan’s Oil And Gas Sector, Kazakh
Chamber of Commerce in the USA, accessed 16 September 2015, http://kazcham.com/russian-energy-projects-
in-kazakhstan%E2%80%99s-oil-and-gas-sector/
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the most challenging technical problems and these are perhaps better suited to other countries
and more advanced companies.
Reducing dependency on Russian owned refineries
Kazakhstan has taken further steps to head off the aggressive Eurasianism and regain control
of its pipeline network. During the creation of Soviet Central Asia, much of the industry’s
infrastructure, including the pipeline network and refineries, were spread out across the region,
extending beyond national borders. As a result, key refineries that process Kazakh raw crude
into refined fuels are located over the border in Russia. The refineries and their locations are
therefore a legacy of the soviet era. Currently, Kazakhstan produces 1,653,000 barrels per
day of oil as a total, whilst its refineries, officially, process only 427,000 barrels per day.67
These figures represent the capacity, not even the reality of production and what is more, oil
cannot simply be ‘diverted’ from one refinery to another to accommodate fluctuations in
production. In 2013 the three refineries (Pavlodar, Shymkent and Atyrau) finally closed for
three years of modernisation, funded in Atyrau by the Chinese government for $1.1bn to
service Sinopec’s production quota in the nearby Atyrau drill.68 The regeneration is expected
to both increase the capacity and to greatly improve the quality of the oil in line with EU
regulations allowing Kazakh oil to reach a wider export market.
The specifics are important. The refineries have been a stranglehold on Kazakh independence
from Russia for decades as their midstream operations have been dependent upon Russian
67 Energy Information Agency, ‘Total Petroleum Production’, Energy Information Agency (US Government), 204,
accessed 16 September 2015, http://www.eia.gov/countries/country-data.cfm?fips=kz
And the refinery figures are based upon the following for each refinery of the three major refineries.
Shymkent Refinery (PetroKazakhstan), 160,000 bbl/d , Pavlodar Refinery (KazMunayGas), 162,600 bbl/d, Atyrau
Refinery (KazMunayGas), 104,400 bbl/d (16,600 m3/d)
68 Reuters, ‘China Lends $1.1 bln For Kazakh Refinery Upgrade’, Reuters, Wednesday 6th June 2012, accessed
15 September 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/06/oil-kazakhstan-china-
idUSL5E8H667N20120606
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political will. In 2013 we can see the beginning of Kazakh autonomy over its midstream starting
to take effect. Because of the refinery closures, Kazakhstan and Russia entered into an
agreement that Kazakhstan would exchange crude oil for refined products with Russia in order
to meet their export agreements.69 As a result of Russian unwillingness to agree a price for
the crude that was shipped to Russia, and because the Customs Union prevented the
operation of an internal tariff, Kazakhstan was selling the oil for less than the market price. To
force negotiations with the Russian government, the Kazakh state instead stopped importing
Russian refined products, choosing to use China’s refineries instead. Not only was this a
display of strength from the Kazakh state in negotiations, but it also illustrated that Russian
refineries were no longer the only option and that China was a willing partner to Kazakhstan,
offsetting Russian interests.
Reducing dependence on Russian operated pipelines
Similar encouraging developments of Kazakh independence have been observed in the
pipeline networks, which again are dominated by Russian firms. Again, because of the Soviet
legacy, Kazakhstan’s oil pipelines were designed to export to Russia, and link to the refineries
in Russia on their way to delivery across the FSU. Whilst smaller amounts of oil are transported
by tanker across the Caspian Sea, Kazakhstan is still a landlocked country further increasing
its dependency on the pipeline network. This gave Russia almost complete control over the
Kazakh pipeline network. This has gradually been changing since Kazakh independence but
the reality is that Russia still retains strong control over the majority of the Kazakh distribution
system.70 The majority of deliveries are transported along the Black Sea route via Russia,
69 Rianovosti, ‘Kazakhstan Seeks Russia Oil Product Import Cut, Pipeline and Gas Journal’, 2013, accessed 16
September 2015, http://en.ria.ru/business/20130130/179124175/Kazakhstan-Seeks-Russia-Oil-Product-
Import-Cut.html
70 Pipeline & Gas Journal, ‘Kazakhstan To Retain Majority Ownership of Pipelines’, Pipeline & Gas Journal,
August 2012, Vol.239, No.8, accessed 15 September 2015,
http://www.pipelineandgasjournal.com/kazakhstan-retain-majority-ownership-pipelines
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particularly from Atyrau, whilst small capacity pipelines connect Kazakhstan with the
Mediterranean via Azerbaijan, and the newly completed Kazakh-China pipeline. Oil is still
imported from Russia to the industrial north of Kazakhstan because there is not the domestic
infrastructure to support internal transport.
In a bid to revise this, the Kazakh state has made significant progress in gaining distributive
independence. Firstly, it invested oil revenues and sought FDI from China for the development
of its domestic pipelines, despite the low domestic oil prices, through the creation of the
Kazakhstan Caspian Transportation System. The most significant aspect of this project has
been the changes in legislation that are part of the larger repatriation project within the
industry. The government recently passed legislation that KazTransOil, the national oil
pipeline operator, must be the majority owner of any new pipelines built on Kazakh soil. This
ensures that the future pipeline project from Yeskene to Kuryk carrying oil from the Kashagan
project will be Kazakh owned. This pipeline will transport a significant amount of oil, estimated
at some 1.12 million barrels per day.71 Not only is this a positive step towards curbing
dependence upon Russian pipeline reliance but also points to Chinese and other consortium
lead pipeline projects planned in the future.
For natural gas, the pipeline network is more closely controlled by Russian interests and
contains less potential to reduce dependency on Russia in this specific case. Yet again, poor
infrastructure and the Soviet historical legacy, leaves the whole of the Central Asian gas export
system designed for transport to Russia. As a result gas is imported into South Kazakhstan
from Uzbekistan at the same time that it is being exported from the northern gas producing
regions. KazTransGaz, the national pipeline operator, is working on connecting the producing
71 Ibid.
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and consuming regions, which are of course the industrial and populated heartlands of
Kazakhstan, and the key to growing the Kazakh economy away from its dependence on
natural resources as a source of GDP. Of the two main pipeline networks, the northern gas
network is the most dependent upon Russia as the network is operated entirely by Gazprom.
The Central Asia Centre Pipeline is controlled by Gazprom and the other two pipelines (the
Bukhara-Urals and Bukhara-Tashkent-Bishkek-Almaty pipelines) which Kazakhstan acts as a
transit state for are also Gazprom owned, which raises issues of the rent that Kazakhstan can
extract from the Russian giant.
Infighting between Transneft and Rosneft
Infighting between Transneft and Rosneft, and increasing Kazakh confidence has further
weakened the Russian pipeline giants bargaining position in what is in effect a prisoner’s
dilemma over Chinese oil deals.72 The lack of coherence between the two strategies shows a
discord between the two firms similar to the relationship between Sinopec and CNPC. As with
the Chinese firms, this discord helps to dispel the myth of an all-powerful leadership with total
control over domestic energy companies. The competition between firms suggests that they
act more independently than previously considered. In looking for additional capacity to pipe
oil to China, Transneft blocked plans for its competitor Rosneft, instead bidding for an
alternative contract via Mongolia. Kazakhstan offered, for a price, to allow Russian oil to be
pumped through the Atasu-Alashanko section of the pipeline once the expansion had been
completed.73 However Igor Demin, of Transneft, was quoted as saying that ‘Kazakhstan is
prepared to offer a discount for transiting [Russian] crude via the Atasu-Alashanko pipeline,
72 Transneft is the Russian state-owned pipeline company and the largest of its kind in the world and Rosneft is
the Russian state-owned oil company.
73 Ben Priddy, ‘Transneft Opposes Rosneft Plans to Increase Chinese Oil Supply’, Oil & Gas Journal , accessed 15
September 2015, http://www.oilandgaseurasia.com/en/news/transneft-opposes-rosneft-plans-increase-
chinese-oil-supply-kazakhstan
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then push us out of business to pump its own oil’.74 This suggests that not only are the Russian
firms in competition with each other, and not acting in the Russian natural interest, but also
that these large Russian international firms do not expect the Kazakh government to be
subservient. The government is now anticipated, in this game for contracts, to be an
autonomous actor, acting in the state’s best interest.
Together, the dwindling legacy, small market share, reducing reliance upon refineries and
pipelines, coupled with the infighting between ROsneft and Transneft has allowed Kazakhstan
to gain greater control over its energy industry than has previously been the case.
Kazakh Military Dependence
Whilst Russian interest in the Kazakh economy might have waned post-independence, it has
certainly remained significant to Moscow’s military strategy. The Central Asia countries are
not regarded as important in their own right, but are routinely conceptualised as buffer states
to distance large and powerful neighbours, or as land-passages to gain unfettered access to
other regions.75 The War in Afghanistan, lasting for almost a decade and a half, has attracted
further security attention to the region, as extra-regional states jostle to once more use
Kazakhstan and its neighbours as the pathway to a conflict destination. Kazakhstan became
a key chain in the Northern Distribution Network for allied forces to transport goods and
equipment to the conflict in return for financial remuneration.76 Furthermore, in a symbolically
important as well as pragmatic decision, Kazakhstan used the opportunity to send officers with
74 Russia Today, ‘Russian oil could take Kazakh route to China in 2014’, Russia Today, March 2013, accessed 15
September 2015, http://www.rt.com/business/russia-china-kazakhstan-oil-869/
75 Sally Cummings, ‘Eurasian bridge or Murky Waters Between East and West? Ideas, Identity and Output in
Kazakhstan's Foreign Policy’, Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol.9, No.3 (2003), pp.139-
55.
Dmitri Trenin, ‘Southern Watch: Russia’s Policy in Central Asia’, Journal of International Affairs, Vol.56, No 2.
(2003), pp.pp.124-5.
76 Andrew Kuchins & Thomas Sanderson, ‘The Northern Distribution Network and Afghanistan; Geopolitical
Challenges and Opportunities’, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC, January 2010.
186
the US military for training in Afghanistan to enhance its own security forces.77 However, the
War in Afghanistan and increased presence of American military power in the region refocused
Russian military attention back upon Central Asia, as exemplified through the building of
Russian airbases in Osh, Kyrgyzstan, and as such, the republics face a stronger contiguous
military presence. Kazakhstan, with its long continuous northern border, is particularly
vulnerable to Russian military aggression and sits within range of various missile bases.78
While Kazakhstan has successfully managed to extricate itself from the Russian economy, it
has become ever more deeply entrenched in the Russian military complex. The modern
military was created during the Kazakh SSR and as a result its military strategy, procedures
and culture remain predominantly Russian, as does its officer class. Russia remains the core
military relationship for training and equipment and the core of its operational military doctrine
is still based upon Russian principles, unlike other states in the CIS countries which have
established more a perfunctory relationship.79 The depth and breadth of Russian influence
impacts upon the ability of Kazakhstan to exercise autonomy and independence in its military
strategy through path dependency of its leadership and through the continued exchange of
information. Before the break-up of the Soviet Union, the Red Army was decentralised from
Moscow into national jurisdictions, thus continuing the institutional memory of the Soviet
system in the newly created states. The same management personnel were employed and
the same doctrines amended again and again over the next decade, still drawing on Soviet
strategic culture, rather than taking the opportunity of a new vision for the role of the military,
and indeed it is this process that has produced the current Military Doctrine 2011.80
77 Roger McDermott, ‘Kazakhstan's Emerging Role on The War on Terror’ Jamestown Foundation Terrorism
Monitor, Vol.2, No.10 (2004).
78 Joshua Kucera, ‘While Astana Suspends Russian Military Testing, Moscow Deploys Missiles To Kazakhstan
Border’, ‘Eurasianet’, 31 March 2014, accessed 15 September 2015, http://www.eurasianet.org/node/68209
79Vladimir Germanovich Burkov, ‘Russian-Kazakhstani and Russian-Uzbekistani relations: opposing models of
political and military alliances’, Life Science Journal, Vol.11, No.11, (2014), pp.236-38.
80 Roger McDermott, Kazakhstan’s 2011 Military Doctrine: Reassessing Regional and International Security,
(Fort Leavensworth: Foreign Military Studies Office 2011).
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The important questions with regard to the Kazakh military are who is protecting whom, and
from what? The external threats are limited and those that can conceivably be thought of as a
military threat, Russia, are heavily embedded within the apparatus. Upon their creation, the
Kazakh military was brought under the direct control of the president, again in Soviet fashion,
rather than embracing the additional civilian budgetary oversight by assemblies that one might
expect in a Western system. Furthermore, the allocation of military equipment to each of the
Central Asian states was not equal; again, as with the allocation of natural resources, this was
intentional on the part of the Soviet leadership and designed to create unease and hostility
between neighbours rather than a unifying force against Russia. Rent seeking behaviour has
encouraged dependence upon cheap Russian equipment. Kazakhstan is now Russia’s most
expensive military ally.81 Despite Kazakhstan having the ability to finance its own air system,
it has chosen to accept the offer from Moscow of a free air defence system (the S-300PS anti-
missile and anti-ballistic defence system), to replace the now obsolete Soviet era models
currently in use by five battalions.82 Altogether this creates a military organisation that is on
the one hand paid for by a foreign aggressive state, with Soviet military strategy engrained in
its strategic culture, but on the other hand is under the direct control of the President effectively
creating a private military. This blurs the lines between the leadership and ultimately corrupts
the boundaries of who the military is designed to protect.
These confusing circumstances are further compounded when we consider the military build-
up in the Caspian Sea. The littoral states, Iran, Russia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and
Turkmenistan, are engaging in an unnecessary and expensive arms-race in this inland sea.
81 Andrzej Wilk, ‘Kazakhstan is Russia's Most Expensive Military Ally’, Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich/ Centre for 
Eastern Studies, 2 May, 2014, accessed 15 September, http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2014-
02-05/kazakhstan-russias-most-expensive-military-ally
82 ibid.
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Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan have been fighting over the demarcation of borders for the
inclusion of a tiny but oil rich portion of the sea which hinders stability in the region and
encourages Russian intervention in the region.83 Cooperation between these two states
increases the likelihood of the trans-Caspian pipeline, which by-passes Russia and supplies
gas to Europe directly, thereby reducing the Russian monopoly of gas in Europe and impacting
Russian leverage.84 Whilst Russia aims to add another 16 ships to its flotilla by 2020,
Kazakhstan has been indulging in its own military revamp. In 2011 a Russian newspaper was
sent a map showing the war games exercise simulating an aerial attack from Iran.85
Furthermore, Astana has attracted arms dealers and ship dealers from Europe, Turkey, and
Russia, and is in negotiation to purchase the renowned Exocet anti-ship missile from
European consortium MBDA.86 Iran has not been idle either; it has built a navy from virtually
nothing at Soviet independence to a fleet of 100 missile boats, two are equipped with Chinese
C-802 anti-ship missiles.87 With all this tension building on the edge of the Caspian, what are
the core challenges facing Kazakhstan’s military?
According to President Nazarbayev, the preeminent challenge facing his ‘global security
strategy’ is the ‘acceleration of the course of history’. As a source of risk this is a rather
nebulous threat, along with nine other precepts that have formed the basis of ‘Kazakhstan
2050’ and guided the reform of the 2011 Military Doctrine of Kazakhstan.88 Whilst the language
83 Shahin Abbasov, ‘Azerbaijan & Turkmenistan: Renewing Caspian Sea Energy Dispute’, EurasiaNet, 11 July,
2012, accessed 15 September, http://www.eurasianet.org/node/65646
84Dmitry Shlapentokh, ‘Turkmenistan and military Buildup in the Caspian Region: A Small State in the Post-
Unipolar Era’, Journal of Eurasian Studies, Vol.4, No.2 (2013), p.155.
85 Periscope, ‘«Московский комсомолец»: Россия готова сражаться за американскую нефть’ Persicope, 26
September, 2011, http://periscope2.ru/2011/09/26/4822/
86 Joshua Kucera,‘The Great Caspian Arms Race’, Foreign Policy, 22 June 2012, accessed 15 September 2015,
http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/06/22/the-great-caspian-arms-race/
87 ibid.,
88 Address by the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Nazarbayev, N., ‘Strategy Kazakhstan-2050”: New
Political Course Of The Established State’, 14 December, 2012, accessed 15 September 2015,
http://www.akorda.kz/en/page/page_address-by-the-president-of-the-republic-of-kazakhstan-leader-of-the-
nation-n-nazarbayev-%E2%80%9Cstrategy-kazakhstan-2050%E2%80%9D-new-political-course-of-the-
established-state%E2%80%9D_1356091973
189
of the strategy may be full of gestures intended to enthuse and awe its audience, the Doctrine
itself clearly outlines some specific perceived threats to the Republic – the situation in
Afghanistan, border and water disputes, and the legal status of the Caspian Sea and the
dispute over oil fields.89 What the decree does not explicitly make clear from these last two
points is that the main military threats that Kazakhstan faces are from Iran over the Caspian
Sea, and Russia through oil and border threats, or the vulnerability that it faces as a state with
no nuclear weapons, no military experience and a deeply entrenched Soviet martial mentality.
Nor does it mention the mutual distrust between the Central Asian neighbours.
Moscow has long seen the military, rather than economic or political ties, as the key to
continuing its goals of Soviet-styled ‘core-periphery’ relations, together with security and
intelligence services.90 Rather than viewing this as a unilateral relationship, the military
affiliation/integration can be seen as an extension of Russian policy towards Kazakhstan more
generally, to which the Kazakh government has developed cautious responses. In an attempt
to overcome this, Kazakhstan has made some attempts to overcome this deficiency, even if it
has not achieved meaningful progress. Security Sector Reform (SSR) in Kazakhstan requires
moving beyond Western notions of security, and beyond the Anglospheric ‘securitization’ of
security reform that has defined the post-9/11 era. Reform has not necessarily been congruent
with Western understandings of security sector reform; namely to create a democratic system
89 Original Text ‐ Транснациональный характер приобрели проблемы наркотрафика и незаконной 
миграции. Нерешенность вопроса о правовом статусе Каспия, стремление некоторых прикаспийских 
государств к увеличению своего военного потенциала и наличие спорных нефтяных месторождений 
могут вызвать в перспективе обострение военно‐политической ситуации в регионе. Характер угроз 
военной безопасности претерпел значительные изменения. 
Taken from Presidential Decree No. 161, Military Doctrine of the Republic of Kazakhstan, October 11, 2011
[available from] http://mod.gov.kz/mod-en/index.php/2009-06-26-02-25-27.
90 Erica Marat, The Military and the State in Central Asia: From Red Army to Independence, (London: Routledge,
2011), p.4.
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of governance with civilian oversight and human security as core values of defence, or to
address the political goals of the Global War on Terror.91
Kazakhstan is not attempting to transition from war to peace, nor from an authoritarian to a
democratic regime, but instead from Soviet to Kazakh. The rules of transformation are self-
generated by the state, in accordance with its own conventions, norms and agenda. In this
sense, it is moving beyond the earlier conceptualisations of transition, which interpret transition
as a linear movement, from one condition to another, and ultimately, there is no ‘sequential
process of normalisation’ taking place.92 As such the end process of Kazakhstan’s reform
should not be considered as having a singular desirable outcome, and instead understood as
being embedded within the social, economic, political and cultural geography of its location.93
In ‘Western’ understandings of security sector reform, military transformation is seen as being
a key component of the development process, helping to define the parameters of the state,
but in Kazakhstan, the military has neither been reformed nor prioritised, remaining
subservient to the development of other sectors of the economy until very recently. Indeed,
between 1995 and 2010 Kazakh defence spending averaged 1.1% of GDP, which meant a
gradual increase from $359m to $1,502m; a modest budget for a country, developing or
otherwise.94 This all changed when Finance Minister Bolat Zhamishev announced in the 2013-
15 budget for defence spending that there is a 23.3% increase to $8.6 billion during this
period.95 These budget increases have of course come from the Kazakh government, to
91 Mark Sedra, ‘Introduction: The Future of Security Sector Reform’, in Mark Sedra (ed.), The Future of Security
Sector Reform (Ontario: Centre for International Governance Reform, 2010), pp.16-18.
92 Timothy Edmunds, Security Sector reform in Transforming Societies: Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro,
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007), p.9.
93 ibid., p.10
94 The SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, ‘Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’, accessed 15
September 2015, http://milexdata.sipri.org/result.php4
95TengriNews,‘Kazakhstan Increases Military Spendings’, TengriNews, 29 August, 2012, available from
http://en.tengrinews.kz/military/Kazakhstan-increases-military-spendings-12539/
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provide wage increases, rearmament and general improvements to the military, but this new
presidential interest in the military has also been funded by outside sources.
International organisations have attempted to improve/intervene in the regional SSR process,
but should they do so? The most effective has been the OSCE, which has worked to improve
and professionalise counter-terrorism training.96 However this has been without working to
strengthen the processes of governance, allowing the elites to engage in predatory behaviour
meanwhile.97 The clearest example of this has been the issue of the Zhanaozen massacre
which occurred shortly before Kazakhstan’s chairmanship of the OSCE,98 and before which
the OSCE should have held the government accountable for its actions. Here the OSCE
shows the limits of its ability to engage in meaningful dialogue and effect change. The Central
Asian states have also engaged with the EU in a small way. Through the European
Commission Support to Justice and Security Sector Reform program and the Regional
Assistance Strategy to Central Asia, the EU has donated €10 million, which has been more
focused upon the governance issues surrounding the reform process.99 Reform is necessary
to the development of Kazakhstan, but who benefits from the improved military capability, the
state or the people?
Roger McDermott concludes that this sudden interest in developing the military has all been
to satisfy the vanity of President Nazarbayev, that he wants to create what he calls a ‘Strong
Army-Strong Kazakhstan’ and that it appeals to a regime that is increasingly focused upon
96 OSCE, ‘OSCE Annual Report; 2011’, OSCE, March, 2012.
97 Alexander Cooley, Great Games, Local Rules; The New Great Power Contest (New York, Oxford University
Press, 2012).
98 Jos Boonstra, Erica Marat & Vera Axyonova, ‘Security Sector Reform in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and
Tajikistan: What Role for Europe?’, FRIDE, Working Paper 14, May 2013.
99 ibid.
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status symbols, and suggests that it will provoke a response by neighbouring states.100
However, there are positive externalities to the military build-up and a functioning modern
defence network is a cornerstone of developing countries. Furthermore, the more experience
the Kazakh military is able to gain away from Russia and FSU countries, the more
independence it will have in military matters. The arrest in 2009 of the Kazakh Defence
minister over receiving bribes from Israeli defence manufacturers is a hint at the small signs
of resistance to Russian domination of Kazakh security.101 Until 1999, the Kazakh military was
solely dependent upon Russian suppliers, but gradually Nazarbayev has diversified the source
of arms to include some of the world’s more established and ‘up and coming’ arms
manufacturers including Ukraine, Spain, Turkey, South Korea and during 2004 primarily, the
United States. There is not necessarily a link between military spending and military capability;
a lack of real experience and an incoherent doctrine mixed with difficult geographical factors
including disconnects between military regions and senor personnel who command them
hinder Kazakhstan’s defence capabilities. Fortunately, whilst the link between natural
resources and violent conflict has been strong in a majority of low level democracies,
Kazakhstan has so far avoided this problem. 102
As of today, Kazakhstan has also managed to avoid the fate of its neighbours, Georgia and
Ukraine, which have both felt the sharp end of Russian rhetoric and its obvious disregard for
their sovereignty. The Kazakh government has used a variety of foreign policy techniques to
integrate itself within a wider security and economic framework that expands across multiple
platforms and inter-regional groupings that are non-Western led. A point has been made of
100 Roger McDermott, ‘Nazarbayev Promises Modernized Armed Forces in Kazakhstan’, James Town Foundation,
Vol.10, No.91 (2013).
101Yossi Melman, ‘Kazakh Minister Arrested in Israeli Arms Sales Bribe Case’, Haaretz, 14 April, 2009, accessed
15 September 2015, http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/kazakh-minister-arrested-in-israeli-arms-
sales-bribe-case-1.274065
102 UNEP & UNDP ‘The Role of Natural Resources in Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration;
Addressing Risks and Seizing Opportunities’, accessed 15 September 2015,
http://postconflict.unep.ch/publications/UNEP_UNDP_NRM_DDR.pdf
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entering into a myriad of security and economic agreements; Commonwealth of Independent
States, Eurasian Economic Community, Eurasian Customs Union, Collective Security Treaty
Organisation, Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and the Economic Cooperation
Organisation. This spreads Kazakhstan’s allegiance to its Central Asian neighbours, its
alliance with the other Turkic populations, Russia and China, as well cooperating with the US
and the EU over regional security matters.
It also raises a significant question: In the event of military intervention by Russia in
Kazakhstan, would China protect its investment? A military intervention is highly unlikely, but
the recent developments in Ukraine and Georgia, and China’s increasingly significant
economic interests for the state and its firms in the Kazakh oil industry and through deals to
improve economic infrastructure should nevertheless concern China’s policy makers.
Understanding Russia’s attitude towards the sovereignty of the former USSR states should
raise questions of how long China can remain politically and militarily inert whilst economically
active overseas. Kazakhstan represents the most economically stable of China’s bordering
states and reduces the geopolitical dependency on transit states in the quest for energy
security. What is Kazakhstan worth to the future of China’s economic development? Can
Russia convince China’s state and firms that it can become a reliable trading partner? Does
Russia need to offer regional reassurance?
The intelligence services are another important source of Russian influence in Kazakhstan,
and indeed across the CIS. This is to be expected, since the original intelligence services of
Kazakhstan were formed during the Soviet era and therefore retain the cultural legacy through
structure and training, and the employment of many of the same staff.103 Furthermore, it is in
103 Stephane Lefebvre & Roger N. McDermott, ‘Russia and the Intelligence Services of Central Asia’,
International Journal of Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence, Vol.21, No.2 (2008), p.253.
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the best interest of Russia to propagate good relations with the security services, as there is
a personal and visceral belief by staff at the Foreign Intelligence Service, the SVR (formally
KGB), that the CIS states are in fact still part of Russia.104 It is not thought that the Kazakh-
Russian security service relations are as deep as Russian engagement with other FSU states
such as Belarus, where Lukashenka is regularly briefed by the head of the SVR and engages
in joint exercises.105 This creates a problem for the West and for China, as the FSU states are
often used by Russia to secure information from third parties who are less suspecting of these
smaller, ‘friendlier’ states. Similarly, the FSB (the Russian Domestic Intelligence Services) has
integrated itself into the CIS Anti-Terrorist Centre in neighbouring Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan and
the centre now receives half of its budget from the FSB.
In recent years there have been some attempts at restructuring the security services of
Kazakhstan, and even incorporating intelligence gathering in Russia into the agenda.106 The
original foreign intelligence service of Kazakhstan, the Barlau, was a small office that formed
part of the Committee for National Security. Whilst the agency was certainly no longer fit for
purpose for the increasingly developed state, an embarrassing incident may have hastened
the development of a new agency. The former son-in-law of the President, Rakhat Aliyev, was
a diplomat in Austria when he was convicted in absentia of various offences of bribery,
corruption and planning a coup. Alnur Mussayev, a former Kazakh intelligence chief was
cleared of all charges. Vadim Koshlyak, a former security adviser was sent to recover the son-
in-law from Austria, but Aliyev died whilst in police custody and was found dead in his cell.
104 Denis Trifonov, ‘Russian Intelligence Presence in The CIS’, The Central Asia-Caucuses Analyst, 17 December,
2003.
105 Paul Goble, ‘Belarusian spy agencies’ cooperation with Russian ones in Lithuania highlights larger problem’,
Euromaiden Press, 31 March, 2015 [available from] http://euromaidanpress.com/2015/03/31/belarusian-spy-
agencies-cooperation-with-russian-ones-in-lithuania-highlights-larger-problem/
106 Janes Intelligence, ‘Kazakhstan's new Foreign Intelligence Services’, WikiLeaks, 21 March, 2009, accessed 15
September 2015, https://wikileaks.org/gifiles/docs/63/63743_kazakhstan-s-new-foreign-intelligence-services-
.html
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The affair generated intense scrutiny of Kazakhstan and its human rights record, and
embarrassed a range of intelligence and security services across Europe.107
Now the Barlau has been turned into a small but better functioning unit called the Sybar - an
independent agency directly answerable to the President, in yet another consolidation of
power towards Nazarbayev.108 Little is known about the remit of the intelligence agency but it
is likely to be interested in dissidents living overseas, particularly in China and in Afghanistan
and Pakistan, or those that have joined ISIS in Iraq and the Levant region. According to the
head of the intelligence services in Kazakhstan, Nurtai Abykaev, there are currently 300
Kazakhs that have joined ISIS, with half that number being women.109 It is likely that this will
be of significant interest both to Kazakhstan, monitoring returning fighters, but also to the
Russian intelligence services, constituting an important subject of common interest and
continued convergence.
Conclusion
Being marginal does not equate to being passively assigned power, but to have taken active
steps to establish an autonomous position on the edges of power. Despite the attempts of
Russia to cultivate a construction of Central Asia as a dangerous ‘other’ allowing it to take on
a role as ‘protector’ and intermediary for the West, this narrative has been interrupted.
Kazakhstan has created a separate identity, one that is not dependent upon Russian
narratives of history. It has sought to, and succeeded in, altering the economic make-up of the
country in order to create an energy industry that is increasingly holding its own, regardless of
107Johannes Dell, ‘Epic murder trial tests Austrian justice’, BBC News, 10 July 2015, accessed 15 September
2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-32922277
108 ibid.
109 Joanna Paraszczuk, ‘Kazakhstan Intelligence: 150 Kazakh Women Are Members Of IS’, Radio Free Europe/
Radio Liberty, 25 August 2015, accessed 15 September 2015, http://www.rferl.org/content/under-black-flag-
kazakhstan-kazakh-women-islamic-state/26698040.html
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the often misguided management choices. Russian disinterest and changing political
commitments to the region have also played their part, as Central Asia oscillated on and off
Russia’s political agenda creating a weak form of marginality. The large Russian population
continues to raise questions for Kazakhstan, but by learning from the example of Ukraine,
hopefully Kazakhstan can avoid a similar trajectory.
But as Kazakhstan loosens its ties through the energy industry, it has tightened them through
the security sector. The increased military procurement through Russia, the training schedules
and the Soviet era connections retain close links between the two states creating an
imbalanced relationship. What use is the effort expended in trying to disentangle the energy
industry if the military union remains so strong? Perhaps in this case, it is better to ask, if you
have to invade another country to control it, do you really have control at all? The imagined
community that Russia has generated through a common language and culture and shared
historical connections are not as strong as they once were in many FSU states, including
Ukraine.110 This disjuncture is apparent with Kazakhstan. The rejection of a shared historical
connection is instead replaced by a new narrative that invokes a sense of nationhood
extending beyond the current Soviet-era creation. The side-stepping around issues of the
continued use of the language suggest a reluctance to confront the controlling nature of
Russian Eurasianism rather than a soft power attraction to Russia.
Kazakhstan has/is assuming a separate identity and an incremental programme of change
designed to separate itself from the center, despite the aggressive Eurasianism that is a
feature of modern Russian foreign policy. The tactical aspects of this change are apparent in
its relations with another neighbouring center of power – China. It is also by exploring the East
110 Valentina Feklyunina, ‘Soft power and identity: Russia, Ukraine and the ‘Russian world(s)’, European Journal
of International Relations, Vol.28, No.3, (2014) pp.463-486.
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Asian dimension that we can start to see how this autonomy from Russia has led to
Kazakhstan’s attempt to realign align itself within the lucrative role that Russia would normally
occupy: energy supplier to East Asia.
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Chapter 6
Kazakhstan and China: Is Mercantilism ‘Going Out’ in Kazakhstan?
In Kazakhstan, China is everywhere and yet nowhere. There are no visible signs that China’s
border is a bus ride from Almaty, the most populous town in Kazakhstan, there is only a tiny
Chinese immigrant population present in the country, very few shops or restaurants, and no
obvious cultural exchange. Moreover, even to discuss the role of China in Kazakhstan is a
rather delicate subject meaning that the degree to which the two states interact is not
commonly appreciated. Despite this everyday reluctance to appreciate or embrace the
changing dynamics, the unspoken reality is that Russia is no longer the most important actor
in Central Asia. Despite only entering the market in 1997, China has made significant
incursions into Kazakhstan’s economy and oilfields. As of 2013, Chinese companies control
40% of the Kazakh oil and gas market, more than the stake of the government of Kazakhstan,
and more than any other country.1 In a republic searching for an identity to help it to bind and
redefine its collective memory, the presence of an interloper with a long term strategy of
securing natural resources and a quietly assertive foreign policy is not welcome. The Kazakh
government has shown itself to be adept at shaping outside interest, but these latest
acquisitions by Chinese firms may begin to tip the delicate balance away from Kazakh national
control.
Within this strange mixture of connection, emersion and rejection, both countries are united
through their experiences of externally driven mythologies and narratives. Just as the ‘Great
Game’ narrative has obscured Central Asia, so China has also long been cloaked with
1Tengri News (2012) ‘Kazakhstan's Kashagan tagged world's most expensive energy project’ 29th November
[accessed 13 January 2014] available from http://en.tengrinews.kz/industry_infrastructure/Kazakhstans-
Kashagan-tagged-worlds-most-expensive-energy-project-14913/
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misperceptions and imagined Orientalist attributes.2 The over-arching construct has ranged
from poor stereotypes to racist discourse in much of mainstream Western cultural discourse,
with Hollywood portrayals oscillating between representations of China, and Chinese people,
as either a modern robotic ‘model’ for success or as a feared ancestral enemy.3 Within
Kazakhstan, this has translated into widespread negative attitudes about the threat of China,
which are largely based upon the fear of a large population just over the border of such a
sparsely populated Central Asian country.4 In fact there have been relatively low rates of
migration since independence, and there are more ethnic Kazakh’s living in China than the
other way around.5 Moreover, the two countries are bound together by the Uyghur population
that extends across the border and is a constant source of tension through the separatist
movement that has gained traction in China’s Xinjiang Province. Meanwhile, this distinction
between the public perception and economic integration marks the difference between the
establishment’s inner view and the general public’s perception.
These obscuring practises and narratives impact upon how we understand the concept of
China in Kazakhstan. We must understand how China operates as a global actor in order to
develop a deeper analysis of Sino-Kazakh relations. Remarkably, while there is a super-
abundance of literature on the role of China in Africa, and in particular relating to the energy
industry, there is much less analysis conducted on the tactics and strategy of China in
Kazakhstan.6 Sino-African relations are often characterised as reflecting an exploitative and
2 See for example Ho-fung Hung, ‘Orientalist Knowledge and Social Theories: China and the European
Conceptions of East-West Differences from 1600 to 1900’, Sociological Theory, Vol.21, No.3, (2003), pp.254–
80.
3 Yuko Kawai, ‘Stereotyping Asian Americans: The Dialectic of the Model Minority and the Yellow Peril’,
Howard Journal of Communications, Vol.16, No.2 (2005), pp.109-30.
4 Elena Sadovskaya, ‘Chinese Migration to Kazakhstan: a Silk Road for Cooperation or a Thorny Road of
Prejudice’, China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, Vol.5, No.4 (2007), pp.147-70.
5 Konstantin Syroezhkin, ‘Social Perceptions of China and the Chinese: A View from Kazakhstan’, China and
Eurasia Forum Quarterly, Vol.7, No.1 (2009); Natalie Koch, ‘Kazakhstan’s changing geopolitics: the resource
economy and popular attitudes about China’s growing regional influence’, Eurasian Geography and Economics,
Vol.51, No.1 (2013), pp.110-33.
6 The body of literature is enormous but see for very frequently cited examples, Chris Alden, ‘China in Africa’,
Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, Vol.47, No.3, (2005), pp.147-164; Ian Taylor, ‘China's oil diplomacy in
Africa’, International Affairs, Vol.85, No.5 (2006), pp.937-59.
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short term strategy.7 This chapter will demonstrate that this model of China in Africa, which
commands almost universal consensus, is not applicable in Central Asia. Instead, China has
developed a longer term strategy in Kazakhstan for many reasons; proximity, religious and
ethnic tensions, border disputes and geopolitical power tussles with Russia. This research
reveals that there is a twin-track strategy being employed in China’s foreign policy. Overseas,
China is more willing to push its agenda onto developing countries in an aggressive drive for
growth, but in ‘its own backyard’ a more nuanced strategy is required.8
Scholarship on China and Kazakhstan began to develop in the early 2000s, but it continues
to presuppose the dominance of China in the relationship.9 The first wave of literature that
examines the phenomena begins within Bill Gates and Matthew Oresman, describing the
changing Chinese focus as China starts to ‘Go Out’.10 It is Nikolas Swantröm who then
discusses the context of Kazakhstan turning between two masters in an interplay of ‘vassal
relations’,11 but again Kazakhstan’s autonomy is not emphasised here. Subsequent responses
to Swanström, such as those by Kevin Shieves have chosen to emphasise Kazakhstan as a
place to stabilise US-China relations and to stress the importance of Xinjiang to its
development.12 More recent work that has started to recognise the importance of Central Asia
in terms of energy security has fallen prey to the easy Great Game/ Mackinder tropes.13
Indeed, it has been more common for Kazakhstan to be written about as the subject of China’s
7 Bates Gill & James Reilly, ‘The Tenuous Hold of China Inc. in Africa’, The Washington Quarterly, Vol.30, No.3,
(2007), p.37.
8 Deborah Brautigam, The Dragon's Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2009), pp.5-19.
9 This is not to suggest that no literature existed on the relationship before this point, but rather that the
literature on the political economy was not developed until this time.
10 Bates Gill and Matthew Oresman, ‘China's New Journey to the West: China's Emergence in Central
Asia and Implications for US Interests’, Washington, DC, CSIS Press, 2003.
11 Niklas Swanstrom, ‘China and Central Asia: A New Great Game or Traditional Vassal Relations?
Journal of Contemporary China, Vol.14, No.45 (2005) pp.569-84.
12 Kevin Sheives,’China Turns West: Beijing's Contemporary Strategy Towards Central Asia’, Pacific Review,
Vol.79, No.2 (2006), pp.205-24.
13 See for example Thrassy N. Marketos, ‘China’s Energy Geopolitics: The Shanghai Cooperation Organization
and Central Asia, (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009).
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energy policy, rather than as an influencing factor.14 Similarly, locally generated literature has
emphasised the competitive nature of the relationship,15 and the unevenness of the
relationship created through the Shanghai Cooperation Agreement (SCO).16 The only
literature that attempts to deny the mercantilist attitude and subdue the power imbalance in
the Kazakh-Sino relationship is that of Joseph McCarthy in 2013.17 Indeed McCarty’s
publication is the most rigorous produced on the subject, but in contrast to this chapter
approaches the topic from the Chinese perspective, rather than the Kazakh experience of
China.
Kazakhstan’s position on the edge of China can be recast in terms of marginality. The Chinese
state has responded directly to the celeritous development of the Kazakh state and has
responded by arranging its own strategy accordingly; the centre of power has made
adjustments based upon the margin, signifying the edge of China’s power. To approach this
from the alternate perspective, this suggests that there is a ‘bottom-up’ model of foreign policy
being employed by the Chinese leadership, and therefore that the margin is affecting the
center. Kazakh autonomy can be recognised in and has been acted upon through the tactics
described by Noel Parker, as it has; sought to play off one state against the other; developed
itself as an alternative centre by competing with Russia for energy contracts; and has sought
rent payments from China.18 It has achieved this through the robust reconsideration of the
14 See for example Erica Downs, ‘China’s Quest for Energy Security’, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, 2006.
Charles E. Ziegler, ‘The Energy Factor in China’s Foreign Policy’, Journal of Chinese Political Science, Vol.11,
No.1 (2006), pp.1-23.
15 Assel Serikbayeva, ’China And Russia:Competition For Central Asian Energy’, May, 2013, St Louis, Missouri.
16 See for example Kuralai Baizakova, ‘The Shanghai Cooperation Organization's Role in Countering Threats
and Challenges to Central Asian Regional Security’, Russian Politics and Law, Vol.51, No.1, (2013), pp.59-79;
Timur Dadabaev, ‘Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Regional Identity Formation from the Perspective
of the Central Asia States’, Journal of Contemporary China, Vol.23, No.85, pp. 102-18; Galiia A. Movkebaeva,
‘Energy Cooperation Among Kazakhstan, Russia, and China Within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’,
Russian Law and Politics, 2013, Vol.51, No.1 (2013), p.80.
17 Joseph McCarthy, ‘Crude 'Oil Mercantilism'? Chinese Oil Engagement in Kazakhstan’, Pacific Affairs, Vol.86,
No.2 (2013), pp.257-80.
18 Noel Parker, ‘A Theoretical Introduction: Spaces, Centers, and Margins’ in Noel Parker, (ed.) ‘The Geopolitics
of Europe’s Identity; Centers, Boundaries and Margins’, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), pp.12-15.
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legal requirements of firms entering the market and successful behind-the scenes negotiation
with Chinese officials over multiple (often contentious) issues - including land reform.
In order to explore these changing identities and tactics, the chapter will examine the three
existing interpretations of the relationship between China and Kazakhstan. The first two
interpretations focus upon China as an economic actor in developing countries – as a
mercantilist and as a neo-colonialist – and ask whether this analysis is in accord with the
Kazakh experience. The third interpretation focuses upon Kazakhstan’s experience of China,
asking whether this supports or contests the ‘Great Game’ interpretations of Kazakhstan as a
‘weak player’ or the marginality hypothesis of autonomous decision-making capabilities. This
latter section of the chapter illustrates how the new millennium has signalled the start of a
more confident Kazakhstan. As such, it is no longer wholly dependent upon the international
community for its immediate survival and instead a genuine domestic strategy based upon
maximisation has been cultivated by both the Kazakh state and commercial actors. We need
to understand how China has entered the closed Kazakh oil market and the precedent that it
has set for other national and private companies wishing to enter the local industry.
Furthermore, we need to examine how this knowledge can be used to understand the global
experience of China’s energy policy and the waning influence of previously dominant market
actors such as Russia.
China the Global Actor
China is the world’s most populous country, it has the largest economy and consumes the
most energy. To meet the demand of a rising middle-class, China has had to look beyond its
own small oil reserves of 20.4 billion barrels and turn outward to import energy from a
multiplicity of exporting states. Until very recently, securing reliable material facts such as this
was problematic: the closed nature of China’s party system has made it difficult for analysts
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to accurately gauge the size of the domestic market or the reserves.19 Excessive domestic
investment, slowly rising inflation and the global financial crisis have all challenged China in
its attempts to secure its receipt of oil on terms it feels it can agree to. Subsequently, this
burgeoning Asian state was forced to secure a presence in the oil producing regions of the
world to ensure the continuity of supply for its growing domestic consumption patterns from
the world market. To improve its position further, China must reinvest in its own oil industry
and improve productivity through collaboration with technologically more advanced
international oil companies. The current literature describes this as problematic through an
interpretation of China’s foreign policy as ‘mercantilist’. As is to be expected, developed and
developing countries have different experiences of China and it is through these different
historical prisms that competing visions of ‘China Overseas’ are generated.
Western frameworks often characterise China as being the ‘Hungry Dragon’.20 From this
perspective China’s presence in the developing world replicates former and present colonial
powers in its exchange of value-added commodities for raw materials.21 Lurid language and
memories of Western imperialism have ignited discussion of China as the ‘yellow peril’ seeking
to usurp US and European hegemony over developing markets, with descriptions of China as
‘devouring’, of being ‘insatiable’, and of its goal of ‘domination’ particularly in the American
print media and academic literature.22 Much emphasis is placed upon its willingness to invest
in any industry regardless of the democratic traditions of the state in question – China’s only
stipulations for receiving its aid are that its ‘One China’ policy is acknowledged and that
19 Lucy Hornby, ‘China releases first formal estimate of strategic oil reserves’, The Financial Times, 20th
November 2014.
20 See for example Sigfrido Burgos Cáceres & Sophal Ear, The Hungry Dragon: How China's Resource Quest is
Reshaping the World (London: Routledge 2013), pp. 4-13.
21 See for example Jonathan Holslag, ‘China’s New Mercantilism in Central Africa’, African and Asian Studies,
Vol.5, No.1 (2006), p.135.
22 T. Houser, ‘Oil-hungry China needs energy security rethink’, Financial Times 17 March 2007; R. Mills, ‘Dragon's
hunger to devour oil firms is good news for Gulf’, The National, 31st July 2011. For an analysis of British media
attitudes to China see E. Mawdsley, Fu Manchu Versus Dr Livingstone in the Dark Continent? Representing China,
Africa and the West in British Broadsheet Newspapers’, Political Geography, Vol.27, No.2 (2008). pp.509-29.
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Chinese loans will be used to purchase Chinese goods.23 This intemperate narrative has been
further exacerbated through US fears of China both as a threat to their hegemonic status and
also as a competitor for international resources using a zero-sum logic.24 This reaches its peak
in the ‘China Threat Theory’, in which China is perceived as an aggressive force,25 or in the
radical foreign policy predictions of warmongering US political commentators on the New York
Times ‘best sellers’ list.26 All of these voices, whilst correctly highlighting the possible
repercussions of China’s ‘peaceful rise’, downplay the murkier aspects of Western
interventionism and their own bloody hunt for oil.
Markedly different narratives have been generated across the Global South. China was once
viewed as an unobtrusive alternative to Western power, one that would not interfere in the
political progression of particularly African and Latin American states. The Non-Aligned
Movement bonded together developing countries and created an impression of a South-South
alliance that would be mutually beneficial to all. But, whilst China has provided investment to
states that would not be considered viable by the West, it has also failed to deliver on its
promises to improve infrastructure, particularly in Africa. Instances such as the collapse of
Chinese built hospitals in Angola or the washing away of newly constructed roads in Zambia
have tarnished China’s reputation.27 Furthermore China has assisted African states in
perpetuating violence against their populations in a series of ‘oil for arms’ deals in the most
troubled conflict zones such as Angola and Sudan.28 On the back of all these lucrative trade
deals, over a million Chinese people have moved to Africa, some from the time of Chairman
23 Amy Myers Jaffe & Steven W. Lewis, ‘Beijing’s oil diplomacy’, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, Vol.44,
No.1 (2002), p.115; Wenran Jiang, ‘China Makes Strides in Energy “Go-out” Strategy,’ China Brief 9, (2009),
No.15.
24 S. Giry, ‘China’s Africa strategy out of Beijing’, The New Republic, 5 November 2004,
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/world/81103/out-beijing
25 Herb Lee and Ian Storey, ‘Introduction’ in Herb Lee & Ian Storey, (eds.) China Threat Theory; Myths,
Perceptions and Reality, (London: Routledge/Curzon, 2002), pp.2-21.
26 Bill Gertz, The China Threat: How the People’s Republic Target’s America, (Washington: Regnery Publishing,
2002), pp.3-15.
27 The Economist, ‘Trying to Pull Together’, The Economist, 10th April, 2011.
28 G. Mohan, ‘China in Africa: A Review Essay’, Review of African Political Economy, Vol.35, No.1 (2008),
pp.155-173.
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Mao, but mostly during the last decade, and this influx is causing friction within the local
population.29 As Nigerian Central Bank Governor Lamido Sanusi noted of China, the notion
of the ‘country as the saviour, a model, a partner’ is to view the modern relationship with ‘rose-
tinted glasses’.30
But how has the Chinese state internalised these narratives? Opinion is divided with writers
such as Michael Yahuda suggesting that the state has little interest in these opinions,
particularly in the case of Japan.31 Conversely, Deng Yong suggests self-interest as motivation
for China being interested in international opinion. Deng suggests that the Chinese state
recognises the difficulties associated with a negative reputation, in particular suggesting that
it can lead to a belligerent attitude developing in wider international discourse and thereafter
restricting China’s ability to pursue foreign policy goals overseas.32 Going further, Deng
proposes China has actively tried to neutralise the ‘China Threat Theory’ overseas, as it has
witnessed negative consequences for its own security sector. China has at different times
adopted different perspectives in order to increase its appeal; from its period of ‘Responsible
China’ that lasted from after Tiananmen Square until the mid-2000s; to its ‘post-Responsibility’
phase characterised by a robust geopolitical approach to international relations.33 As we shall
see, the astute awareness of self-publicity is present in China’s dealings with Kazakhstan,
suggesting that Deng’s interpretation is more relevant in the region.
29 Xin Rice, ‘Chinas Economic Invasion of Africa’, The Guardian, 6 February, 2011, accessed 12 September 2015,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/feb/06/chinas-economic-invasion-of-africa
30 L. Sanusi, ‘Nigerian Central Bank Governor: Africa Must Get Real About Chinese Ties’, Financial Times, March
11, 2013, accessed 12 September 2015, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/562692b0-898c-11e2-ad3f-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz2ZJ3heneH
31 Michael Yahuda, ‘The Limits of Economic Interdependence: Sino-Japanese Relations’, in Alistair Johnston &
Robert S. Ross, (eds.) New Directions in the Study of China's Foreign Policy (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
2006).
32 Yong Deng, ‘Reputation and the Security Dilemma: China Reacts to the China Threat Theory’, in (eds.) Alistair
Johnston & Robert S. Ross, New Directions in the Study of China's Foreign Policy, (Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 2006), p.188.
33 Yong Deng, ‘China: The Post-Responsible Power’, The Washington Quarterly, Vol.37, No.4 (2015) p.128.
206
China the ‘Mercantilist’
In order to understand the role that China is playing in Central Asia we must work through the
myths and perceptions of ‘China overseas’. Quite obviously, Kazakhstan is not Africa, and we
must not make the mistake of applying the ‘lessons learnt’ from that continent directly onto
Kazakhstan’s experience. To do so would have quite profound and distorting implications for
our research. To apply the standard view of China as mercantilist, we are making assumptions
about the power dynamic between the two states, and this presents a serious challenge to the
understanding of Kazakhstan occupying a place of positive marginality. Kazakhstan has
influenced the geopolitical strategy of China, and it has the opportunity to shed light on the
rising world economy. It is to the realities of China as a global actor that the chapter now turns.
Since China became a net-importer of oil in 1993, a large body of academic work suggests
that China is adopting a mercantilist attitude towards energy relations, ‘locking-up’ energy
reserves around the world from the US and EU.34 China’s overseas engagement has typically
been viewed as a zero-sum race for natural resources and developing markets across Asia,
Africa and Latin America.35 This debate tends to characterise China’s energy security policy
as ‘mercantilist’ and frames Chinese interest as being in direct opposition to the interests of
the United States. Understood in this way, the use of the term mercantilism suggests that
China buys assets over the market-value to secure sole-supply and that China is a neo-
colonial foreign power seeking to emulate European powers whilst ignoring the world market
as a means of securing supply. By implication, this view of China’s policy suggests that the
US and other Western powers have long ceased to rely on such practises. Furthermore, it
34 See for example the classification of China’s interest as geostrategic, as opposed to economic in John Lee,
‘China’s Geostrategic Search for Oil’, The Washington Quarterly, Vol.35, No.3 (2012), p.75.
35 See for example in the press - The Economist (2010) Welcome to a Zero-sum World November 22nd 2010
Or in academic papers – T.J. Christensen, ‘Fostering Stability or Creating a Monster? The Rise of China and U.S.
Policy toward East Asia’, International Security, Vol. 31, No. 1 (2006), pp.81-126.
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also suggests that the operations of the Chinese NOCs/ IOCs are directly controlled by and
are answerable to a monolithic Chinese state.36
However, more recent scholarship, such as that produced by Erica Downs and Shaun Breslin,
has been quick to point out the difficulties in treating the China of the new millennium as the
command economy it once was.37 During the 1980s and 1990s, China’s centralised decision-
making body was devolved to encourage new government projects that facilitated economic,
if not political, autonomy. This led to a regionalisation and a localisation of power that forced
the central party members to seek support from regional groups to affect change, and
lessened the political power of the individuals within the party.38 The result of this change has
been not only the increase in local representation by the state and the gradual part-
privatisation of the public sector, but also a more inefficient bureaucratically led state-system.
State-led projects such as the ‘Going Global’ strategy encouraged outward-investment from
both the state and private sector in an effort to release pressure on the renminbi, thereby
counter-balancing domestic policy and improving Chinese diplomatic relations abroad. If the
state relinquishes complete control of the energy sector to bolster its economic performance,
logically it must also lose the ability to control the actions of the industry.
The command-economy that China pursued until the 1990s sheltered it from the storms of the
international energy markets, allowing China the luxury of remaining neutral over conflicts in
the Middle East. Furthermore, its domestic energy production covered its oil and gas
requirements, allowing small amounts of oil to be exported, taking advantage of the high prices
36 Erica Downs, ‘China’s Quest for Overseas Oil’, Far Eastern Economic Review, September 2007.
37 Shaun Breslin, ‘China and the South: Objectives, Actors and Interactions’, Development and Change, Special
Issue: Globalization with Chinese Characteristics, Vol.44, No.6 (2013), pp.1273–94; E. Downs, ‘The Chinese
Energy Security Debate’, The China Quarterly, No.177, (2012), pp.21-41.
38 Erica Downs, ‘China’s Quest for Overseas Oil’, Far Eastern Economic Review, September 2007, p.52.
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on the world markets that were stifling the liberal-market based economies.39 However in
1993, Chinese demand for oil outstripped production and so began the internationalisation
and liberalisation of the Chinese energy sector. Internally, this created demand for natural gas
and the implementation of the West-East Pipeline project across 4000 km from Xinjiang to
Shanghai. It is this transformation in the needs of the Chinese state to acquire energy from
overseas to support domestic growth that leads academics like Ian Taylor to locate the
Chinese state as the central unit of analysis for Chinese firms going abroad. Taylor suggests
that China’s policy (in Africa) is ultimately self-serving and economically driven as shown by
the actions of the energy firms at the command of the Chinese state. However, whilst Taylor
may be correct in assuming that the procurement of oil is self-serving, he is wrong to solely
attribute this to the state rather than the competitive nature of the Chinese oil firms.40
Whilst this may appear to be a state-led decision to improve self-sufficiency, the project was
in fact initiated by the newly restructured firms and propelled by their new capitalist mandate
for growth.41 In 1994, China began to devolve the centralised energy sector by creating two
new vertically integrated firms; the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and the
China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation (Sinopec). Both firms perform onshore, upstream,
midstream and downstream processing and as a result are often in direct competition with
each other. Since then off-shore production firms have been created, including the gargantuan
China National Offshore Corporation (CNOOC), to expand China into new markets. At home,
in the domestic market this is easily controlled by the government as it is the state that decides
which firms secure which contracts.
39 A. Jaffe, & S. Lewis, ‘Beijing’s Oil Diplomacy’, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, Vol.44, No.1 (2002),
pp.115-34.
40 Ian Taylor, China’s Oil Diplomacy in Africa’, International Affairs, Vol.82, No.5 (2006), pp.937–59.
41 E. Downs, ‘China’s “New” Energy Administration’, China Business Review, November-December 2008, pp.42.
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However, overseas is where the competition begins. The firms are in theory operating at the
behest of the state, but where there is a conflict between state goals and market goals the
firms have shown themselves willing to ignore government orders and compete against each
other for overseas contracts. This has been the case in Sudan, where the wishes of the
communist party leadership were directly ignored.42 Similar outcomes can be observed in
Argentina over competition for Repsol’s shares in a local oil project.43
This is not to suggest that Chinese oil firms are entirely autonomous actors; there are still
strong ties between the state and these firms. This link is created by the revolving door of staff
recruitment between politicians and top level management of the energy firms. For example,
the current leadership of the state energy firms—Fu Chengyu (CNOOC), Jiang Jiemin (CNPC)
and Su Shulin (Sinopec) are all vice ministers in the Party.44 It is important to see this as a
characteristic of the oil and gas industry more generally, and indeed many more industries,
rather than being a unique feature of the Chinese state-market relationship - Western oil
markets are similarly constructed. Examples of the extent of this were revealed in the wake of
the 2010 BP oil spill off the Gulf of Mexico. Extraordinary links between the US regulatory body
(the Minerals Management Service) and the employees of BP showed that employees partied
together, and viewed each other as a client and potential employer rather than as independent
market actors.45 Furthermore Non-government International Organisations have developed
similar relationships. The World Bank has been involved in similar ‘revolving door’ fiascos
42 S. Lewis, Chinese NOCs and World Energy Markets: CNPC, Sinopec and CNOOC (The James A. Baker III
Institute for Public Policy, Rice University 2007).
43 C. Chan, & J. Lima, Repsol Is Said to Favor CNPC Over Cnooc in YPF Sale Bloomberg [available from]
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=ax1DAhgzGs.w
44 E. Downs, Who’s Afraid of China’s Oil Firms? (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2010).
45 As a result of the entrenched network of government and BP, and its contribution to the disaster, the MMS
was restructured and is now managed under the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and
Enforcement. For more details of the involvement between the government and the oil firms in this case see;
The New York Times [The Editors], ‘New York Times Rules, Revolving Doors and the Oil Industry’, The New York
Times, accessed 12 September 2015, http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/05/05/rules-revolving-
doors-and-the-oil-industry/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0
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through their International Finance Corporation division, again forcing a structural
reorganisation, this time following personnel exchanges when the former chief executive
moved to the Texan oil firm Kosmos amid contract exchanges.46
Internationally, both the Chinese state and its energy firms pursued new markets in the Middle
East and Africa and later, Latin America. Often these deals were with countries outside of the
Western alliance and longer contracts were negotiated in exchange for arms. Furthermore,
the Chinese state did not discriminate against states based upon their human rights records,
and the firms worked to the employment standards of the host country. However, this mutually
beneficial mode of operation did not continue unchallenged. In response to international
criticism over its conduct in Sudan, China added it to the list of states in which its firms were
not allowed to invest. Furthermore, previous patterns of FDI from China suggested a pattern
of investment ‘the worse the institutional environment of a host country, the more is Chinese
FDI attracted by the country’s natural resources’ up until the mid-2000s, where more recently
there has been a observed shift towards a Chinese focus on the developed economies in the
West.47
Therefore, when considering the idea of ‘China’ overseas operating as a mercantilist, there
must, at the very least, be a separation between one attributes to the state and to the firm.
The international and the national oil firms both pursue economically driven agendas as part
of the liberalisation of the industry by the state; the decision-making process is therefore led
46 Emma Haslett, World Bank Shuts Its Own Revolving Door’, Management Today, 24 December 2013,
accessed 12 September 2015, http://www.managementtoday.co.uk/go/news/article/1225734/world-bank-
shuts-its-own-revolving-door/
47 I. Kolstad, & A, Wiig, What Determines Chinese Outward FDI? CMI Working Paper (CHR Michelsen Institute,
Bergen 2009). Although the empirical conclusions of the paper argue that ‘the worse the institutional
environment of a host country, the more is Chinese FDI attracted by the country’s natural resources’, there is
significant room to investigate the qualitative analysis of why these results were achieved beyond the
description of a ‘ravenous China’ with which the author disagrees.
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by the firm not by the state. The oil companies themselves are not the only stakeholders in
the NOCs. The host state, the investment sector and partner oil companies also take an active
interest in its development. The Chinese NOCs are partially-listed firms on international stock
exchanges. Indeed, when considering China through the ‘China Threat’ lens it is important to
note that the contracts signed by the Chinese NOCs do not fundamentally differ from the
contracts signed by other international IOCs.48 There is also a distinction between established
and emerging firms. Firms that are well established hire more local employees in a range of
positions, whilst newly established firms tend to bring in more Chinese and international
workers.49 Furthermore, there is a difference in the actions of firms that perform a single
operation in the country and those that control up, mid and down-stream production. All of
these distinctions make it harder still to conceptualize the actions of China’s firms overseas
as the work of a single homogenous actor.
Viewing China as mercantilist also assumes that the Chinese state is efficient. In reality, the
Chinese bureaucratic machine is large and unwieldy, with overlapping departments and
organisational friction, as you would find in all states. These inefficiencies have resulted in
China being less active than its Western counterparts in completing mergers and acquisitions
in the industry. To date, no Chinese firm has managed to perform a merger over $4bn (a 2005
deal to purchase PetroKazakhstan), despite having the capacity to conduct $40bn takeovers.50
Rather, as Shaun Breslin makes clear, if we think of the Chinese state as able to operate with
a single voice, it is because this is the image that the China wishes to project.51
48 Shell Representative, Interview – Astana, 2nd March 2013.
49 Shell Representative, Interview – Astana, 2nd March 2013.
50 Wood Mackenzie, ‘The Impact of Asian NOCs on the Upstream M&A Market’, Corporate Insight, May 2006
51 S. Breslin, ‘China and the South: Objectives, Actors and Interactions’, p.1273–1294.
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China Going Global… in Kazakhstan
China may be well known for investing in developing countries, but in fact since the mid-2000s,
it has invested in mainly developed countries.52 How important is Kazakhstan in China’s wider
foreign policy and energy strategy? For China to invest so heavily in its neighbour, which is
still very much a developing state, there must be good reason. One motive for this is the need
to diversify supply away from the Strait of Malacca which is often perceived as a delicate
chokepoint. This section examines some of the competing theories that provide an
understanding of China’s involvement in Kazakhstan.53
When considering China’s success in Kazakhstan, the most obvious place to look is at the
vast sums of money. Or, as the First Vice President of KMG phrases it in relation to a recent
oil deal with China-
"First," he said, "this is the decision of the government, and of course
we respect it and will implement it. Second, I will tell you what I would
tell my wife in the kitchen. It's a shame. When we deal with the
Chinese, there is always concern about quality and performance,
safety and security, health and the environment. But how can you
walk away from $10 billion?"54
52 I. Kolstad & A. Wiig, What Determines Chinese Outward FDI? CMI Working Paper (CHR Michelsen Institute,
Bergen, 2009). Although the empirical conclusions of the paper argue that ‘the worse the institutional
environment of a host country, the more is Chinese FDI attracted by the country’s natural resources’, there is
significant room to investigate the qualitative analysis of why these results were achieved beyond the
description of a ‘ravenous China’ with which the author disagrees. Previous patterns of FDI from China suggested
a pattern of investment ‘the worse the institutional environment of a host country, the more is Chinese FDI
attracted by the country’s natural resources’ up until the mid-2000s, there has been a observed shift towards
Chinese attraction to developed economies in the West.
53 Zhong Xiang Zhanga, 'China's energy security, the Malacca dilemma and responses', Energy Policy, Vol.39,
No.12 (2011), pp.7612–15.
54 US Embassy, ‘Kazakhstan: China National Petroleum Corporation Acquires’, WikiLeaks, 2009, accessed 12
September 2015, https://wikileakskz.wordpress.com/2009/04/23/09astana678-kazakhstan-china-national-
petroleum-corporation-acquires/
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So whilst money is an obvious feature of the relationship is there more to it than this?
The Strait of Malacca renders China strategically vulnerable because it supplies 80% of its oil
imports. Every year 87 million bbl/d of oil are produced around the world, half of which are
transported by sea. Of that, 15.2 million bbl/d are transported every year, and rising, through
the narrow passage of water that is the Malacca Strait. Some 77,000 ships passed through
the strait in 2010 which, at its narrowest is only 1.7 miles wide, to connect Asia with the rest
of the world. Major ports along the route such as Singapore are congested with tankers often
waiting offshore for long periods before they can be taken to harbour. Tanker collisions, oil
spills, natural disasters, hijackings and piracy are all examples of how this fragile system can
be interrupted, causing delivery delays, increasing the cost of shipping, and raising insurance
claims. This leaves China vulnerable, because no matter from how many different countries it
sources oil, each barrel is transported via the same tiny vulnerable route.
So whilst the straits of Hormuz, Malacca and Bab el-Mandab have all been heavily contested
and are points of antagonism between states, it is more important to realise that these
chokepoints are simply vulnerable to overcrowding. Oil spills, collisions, natural disasters have
all occurred in the past. In order to overcome this China has been pursuing a more balanced
energy security strategy through the use of overland pipelines. Alternative partners include
Burma and Pakistan; however neither provides a stable partnership and the pipelines are
vulnerable to attack through internal conflict and are topographically expensive. Russia
already supplies to China but it has proven to be an unreliable partner. In a bid to solidify its
presence in the South Pacific (for reasons beyond energy) the state has invested heavily in
its shipbuilding industry and as a result China’s military shipbuilding capabilities now surpass
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South Korea, Western Europe and Japan, and they are fast approaching the standards of
Russia.55
Andrew Erikson contests this strategic appraisal of China’s motivations for pursing pipeline
projects.56 Instead, he suggests that the importance of the pipeline projects has been
generated to help provide jobs and secure political relationships, that transporting oil by land
is too expensive and that shipping is a far cheaper and more secure option. In his analysis of
the three potential pipeline projects between China and Kazakhstan, Burma and Pakistan, it
is only the Kazakh model that he appraises as being a cost effective project. This may be true
– the other projects are, quite literally, pipe-dreams. However, whilst the Strait of Malacca is a
chokehold in the energy security of China, Russia is a larger, more established, more powerful
neighbour too, the questions remains, how important is Kazakhstan in China’s quest for long-
term energy security?
Kazakhstan’s Engagement with China
In order to contextualize Kazakhstan’s relationship with China we have unpacked not only the
driving force behind China’s appetite for oil and the nuances behind the industry and its
practises, but also the basis for China being interested in Kazakhstan as an investment
destination. In doing so, it is apparent that there are opportunities for Kazakhstan to benefit
from having such a wealthy patron on its border. If Kazakhstan is acting on the margin of
China, it is altered by the power of the centre, but it should also be able to affect the actions
of the centre. Kazakhstan has taken on a new identity; it has become a competitor to Russia
for oil contracts with China. Previous chapters have shown Kazakhstan has internalised its
position as a margin and is actively seeking ways in which to increase autonomy and relative
55 Andrew S. Erikson, ‘US Navy Take Notice China Is Becoming a World Class Military Shipbuilder’, The
Diplomat, 12 November 2012, accessed 12 September 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2012/11/u-s-
navy-take-notice-china-is-becoming-a-world-class-military-shipbuilder/
56 Ibid.
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power. By actively seeking another centre, away from Russia, Kazakhstan is increasing
autonomous capability, but by developing itself as an alternative centre57 questions are asked
about the strength of Russia’s relationship with China. During the 1900s, Sweden and the
Nordic states promoted themselves as an alternative centre to the US and the Western liberal
market economies by emulating European states, but still creating room to be an
‘improvement’.58 Through the development of its relationship with China, there is the beginning
of an ‘alternative centre’ identity forming in Kazakhstan as a regional energy destination.
This is evidenced by the contrasts between how China is operating in the region compared
with its global strategy. If Kazakhstan was a peripheral state, as opposed to a marginal state
with no power to influence the centre, we would expect Kazakhstan to be subject to the same
treatment as other less empowered states. David Zweig suggests that China’s global hunt for
energy has avoided countries already involved with US firms, and it is this that avoids conflict
between the power states over Africa.59 However, this is not the case for China’s involvement
in Kazakhstan. There has already been a strong US presence both economically and militarily
in the country and region, and whilst aspects of the relationship will weaken in the post-2014
withdrawal from Afghanistan, the US oil and gas firms are financially committed to the region.
Many of the Western human rights and environmental arguments that have been generated
in Africa are also not applicable here; whilst China is supporting a semi-authoritarian ruler, so
are the international oil firms and trade deals from many Western governments. China has
also responded to Kazakh environmental standards in its oil fields, something which its firms
have not readily done in African states. Whilst in Africa there have been ongoing
environmental concerns caused by China’s resource appropriation in Africa, this has not been
57 Noel Parker, ‘A Theoretical Introduction: Spaces, Centers, and Margins’ in Noel Parker, (ed.) The Geopolitics
of Europe’s Identity; Centers, Boundaries and Margins, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), p 15.
58 Noel Parker, ‘Differentiating, Collaborating, Outdoing: Nordic Identity and Marginality in the Contemporary
World’, Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power, Vol.9, No.3, (2002), p.355.
59 D. Zweig and B. Jianhai, ‘China's global hunt for energy’, Foreign Affairs, Vol.84, No.5 (2005), pp.25–38.
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the same in Kazakhstan.60 The development of the Kashagan field in 2007 was delayed by
the states in order to renegotiate PSA agreements and also to reinforce environmental
regulation. However, it must be noted that there are still ongoing water disputes between
China and Kazakhstan, albeit these are unrelated to the energy industry.61
The differences between these experiences go further still, as Kazakhstan is strategically
important to China beyond its resources. Historically, China has been involved with the African
states since the beginning of the second wave of democracy that swept Africa in the 1950s.
Whilst regional specialist Niklas Swanström seeks to create a historical connection between
China and Central Asia,62 the reality is that the traumatic changes that took place in Central
Asia during the period of Soviet rule destroyed nearly all that was left of this cultural bond. The
peregrinating culture, that had strong ties to China, was destroyed. Kazakhstan was ‘russified’,
with the Russian language and a majority Russian population in the north to compound this
change. By the time of Perestroika there was little left of the old Silk Road relationship.
Therefore, whilst the association is in theory old and venerable, the Kazakh nation is younger
than the Sino-Central Asia relations and there are no living generations to remember this
tradition in a meaningful way.
Where China and Kazakhstan do share a strong historical connection is through their Muslim
Uyghur populations. The Uyghur population outside of Central Asia does not identify itself as
Chinese and within China there is a strong desire for the creation of a separate Uyghur state,
60 Giles Mohan and Marcus Power, ‘New African choices? The politics of Chinese engagement in Africa and the
changing architecture of international development’, Review of African Political Economy, Vol.35, No.1 (2008),
p.37.
61 See Radio Free Asia for more information on this subject: Radio Free Asia, ‘Rivers Threatened as China,
Kazakhstan Water Pact Remains Elusive’, Radio Free Asia, 24 June 2013, accessed 15 September 2015,
http://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/delay-06242013164251.html
62 Niklas Swanström, China and Central Asia: A New Great Game or Traditional Vassal Relations’, Journal of
Contemporary China, Vol.14, No.45 (2005), pp.569-584.
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breaking away from the strict ‘One China’ policy of the CPC. For Swanström this is the key
driver of China-Kazakh relations, with oil coming second in importance. China has long warned
the Central Asian states that they must not allow terrorists to pass across to China from
Afghanistan and Pakistan, and as such ‘no governments in the region would dare support any
organisation that [China] could classify as terrorist’. As Swanström himself suggests, many of
the Central Asian states are already hostile to the cause, fearing their own separatist and
political movements.63 Furthermore, Kazakhstan has gone to considerable lengths to down-
play China’s geopolitical proximity and presence. In December 2009, President Nazarbayev
forbade the dissemination of information of land sale to China in a bid to curb the domestic
and international opposition. In this sense, Kazakhstan operates a dual policy in its operations
with China.64 The public face of the relationship is one of limited exposure, limited migration
and limited cultural exchange.
Yet whilst viewing this relationship through a security prism may have been appropriate in the
early and mid-2000s during the height of the War in Afghanistan, the nature of the relationship
between these two regions has changed under the new leadership of President Xi Jinping. In
January 2014, announcing the creation of a new economic Silk Road belt stretching from
China to the Arabian Peninsula, the President expressed that the Xinjiang Uhygur
Autonomous Region would be the financial, transport and logistics centre of the Road.65 As
such, Xinjiang will become a focus of Chinese government funding and development
assistance, removing many of the economic grievances expressed by separatists. Security
63 Ibid., p. 572.
64 Joanna Lillis, ‘‘Kazakhstan: China Looking to Lease Land for Agricultural Purposes’, EurasiaNet, 3rd February
2010, accessed 12 September 2015,
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav020410.shtml
65 Abdul Aluwaisheg Aluwaisheg, A.,‘China’s New Silk Road Initiatives: A GCC perspective’ Eurasia Review,
2014, accessed 12 September, http://www.eurasiareview.com/02022014-chinas-new-silk-road-initiatives-gcc-
perspective/
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and oppression are being gradually replaced by prosperity, thereby alleviating the security role
of Central Asia in ‘controlling’ the Uhygur question.
Since Swanström wrote in 2005 that China staged only multilateral interactions with Central
Asia, further changes have occurred. Swanström is right to note that China used the Shanghai
Cooperation Organsiation as method of speaking to Central Asia on a multilateral basis,
especially on the subject of Xinjiang.66 This was indeed the case in the early years of CIS
independence. However, China’s strategic interest in the region has changed, and with the
recent purchase of a stake in Kashagan and the accompanying $30bn trade deal, the local
dynamics have also somewhat altered. Kazakhstan has become the focal point of Chinas
attention, suggesting that the relationship is now more bilateral than multilateral. China is
looking for the most stable regional power with which to secure its future projects for oil and
trade.67 That description is not met by Russia. Turkmenistan is predominantly supplying
natural gas,68 Uzbekistan is the regional military leader and Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are
underdeveloped, relatively hostile states with uncertain economic futures. It is therefore no
longer feasible to perform fruitful multilateral negotiations and China has wisely selected
Kazakhstan as the neighbouring state with which to begin concentrated unilateral
negotiations. Taking advantage of America’s pivot towards East Asia, and Russian indecision,
China has gradually become the preferred partner of Kazakhstan.
However, Swanström is wholly right to take issue with Parag Khanna’s suggestion that China
is creating a Lebensraum for its people.69 Indeed where Khanna views these developments in
66 Swanström, ‘China and Central Asia’, p. 575.
67 Alexandros Peterson, ‘How the West Is Wholly Missing China’s Geopolitical Focus’, Foreign Policy, 10 January
2012.
68 In 2010 nearly half of China’s gas consumption was imported from Turkmenistan.
69 Parag Khanna, ‘China’s Final Frontier’, Prospect Magazine, June 2009, accessed 15 September 2015,
http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/magazine/china-xinjiang-tibet-rebellion/#.UvjvR_l_u8A
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purely spacial terms, he conjures up a degree of hysteria about an invading population and a
defenceless Kazakhstan, again playing into a stereotypical ‘Great Game’ analysis of regional
dynamics. The low rates of migration from China to Kazakhstan, except for through the
Oralman repatriation programme for ethnic Kazakhs, suggests that there is little interest
amongst the Chinese citizenship in becoming Kazakhstani.70
Whereas Swanström analyses the dynamic from the Chinese perspective and prioritises
security as the keystone of the Kazakh-China relations, Pinar İpek approaches the question 
from the Kazakh perspective and considers pipeline politics as the principle driver of
Kazakhstan as part of a ‘multivector foreign policy’. İpek conceptualises Kazakh foreign policy 
as being wholly constructed around geopolitical considerations, insisting that it is not based
upon ‘clan politics’, that it is ‘pragmatic’ and carefully ‘balanced’.71 Beginning with the question
of the role of domestic influence on foreign policy, it is hardly surprising that oil and gas takes
priority. It is the instrument with which Kazakhstan has developed almost the entirety of its
economic development and will have to so for some time. However, to suggest that because
‘clan politics’ is weakening, does not alter the political economy of personal interest that exists
in the Kazakh government – consider the case of Mr Giffen, the US ‘fixer’ indicted for bribery
between President Nazarabayev and US firms, which shows that personal interests are still
able to take precedence over pragmatism at the highest levels.72
Kazakhstan’s relationship with China is often framed through the balancing or multivector
framework. In this framework of understanding, a certain degree of strategy and forethought
is presumed. Reuel Hanks describes the foreign policy strategy of President Nazarbayev as
70 Elena Sadovskaya, ‘Chinese Migration to Kazakhstan: a Silk Road for Cooperation or a Thorny Road of
Prejudice’, China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, Vol.5, No.4 (2007), pp.147-70.
71 Panar İpek, ‘The Role of Oil and Gas in Kazakhstan’s Foreign Policy: Looking East or West?’, Europe Asia
Studies, Vol.59, No.7 (2007), pp.1179-99.
72 See Matthew G. Yaeger, ‘The CIA Made Me Do It: Understanding the Political Economy of Corruption in
Kazakhstan’, Crime Law Soc Change, No.57 (2012), pp.441–57.
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having ‘shown the greatest sensitivity, skill and persistence in formulating and implementing
multi-vectorism.’73 Whilst there maybe skill in balancing the relationships with Russia, and
embracing new sources of foreign direct investment in the Kazakh economy, it does not
necessarily follow that this is based as much upon skill, and could conceivably reflect the
strategy of the most willing partner. Indeed, President Nazarbayev has listed his partnership
options as including ‘CIS states, Europe, Asia, North America and the Pacific Basin. Russia,
China and the USA’. This is, in essence, most of the countries of the developed world, and as
such a general statement of diversification rather than a focused strategy on a defined set of
states or regions.
İpek goes on to suggest there has been an evolution in Kazakh foreign policy towards a 
balanced multi-vector foreign policy. In the first decade it was Russia that Kazakhstan
depended upon through the close integration of industrial enterprises into the Soviet economic
system;74 in the second decade it was the West that provided technological support to develop
the oil economy;75 and more recently Kazakhstan has turned to China as a secure buyer that
was willing to circumnavigate Russian control.76 Whilst the individual elements of this
argument are accurate, one does not necessarily draw the same conclusion. Another
interpretation of the same data would be that Kazakhstan has been consistently and slowly
seeking to reduce Russian control and find a new suitor which does not interfere in its domestic
affairs. In the beginning, there was no alternative to Russian foreign assistance, but as Russia
turned away from Central Asia, so space has opened for alternate market actors. And whilst,
India has shown interest in oil acquisitions in Kazakhstan, most recently in the Kashagan
project, the bid by the Indian state firm was rejected in favour of China’s CNPC. If Kazakhstan
was merely looking for alternatives and more opportunities to balance powers it would surely
73 Reuel Hanks, ‘Multi-vector Politics’ and Kazakhstan's Emerging Role as a Geo-Strategic Player in Central
Asia’, Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, Vol.11 (2009), p.257.
74 İpek, ‘The Role of Oil and Gas in Kazakhstan’s Foreign Policy’, pp.1180‐3. 
75 ibid, pp.1183-7.
76 Ibid., pp. 1187-92.
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have welcomed an alternative to the increasing presence of Chinese firms in its core
industries. This would suggest that Kazakhstan is pursuing a complex policy of balancing by
working with rising powers that offer the least threat to its independence, rather than simplistic
power balancing.
In the last five years, the revenues generated from its natural resources, combined with
Kazakhstan’s confidence from strong growth, have allowed it to renegotiate its contracts with
all IOCs. In one of the world’s largest off-shore oilfields, Kashagan, the government has shown
its autonomous decision making capabilities. After threatening renationalisation of the field
earlier in the project, the government used its renegotiated pre-emptive rights in 2013 to reject
India as a bidder for ConocoPhillips share of the field, and made little attempt to reconcile
Statoil leaving the Abai oil project in the same year. Kazakhstan has also renegotiated its
contracts to give the state oil company, KazMunaiGaz, the right of first refusal on all oil
projects. This, combined with renegotiated Production Sharing Agreements and excessive
profit taxes, has altered the Kazakh position in its energy market.
Squeezing Out Russia
Sino-Russian relations are not what they first appear. On the surface both countries enjoy a
strengthened union through the Shanghai Cooperation Agreement (SCO) which promised to
redress previous decades of mutual mistrust and form a consensus on the protection of
Central Asia from US influence. Russia and China have island disputes with Japan in
common, with each country backing the other’s claim to the territories of Kurile and Diaoutyi/
Senkaku respectively.77 Trade has deepened the relationship further still with Russia supplying
arms and oil to China in a convenient exchange for manufactured goods. And yet, under the
77 The Diplomat, ‘Asia's Other Island Spat...Between Japan and Russia’, The Diplomat, 24 January, 2013, accessed
13 January 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2013/01/history-aside-a-russian-japan-rapprochement/
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agreements and handshakes very real fractures are beginning to emerge in the relationship,
with profound consequences for how the pair behaves both toward each other and in Central
Asia.
Tensions between Russia and China stem from the imbalance between a former colonial
power and the seemingly unstoppable progress of a rising world power. Where once China
was grateful for Russia’s indifference to the West’s arms embargo, it now feels constrained by
the inferior Soviet-era weapons systems it is offered, especially in comparison to the higher
quality goods it is increasingly able to domestically manufacture.78 Indeed it is China’s
manufacturing industries that have economically propelled it above its neighbour and provided
it with alternative allies against US hegemony such as Tehran and New Delhi. Russia’s
historical fears of a dominant neighbouring state with a large population have come true.
Furthermore, China’s success in Central Asia acts as a reminder of the shrinking influence of
an increasingly antagonistic, nationalistic Russia.
Once the Kazakhstan-China pipeline is operating at full capacity in 2014, Kazakhstan will be
a more consistent source of oil. Russia has past record for using its energy supply as a method
of controlling political events, as experienced by Europe, and in particular Ukraine. It was
during the construction of the Central Asia-China Pipeline that the first signs of energy
competition between China and Russia began to emerge. The diminishing production capacity
of Gazprom forced Russia to purchase more gas from Central Asia to meet European
demands, whilst Turkmenistan wanted to secure Chinese funding by supplying direct to the
East.79 Russian unhappiness at this turn of events was expressed though the delayed
construction of the Russian pipeline to 2010.
78 N. Swanstrom, ‘Transformation of the Sino-Russian Relationship; from the Cold War to the Putin-Era’ in R.
Bedeski, & N. Swanström, (eds.), Eurasia’s Ascent in Energy and Geopolitics: Rivalry or Partnership for China,
Russia, and Central Asia? (New York: Routledge, 2012).
79 D. Kimmage, ‘Turkmenistan-China Pipeline Project Has Far-Reaching Implications’, Radio Free Europe, 10 April,
2006, accessed 11 January 2014, available from http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1067535.htm
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Perhaps the most defining characteristic of Russian strategy towards Central Asia has been
inconsistency. The initial presidency of Vladimir Putin saw Russia take on the role of regional
mediator, drawing the five countries together in regional cooperative agreements, but
choosing not to side with any one state over localised disputes such as water shortages and
land boundaries. The ‘modernizer’ Medvedev continued with broad policy directives, soft
power-styled attempts at drawing in the states but in the face of financial crisis and domestic
unrest this amounted to little. Since 2012, the new Putin-era has seen a ‘divide-and-conquer’
strategy.80 Kazakhstan has become the chosen state, receiving the most official visits, with
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan valued second and Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, with their more
authoritarian leaders neglected and left to operate as dependent states.
Whilst Russia has pursued multiple strategies since Peristroika, China has remained
consistent in its approach and has delivered on its promises. Marking the culmination of a
recent wave of visits to Kazakhstan, President Xi Jinping signed a $30 billion agreement to
begin with immediate effect for the purchase of a stake in Kashagan and loans to Baiterek,
the Kazakh state fund for industrial development projects. Whilst Asia observers have
regarded this as a new development in China-Kazakh relations, this is not the case.81 China
has always been interested in the oil fields and political process of Kazakhstan, as its closest
oil producing neighbour to the West, it is only now that Kazakhstan has made it possible for
Chinese firms to enter the market in such high profile manner.
Previously, China has moved with caution into the Kazakh oil market. Earlier ventures by
Chinese firms, when China did not possess such high disposable income or its firms such
technological expertise, were into smaller, more mature oil fields. CNPC made it largest ever
80 A. Cooley & M. Laruelle, The Changing Logic of Russian Strategy in Central Asia: From Privileged Sphere to
Divide and Rule? Eurasia Policy Memo, July 2013, No. 261 PONARS.
81 A. Filous, ‘China’s Central Asia Overtures: Why Now?’ The Diplomat, 6 November 2013, accessed 13 January
2014, http://thediplomat.com/2013/11/chinas-central-asia-overtures-why-now/
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acquisition in 2005 when it purchased PetroKazakhstan for $4bn, but then stepped back from
the pursuit of Canadian oil firm ‘Nations Energy’ that was on the market and receiving offers
from a number of firms including Lukoil. This retreat by CNPC was in direct response to the
amendment of Article 18, paragraph 3 of the Law Concerning the National Security of the
Republic of Kazakhstan. This amendment gave the government the right to block any
transactions which ‘may entail concentration by one entity…of rights associated with the
performance of petroleum operations’. It was obvious therefore that the Chinese oil giant’s
reluctance to deepen its interests in the Kazakh oil fields was intended to protect its long-term
interests in the region. In short, it reflected a fear of moving too quickly for the Kazakh
government, rather than a lack of interest in pursuing the Kazakh market.82
Politically the presence of China in Russia’s ‘backyard’ is awkward. Chinese firms are
increasingly successful at securing contracts that would once have been made available to
Russia, and not just in Kazakhstan but across the region. The power imbalance between the
two states is beginning to fracture their working relationship and play into rising Russian
nationalism. Furthermore, China’s presence in the region is forcing out other actors that have
sought to enter. The Kashagan project saw ONGC Vidash, the Indian state firm usurped as
the contractor following the withdrawal of US firm ConocoPhillips in 2013. What happens in
Kazakhstan’s oilfields has international geopolitical ramifications.
Contrasts with Western Approaches
It is not just the sheer size of Kazakhstan, the remote locations and poor infrastructure or the
offshore drilling that makes Kazakhstan a difficult place to look for oil, it is also the harsh
temperatures ranging from -40°c in the winter and up to 40°c in the summer. Furthermore
82 US Embassy, Astana, ‘Kazakhstan: China National Petroleum Corporation Acquires’, WikiLeaks, 2009, available
from https://wikileakskz.wordpress.com/2009/04/23/09astana678-kazakhstan-china-national-petroleum-
corporation-acquires/
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there have been significant changes within the industry as a result of rising awareness of
climate change and major alterations to health and safety compliance following a series of
serious oil accidents in recent years. In combination, these factors have all contributed to
raising the cost of production, increasing the amount of capital required to begin oil extraction
and therefore the risk of any project undertaken in Kazakhstan. When operational risk is
combined with strategic risk through the filibustering of the state, the costs increase further,
as in the case of Kashagan, the largest of the Kazakh oil fields, which has now become the
most expensive oil field of the last 40 years.
It is therefore geography, climate, technology and financial resources that define the strategies
of China and the West in Kazakhstan. Western firms take a zero-tolerance attitude towards
accidents whether that is on site or in the offices. They generally speaking have more
experience in technologically demanding locations, the artic or deep seas rigging, and bring a
high level of expertise to a site, but at a considerable cost. There also exists a spectrum of
European firms that are more or less committed to compliance, with Norwegian firms the most
overtly committed to the cause, with anecdotal industry advice suggesting Italian firms sit at
the other end of the scale.83 Not only does this change the ability of the firms to gain access
to sites, it also creates a different working culture once the field becomes operational. Chinese
firms have more of a reputation for accepting and facilitating a culture of low compliance
raising the interest of local political and industry figures, but diminishing the ‘ease of doing
business’.84
Meanwhile, the advantage Western firms gain in technology they lose in attitude.
Continuously, the firms ignore quotas for local personnel, and after being in Kazakhstan for
over 20 years, there are no Kazakhstani citizens installed as managing directors of major oil
83 BP Representative, Astana, 3rd March 2013.
84 BP Representative, Astana, 3rd March 2013.
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and gas exploration and production projects.85 In an effort to contribute towards the
development of staff and mollify the Kazakh government, CNPC has invested heavily in its
local staff development programs for management and administrative staff since 2012.
Furthermore, there is a difference in perception between how the Kazakh government views
its business climate relative to other resource-rich states and how they perceive they are being
treated by Western firms. The Chinese firms are willing to pay the market price to secure their
investment. In the recent bid for Kashagan, CNPC was able to pay the full amount asked for
by the Kazakh government, unlike the bid that India’s ONGC offered.86
Conclusion
The difference between Kazakhstan’s relationship with Russia and with China is almost
entirely opposite. Russia’s long history in the country, ostensibly still in evidence because of
the historical and linguistic connections, contrasts with China’s barely visible presence yet
increasing importance for the future of Kazakhstan’s economic development. Unlike Russia,
China has committed financial resources and preferential trade agreements to augment its
procurement of energy resources. This suggests that China is not replacing Russia, it is not
seeking to become a ‘protector’ or even a guarantor, but instead is operating in the country
with a minimalist presence, which is mutually desirable for both parties to ensure continued
domestic government support.
In this sense, whilst Kazakhstan’s foreign policy has often been labelled as “multi-vector”,
perhaps it is better understood as being opportunist. Kazakhstan has only selected China as
its current favoured partner because it is the most viable option, but because it has negotiated
the terms of trade, this relationship has been approached from a position of strength. Both
85 US Embassy Astana, ‘10ASTANA198, Kazakhstan: First President Of Kazakhoil Calls For’, WikiLeaks, 16 February
2010, accessed 12 September 2015, https://wikileaks.org/cable/2010/02/10ASTANA198.html
86 Gordeyeva, M., ‘China buys into giant Kazakh oilfield for $5 billion’, Reuters, 7 September, 2013, accessed 12
September 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/07/us-oil-kashagan-china-
idUSBRE98606620130907
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China and Kazakhstan have been subject to narratives that obscure their actions. China has
been identified as a threat, with an aggressive monolithic state-driven foreign policy that is
played out through the energy industry. It has also been labelled as ‘apolitical’ in its foreign
policy, with a blanket approach to developing countries. By showing that there is a difference
in the approach taken by China in Kazakhstan we can start to understand China as a more
nuanced and political actor than previously acknowledged. More importantly, through the
responses of the Kazakh state, and the types of deals that it has negotiated with China, we
can see that Kazakhstan is not deserving of its passive reputation.
As a result of Russian sanctions and difficult reputation that Moscow has created through
policy choices with Ukraine and Georgia, it is no longer the most obvious choice for China to
partner with in its energy industry. A testing historical relationship, and a serious imbalance
between the economic capabilities between the two countries has shifted the balance of power
away from Russia towards China. Kazakhstan has been able to take advantage of its position
as a regional Central Asian power and has effectively offered itself as an alternative centre to
Russia for China’s business. Deepening energy relations, the neutral stance of Kazakhstan,
its position on the margins of Central Asia and proximity to the oil pipeline network have all
contributed to this increasingly beneficial relationship.
One question persists: has Kazakhstan supplemented one centre for another? The Russian
economic situation has stymied its ability to be an attractive funding partner on the same scale
as China, and there is no wealthy patron elsewhere waiting to step in. Kazakhstan has so far
managed to remain stable in its new relationship, addressing its desire for balance, but there
is a possibility that it will have leveraged itself too far in the direction of China. So far China
has shown itself unwilling to interfere in the domestic politics of the countries in which it invests,
but for how much longer can it sustain this position? Most countries ultimately act to protect
their investments and their interests. At what point will its leveraged assets overseas force
China’s need to protect its interests?
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Chapter 7
Mirage on the Steppe: Kazakhstan, the EU, Europe and the US
In 2010, Kazakh Vice President Idenov sat down to a dinner of roast lamb and fine wine with
US Ambassador Hoagland to discuss corruption. In the unwittingly recorded conversation,
Idenov drew some interesting parallels between the capitalist democratic model and his own
country’s methods and afflictions, which Hoagland then reported word-for-word back to
Washington:
Listen, almost everyone at the top is confused. They're confused by
their Soviet mentality. They're confused by the corrupt excesses of
capitalism. 'If Goldman Sachs executives can make $50 million a year
and then run America's economy in Washington, what's so different
about what we do?' they ask.87
According to Idenov, in Kazakhstan a market economy equates to unfettered capitalism,
comprising of big money and large bribes for the best connected. If the Great Game of old
was supposed to be a ‘civilising’ mission then oil too has had its cultural impact, and there is
continuing evidence to suggest that there is widespread corruption within the energy industry,
including reportage from the highest ranks of the Kazakh government that British and other
European firms are involved.88 Chinese firms exacerbate the problem of corruption in
Kazakhstan,89 but the Western firms do not have a perfect record as the scandal with the
prominent Washington fixer James Giffen shows, along with the investigation into the CEO of
87 Askat Idenov, Idenov, A., ‘Kazakhstan: Money And Power’, WikiLeaks, 2010 January 25, accessed 15
September 2015, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/10ASTANA72_a.html
88 ibid.
89 For more information on the corruption system between China and Kazakhstan in the energy industry see
Daniel O’Neil, ‘Risky business: The political economy of Chinese investment in Kazakhstan’, Journal of Eurasian
Studies, Vol.5, (2014) pp.145–156.
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the Italian energy giant, Eni, over bribing officials at the Kashagan field.90 It is interesting to
note that in interviews with Statoil, the Norwegian firm, escaping the culture of corruption was
cited as a reason for the firm leaving the Kazakh energy industry in 2013.91
This confidential conversation between an ambassador and vice president captures an
essential truth. The civilising mission that the old Great Game represented is still present in
much of the Western interaction with Kazakhstan, from aid programmes, to school exchanges,
to CSR programmes. And yet, despite these worthy endeavours there remains a double
standard in place within many of the interactions. Kazakhstan must be ready and willing to
engage in anti-corruption programmes, and abide by international standards, and embrace
Western norms, but in the knowledge that many Western firms accept there is a cost of doing
business in the region that, in turn, reflects Kazakhstan’s own raw image of the West.
This double standard punctuates the relationship in many ways. The cultural ties and social
foundations of the relationship are a one-sided affair, as Kazakhstan absorbs Western cultural
norms, but are then reciprocated through the ‘discourse of danger’. The War in Afghanistan
was supposed to provide closer integration between Kazakhstan and America, yet there has
been little material gain for Kazakhstan, or indeed, Central Asia. Similarly, whilst China’s
operating procedure has been heavily criticised, the Eastern neighbours are launching better
funded and more realistic ‘Silk Road’ Infrastructure projects across the region, compared to
90For details of China’s supposed involvement in corruption see Richard Hoagland, ‘10ASTANA275, Kazakhstan:
Minister Of Justice Praises Cooperation’, WikiLeaks, 26 February, 2010, accessed 15 September 2015,
https://wikileakskz.wordpress.com/2010/02/26/10astana275-kazakhstan-minister-of-justice-praises-
cooperation-with/
For the Giffen case see Matthew Yeager, ‘The CIA Made Me Do It: Understanding the Political Economy of
Corruption in Kazakhstan’, Crime, Law and Social Change, Vol.57, No.4, (2012), pp.441-457.
For the Eni case see Azamat Maitanov ‘Kashagan To Be Ruined By Italian Convict And Our Businessmen In
Ministerial Chairs’, Ak Zhaik, 1 April, 2014, accessed 15 September 2015, http://azh.kz/en/news/view/3533
91 Statoil Representative, KIOGE Energy Conference, Almaty, May 2013.
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the American offerings. Further confusing the cacophony of messages is the presumption that
‘West is Best’ when it comes to models of energy industry governance.
This chapter seeks to understand the relationship between Kazakhstan and the ‘West’. While
‘West’ and ‘Western’ are somewhat problematic labels, born of necessity to categorise the
research, there are nevertheless some merits to this framing of the problem.92 Firstly, this is a
meaningful distinction that is present within colloquial dialogue in Kazakhstan. Secondly, it is
a distinction experienced within elite interviews discussing the nature of the energy industry,
and the division is born of differences in the standards with which the firms must comply.
Thirdly, whilst there are international norms, the degree of oversight and enforcement varies
greatly from country to country. Fourthly, the energy companies of the American and European
firms play a very similar role in the energy industry, as they both tackle the most technologically
advanced projects, going where the Chinese, Russian and Indian firms cannot. To this extent
at least, there exists a complex grouping of ideas that constitutes an understanding of the
‘West’ within Kazakhstan.
In the Great Game literature, America looms as a powerful force, particularly because of the
War in Afghanistan, one of the longest wars of the last hundred years. However within the
confines of the marginality framework, there are reasons to re-evaluate this relationship.
Russia and China are both centers of power within close proximity to Kazakhstan. The
European states and the US are aligned with Kazakhstan through trade and cultural analysis
but do they have political power enough to affect Kazakh autonomy? The chapter begins by
analysing the cultural exchange between the US and Kazakhstan; can the US lay a claim to
influence Kazakhstan through cultural means similar to Russia or does it hide its face, similar
92 Jan Ifversena, ‘Who are the Westerners?’, International Politics, Vol.45, No.2 (2008), pp. 236–253. See also
the introduction to Christopher Browning & Marko Leh (eds.), The Struggle for the West: A Divided and
Contested Legacy (London: Routledge, 2010), pp.3-5.
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to China? The chapter asserts that the US government views the relationship through the
prism of the Afghan War, and as a result tries to co-opt the state into its programmes for
regional development and security such as the “The New Silk Road”. The chapter deliberately
contrasts the different approaches to regional integration taken by America and China, and
asks who has revitalised the old merchant trope to greatest effect. Returning to the economic
connections to examine the experience of US commercial entities in the region, the chapter
explores the link between international oil firms, the state and the local population in the oil
producing areas.
The second half of the chapter concerns the European firms that are located in Kazakhstan.
If, as the chapter assumes, there is less cultural exchange between Kazakhstan and the
‘West’, to what extent is there a distinct ‘European’ voice in Kazakhstan? The chapter begins
by examining the role of the EU and its member states, and asks what, if anything, Kazakhstan
can learn from the experience of such heavy external involvement in its core industries. In
theory, Kazakhstan should be a significant destination for the collaborative efforts of the
European energy industry, but there is something obstructing this. If Kazakhstan is
encouraging European involvement in the energy industry, does this mean that it should be
emulating it? Norway is often considered a model that other developing states should seek to
emulate, but does this model of energy governance fit with the local experience and tradition?
The concept of marginality is not only important to our understanding of Kazakhstan’s
relationship with Russia and China, but also with the Western states. The relationship with the
Western states is more complex because each state has a smaller unilateral relationship with
Kazakhstan, but cumulatively these are vital to the Kazakh economy. Understanding
Kazakhstan’s autonomous and marginal position here means understanding the degree to
which Kazakhstan seeks to emulate the centre of power, how it manages its relationship with
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the power, and if it is able to achieve and negotiate according to its own principles. The role
of marginality here is not to create a proximity-based understanding of geopolitical power, but
instead to break with the Great Game assumption that Kazakhstan is powerless in its dealings
with the West.
Cultural Exchange and Historical Ties
Kazakhstan, like many developing countries, understands the charisma of capitalism. If
Russia is ‘old news’ and China is ‘under the radar’, the siren call of Western style consumerism
is well and truly manifested in city life. In Astana and Almaty, Kazakh culture and customs
connect with fantasies of LA lifestyles, and mix again with Russian taste. Norman Foster has
won many contracts here in the new capital, filling the centre with eccentric tent and pyramid-
shaped buildings, helping to cement the cultural ‘arrival’ of the city and soothe the ego of the
President.93 In a bid to keep up appearances, whole avenues of enormous themed restaurants
line the city and they remain empty except for a smattering of government staff, with rumours
circulating of money laundering. Similarly, amongst the fleets of Porsches and Maseratis, there
are rows of scuffed Geelys and Ladas showing a glimpse of regular life. Whatever modern
image Kazakhstan tries to project, there are always signs of the serious flaws beneath the
shiny surface.
To understand the effect that America has upon the public imagination, consider the
thousands of children who enter annual competitions for the opportunity to spend a year living
with American host families. The FLEX programme, as it is known, is rarely what the children
imagine. They are often sent to religious families in the mid-west, and can struggle not only
with language but also with cultural adjustment and, sadly, often racial prejudice.94 Amongst
93 The Khan Shatyr Entertainment Centre is worth looking at simply for the wonder of its design.
94 Interview Alice Raymond, FLEX Programme Director, Interview, American Council in Kazakhstan, 13 August
2013.
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the teenagers of the elite class, there is a strong recognition of American cultural symbols
such as actors, politicians and athletes.95 The superficial acquisition of a ‘Western lifestyle’
appears to be prioritised by the rising middle classes, but with little critical understanding of
the structures that have created such a ‘standard of living’. This results in a skewed perception
of American and European cultures, often exacerbated by the influence of ostentatious cultural
products and the affluent expat communities that circulate.
In return, Central Asia is at best ignored and at worst othered as a dangerous, empty space
that needs to be civilised. Fear of the unknown has generated inaccurate populist narratives
and ‘discourses of danger’ are presented time and again by Hollywood. More recently, this
representation has shown itself to be more self-aware. Take for example the almost mocking
and jubilant caricatures of the American animated HBO show ‘Archer’ which goes so far as to
knowingly poke fun at the apparent inability of the show’s hero to tell the difference between
any of the ‘-stan’s’. However, the accurately depicted traditional dress and cultural insignia
gives the game away as to the location, and more importantly, shows a nod toward to the
earnest research that has been undertaken.96 Whether the result of public indifference or
strategic appropriation, there are very few popular narratives that accurately portray the newly
independent republics, and certainly not in a way that would be recognised in Kazakhstan.
The cultural exchange of the Western-Kazakh relationship is therefore a one-sided affair.
Whilst these are general representations for public consumption, perhaps more worrying is
the recent history of the policy literature that has permeated political relationships. The War in
Afghanistan has further obscured the Central Asian states as confusing messages from the ‘–
95 Recognition was high for 100 degree level students asked about a range of celebrities from politicians, to
actresses, sportsmen and women. The discussions took place as part of lectures taught at KIMEP University,
2013.
96 ‘Once Bitten’, Archer, Season 4, Episode 6, USA, HBO, February 21st, 2013.
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stans’ are brought to the West.97 The radical regrouping of the State Department in the wake
of September 11th redefined Kazakhstan, strategically moving it from Europe and instead
linking it with Afghanistan showing a significant reimagining of the role and place of Central
Asia, and having repercussions for foreign policy in the region.98 Central Asia was no longer
post-Soviet, instead it was an extension of culturally, linguistically, religiously, different states
with which Kazakhstan has little trade or diplomatic exchange.99
From 1991 onwards, we see a gradual integration of Western money and culture seep into
Kazakhstan that was unique and by no means part of a wider regional pattern. When Martha
Brill Olcott describes the collection of newly independent states in 1992, she paints a scene
of fragile economies damaged by their reliance upon Moscow, riddled with rent-seeking
behaviours, and reluctantly accepting their fate (apart from the arrogant leadership choices of
the Uzbek leader Islam Karimov).100 Given their delicate economic situations, and dramatically
different economies and natural endowments, it is no wonder that they each pursued different
strategies into independence and beyond. The natural endowments of Kazakhstan were
echoed in the gas deposits of Turkmenistan. Yet whilst Kazakhstan sought investment from
the West, Turkmenistan looked to Iran for support of its industry and continued on to what
would become an insulated economy through the strange personality cult of its leadership.
97 S. Neil Macfarlane, 'The United States and Regionalism in Central Asia', International Affairs, Vol.80, No.3
(2004), pp.447–461.
98 William Golding, Interview, Astana, 3rd April, 2013.
99 Roy Allison, ’Regionalism, Regional Structures and Security Management in Central Asia’, International
Affairs, Vol.80, No.3 (2004), pp.463.
100 Martha Brill Olcott, ‘Central Asia's Catapult to Independence’, Foreign Affairs, Vol.71, No.3 (Summer 1992),
pp.108-30.
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The American Government and the Battles for the Silk Road
‘The US Government remains committed to its relationship with Kazakhstan’.101 This was the
official message from the US embassy in Astana after the announcement of troop withdrawal
from Afghanistan. By mid-2013, President Obama had announced the US ‘pivot to Asia’.102
Not only is the term ‘pivot’ lifted directly from the lexicon of geo-strategist, Halford Mackinder,
but by referring to ‘Asia’, he is actually making reference to the Asia-Pacific region. Effectively
this is a pivot away from Central Asia, away from Afghanistan and Pakistan and the northern
Central Asian states and onto the next geopolitical hotspot fuelled by the notion of long-term
strategic competition with China. And yet, despite the supposedly new framework for Obama’s
foreign policy, very little of this has actually resulted in action, and instead if anything,
operationally there has been a ‘re-pivot’ to the Middle East with Syria, Iraq, Iran and Yemen
taking the majority of the attention. So if the relationship between the US and Kazakhstan is
not of central importance, it is not clear from the current Great Game literature, what this
relationship is.
Fathoming the true scope of the relationship is rendered more problematic by the Kazakh-US
relations literature itself. There are two very distinct voices that dominate the literature. The
first is the already discussed notion that Soviet/ Russia specialists apply their knowledge to
Central Asia after-the-fact. The second dominating voice in the literature is that of the
American writers. The sheer scale of American think-tank/academic writing means that
American academia commands the largest voice on a given subject, and particularly on a
region less studied than many others. This is made yet more difficult by the close links between
the US government and much of the leading academic writing on the region. The leading
example of this is the Jamestown research cluster, The Central Asia-Caucus Institute Silk
Road Studies Program. The head of the cluster, Frederick Starr, is a leading academic in his
101 William Golding, US Embassy to the Republic of Kazakhstan, Astana, March, 2013.
102 Kurt Campbell and Brian Andrews, ‘Explaining the Pivot to Asia’, Chatham House, 2013, August p.3.
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field whose work is linked rather closely to the foreign policy strategy of the US towards Central
Asia, and indeed has worked with Hilary Clinton during her time as Secretary of State in the
founding of the Silk Road program.103 This dynamic between academia and politics leads to a
heavy US bias, and a tendency to overinflate the role of the US in the region, and is particularly
true of a recent report upon Kazakh-US relations.104 This is not to suggest that the centre does
not produce excellent research, it is clearly of a very high quality, but it often prioritises the
role of the US and overextends its importance in the region, its ability to influence the state,
and the role of Kazakhstan in regional stability. Kazakhstan’s regional significance is not
predicated on the War in Afghanistan, but by emphasising the role of the US it in danger of
being understood in this way.
At the beginning of the War in Afghanistan, the role of Kazakhstan was more clearly defined.
Russia was ‘leaning’ towards the West, offering its condolences over the September 11th
attacks and cooperating through NATO-Russia negotiations over the movement of military
equipment through the region.105 Central Asia at this time was inclined to cooperate with the
US in exchange for the financial rewards and other deals with the US.106 Importantly,
Kazakhstan’s agreement to facilitate the Northern Distribution Network agreements for the
transit of non-lethal supplies allowed the US to circumnavigate the vulnerable Khyber Pass
route through Pakistan.107 The US also used Kazakhstan as an alternative to other Central
Asian partners at times when these other relationships faltered; Kazakhstan entered into
103 Joshua Faust, ‘The Brilliant, Unworkable New Silk Road’, The Atlantic, 11 October 2011.
104 In particular, the following report emphasises the nature of the work of the institute. It asks how
Kazakhstan can benefit the US government rather than as a bipartisan reflection upon the nature of the
relationship Frederick Starr et al, ‘Looking Forward: Kazakhstan and the United State’, Central Asia Silk-
Caucuses Institute Silk Road Studies Program, (2014), pp.16-30.
105 John O’Loughlina, Gearoid Ó Tuathailb, & Vladimir Kolossovc, ‘Russian Geopolitical Storylines And Public
Opinion In The Wake Of 9–11: A Critical Geopolitical Analysis And National Survey’, Communist and Post-
Communist Studies, Vol.7, No.3 (2004), p.281.
106 For more details of the power dynamics and deals that took place across Central Asia see Alexander Cooley,
Great Game, Local Rules: The New Great Power Contest in Central Asia (New York: Oxford University Press,
2012), pp.30-51.
107 Roman Muzalevsky, ‘NATO-Kazakhstan Transit Agreement: Unleashing the Potential of Northern Supply
Route’, Jamestown Daily Monitor, 24 February 2010.
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bilateral agreements in 2002 as an emergency alternative to Kyrgyzstan’s Manas base. As a
result of the agreement, there followed 6,500 overflights, and 60 diverts.108 The US has sought
more indirect opportunities to use the Central Asian states as a means of achieving goals in
Afghanistan through the creation of the Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA).
The network, which comprises the five Central Asian states, became a key focus for the US
government to find ways to include Afghanistan in the agenda of the talks.
In 2006, the WikiLeaks database release of US government documents and emails radically
altered our understanding of the functions and capacity of the US government. Whilst the
information leaked revealed great swathes of data that transform our comprehension of the
War in Afghanistan, the Iraq War, Guantanamo Bay, corruption in Kenya to name but a few of
the high-profile subjects the leaks covered, it has given insights into the US governments
understanding of many other regions and countries beyond these headline stories.109 In the
case of Kazakhstan, the emails released focused mainly upon the regular briefings between
Ambassador Hoagland and Washington and Kazakhstani officials. Because of their candid
nature, we are better able to compare the official (and tired) rhetoric one often encounters
during formal interviews with the private views of government representatives and the events
behind the scenes.
By the time of these leaks, the relationship had drifted; Kazakhstan’s involvement in the US
projects was no longer as strategically important and President Obama’s distant behaviour
was hampering relations. American diplomats working in Kazakhstan sent back a very
108US Embassy Astana, ‘09ASTANA2099, Kazakhstan: Presidential Entrepreneurship Summit’ WikiLeaks, 30th
November 2009.
109 For a good example of how WikiLeaks has incorporated into geographical research see John O'Loughlina,
Frank D. W. Witmera, Andrew M. Linkea & Nancy Thorwardsona, ‘Peering into the Fog of War: The Geography
of the WikiLeaks Afghanistan War Logs, 2004-2009’, Eurasian Geography and Economics, Vol.51, No.4 (2010),
pp.472-95.
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particular and characterful analysis of the relationship between the two states. President
Nazarbayev continued to place great importance upon receiving an invitation to the White
House and being seen in the Oval Office. Repeated requests were made to the American
Embassy in Kazakhstan for President Nazarbayev to meet with President Obama over many
months and years. Such a strong desire for symbolic gestures, with no request for a particular
trade agenda to accompany this meeting, is emblematic of the Kazakh President’s need to be
acknowledged by the US, and underlines the extent of the soft power, together with the cultural
impact of the US in the region.
Another obsession of President Nazarbayev was in gaining the chair of the OSCE, which
became a pressing aspect of his personal agenda in his relationship with the West. This is
important in understanding the causes of difficulties in the relationship, because as the
WikiLeaks confirm, there is little room for the American diplomatic staff to negotiate with the
middle or lower ranks of the Kazakh state. American objectives are usually only achieved
when there is a direct diplomatic connection to the president’s office.110 In Astana, lower
ranking government officials are either unable to operate because of stifling Soviet era
bureaucracy or are unable to make decisions without consent of the leadership. Further
examples of the difficulties in the relationship are revealed by the inability of small requests to
be facilitated by either side. For example, the US government failed to gain the tax exemptions
for which it had been lobbying the Government of Kazakhstan that related to US assistance
programmes. Other examples include the decline in the number of overseas student
exchanges to the US, the repeal of the 1974 Jackson-Vanik Amendment, and American
indifference to Kazakh requests for more support to secure its interests in the Caspian Sea.111
110 US Embassy Astana, ‘Kazakhstan: Whither In 2006’, WikiLeaks, 24 February, 2006.
111 Ibid.
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Transport links also underline seeming American indifference. Frederick Starr conceived the
latest ‘New Silk Road Project’ in the mid-2000s,112 Hillary Clinton talked about implementing it
in 2011 as Secretary of State,113 meanwhile China implemented a ‘Silk Road’ programme of
its own in 2014.114 We know what the Silk Road was historically: an organic web of routes
connecting Asia, Africa, Europe and the Far East along which trade, religion and migration
spread.115 Far more than material goods were disseminated, as ideas, art and disease curved
their way around the globe, accompanied by war and conflict. This epitomises the difference
in the strategic cultures of these two states and highlights the divergent approaches to the
region. Both are reinvigorating romantic narratives as a possible solution to the stagnation of
the region’s development, but only one has committed the resources to bring the project to
fruition.
Hillary Clinton’s Silk Road concept was based upon the work of Central Asia-Caucasus
Institute & Silk Road Studies Program led by Frederick Starr. It was to be an infrastructure
network designed to improve the transit of goods across the region, boosting trade for all, and
connecting East with West.116 The American policy approach, and the academic research it
was based upon, views Central Asia through the troubled optic of Afghanistan, with an
emphasis on promoting regional stability.117 Accordingly, the key projects of the programme
are the TAPI pipeline project, energy projects in Afghanistan, rebuilding of the road network
of Afghanistan, a Regional Cooperation Framework to improve trade, a CASI electricity grid
112 Frederick Starr, (ed.), The New Silk Roads: Transport and Trade in Greater Central Asia, 2007,
http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/inside/publications/GCA.html, (accessed 16 September 2015).
113 Younkyoo Kima & Fabio Indeob, ‘The New Great Game in Central Asia Post 2014: The US “New Silk Road”
Strategy and Sino-Russian rivalry’, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Vol.46, No.2 (2013), pp.275-6.
114 Ben Simpfendorfer, The New Silk Road: How a Rising Arab World is Turning Away from the West and
Rediscovering China (London: Palgrave, 2011), pp.8-15.
115 For a more detailed explanation of cultural exchange across the Road, see Xinru Liu and Lynda Schaffer,
Connections Across Eurasia: Transportation, Communication, and Cultural Exchange on the Silk Roads (New
York, McGraw Hill, 2007).
116 Frederick Starr and Andrew Kuchins, The Key to Success in Afghanistan: A Modern Silk Road Strategy,
Washington D.C, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, 2010, p 9, available from
http://www.isdp.eu/images/stories/isdp-main-pdf/2010_starr-kuchins_key-to-success.pdf
117 Starr and Kuchins, The Key to Success in Afghanistan, p.10.
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to supply Afghanistan and a Cross Border Transport Accord to improve cross border trade in
the region.
Many of these projects are bold and well intentioned. If they had come to fruition they would
have had a transformative impact upon the region. However, in the majority of the projects,
America was the coordinator as opposed to the financial backer and they have stalled. In the
case of the CASI electricity grid, the US committed only $15 million, of the total $1 billion
expected cost.118 Furthermore, the TAPI pipeline project, a scheme connecting Turkmenistan,
Afghanistan, Pakistan and India, has gone wildly over budget and has not yet come close to
completion. When one considers the countries involved in that collective it is not difficult to
imagine why; Turkmenistan is a barely functioning dictator-led state and all of the states have
serious corruption issues.
Furthermore, the Central Asian states have a poor record in the realm of regional integration,
and there is little to incentivise wealthier states such as Kazakhstan to want to be integrated
into the Afghan market. The closest Kazakhstan has come to becoming involved is through a
pledge to provide scholarships to Afghan students to come to Kazakh universities, which it
should be noted, all teach in Russian, or English. As such, this proposal is based upon a
Western need to secure a foreign policy agenda, and it so happens that the externalities of
that decision are intended to bring improved transport links to the region, rather than
Kazakhstan and its neighbours being a foreign policy priority in their own right. Meanwhile, the
effects of the War in Afghanistan upon the northern states of Central Asia have been limited
and therefore Afghan development is not a strategic goal for Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan or
Kazakhstan.
118 World Bank, ‘Central Asia South Asia Electricity Transmission and Trade Project (CASA-1000)’, World Bank,
available from http://www.worldbank.org/projects/P145054?lang=en
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By comparison, China’s New Silk Road is defined by economic focus and wider regional
connectivity. China’s economic growth, whilst still impressive, has been slowing in recent
years. By playing an active role in developing the economies of neighbouring countries, it
hopes to offset this by developing its future markets. China’s Silk Road also has an aquatic
element, and so the development plans include the ‘Maritime Silk Road’, which would expand
ports across the Persian Gulf and beyond.119 As of 2014, this has been backed by $30 billion
deals with Kazakhstan, $15 billion with Uzbekistan, $3 billion with Kyrgyzstan and a $40 billion
Silk Road Development Fund.120
China’s scheme is more transparently self-serving and has been less planned. Nevertheless,
it has secured the financial backing to provide positive externalities for the states along the
‘Road’. It was in Kazakhstan that President Xi Jinping announced the Silk Road, and it was
with $30 billion allocated to Kazakhstan that the first phase of the Road was launched with an
early emphasis on the natural resources of the region. Meanwhile, unlike Washington, the
government of Beijing has cultivated bilateral relationships with each of the Central Asian
states, making Kazakhstan the clear leader of its regional vision. Unlike the American
programme, this project has been bilaterally negotiated, avoiding the need for regional
cooperation in its success. China’s Silk Road is also far more extensive, extending into Central
Africa and to Northern Europe, instead of making Afghanistan the main focus, in the Chinese
model, Afghanistan is this time a mere externality of the project.
119 For more on the Arab segment of the ‘road’ see Ben Simpfendorfer, ‘The New Silk Road; How a Rising Arab
World is Turning Away from the West and Rediscovering China’, (Palgrave MacMillan: Basingstoke), 2011.
120 James MacBride, ‘Building the New Silk Road’, Council on Foreign Relations, 25 May, 2015,
http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/building-new-silk-road/p36573 accessed 16 September 2015).
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If America’s purpose in proposing a New Silk Road was centred upon ‘fixing’ Afghanistan, so
China has its own geopolitical agenda too. The root of its sprawling ‘road’ is in Xinjiang. This
western province of China has been a continuous source of tension for the local and central
government because of rising Muslim separatist movements in the region, which are
underscored by other political developments in the region such as low productivity rates,
employment and welfare121. Both the US and China are following quasi-imperial ambitions.
For all China’s discussion of the wider economic benefits to the entire mission, it also
integrates Central Asia into a sphere of growing Chinese influence, and investment of capital
on such a spectacular scale secures a certain degree of loyalty. At a time when there is rising
antagonism in the South China Sea, this is a dramatic display of the potential of China to
expand quickly across the region to exploit alternative opportunities, using the umbrella of
development. It is all too easy to view this as a ‘failure’ of American engagement with Central
Asia. Nevertheless, with no contiguous borders or obvious points of traction, why should it
succeed over China? Historically it has almost no role in the region, has had little economic
interaction with wider Central Asia and beyond securing a more positive regional legacy, such
a scheme is of little direct economic benefit to the US.
Addressing the American Chamber of Commerce, Geoffrey Pyatt, the lead US diplomat
superintending South and Central Asian affairs, made some intriguing remarks that seem to
summarise the American position on Kazakhstan.122 He started by highlighting the
‘relationship with Kazakhstan as perhaps our deepest and broadest in Central Asia’, then
bemoaning the fact that ‘Central Asia remains one of the least integrated areas of the world’
before lecturing the mainly Kazakhstani audience about the fact that ‘Central Asia lies at the
121 Brenda L. Schuster, ‘Gaps in the Silk Road: An Analysis of Population Health Disparities in the Xinjiang
Uyghur Autonomous Region of China’, The China Quarterly, Vol.198, No.1 (2009), pp.433.
Michael Clarke, ’Widening the Net: China's Anti-Terror Laws and Human Rights in the Xinjiang Uyghur
Autonomous Region’, The International Journal of Human Rights, Vol.4, No.4 (2010), pp.543.
122 Geoffrey Pyatt served as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of South and Central Asian
Affairs from May 2010 until July 2013 before becoming US Ambassador to the Ukraine.
243
crossroads of Europe, Asia, and the Middle East’.123 Pryatt’s presentation then degenerated
into a list:
Over the past 20 years American companies have invested more than
$16.5 billion in Kazakhstan, with much of that investment focused on the
extractive industries particularly the energy sector. But our investment in
Kazakhstan hasn’t been totally one-dimensional; U.S. companies
increasingly recognize the immense opportunities that exist in other sectors
of Kazakhstan’s economy. Up north in Astana, our Embassy chalked-up 57
concrete export successes in 2011 valued at $7.8 million, and two
commercial diplomacy successes valued at $3.4 million.124
In fact, his statement clearly outlined the American interest in Kazakhstan as being largely
one-dimensional. If we compare the $16.5 billion investment over 20 years with the $30 billion
investment in a single year from China, the limited scale and commitment to the region
becomes clear. The focus on concrete exports also underlines the difference. American
involvement is narrowly directed at the energy industry, and the chief role of the state is to
support its IOCs working in Kazakhstan. Any interest in supporting Kazakhstan beyond that
is based upon the need to secure the energy transit routes that are currently perceived as
monopolistic and over-reliant upon Russia.
Pryatt’s statement forms part of a long and honourable tradition of ideational foreign policy in
the United States in which he emphasises political liberty and free markets, yet which conflates
this seamlessly with American economic interest. As Christopher Thorne has argued, this
often results in a zealous belief that American ideals are synonymous with freedom in the
123 Geoffrey Pyatt, ‘Kazakhstan's Place on Central Asia's New Silk Road’, Almaty, April 20th,
http://www.state.gov/p/sca/rls/rmks/2012/188175.htm (accessed 16 September 2015)
124Ibid.
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wider world.125 The work of Pearl Buck, a popular essayist on American policy towards Asia
who was brought up in China, and the first woman to win the Pulitzer Prize for Fiction,
exemplifies this tradition. As she remarked, if the American traditions of freedom and liberty
were to survive, they had to ‘triumph in Asia’.126
This curious doublethink, which associates freedom in a neo-liberal sense with American
purpose in the world, explains many statements that would otherwise seem puzzling. Take for
example Stephen Blank’s recent analysis of the context of US interests in the region. In a
monograph entitled US Interests in Central Asia, Blank states that:
“energy access, though important is not, and should not be, the primary
driver of US policy here [in Central Asia]. Rather it is a means to an end…
In this sense the driving force behind US policy is anti-monopoly, while the
driving force behind Moscow and Beijing is quintessentially monopolistic in
nature.”127
The underlying ideas here are not dissimilar to those of Pyatt, recently the US deputy secretary
for the region. It is the assertion that the primary objective of the United States government in
the region is something other than over their securing of oil contracts for its firms. As the only
state in the region with real oil reserves, this narrowness of vision is of direct concern to
Kazakhstan. Furthermore, the statement here is about the requirement of the US national
interest. The central concern is to secure the best policy for the US interest in the region, or
perhaps to be more generous, the best climate of political economy in the region for US
interests, rather than what is best for the Central Asian states. This speaks to a ‘Great Game’
125 Christopher Thorne, ‘American Political Culture and the End of the Cold War’, Journal of American Studies,
Vol.26, No.3 (1992), pp.303-30.
126 Akira Iriye, 'Culture and Power: International Relations as Intercultural Relations', Diplomatic History, Vol.3,
No.2 (1979), pp.115–28.
127 Stephen Blank, ‘US interests in Central Asia and the Challenges to Them’, Strategic Studies Institute, (2007),
p. 3
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understanding of regional analysis, and again represents a set of ideas originating in a state-
backed Strategic Studies institute. If the state was interested in Kazakhstan beyond energy
contracts then it would allocate resources appropriately, but it has not done so.
US Involvement and Lessons Learnt
Oil extraction in Kazakhstan is challenging. The extreme climate of the environment, coupled
with the depth and pressure of the largest Kazakh oil projects, makes them notably complex
and expensive to operate. International oil firms have needed to be involved with Kazakh oil
projects from the beginning because of the advanced technology required. Accordingly, during
the privatisation phase of Kazakh oil and gas, discussed in Chapter 2, US oil and gas firms
joined the Kazakh energy market. The US firms Chevron and ExxonMobil entered the industry
from the beginning, arriving in the Tengiz energy project in 1991, and later taking shares in
Karachaganak and Kashagan. These three energy projects, Kashagan, Tengiz and
Karachaganak, are all consortium-led operations with a mixture of Kazakh and International
Oil Companies. It is the world’s largest oil companies that run these projects; ENI, Total, Agip,
ConocoPhillips, Shell, Statoil, Sinopec and CNOOC.128
But how have these firms integrated themselves into Kazakhstan? What role beyond
extraction do they play in the Kazakh community? Unlike the Russian and Chinese firms, these
IOCs are answerable in their home states for their actions overseas. Each of these firms make
profits from their global enterprises that are far beyond the GDP of many countries and employ
an army of workers in some of the most hostile working conditions across the globe. The
unique properties of the minerals they extract, and the prices that they command, can make
even the riskiest of adventures profitable. The pursuit of profit has at times been at the expense
128 Pinar İpek, ‘The role of oil and gas in Kazakhstan's foreign policy: Looking east or west?’  Europe-Asia Studies
Vol.59, No.7 (2007), pp.1179-99.
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of human life and with flagrant disregard for the environment at every stage of the process –
exploration, production, refining, transportation and consumption.129
At the extreme end of the spectrum, the wrongs of the oil industry are easy to articulate - large
avoidable oil spills such as BP Deepwater Horizon or the entrenched bribery culture in the
Nigerian oil sector are simple ‘wrongs’, but deciding upon best practise when confronted with
individual country examples is not so immediately obvious. What form of assistance should
the international oil companies give, and should it be uniform or unique? Should their
objectives be loyal to their shareholders, the local beneficiaries, or the Kazakh state? Do they
have a moral obligation to produce social initiatives, and what would qualify to meet those
obligations? What is an appropriate measure of success and who is the arbiter of failure?
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) has been the industry solution to these questions and
to the pressure they face to act ‘cleanly’. It is impossible to over-exaggerate the effect that that
changes to health and safety and CSR has had upon the industry within Western energy firms.
Some claim it is now not possible to walk down the stairs in the corporate offices without
holding the handrail; accidents are understood as preventable, even in the stairwell. CSR
packages are now standard for every major oil company, and to ensure that these are within
a strict framework they are integrated into global governance projects, and again into the
frameworks of a vast network of international organisations, including the UN’s Global
Compact and Global Reporting Initiative.130 These projects can range from staff taking a day
off work to build a schoolyard, through to the funding of hospital projects. Each of the oil firms
129 Samuel Lussac, Géopolitique du Caucase: au carrefour énergétique de l'Europe de l'Ouest, Paris, Editons
Tecnip, 2010, pp. 3-12.
130 Shell Representative, interview, Astana, 6th June, 2013.
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on the major projects in Kazakhstan has a CSR programme that shapes their integration with
the local community.131
Jedrzej Frynas, in his recent discussion of oil companies and their impact, suggests that it is
common to view the rise of CSR as simply the pressure on international energy companies to
‘do something’ about the environment, community development or global warming. Instead,
Frynas suggests that is more complex: we should understand the prevalence of CSR
programmes as the pressure of multiple motivating factors; obtaining a competitive advantage;
maintaining a stable working environment; managing external perceptions and keeping
employees happy are all reasons why oil companies (specifically) might engage in CSR.132
Each of these pressures has culminated in the development of CSR and has led to its inclusion
within many Western firms. What does this tell us about the perceptions of CSR from the
perspective of the state and local population?
CSR is fundamentally a Western construction applied to developing countries. It is the space
where distinct, culturally embedded ideas about the methods and practices of business must
mesh with the local context. The need to appease shareholders also meets the development
goals of the state. The burgeoning CSR literature would assume that it is in the best interests
of the Kazakh government to have international oil companies paying for and being the face
of development projects in the region – this is money the state does not have to spend and
the companies existence is justified to the local community through ‘good’ projects. Indeed, in
2008, President Nazarbayev himself engaged with the UN Global Compact by asking for
businesses to ‘adopt principles of corporate social responsibility’ and his Labour and Social
Protection Minister, Berdibek Saparbayev, stressed the ‘inconsistency of business in defining
social indicators, like in [the] oil and gas complex where gaps persist in wages to foreign and
131 Shell Representative, interview, Astana, 6th June, 2013.
132 Jedrzej George Frynas. ‘The False Developmental Promise of Corporate Social Responsibility: Evidence From
Multinational Oil Companies’, International Affairs, Vol.81, No.3 (2005), pp.581-98.
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local staff’.133 The National Economic Chamber of Kazakhstan ‘Atameken Union’ acts as the
arbiter for state business relations within Kazakhstan and is charged with addressing issues
of CSR. The Foreign Investors Council and the Kazakhstan Petroleum Association are local
business organisations with direct access to the Office of the President, again with a mandate
to implement CSR in conjunction with the American Chamber of Commerce, the Eurasia
Foundation and USAID.134
Altogether, this suggests a positive attitude to CSR, emanating from the highest levels of office
in Kazakhstan, however interviews suggested otherwise. Senior oil company management
working on government relations in Kazakhstan from two major US firms repeatedly asserted
that the Kazakh government was hesitant about CSR projects, and ‘did not want the IOCs to
be seen as the ‘face’ of development in the region’, especially in the oil producing regions
which have experienced the smallest tangible benefits.135 Small projects had been sanctioned,
but a lengthy bureaucratic process had prevented many projects from being launched. CSR
projects in Kazakhstan have taken different forms depending upon the energy company, but
have ranged from industry specific environmental concerns such as commitments to reduce
‘flaring’136 to more socially focused projects that have included delivering services to education
such as scholarships for orphanages, donating medical equipment, and funding health
awareness campaigns. However, many attractive projects were either directly vetoed or
sidelined through a process of ‘bureaucratisation’ that halted their development.137 Answers
133 International Labour Organisation (2008) Business and Responsibility: Forum in Kazakhstan 24 January
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/region/eurpro/moscow/news/2008/0124.htm (accessed 16 September
2015)
134 Royal Norwegian Embassy in Astana (2012) White Paper: Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in Kazakhstan
http://www.norvegia.kz/Global/SiteFolders/webast/White%20Paper%20on%20CSR%20April%202012.pdf,
135 Oil Company Interviews, Astana, 3rd March 2013.
136 The burning of natural gas during the oil extraction process to reduce pressure. It is a serious pollutant of
carbon dioxide and damages wildlife attracted to the naked flame. Russia practises the technique the most.
international environmental agreements in place to reduce the practise rather than it being a purely industry
led venture.
137 Oil Company Interviews, Astana, 3 March, 2013.
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as to why this apparent conflict of interest has emerged can be found in the colonial legacy of
the region.
Kazakhstan’s Soviet legacy has created rigid institutional structures, together with possessive
qualities that are often exhibited by the state. The same individuals that were able to exercise
control over the natural resource sector and expand their political power, were later able to
continue to increase influence through nepotism and patronage within the industry. The Soviet
legacy of a state system characterised by the planned economy with its emphasis on full
employment and the states total provision of goods and services is in stark contrast to the later
waves of privatisation in the energy industry. The result of this is that the Kazakh government’s
greatest battles are fought with itself, rather than expressing themselves in struggles with the
under-developed social forces or non-state actors.138 Before 1991, Kazakh natural resources
were allocated amongst a small group of men, creating competition and powerful groups, but
in the post-transition phase: those groups have retained their powerful influence without the
same centralised bureaucratic central command system that was present within the Soviet-
era. No longer managed by Moscow or by administrators they have been able to consolidate
power and become stronger voices within the system. Therefore, in Kazakhstan, the powerful
figures are a small group of individuals within the state, not outside it as is the case with other
developing countries.139
It is therefore fundamental to the entire system of governance that the status of local
government elites is never called into question. There are no intermediaries between these
elites and the state; negotiation is direct. The waves of privatisation that have occurred in the
138 Pauline Jones Luong, ‘Conclusion: Central Asia’s Contribution to Theories of State’ in Pauline Jones Luong
(ed.), The Transformation of Central Asia: States and Societies from Soviet Rule to Independence (New York:
Cornell University Press, 2002).
139 Luong, ‘Conclusion: Central Asia’s Contribution to Theories of State’, p.10.
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oil rich regions occurred because it was advantageous at bringing wealth to the local elites
and their ‘constituencies’.140 Local elites have the power to obstruct centrally commanded
initiatives, either through a direct refusal, or more likely, through a process of
‘bureaucratisation’, where-upon directives are delayed or sidelined into non-existence.141
Reconnecting this understanding of intra-state struggle to the oil companies and CSR policy,
provides an insight into the underlying motives of local government hesitation in the face of
seemingly beneficial projects. Because of the Soviet legacy of the centrality of the state as the
main provider, there is a strong expectation on the part of the population of the role of the state
versus the firm. Elites need to justify their political record to their population and patronage
group in order to gain re-election. Meanwhile CSR presents a subliminal threat since it is the
practice of development projects by firms that would otherwise be performed by the state. The
abiding consensus within current CSR literature contains the hidden assumption that it is in
the best interest of the state to endorse CSR policy as it reduces financial strain and improves
the standing of the international firm with the local population.
However, the Kazakhstan case may suggest that the CSR programmes of the state usurp the
role of the local government elites here when they take on highly visible roles normally
performed under command of the elites. The local government wants to be seen as the sole
provider of economic and social stability. This is in direct contradiction to the CSR motives of
the firm that are also ‘political’ in the widest sense. It is in the best interest of the oil company
to be observed actively engaging with the community in order to show its own stakeholders its
contribution to social progress in the region. Progressive projects such as helping develop
schools or hospitals are easier to ‘show-off’ to employees looking to feel enfranchised when
working for an oil company, or to the pressure group that is lobbying against oil firms, or to the
local government of another prospective drilling well site. The sceptical perspective would be
140 Wojciech Ostrowski, Politics and Oil in Kazakhstan (London: Routledge, 2010), pp.9-15.
141 ibid.
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that it is easier to suggest that an oil firm is doing good work when the management can be
photographed with a group of smiling schoolchildren who have benefitted from a CSR project.
CSR is a Western concept; there is no direct comparison within Kazakhstan. This divergence
in the attitudes of CSR could also be the result of two distinct cultures coming together. A 2010
study suggests that the concept of CSR is not present within local Kazakh firms.142 As such,
it is increasingly clear that some of these differences in the appearance of CSR should be
locally defined; what works in Nigeria or Norway will not necessarily be the best practice in
Kazakhstan.
Curiously, this type of competition between the state and the firm has more in common with
the relationship between paramilitary groups and the state than it does with regular forms of
state-market competition. To be clear the ultimate aim of paramilitaries and oil firms are not
comparable – ultimately paramilitaries are concerned with killing whilst the oil company is
looking to maximise profit. Nevertheless, for both parties, meeting the approval of their various
stakeholders requires that their more short-term goals align. Paramilitary groups form when
the state is weak or failing to perform its required functions, such as failing to protect the
population or secure basic economic goals. Examples of this can be seen in the tactics of
groups such as the Irish paramilitary groups during The Troubles143, or in Colombia with
Bolivarism and its broad agenda of political participation and agricultural development.144 Here
the organisation is competing with the state for the ‘hearts and minds’ of the population in
order to gain support for their activities, and what is CSR if it is not a competition for hearts
and minds?
142 Rajasekhara Potluri, Yespayeva Batima and Kunev Madiyar, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility: A Study of
Kazakhstan Corporate Sector’, Social Responsibility Journal, Vol.6, No.1 (2010), pp.3.
143 Steve Bruce, ‘The Problems Of ‘Pro‐State’ Terrorism: Loyalist Paramilitaries In Northern Ireland’, Terrorism
and Political Violence, Vol.4, No.1 (1992), pp.67-88.
144 Zakia Shiraz, ‘The Colombian Conflict’, Ph.D., 2014, University of Warwick.
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International oil companies have to justify their existence to the local population. They are
ultimately in Kazakhstan to extract and remove commodities in the form of oil back to their
registered country of origin, and often, as in the case of Kazakhstan, it is not the towns and
villages that are closest to the extraction that see the majority the profits and their populations
are seldom employed by the IOCs. Evidence of the strength of feeling amongst the local
population over the distribution of wealth within Kazakhstan between the oil producing towns
and the business owning elites is exemplified by the protests and riots that preceded the
Zhanaozen massacre in 2011.145 When the strength of feeling rises high, the legitimacy of the
authoritarian leadership, in this case the presidency of Nazarbayev, is called into question
forcing the state to act or appear impotent.
There are obviously limits to the extent of this comparison; the oil companies are not
purposefully trying to challenge the position of the state. However, this does not mean there
is not a conflict of interest. This is not just important within Kazakhstan but also as part of the
politics of most global oil networks. Oil wealth does not secure the legitimacy of the leadership
of weak states, and the CSR policy of firms has the potential to create a conflict of interest
between the state and the firm, especially where states are uncomfortable with notions of
plurality. CSR is central to the public relations of IOCs and its role in turning the attention of
companies to the externalities of their industrial projects is vital, but understanding the
potential site-specific conflicts better would allow firms to adapt their CSR programs in a
nuanced to the local political environment.
145 For analysis on the implications of the Zhanaozen Massacre and the implications for President Nazarbayev
see Joanna Lillis Lillis, J., ‘Kazakhstan: Violence in Zhanaozen Threatens Nazarbayev Legacy’, EurasiaNet, 21
December, 2011, accessed 12 September 2015, http://www.eurasianet.org/node/64745, (accessed 16
September 2015).
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The US involvement with the energy industry has been vital to the development of the energy
industry and therefore to the development of the country, but how has this affected
Kazakhstan’s marginality? The cultural connection is a one-sided relationship, with a dominant
US cultural influence. However, this is tempered by a lack of economic or military interest in
the region of a scale able to compete with China’s contribution. The extension of the US as a
center of power into Central Asia is dwindling and despite its civilising missions there are local
issues competing for attention. The difficulties surrounding CSR highlight the often competing
and contradictory attitudes of both sides. In contrast to Russia, whilst the overtures of the
leadership are seen as patronising, they are not threatening and have little effect on Kazakh
autonomy.
European Firms, the EU and European states in Kazakhstan
If it is relatively straightforward to conceptualise the place of America in Kazakhstan, then the
same cannot be said for either the EU or its member states. There is much for Kazakhstan to
gain from the EU member states increasing ties with the region and supporting Kazakhstan to
create new export routes, but there are many barriers to this being achieved including major
differences in socio-political environments. Far from this relationship being a ‘Great Game’,
when viewed through the prism of marginality the imposition of power by Western European
states is less than would be imagined. Beyond the energy industry, EU states have very little
to do with Central Asia whilst it is some European firms that are centrally important to the
development of the country. This section examines the basis of the EU in Kazakhstan, asking
how the EU’s own energy strategy is driven by complicated domestic issues, and what the
member states contribute to the Kazakh economy. As part of the civilising mission associated
with Western interpretations of Kazakhstan linking back to the great game narratives, the
chapter finishes by asking whether the archetypical European model of a ‘petro-state’ can
really be applied to Kazakhstan, and why the literature persists in trying to ‘make it fit’.
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Understanding the role of the EU in the international energy markets is rendered more
complicated by the contradiction between the individual states and the EU as a single actor.
Article 194 of the Lisbon Treaty is clear that ‘Member State's [have the] right to determine the
conditions for exploiting its energy resources, its choice between different energy sources and
the general structure of its energy supply’.146 As a result, each individual state is free to pursue
its own individual strategy, within the boundaries of EU regulation on maintaining competition,
but with a view to promoting the integration of energy policy across all states. At times, this
quest for oil and gas comes into conflict with the EUs policies on the promotion of human
rights, since many of the countries that the EU engages with are violators of human rights. In
the case of the recent conflict between Russia and Ukraine, we can see the difficulty of
engaging EU soft power as the consumer when it confronts the hard-power strategies of the
EUs largest supplier.
Amongst the EU member states, there is enormous variety of profiles in terms of what is
required to attain energy security. Geography plays an important determining role amongst
the EU states (as indeed it does for all states), who has direct access to resources as a
producer or neighbouring state such as those with proximity to Norway, together with the
infrastructure and expense that is required to overcome these challenges. Politically, the size
of the domestic market alters purchasing power and therefore the ability to influence producer
or transit states, but can also make the state in question more vulnerable - as we can see
clearly in the case of Ukraine. Not all of these factors are controllable by the member states
or by the EU as an institution, and are influenced by external factors relating to the external
producer/consumer state. Whilst the mandate of the EU is to move towards integration, with
146 Conference of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, Treaty of Lisbon Amending the
Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community, 13 December 2007, 2007/C
306/01, http://www.refworld.org/docid/476258d32.html.
255
the intention of improving and deepening relations, instead the liberal integration of energy
resources and policy may have been miss-sold as a source of peaceful existence.147 In
practice, Moscow has used the windfall profits from European integration and Russia has
taken advantage of Europe’s overreliance to mould itself as the opposition to liberal
hegemony, creating conflict and exposing weaknesses in the structure of the EU. The result
has been that the EU has had to prioritise a crash programme to diversify its energy sources.
Not only is location an issue, but also the ability of individual states to create cohesion over a
single policy is hindered by the import requirements of each state. The EU as a whole relies
upon imports for 53% of its total energy needs, but this varies wildly from state to state. The
unique properties of each state create extremes as Denmark imports only 10%, whilst at the
other extreme Malta imports 100%.148 Russia is the single most important energy provider to
the EU, providing 177 mtoe of oil, 107 mtoe of natural gas and 52.7 mtoe of coal with the
largest recipients of Russian energy being Germany, Poland, Netherlands, Belgium and
Italy.149 Kazakhstan supplies a comparatively much smaller amount; a total of 29.2 mtoe of oil
in 2011 and its key destinations (from a demand perspective) in Europe are France and
Germany, with Romania, Italy, Austria, the Netherlands and Portugal as smaller
partnerships.150
147 For the discussion on the role of energy interdependence in theory and as a global practise see Zha
Daojiong, ‘Energy Interdependence’, China Security (2006), pp.2-16; Filippos Proedrou, ‘The EU–Russia Energy
Approach under the Prism of Interdependence’, European Security, Vol.16, No.3-4 (2007); Erik Gartzke, Quan
Li and Charles Boehmer, ‘Investing in the Peace: Economic Interdependence and International Conflict’,
International Organization, Vol.55, No.2 (2001), pp.391-438 ; Daniel Yergin, ‘Ensuring Energy Security’, Foreign
Affairs, Vol.85, No.2 (2006), pp.69-82.
148 Jakub M. Godzimirski, ‘Mapping EU countries’ relationships with energy suppliers’, Global Re-Ordering:
Evolution Through European Networks (March 2014) Project Gree:n EU Policy Briefing, p.3.
149 Godzimirski, ‘Mapping EU countries’ relationships with energy suppliers’, p.3.
150 Godzimirski, ‘Mapping EU countries’ relationships with energy suppliers’, p.4.
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These considerations – of geography, multiplicity of policy, and indeed political expectation –
all affect the Kazakh-EU relationship. The fruitful interactions are between the government of
Kazakhstan and the international energy firms or the individual member state. The EU does
not function coherently enough as a unit to be able to act as body in the energy industry of
Kazakhstan, either as a consumer or producer. On a diplomatic level, the EUs Consular
Delegation to Kazakhstan manages the relationship. Its role is to provide an ‘information
exchange’, a platform to introduce and support a dialogue on human rights and obviously to
provide services to the citizens of the European Union. In Kazakhstan at this time, its role was
to understand the business climate, and in particular, the energy climate, which would concern
the future development of EU firms in Kazakhstan.
Despite the EU’s decision to accelerate the diversification of fuel sources, Kazakhstan has yet
to become a priority. This is due to pipeline politics, rather than any specific issues relating to
human rights in Central Asia. In 2008, oil routes from Kazakhstan to Europe were disrupted
during the Russian invasion of Georgia coinciding with a surge in Kazakh production. The lack
of an alternative route to Europe hindered Kazakh ability to get oil to market, and it was not
until 2010 that Kazakhstan felt secure enough to begin investment in a tanker route across
the Caspian to connect with the Caucasus. Again, the problem for Kazakhstan here is Russian
control through the pipelines, and once Kashagan began producing at full capacity, this would
have exacerbated the problem further unless other alternatives had been found. The EU
member states are central to Kazakhstan’s energy market; Italy is the end market user of 26%
of all Kazakh energy supplies, the Netherlands 12%, Austria 9% and France 9%.151
151 Energy Information Agency, ‘Kazakhstan’s Liquid Fuel Exports by Destination’, US Energy Industry Agency,
2012, accessed 12 September 2015, http://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=KAZ.
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Sanctions toward Iran had strangled the Kazakh export market, but with thawing relations, this
could further reduce Russian influence on the pipelines. Currently, much of Kazakh oil is
transported across the Caspian via trains and tankers, as well as the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan
pipeline or the Northern Route pipeline (Baku-Novorossiysk), pipelines that run across
Russian territory. The option of entering into energy swaps with Iran had virtually halted over
the last decade because of the Western-led sanctions. Now, with the new geopolitical climate,
these swaps can resume, providing another outlet for Kazakh oil, and the joint building of a
refinery.152 However, the flood of new oil to market may yet be problematic to the Kazakhstan
energy sector, driving the world price of oil down.
152 TengriNews, ‘Next oil refinery in Kazakhstan to be built together with Iran’, TengriNews, available from,
http://en.tengrinews.kz/industry_infrastructure/Next-oil-refinery-in-Kazakhstan-to-be-built-together-with-
261261/,
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Figure 5. Energy Information Agency, ‘Oil Export Routes Map’, 14 January 2015,
http://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis_includes/countries_long/Kazakhstan/kazak
hstan.pdf
In summary, EU member states are integral to the success of Kazakhstan, even if the EU as
an institution is relatively unimportant. European and American firms have transformed the
Kazakh energy industry, and through their CSR programs have an impact upon the local
community, even if it is at the expense of the government’s role in that community. Through
the local purchasing and local content legislation a certain amount of Kazakh goods, services
and personnel have to be employed by the European firms. The European firms are held to
international standards and so, in turn, demand higher standards of the Kazakh industry,
thereby raising local standards, creating a stronger Kazakh industry. What if that relationship
was pushed further? To what extent should Kazakhstan be seeking to emulate the European
energy industry? And what impact would this have upon the domestic industry?
Should the Kazakh Industry Be a Bit More European?
The ultimate model of a successful petro-state in control of its geopolitics and economic
development is Norway. Inward flows of FDI have made up between 2-5% of GDP over the
last five years and the majority of this investment has been into the oil and gas sector from
British, French, American and Italian supergiant companies.153 Furthermore, the foreign
companies have made significant contributions to the future of the oil and gas industry,
developing local content and using supporting local business for example. This success has
been achieved despite a number of factors that should theoretically make it unattractive to
FDI. Consider the high tax environment in which firms still pay a special tax on petroleum
exploration (unless no oil is sourced). Furthermore, wages are uncompetitively high and the
153 The Economist Intelligence Unit, ‘Country Forecast Norway September 2011’, 19 September 2011, accessed
12 September 2015, http://store.eiu.com/article.aspx?productid=1930000193&articleid=468448631
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general cost of living and operating is significantly higher than in another oil country in the
world.
In theory, this success story should at the very least provide a benchmark or useful points of
comparison to help us evaluate Kazakh oil governance. However, a direct comparison will not
work here, nor is it entirely the point. Kazakhstan faces intense geopolitical interest from large
powerful neighbours in a way that Norway simply does not. As a founder member of NATO,
Norway has a relationship with rich powerful European states that negates the need for a large
powerful military and as such, it occupies a very different, privileged sphere of international
relations. That said, analysis of these features does throw into relief some of the practises
widely heralded in the academic literature and indeed what is viewed as best-practice by the
industry. Understanding why the Norwegian Model will not work in Kazakhstan helps to tease
out the unique features of the Kazakh oil economy, and to understand why other states have
chosen different paths to oil governance rather than converging around a single model. The
purpose is not to try to understand how to attract FDI, if there is a large amount of oil there will
be willing investors, but to understand how to balance attracting investment and expertise with
the state maintaining control over its industry.
Kazakhstan has already looked to Norway for ideas on developing its economy, but only
certain aspects of this have been ripe for implementation. One idea, which Kazakhstan, and
many other developing petro states, has adopted, is the creation of a sovereign wealth fund.
There are two Kazakh funds; Samruk-Kazyna is modelled on the Norwegian equivalent fund,
estimated to reach approximately $100 billion by 2015, and similarly the Kazakh National Fund
is valued at $77 billion.154 To put this number into perspective, Samruk-Kazyna currently owns
154 For more information on the capabilities of the fund see Yelena Kalyuzhnova, ‘The National Fund of the
Republic of Kazakhstan (NFRK), pp.From accumulation to stress-test to global future’, Energy Policy, Vol. 39,
No.10 (2011), pp.6650–57.
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60% of Hong Kong’s national debt and is the sixteenth largest fund in the world, bigger than
Alaska’s.155 The result has been successful, although, both funds have a very poor
transparency rating, 2/10 on the Linaburg-Maduell Transparency Index, and are widely
understood to be the fruit bowl of the president. Not only does this neatly highlight one of the
key problems of comparison between many developing states with the Norwegian model, it
also emphasises the difficulties in researching the practises of an opaque and corrupt industry.
Central Asian expert Martha Brill Olcott explicitly proposes attempting to draw Kazakhstan
towards the Norwegian model. She suggests that implementing regulatory reform, including
removing the regulatory and competitive factors from state control, as seen in Norway, should
be a priority for ‘the Kazakhs’.
Much like Kazakhstan, Norway has a limited number of operating companies
that are the potential subjects of regulation. And like Norway, Kazakhstan
stands to benefit from reducing its reliance on prescriptive governmental
regulations, creating a shared culture of industrial safety, and shifting the
primary responsibility for regulation onto industry itself. By establishing clear,
long-term safety goals it can free up companies’ abilities to innovate while
increasing the effectiveness and efficiency of the country’s safety
measures’156…‘Simply put, the Kazakhs need to delve deeper into their
regulatory reforms to make their system more like the Norwegian one. This
would make the country more attractive to foreign investors, simplifying the
For a comparison between Kazakh, Norwegian and other sovereign wealth funds see David Kemme, Sovereign
Wealth Fund Issues and The National Fund(s) of Kazakhstan, William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number
1036, The William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan, August, 2012.
155 Rob Wile, Wile, R., ‘The 20 Sovereign Wealth Funds That Are Buying Up The World’, Business Insider, 3
October 2012, accessed 12 September 2015,
http://www.businessinsider.com/sovereign-wealth-funds-buying-up-the-world-2012-10?op=1#ixzz3CGF63dUu
156 Martha Brill Olcott and Eli Keene, Regulatory Reform In Kazakhstan: A Spur to Economic Development,
(Washington DC; Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2014), p.15.
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task of introducing new technology, and generally reducing the cost of doing
business in the country.157
Parts of the report may be based upon health and safety within the industry, but the remedy
presented here is very much industry wide and the message clear – Kazakhstan’s oil industry
must become more like Norway’s regulatory regime. However, is this desirable or even
necessary? Should Kazakhstan be trying to align its industry more clearly with the Norwegian
model? Is it even possible?
The key attributes of the Norwegian model that are not readily applicable to other states are
those that depend upon a strong political consensus. Together, this system has created one
of the industry’s great success stories. The accomplishments are based upon a strong system
of governance, which in turn has been used to develop policy in accordance with the ‘benefit
for all people’ principle.158 In the early stages of development, there were small amounts of
legislation, gradually created over a decade (1985-1996), to support the industry.159 ‘National
steering’, the term used to coin the close relationship between industry and authorities,
coupled with the slow development helped to avoid economic shocks during the early years
of discovery. All participation in the industry was initially Norwegian (firms and state), only later
were projects allowed to incorporate up to fifty percent foreign investment.
From the very beginning, during the 1970s, Norway was able to stipulate the percentage of
local content to foreign contractors. In addition, from the outset there was a focus upon
157 Olcott and Keene, Regulatory Reform, p.16.
158 Farouk Al-Kasim, Managing Petroleum Resources: The Norwegian Model in Broad Perspective (Oxford:
Alden Press, 2006), p.241.
159 ibid., p. 241.
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conservation of reserves and the maximisation of oil recovery from reserves. This same
central planning has allowed the Norwegian state to utilise the infrastructure created to
develop large discoveries was used to support smaller satellite fields that would otherwise
have been unable to operate. The most distinct attribute of the Norwegian Model is the
government’s administrative separation of the administrative, regulatory and commercial
interests.160 In this model, the NOC Statoil, that prospects and produces oil at home and
abroad, is separated from the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy which sets regulation, and
from the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate which is the regulator and advisory body. The first
of the oil economies to do this, Norway benefited from having entirely separated government
commercial functions from policy/regulation functions, so that all appointments and contracts
were awarded based upon merit.
Somewhat optimistically, it was once considered that these ideas and this formula could be
easily transferable to developing countries, similar to a Washington Consensus for the energy
industry. The formula was to add a Norwegian element, particularly the idea of separated
government departments, ‘and stir’. According to Thurber et al, this orthodoxy within the
industry reached a peak in the late 2000s, with the creation of the National Resource Charter
as a guide to help and encourage the responsible state building of extractive industries.161
However, as Thurber noted in 2011, the orthodoxy of total separation was beginning to be
questioned as more literature evolved suggesting that there may be certain conditions that
made the separation of all government entities possible when certain conditions were met. By
2014, the charter is far more ambiguous instead suggesting that ‘each of these objectives
160 National Resource Charter, ‘Precept Six’, Natural Resource Charter, 2014, accessed 12 September 2015,
available from http://naturalresourcecharter.org/precepts
161 Mark Thurber, Patrick Hults & Patrick Heller, ‘Exporting the “Norwegian Model”: The Effect of
Administration Design on Oil Sector Performance’, Energy Policy, Vol.39, No.9 (2011), pp.5366.
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[government functions] can be appropriate in different country contexts—but not necessarily
at the same time—and may involve trade-offs’.
In the previous chapter we used Thurber et al to analyse the characteristics of the Kazakh
energy industry and draw conclusions about its effectiveness, and there are lessons that can
be applied here. There are conditions that make the application of the separated functions to
an energy industry more likely to succeed.162 Higher levels of institutional capacity and political
competition increased the likelihood that the state functions (Norwegian Model) could be
successfully implemented, whilst conversely low levels of institutional capacity and political
competition. Countries that tried to implement the policy with low capacity and low
competition, such as Angola, have been unsuccessful. Only Norway has the high institutional
capacity and political competition to have successfully implemented the strategy. The other
states examined in the study presented a mixture of high and low characteristics. Nigeria, with
its low capacity but high political competition is in danger of the industry being used to political
ends by the different political entities and does not benefit well from the creation of separate
entities. Furthermore, there were oil economies that were successful that have never tried to
implement such a policy, such as Saudi Arabia, Malaysia and Angola. So where would
Kazakhstan appear in all of these categories?
Separation Success in Kazakhstan?
If we replicate all of the conditions of Thurber’s study for Kazakhstan, we can begin to build
recommendations based upon the current approaches used within the academic literature.
This requires assessing the effectiveness of the institution, the degree of competition, and the
performance of the oil sector.163 Using the World Bank Government Effectiveness Index we
162 Algeria, Angola, Brazil, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Norway, Russia, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela
163 Thurber et al., ‘Exporting the “Norwegian Model”’, pp.4-6.
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can assess the institutional quality of Kazakhstan as being in the 39th percentile, and given a
rank of -0.44 (on a scale between -2.5 to +2.5).164 To compare this score with other oil
producers, this puts the effectiveness of Kazakhstan’s government on approximately the same
level effectiveness as Russia or Venezuela; lower than Saudi Arabia but higher than Nigeria
or Angola. To measure political competition, Thurber suggests the length of time between
factions of party changes occurring in government. Therefore, Kazakhstan, with its single party
politics and authoritarian ruler since independence in 1991, has a very low ranking.
Judging the performance of the oil sector is more a subjective process and therefore open to
critique. Thurber suggests that judgement of the sector should include ‘the ability of the
government to find, develop, and produce oil and gas in a timely manner; to minimise
disruptions to hydrocarbon operations; to maximise government take without deterring
investment; to exert influence over its hydrocarbon sector to ensure that revenue is produced
in accordance with government objectives’.165 Whilst the study in the literature cited here is
based upon the work of the Stanford project, here we can use richer qualitative data to assess
the performance of the Kazakh energy sector. Ultimately, Thurber uses a score of Poor-Fair-
Good to describe the sector, which is useful as a method of categorisation, but as this is an
assessment of Kazakhstan, there is room to be more expansive on the assessment.166 The
section therefore assesses the ability of the government to –
164 The World Bank Government Effectiveness Index comprises six measurements - i) Voice and Accountability,
ii) Political Stability and Absence of Violence, iii) Government Effectiveness, iv) Regulatory Quality, v) Rule of
Law, and vi) Control of Corruption. Percentile ranks indicate the percentage of countries worldwide that rank
lower than the indicated country, so that higher values indicate better governance scores. The line graphs
include margins of error shown as dashed lines, corresponding to 90% confidence intervals. The data used is
between 1996 and 2012 and comprised of data from the following institutions; Business Enterprise Environment
Survey, Bertelsmann Transformation Index, Economist Intelligence Unit, World Economic Forum, Global
Competitiveness Survey, Gallup World Poll, Rural Sector Performance Assessments, Institutional Profiles
Database, World Bank Country Policy and Institutional Assessments, Political Risk Services International Country
Risk Guide, Institute for Management & Development World Competitiveness Yearbook,
Global Insight Business Conditions and Risk Indicators.
165 Thurber et al., ‘Exporting the “Norwegian Model”’, p. 6.
166 ibid., pp. 6-7.
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Find, develop, and produce oil and gas in a timely manner: This is a difficult aspect of sector
management to answer in the context of Kazakhstan. The NOC, and therefore the
government, owns a major stake in each of the big three fields along with a host of IOCs, and
indeed wholly operates some smaller projects. These are successfully run and all have taken
oil to market. However, the big projects, the projects that matter economically and politically,
could not be operated by the NOC in their entirety because of technical and financial
constraints. However, this is not necessarily the weakness of the state company as no single
oil company would normally be willing to take on the scale of investment that is required to
extract. That said, the Kazakh government would never have been able to finance nor
actualise the extraction process in the early days of independence. This mix of circumstance
and competence would suggest a ‘poor’ ability to develop oil production in a timely manner.
To minimise disruptions to hydrocarbon operations: Kashagan is called ‘the world’s expensive
plumbing project’.167 Quite how much Kashagan has cost because of these changes depends
upon the news source, but it is widely expected to have cost in the region of $50bn. That is
$30 billion over budget and as at 2014, some 8 years behind schedule, having a serious effect
on the balance sheets of many of the European investors. Aspects of these problems are
political, such as the delays over the sale of ConocoPhillips share of the project, insistence on
local employees or the delays over environmental standards challenges. However, at the
same time there have been lengthy delays caused by the partnership of IOCs that have
resulted in compensation, of $30 million per quarter, to the Kazakh government because of
gas leaks delaying production.168 Tengiz, the second major Kazakhstan programme, was
167 Selina Williams, Géraldine Amiel and Justin Scheck, Developed by Western Oil Companies, Giant Project Off
Kazakhstan Is Years Late, More Than $30 Billion Over Budget, Wall Street Journal, March 31, 2014.
168 Daniyar Mukhtarov, Amount Of Compensation From Kashagan`s Contractors To Kazakhstan Announced
Trend.KZ (2014) available from http://en.trend.az/business/energy/2298382.html
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developed on time and on budget, although it is a much less complicated project. So the
question then becomes perhaps, is the NOC/IOCs incompetent or is the government wilfully
neglectful for political ends? The answer is “yes” to both, to a lesser degree, and therefore the
overall ability should be considered fair-poor on Thurber’s scale.
To maximise government take without deterring investment: Thus far, the sheer scale of the
reserves has proven to be an important and sustained incentive to the oil companies. As a
result, despite these delays, when the state released the recent tender for ConocoPhillips’
stake in Kashagan, Indian and Chinese state firms were eagerly competing for a place in the
project. Its strategic location and stable political culture makes it an ideal choice for investment.
The government has also successfully renegotiated the position of the KazMunaiGaz into
projects, most notably in 2008 securing an equalising stake in Kashagan, and across all major
projects in Kazakhstan. The legal environment has been gradually changing to encourage
more Kazakh firms and individuals within the industry. For example, a 2010 change to the Law
on Subsoil Use established a legal obligation that where available all goods/services be
procured locally. 169 Similarly, Kazakh companies were allowed a 20% price reduction in the
bid price for all local tenders. The ability to improve the relative position of Kazakh business
within the industry has been a key feature of the success of the Kazakh government. On
Thurber’s scale this would be equivalent to a ‘good’ rating.
To exert influence over its hydrocarbon sector to ensure that revenue is produced in
accordance with government objectives: The steep and authoritarian hierarchy that is the
Kazakh government places Nazarbayev at the head of the government. We can see the extent
of his control over the leading industry figures, all of whom he has placed in those positions,
169 Law of RK, 24 June 2010, on Subsoil and Subsoil Use No. 291-IV (with last amendments additions made, 20
February 2012).
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during fallout from the fatal Zhanaozen riots. Following the heavy-handed local police
response to the strikes, President Nazarbayev requested the resignation of the CEO Askar
Balzhanov. He also fired Timur Kulibayev from his role as head of the sovereign wealth fund
that representing a direct show of power, as Kulibayev is his son-in-law, a director of Gazprom
and worth $1.3billion according to Forbes. Similarly, the President fired the head of
KazMunaiGaz National Ltd, Bolat Akchulakov. Therefore, government/leadership influence is
extremely high or ‘good’ as Thurber’s scale indicates.
On Thurber’s scale, the oil sector performance of Kazakhstan rates as ‘fair’. The high level of
government control, the ability to increase the government revenue without deterring
investment, tempered by poor timeliness and delays mean that we can evaluate the outcome
to be no more than ‘fair’ over all. Compared to the other countries in Thurber’s study,
Kazakhstan ranks in in a midway point above the declining oil industries of Venezuela and the
power consolidation of Russia, but below the smooth functioning of Angola and the
technological capabilities of the Brazilian NOC. So when combined with the mid-level score
for government effectiveness and low political competition, this fair rating can begin to be used
to understand the implications for Kazakhstan implementing the Norwegian Model of
separation. According to Thurber’s paper, the combination for successful implementation,
based upon country analysis, is the level of institutional development at the time of
implementation.170 Once these conditions were met, Brazil and Norway successfully
implemented the scheme. Nigeria, which has not established a strong institutional capacity,
failed in its implementation of separate government functions, whilst Angola has chosen to
consolidate power initially, and Brazil took a long time in developing separation. Furthermore,
Thurber et al note that successful separation rarely occurs when there is low government
competition.171 Attempting to implement the separation without meeting these conditions has
170 Thurber et al., ‘Exporting the “Norwegian Model”’, p.10.
171 ibid., p.9.
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had the opposite effect in the case of Nigeria, which tried to push through reform too quickly,
which increased corruption and created a proliferation of institutions.
Therefore, Kazakhstan, should not implement the Norwegian model of function separation
because of its low political competition and medium institutional capacity. The National
Resource Charter may have made ‘functional separation’ a priority for development, but this
does meant that it is suitable for all developing countries. Using Thurber’s model, we can see
that Kazakhstan does not fit the conditions for the successful implementation. The government
consolidates power under President Nazarbayev. Moreover, since independence, little
competition has been allowed, meaning that long-term planning and implementation has been
followed, creating continuity of policy and accountability.
Creating institutions that are internally competitive, jostling for power and position without the
correct system of checks and balances would bring instability to the industry rather than
empower it. Currently, many of the top industry positions are still occupied by family members
of the president, some of whom are more or less capable than others, and until this has
changed to a merit based appointment system KazMunaiGaz will not be able to develop
coherently. Kazakhstan has a complex bureaucracy, large and unwieldy, riddled with
corruption yet functioning. The combination of this mechanism coupled with the low political
competition makes it difficult for any separation attempts to have a lasting or serious impact
upon the government. There is nothing to suggest that separating the regulatory body further
from the state would not necessarily exacerbate current problems.
Martha Brill Olcott suggests that Kazakhstan should embrace Norwegian styled regulatory
reform, but the empirical evidence from Kazakhstan (viewed through the prism of Thurber’s
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thoughtful contribution on the conditions in which regulatory reform succeeds coupled) would
suggest otherwise. It also neatly evidences the need to see the oil industry holistically within
the context of the wider economy. Does the regulatory framework fit with the wider goals of
the economy, is there is desire to change? Norway’s industry legislation has been designed
with the idea that all of these functions will have to be accompanied by central planning
focused upon preparing the economy to be ‘post-petroleum’. The public discourse has focused
upon the need to redistribute the wealth and these words accompany the realpolitik of
institutional change. Urbanisation has been offset by policy to improve employment
opportunities in rural areas; a distinct focus upon the efficiency of domestic industry to offset
higher wages that come from resource dependency; taxation used to achieve and incentivise
corporate social outcomes rather than merely as a source of revenue.
Conclusion
Looking at the relationship between Kazakhstan and the West, we can see that marginality is
not an appropriate label for this relationship; Western interest in the region is instrumental and
mutually beneficial but there is no desire or suggestion to control Kazakhstan as with the
Russian military threat or through Chinese purchasing power. The ‘Great Game’ and the War
in Afghanistan have cast a role for America in the region that is simply not relevant to
Kazakhstan’s experience. The foray into Central Asia that is the New Silk Road is not as
competitive as the programme developed by China, nor does it come with the necessary
financial backing to achieve its goals, only unsupported rhetoric. America’s regional influence
is increasingly as a facilitator rather than as an actual ‘player’ in any particular game. The
state’s role is minimal, and is there principally as a trade envoy to smooth the passage of its
large international oil companies in the region. This is a legitimate reason to invest in the
country, but it rings hollow when ones takes into account the knowledge of endemic corruption
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within the industry. In turn, the Kazakh government picks and chooses who it will publicly name
and shame as having bribed officials, using this as a form of leverage to control the industry.
CSR illuminates the fears of the Kazakh state and the green-washing of the energy firms.
Incongruously, a stereotypical ‘strong-man’ leads the Kazakh state, yet the leadership cannot
tolerate being seen as secondary in providing local community projects because of its
delicacy. To be clear, the oil producing regions around Atyrau and Aktau are shamefully under-
developed. There are no proper roads, hospitals or infrastructure, with many households not
yet having access to proper sanitation. These regions give the most in terms of land and
resources, but because of the formation of the energy pipelines and political redistribution,
they receive the lowest recompense. This is in direct contrast to the Almaty and Astana regions
that are the seats of power. Therefore, distribution is a sensitive issue in Kazakh politics, and
any discussion of local conditions begs awkward questions about the structure of the state
and the role of the leadership.
Kazakhstan should be of significant interest to the European market as an alternative source
of oil. The lifting of sanctions with Iran will have an enormous affect not only upon the regional
- but also potentially upon the global oil market. It could also offer an alternative way to take
Kazakh oil to market. The startlingly different energy requirements of the EU member states
make cooperation with the institution redundant and instead award priority to unilateral
relationships. The Norwegian model of energy governance is touted as the ‘fix-all’ for the
region and yet, as this chapter has shown, there are significant flaws in attempting to ‘copy
and paste’ the model onto the Kazakh system as part of a crude policy-learning exercise.
There is simply not the political infrastructure present to permit a meaningful reproduction of
the Norwegian matrix. As a result, Western influence on the region has been aspirational and
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a technical necessity, but is not as deep nor as indentured as the mostly American-authored
‘Great Game’ literature would like to assume.
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Conclusion
“We must strive to encourage East and West not only to move towards each other but also
to encourage them to find a new philosophy ...”1
President Nursultan Nazarbayev
Kazakhstan could yet rot from within. The vanity of President Nazarbayev as the self-
appointed ‘Leader of the Nation’ highlights his inability or unwillingness to implement a more
stable regime structure. As the previous chapter shows, marginal power is better generated
through wealth creation rather than political aggrandisement or pandering to the competing
interest groups who are ready to defend their own fortune over the national interest.
Nazarbayev has maintained stability between the different ethnic groups and has maintained
relationships with China and Russia, but what about once he leaves? Will there be a “Tito
effect” in Kazakhstan? There is no opposition leadership to provide stability in the change-
over at a time when Russian Eurasianism is rising; the President has successfully eradicated
any trace of an alternative. At a time of regional instability there is no one else who could
meaningfully move into the presidency to manage Kazakh-Russia relations. Having made
himself so central to the functioning of the government, Nazarbayev has weakened the country
he has sought to build. Russia doesn’t need to invade Kazakhstan; it can simply ingratiate
itself into the inexperienced leadership of a post-Nazarbayev era.2
In 2015, President Nazarbayev won the general election with a remarkable 97.7 % of the vote.
At 75 years old, the man with his hand on the tiller of a country with twice the oil reserves of
Brazil, is marching closer to death with no successor in plain sight. He has achieved such a
remarkable election victory not only because the election had been rigged (his main competitor
1 Nursultan Nazarbayev, Speech to the 8th Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan, 24 October, 2001.
2 Dusko Doder, ‘Yugoslavia: New War, Old Hatreds,’ Foreign Policy (1993), pp.3-5.
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was a former-mechanic)3, but because there is no opposition, rule of law and or civil society
to protest the results. Yet unlike his peers, Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow of Turkmenistan or
Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan, the President has consistently taken successful steps to
generate economic improvement and he displays a genuine desire to craft an improved future
for Kazakhstan. This adds up to a problematic assessment. How does one celebrate the
achievements of this exciting and vibrant country without in the process condoning many of
the methods that have plagued its development? The President has committed himself to
building the state, but at the same time has plundered the livelihoods of its people by secretly
channelling billions to hidden bank accounts in Switzerland, whilst also being complicit in many
human rights abuses.4
Ultimately this thesis has sought not only to demonstrate that Kazakhstan has ceased to be a
mere pawn on a chessboard, but also to demonstrate how this has been achieved. It is an
active state in international relations, it has autonomous capacity and uses tactics to generate
positive marginality. This thesis has a number of claims by way of its contribution to
knowledge. This the first time that Kazakhstan has been considered through the prism of
marginality, and it is the first time that the marginality literature has been applied to an oil case
study. It also appears to be the first study on Kazakhstan, whose purpose has been to re-align
the relationship with Russia and China through a systematic review of energy security and
strategic culture of the state. Its claim to originality therefore lies in deploying an area studies
approach in order to examine real world international relations questions that are generated
from the locality itself.5 In this sense it answers the call of earlier geographers who encouraged
the building of knowledge from a single location. This is not the story of Kazakhstan as told by
3 Jack Farchy, ‘The succession question of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan grows more urgent’, 13 May 2015
available from http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/1938344c-ed87-11e4-987e-00144feab7de.html#axzz3k1TVnL7T
4 R. Stodghill, ‘Oil, Cash, and Corruption.’ The New York Times, 5 November 2006. See also G. Hayman and
Tom Mayne, ‘Energy-related Corruption and its Effects on Stability in Central Asia,’ China & Eurasia Forum
Quarterly, Vol.8. No.2 (2010), pp.137-41.
5 The issue has long been pondered see for example: M. Brecher, ‘International Relations and Asian Studies,’
World Politics, Vol.15, No.2 (1963), pp.213-35.
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Russia and China, instead it is rooted in Kazakhstan’s own history, environment and future
trajectory. The results, field of study and parameters of this thesis have been decided ex post,
rather than squeezing the Kazakh experience into a formula derived from the international
system.
The marginality literature has helped us to understand the behaviour of the state as a series
of exercises in power and control, and the particular sets of strategies and tactics that this has
sought to leverage. To return to the ideas that were explored in the introductory sections, and
which have framed the analysis throughout this thesis, Noel Parker describes precisely what
it means for a state to exhibit positive marginality:
‘We can identify a marginal entity or actor as one which can be
plausibly perceived to occupy a position on the edge of a prima facie
bigger, or more coherent, and/or more influential other’ s (center’s)
space and/or concentration of resources. Resources can refer to a
range of capacities ostensibly concentrated in the centre: power in its
many forms; financial or material goods, ideological/ religious/ cultural
impact, structural coherence, identity in the sense of a capacity to be
an actor with sovereign identity, hold over discursive forms.’6
Kazakhstan occupies such a position on the edge of two such centers: Russia and China.
These resources that Noel Parker describes are notably present in Kazakhstan's historical
relationship with Russia, and the ideological/ religious and cultural presence runs deep in the
historical relationship between the two states. By contrast, China enjoys increasing power
through its financial and material presence. What is implicit within this arrangement is that
6 Noel Parker, ‘A Theoretical Introduction: Space, Centers, and Margins’, in Noel Parker (ed.), The Geopolitics of
Europe’s Identity: Centers, Boundaries and Margins (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008). p.12.
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both parties are defined by their relationship. Kazakhstan marks the end of China’s territory,
and whether Russia is willing to acknowledge it or not, it increasingly marks the end of
Russian territory too. The centre is, as Parker notes, ‘hostage’ to the margin.7 We normally
expect to hear about the center’s role in influencing this relationship, but this thesis through
its emphasis on marginality has shown the ability of the margin to impact upon the centre to
a significant degree.
As we have seen, Kazakhstan has achieved this in numerous ways that correlate
convincingly with Parker’s theory on tactics8 and identity.9 We can see from Chapters 4 and
5 on China and Russia, that Kazakhstan has tactically played the two centers off against the
other. By signing up to regional contracts with Russia that have altered little, but which have
nevertheless been symbolically important, such as the Eurasian Economic Community,
Kazakhstan has remained within the periphery of Russia without sacrificing autonomy.
Furthermore at the same time, these agreements have ‘concealed’ the lengths that the
Kazakh state has gone to patiently divest itself of Russian influence through changes to the
pipeline networks and the improvements to the domestic refinery systems. Furthermore, as
the thesis has shown, Kazakhstan has gone to significant lengths to approach alternative
sources of finance from the beginning of its independence.10
7 ibid.
8 These might be enumerated as (1) Obtaining loyalty rewards; (2) Obtaining intermediation rewards; (3)
Competing for rewards; (4) Playing one centre off against another; (5) Manifest emulation; Rent-seeking; (6)
Guaranteeing order. Taken from Noel Parker, ‘A Theoretical Introduction: Space, Centers, and Margins’, in
Noel Parker (ed.), The Geopolitics of Europe’s Identity: Centers, Boundaries and Margins (New York: Palgrave
MacMillan, 2008). p.13.
9 (1) Being in a marginal position; (2) Seeing oneself in a marginal position; (3) Being conscious of potentialities
that are implicit in being marginal; (4) Using those potentialities to advantage; (5) On the basis of one’s
marginality seeing a potential to redefine received patterns and; (6) including other’s identities in such a
redefinition. Taken from Noel Parker, ‘A Theoretical Introduction: Space, Centers, and Margins’, in Noel Parker
(ed.), The Geopolitics of Europe’s Identity: Centers, Boundaries and Margins (New York: Palgrave MacMillan,
2008), p.15.
10 The extent to which this has been a long-term project is underlined by J.P. Dorian, Ian Sheffield Rosi,
and S. Tony Indriyanto, ‘Central Asia's oil and gas pipeline network: current and future flows," Post-Soviet
Geography, Vol.35, No.7 (1994), pp.412-430.
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Kazakhstan is increasingly attracting interest from China, and with its generous remuneration
packages the Dragon is able to ‘outbid’ Russia for contracts in Kazakhstan and across
Central Asia. In this sense, Kazakhstan is exhibiting rent seeking behaviours in its
interactions with China, by being paid to move into its sphere of influence. There is a finite
supply of oil available for sale from Kazakhstan, and China is securing this for itself in the
future, seeing off rivals for resources. We can see that this is a strategy, and that it comes
from a position of power and strength because China has approached Kazakhstan for oil
contracts previously and been rejected, as shown in Chapter 5 on China. China has been
unable to secure its contracts with Kazakhstan until such time as it proved advantageous to
the Central Asian state.11
Kazakhstan has developed a tactical manifest emulation of all the states it encounters. It is
at once resolutely developing its own path towards identity, but at the same time it
strategically mimics the attributes of those with which it comes into contact. Not unlike the
bird of paradise during mating season, Kazakhstan has developed a strategy designed to
appeal to all possible onlookers through the elaborate ‘dance’ that constitutes the
‘Crossroads of Civilisations’ and the ‘Heart of Eurasia’ strategies. To Russia and China,
Kazakhstan remains a secure neighbour intent on retaining ‘traditions’ of non-democratic
leadership, reassuring them that they do not have an interloper in their midst. To the West,
the leader hires Tony Blair to make the country more liberal-media friendly, more palatable.
Indeed it would be easy to visit the region and see the modern cars and material goods and
assume that there was a collective urge to emulate the West, but it is an impersonation rather
than a genuine adoption of values from any center. Furthermore the chapter on Kazakhstan’s
11 The acceleration of this transformation is also explored in S. Peyrouse, Economic aspects of the Chinese-
Central Asia rapprochement (Silk Road Studies Program, Uppsala University, 2007).
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transition has shown that the direct emulation or transplant of idealised norms onto the
domestic industry and political structures from Western states is neither likely nor desirable.
In performing this elaborate manoeuvre, (and as we can see from Chapter 4 on Russia)
Kazakhstan has also overturned the tactics of Russia. Where once Russia presented itself
as the guarantor of the Central Asian states against ‘terrorism’ for the West, it has now shown
itself to be an aggressor in the region, risking instability, whilst by contrast the Kazakh state
has shown itself willing to engage in organising its own space and to cooperate with a
Western presence in the region. The Western states are presumed to have significant
influence upon the region by the ‘Great Game’ literature, but through the thesis we can see
a growing uneasiness in this relationship. The US has a visibly waning influence through its
weak plans in the region that are focused too closely upon Afghanistan to entice Kazakhstan.
Why Washington chose the American Silk road approach, with its regulation and mediocre
funding, when China’s offering is financially more rewarding is puzzling. The United States
remains influential within the narrow ambit of the energy industry, but this does not appear to
have translated into political power; the industry adapts to the local conditions, and the
Kazakh state appears wary of many of the Western methods such as CSR taking priority over
the state’s role in the oil producing regions.12
We can also now begin to see that changes have affected Kazakhstan’s identity. If the
country’s marginal strategy has been effective then there should be ‘evidence’ through
changes in identity both for the centre and the margin. Kazakhstan can be understood to have
a self-internalised concept of its own position in international relations, as shown through the
strategic choices it has made with regards to Eurasianism (Chapter 2). Particularly through its
energy industry and other strategic choices, Kazakhstan has developed itself as an alternative
center to Russia for China’s investment in the energy security arena. It is still a risky investment
12 See also L. Murat, ‘US Central Asian Policy Under President Barack Obama’, Central Asia and the Caucasus,
Vol.11, No.4 (2010).
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climate because of the propensity for sudden change, but it lacks the military aggression that
is evident in Russian foreign policy. Furthermore, it is the first choice in Central Asia for
international investment. Kazakhstan is increasingly able to demonstrate that it is acting
autonomously in the region and is using cultural domestic signifiers such as changes in
language and nation branding, and in doing so it redefines Russia’s relationship within the
margins of its territory.13
Currently, China shows little interest in ‘colonising’ Kazakhstan regardless of the local fears of
its neighbour. However, there is a danger that without intending to Kazakhstan may have
swapped one centre for another. Some have argued that as China becomes increasingly
reliant and leveraged to the developing economies in its quest for oil and natural resources,
so it will inevitably have to police the investments that it has made. The analogy that is
frequently drawn is America’s rise to globalism, moving from a country which, in 1920, seemed
content merely to own the world, to one which, after 1950, was anxious to police the world.
Many scholars have also suggested that moments of hegemonic transition are especially
dangerous. This debate is well beyond the scope of this thesis, but its evidence concerning
marginality explored here suggests that new forms are emerging in the international system
and the future does not always have to follow the past. This is not to suggest an invasion or
display of aggression of the kind that emanates from Russia, but instead a pressure that
comes from having heavily invested in an economy; inducing coercive behaviour to ensure
favourable outcomes to ensure China’s continued success.14
13 See also G. Strüver, ‘What friends are made of: bilateral linkages and domestic drivers of foreign policy
alignment with China,’ Foreign Policy Analysis, (2014).
14 Many scholars have joined this battle, but the most prominent are: G. John Ikenberry, ‘The Rise of China and
the Future of the West: Can the Liberal System Survive?’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 87, No.1 (2008), pp.23-37; John
J. Mearsheimer, ‘The Gathering Storm: China’s Challenge to US Power in Asia’, Chinese Journal of International
Politics, Vol.3, No.4 (2010), pp.381-96.
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On the Margins of Marginality
To create a contrast to the Great Game narrative, this thesis needed to produce an alternative
narrative that better encapsulated the problem of understanding geopolitics in Central Asia. It
needed to capture the notion of power being able to manifest away from great power states;
just because Kazakhstan is not as powerful as Russia, does not automatically mean it is a
weak state, or that a victim narrative is the most accurate representation. In this sense, using
marginality allowed that spirit of entrepreneurship that was self-evident within the country itself
to be captured and explore what this might mean at a societal level. And yet, just to
acknowledge that marginality was a better label for the status quo was not enough; once we
had created an alternative understanding for geopolitics we needed to be able to explain how
this was happening. What are the conditions that have created this relationship? Has it been
passive? Has Kazakhstan just been allotted power by the international system or has it made
deliberate changes to create this understanding. This is where the limits of the marginality as
a theoretical framework are apparent; it does not have the power to describe the causal factors
that have contributed to its development.
This flexibility is both a blessing and a curse. Marginality, as a literature, is a framework of
understanding whereby observing certain actions being taken by the state can help to
determine where the centre of power is located. In this sense it is useful to show development,
but it does not show causal factors. The dichotomy between Russia’s waning presence and
China’s almost unobservable glide into the economy would not be able to be understood using
the marginality literature alone. By supplementing and synthesising these insights with
theoretical devices from the energy governance literature and the strategic culture literature
we were able to create an understanding that answered the how question. Strategic culture
explains how we were able to have continuity in Central Asia from the Soviet era, but also be
entering a unique era of independence. It also allowed us to observe this happening in the
energy industry through continuity and shifts in the power groups that are present within the
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state. By focusing on one industry, the energy industry, which is so central to the economic
development of the country, we were able to show that this had been a considered change
and that there were also limits to the Kazakh ability to gain marginality because of the often
poor and corrupt decisions that were being made on a continuous basis. Creating locally
rooted research that was interested in producing an accurate account of how Kazakhstan
arrived at its current position, and how much of this was by design or by accident, was a crucial
task of the thesis.
However, there are questions to be asked about marginality itself. Does the very concept of
marginality simply move the boundary of power or is it relocating a boundary itself, rather than
creating an alternative position within geopolitics? Is its obsession with rules and regulation
and the creation of neat categories, counter-intuitive to its stated purpose? Does marginality
need to be reconceived in order to create a post-structural understanding? These questions
remain unanswered here because the limits of the use of marginality have been supplemented
with alternative explanatory tools instead. Where there are holes, a synthesis with other
theoretical positions has been sought. Many criticisms from a position of poststructuralism are
difficult to integrate here because the ultimate aim of this thesis has been to problem-solve an
approach to understand rather than to remain aloof in criticism of the status quo. The aim of
drawing out the work of Parker in the literature review was to provide substantive justification
for continuing with this position, despite some of the weaknesses identified.
The actors in this region are the largest and most powerful states that are currently operating
in world politics; Russia, China and America. In using marginality in this context, to understand
a transition from a weak state to a centre of power, albeit a smaller power, the thesis has
shown the tactics and mechanisms that can be used to explain these changes. By choosing
to use the energy industry as the key explanatory tool for this tool, the thesis shows that there
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is scope to explain geopolitics in another formulation. We need not think of energy powers as
weak or small, but as a center or a margin, and therefore as having shifting, moveable
boundaries of power with limits. By thinking of the governance of the energy industry in terms
of competing subcultures the changing yet resolutely repetitive aspects of the energy industry
can begin to be appreciated in the face of a heavily changing international environment. In
other words the thesis helps us to understand how smaller energy producers can begin to
understand the opportunities that they are presented with and the tools that are available to
them to increase their position within the market. Blending geopolitics and political economy
has the potential to create more valuable understandings of market function when we realise
that the leadership and decision-makers of many states is as equally divided between these
different factors. The domestic and the international are already smudged boundaries that
conflate actor decision-making capacity, this combination of frameworks just helps to draw out
the details.
The Future for the Marginally Powerful
Death and Destruction?
There are two core problems looming on the horizon for Kazakhstan. The first is the death of
the ‘Leader of the Nation’, and the second is the inefficiency of the domestic energy industry.
When the President eventually succumbs to the inevitable, all this work could be for nothing,
since there has been little succession planning.15 Kazakhstan’s has achieved power as a
marginal state, and built an autonomous path for its future development, but when there is no
leader, and the power vacuum sets in, who will prevent Moscow from seizing its opportunity?
Not unlike Tito in Yugoslavia, Nazarbayev has justified his authoritarian leadership by claiming
that he unites the people, and prevents ethnic tension splitting the nation during the early years
15 R. Isaacs, ‘Informal politics and the uncertain context of transition: revisiting early stage non-democratic
development in Kazakhstan’, Democratization, Vol.17. No.1 (2010), pp.1-25.
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of statehood and development.16 His death will leave the country in a difficult position. With no
power structures in place, a contest will begin for the leadership, but also for legitimacy. In a
region that is dominated by personality, not politics, there are no characters that command the
public imagination.17 If Nazarbayev has not announced his successor, why should the next
leader be accepted, and upon what grounds?
Given the lack of any public figures with appropriate stature, it is unlikely that popularity or
charisma will have much place within the decision-making process. Instead it is more probable
that the candidate will be someone deemed palatable to the various interest groups, who
operates within an existing power structure and has a network of support embedded within
the political elite system.18 In order to have been in a position to have secured this, it is highly
likely that the candidate is already within the closest circles of the current leader, and a trusted
member of his personal entourage. Given the centralised and authoritarian structures that are
present it also remains rather unlikely that there will be an opposition candidate in a position
to offer an alternative and almost certainly there will be no immediate election. Given the
limited public dialogue that this subject matter receives it is difficult to gauge a public ‘mood’
towards succession, but it does not mean that there is not intense speculation or concern.
Whoever is chosen as the next leader will not repeat the trajectory of Nazarbayev. The new
leader will appear in a new age in which social media is more important and where ideas pass
more freely than ever before: the current generation has watched the various outcomes of the
Arab Spring. Across the whole region, many have asked what the Arab Spring means for
Russia, Central Asia, and the Caucasus.19
16 Catherine Putz, ‘Should We Stop Calling Kazakhstan an Autocracy?’, The Diplomat, 3 September, 2015,
available from http://thediplomat.com/2015/09/should-we-stop-calling-kazakhstan-an-autocracy/
17 See also R. Isaacs, ‘”Papa”– Nursultan Nazarbayev and the Discourse of Charismatic Leadership and Nation‐
Building in Post‐Soviet Kazakhstan,’ Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism, Vol.10, No.3 (2010), pp.435-52; T.
Ambrosio, ‘Leadership Succession in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan: Regime Survival after Nazarbayev and
Karimov,’ Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, Vol.17, No.1 (2015), pp.49-67.
18 Sean Roberts, ‘Rating Nazarbayev’s Likely Successors’, PONARS Eurasia, 18 April, 2013, available from
http://www.ponarseurasia.org/article/rating-nazarbayev%E2%80%99s-likely-successors
19 A. Zikibayeva, Serge Korepin, and Shalini Sharan, ‘What Does the Arab Spring Mean for Russia, Central Asia,
and the Caucasus?’, Center for Strategic & International Studies, Vol.8 (2011), pp.1-3.
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In theory this leaves a wide range of options in the event of succession, and all of them are
somewhat precarious. In practice, markets dislike instability, and more than that they dislike
instability in a capital intensive industry such as the energy industry. Because this makes
capital flight a real risk in the event of a power vacuum, the question of succession is likely to
be resolved quickly. Everyone understands that the stability of the changeover phase will
depend upon the speed at which ‘normalcy’ can be returned and the ability of the next leader
to appease the markets, guarantee contracts and re-emphasise the rule of law. The external
variables are less controllable and depend upon the geopolitical context at the time that the
succession takes place and the relationship that Kazakhstan is experiencing with Russia at
that time. A fragile connection could prompt interference from Moscow at a time when the
state is already in a precarious position. Again a speedy transfer will occlude a window for
Russian opportunism. It is therefore most likely that the succession, so much discussed and
mulled-over, will occur speedily without a second glance.
Efficiency, Nuclear Energy and the Saudi Example
In 2011, when this study was initiated, Brent Crude was over $100 dollars a barrel.20 The Arab
Spring, rising demand from China and transportation bottlenecks were forcing the price of oil
upwards, furthermore shale was in its infancy, not yet a fully viable product. In the early autumn
of 2015, Brent Crude was under $50 per barrel. To take a long view, the price of oil was
historically below this mark for the majority of the previous century, but since the 1970s the
market has experienced greater volatility and higher prices; the age of cheap oil was over.
Under these comfortable conditions, a seller’s market developed and more exploration was
undertaken in increasingly hostile and demanding conditions - all the while - raising the price
20 US Energy Information Administration, ‘2011 Brief: Brent crude oil averages over $100 per barrel in 2011’,
US Energy Information Administration, January 12, 2011, accessed 12 September 2015,
http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=4550#
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of extraction to higher levels.21 It was amongst these jubilant market conditions that the
development of the Kashagan oil projects began. They are the largest and the most expensive
oil fields to have been developed in the last fifty years, and the spiralling cost of their creation
has elevated the estimated break-even point to over $100 per barrel in the first years of
production.22 Therefore, it is imperative that every drop of profit that can be extricated within
the current market conditions be collected by the state and stored in the sovereign wealth fund
to enable the domestic development to continue. It also needs to be able to sell as much oil
at international prices as possible, rather than selling to the domestic market where prices are
subsidised by the state.
Natural gas is required for the production of oil in Kazakhstan. This is not true of all oil fields,
but the geology of the Kazakh fields necessitates that natural gas be pumped in to aid the
recovery of oil and extend the life of the fields. Between this and high levels of domestic
consumption, Kazakhstan has a very inefficient gas industry. Currently Kazakhstan consumes
19% of its oil production and 14% of its natural gas, but its main source of fuel comes from
domestically produced coal, consuming some 64% of its production. Aware that this is an
inefficient use of natural resources, Kazakhstan is undertaking a national gasification project
which includes improving its production efficiency. Furthermore, Kazakhstan has no national
grid of its own. Instead it has a northern grid serviced by Russia and a southern grid serviced
by Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan further reducing gas consumption, but decreasing energy
security through its reliance upon unpredictable neighbours.23 What are Kazakhstan’s
options?
21 R. Matthew, Twilight in the Desert: the Coming Saudi Oil shock and the World Economy (New York; John
Wiley & Sons, 2006), pp.3-7.
22 TengriNews, ‘Kashagan Economically Viable With Prices For Oil At $100 Per Barrel’, TengriNews, 9 Feburary
2015, accessed 12 September 2015, http://en.tengrinews.kz/finance/Kashagan-economically-viable-with-
prices-for-oil-at-100-per-258906/
23 G. Simmons, ‘Russia and the Politics of the Central Asian Electric Grid,’ Problems of Post Communism, Vol.50,
No.3 (2003), pp.42-52. See also S. Peyrouse, ‘The hydroelectric sector in Central Asia and the growing role of
China,’ China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, Vol. 5. No.2. (2007).
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Saudi Arabia is a world leader in oil production, a member of the G-20, a fully industrialised
nation, the global Islamic centre for Sunni Muslims and a regional power in the Middle East.
The reserves and production capacity of Kazakhstan may not be on the same scale as Saudi
Arabia, but the Middle Eastern giant has two key lessons to teach the junior petro-state.
Domestically, population changes and consumption are crippling the supply of gas with
serious consequences for its long-term future. The major problem suffocating the Saudi
economy is the management of their domestic energy market.24 Currently, 25-30% of its oil
production is being used to support its industrialisation programme and its gas supply is being
used to fuel the petrochemical plants.25 A rising population requires more water, again an
issue that Kazakhstan also experiences, and in the case of Saudi Arabia this must be collected
from electricity-intensive, energy-draining desalination plants. This rising population is also
urbanising, with 85% of the population living in the cities, and starting to consume in a
spectacular fashion. The rise in demand for goods and lifestyle changes, such as air-
conditioning in a desert country, all increase the demand for energy. Internationally, the
challenging global market conditions are impacting Saudi Arabia’s political influence.26 In
short, Saudi Arabia is going nuclear, and this begs the question should Kazakhstan be heading
in the same direction?
Whilst desalination may not be the main problem, Kazakhstan is nevertheless exposed to
many of the same conditions as Saudi Arabia. Urbanisation in Kazakhstan is rising; the 2009
census records 57% of the population living in a town or city and the expectation is that figures
will reach 66% by 2030.27 Extreme weather means that it is the heating bills rather than the
24 For more information see Gladha Lahn & Paul Stevens, ‘Burning Oil to Keep Cool The Hidden Energy Crisis in
Saudi Arabia’, Chatham House, December, 2011.
25 NPR Saudi Major Investment in Nuclear Technology
26 Y. Al-Saleh, ‘Renewable energy scenarios for major oil-producing nations: the case of Saudi Arabia,’ Futures,
Vol.41, No.9 (2009), pp.650-62.
27 Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, ‘Economic Statistics in Kazakhstan’,
Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, 2009,
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air-conditioning that drains the Central Asian state, and as the rise of a middle class begins,
so more access to consumer goods will be required to meet similarly rising expectations.
These factors place considerable demands upon the state to provide cheap natural resources
across a notably large, sparsely populated country with an increasingly out-of-date
infrastructure.
Like Saudi Arabia, Kazakhstan is therefore using its own supply of natural resource for fuel
rather than using it to exchange on world markets. Whilst using its own gas supply as a power
source means a reliable source of fuel, improving energy security, there are negative
consequences. At a time when confidence in Russia as a stable source of gas is low in Europe,
but the demand is high, increasingly supply to Europe must be a priority. Furthermore, the
sheer size of Kazakhstan means that gas or coal fuel must be transported vast distances in
difficult conditions to service all regions. Any fluctuations in the world market price of gas, or
changes in production would adversely affect the less densely populated oblasts. Many
existing gas and coal power plants are due for upgrades or obsolescence programmes.
Accordingly, the country’s energy policy is under review and new solutions need to be
seriously considered if the leadership is to improve the independence and sustainability of
Kazakh energy supplies.28
In response to these domestic and international market changes, Saudi Arabia has begun an
ambitious programme to develop sixteen nuclear power stations by 2020. This is not a reaction
based upon fears over the availability of oil in the state - indeed it has proven reserves of 267
billion barrels - instead it is a reaction to the rising cost of extracting oil. The steadily increasing
cost is in part due to the increasingly technologically advanced methods required in the
28 Z. Atakhanova and Peter Howie, ‘Electricity demand in Kazakhstan,’ Energy Policy, Vol.35, No.7 (2007),
pp.3729-43.
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extraction process now that the previous centuries easy-access, cheap recovery, low
efficiency projects are nearing an end. Instead, this century marks a new era of more
expensive and harder to extract oil from more diverse locations with lower profit margins. As
a result of these changes, Saudi Arabia fears the loss of customers as developed countries
turn towards cheaper and more environmentally sustainable sources of energy.29
Kazakhstan could potentially benefit from pursuing a similar nuclear energy strategy in the
long term in a manner similar to Saudi Arabia. Clearly, there is no feasible alternative power
source in the short term. Hydropower is not an option for either Kazakhstan or Saudi Arabia,
both of which suffer with restricted access to water. Unlike Saudi Arabia, solar energy
possibilities are limited and seasonal. Meanwhile, Kazakhstan has many advantages over
Saudi Arabia in the proliferation of nuclear technology. Firstly, it has a domestic supply of the
raw materials required in Uranium production; it holds 12% of the world’s uranium reserves,
and is currently the world’s leading producer.30 Secondly, it is seen as a credible and reliable
supplier of uranium to China, Japan, Russia, India and South Korea. After negotiation with
Canadian firms, Kazakhstan is looking to expand its nuclear industry to launch a uranium
conversion facility, creating a value-added uranium product, to be sold straight to the supplier.
Kazakhstan would therefore be self-reliant for energy once more. Thirdly, Kazakhstan’s short
history has been a peaceful one, especially in the context of nuclear disarmament. At
independence the country held the fourth largest nuclear weapons arsenal in the world. The
1,410 nuclear warheads were immediately repatriated to Russia by President Nazarbayev,
and the nuclear testing site closed. KazAtomProm, the national nuclear holding company,
estimates that a single nuclear power plant opening in Mangistau would reduce the output of
carbon dioxide into the region by 3 million tons per year.31 The history of Kazakhstan’s Soviet
29 R. Gold and N. D. Drilling, ‘Global Oil Glut Sends Prices Plunging,’ The Wall Street Journal, 14 October 2014.
30World Nuclear Association, ‘Uranium and Nuclear Energy in Kazakhstan, World Nuclear Association,
September 2013, Accessed 12 September 2015, http://world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Countries-G-
N/Kazakhstan/
31 Ibid.
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era nuclear legacy has no doubt impacted upon the decision to offer the tender to international
firms that are able to offer the highest 3+ safety rating facilities rather than push for domestic
project management. These developments seem important for the stability of the Kazak
growth in the medium term as well as long-term political stability.
Future Avenues for Research
Kazakhstan is under-researched given its importance to the region. This thesis therefore lays
the ground work for a number of cognate areas of research. One of the most interesting
avenues for future research is related to the current geopolitical climate created by Russia. A
comparative study that compared the marginality and tactics of the FSU states would enable
us to understand better how states are responding to the new aggression, looking for tactics
and conditions that affect the ability of these states to act autonomously; geographical distance
to Europe or other centers, resource endowment, economy, population size and density, and
cultural integration. This might well form the basis of an international team project.
Furthermore, in 2011 when this study was commencing, China was barely mentioned in the
literature as the alternative centre to Russia. Further research is required on the relationship,
examining not only how Kazakhstan has experienced China, but also placing this issue in a
comparative context. There are definite differences in terms of how China is responding to
each country, creating a more nuanced political actor than has previously been acknowledged
by scholars. Teasing out these differences between the ‘Kazakh’ experience and other states
would enable us to become more knowledgeable about China’s responses to local
developments around the world and assist in forecasting its future foreign policy.
289
Research on Kazakhstan and its place in the world is hindered not only by the anachronistic
fixation with stereotypical ideas like the ‘Great Game’ but also by its lack of connection to wider
considerations of international relations in the literature. It is rarely part of the collection of
states in wider regional studies or comparisons, and seldom is it used as a case study to
exemplify a characteristic. And yet, it sits within a group of states that have developed
autonomously from the same starting point into wildly different countries. This is likely to
change in the next ten years, not least because of growing connections between universities
in Central Asia and major centres of research elsewhere in the world. Eurasia has so much to
offer, not only in terms of political economy - but also to researchers. Therefore its future as a
field of intellectual study looks promising and is likely to follow a similar trajectory - away from
marginality.32
32 N. Mouraviev, ‘Kazakhstan has Joined the Bologna Process: New Challenges for the Higher Education Policy,’
Social Policy and Administration, Vol.39, No.4 (2012), pp.361-380; A. Sagintayeva and Kairat Kurakbayev,
‘Understanding the transition of public universities to institutional autonomy in Kazakhstan,’ European Journal
of Higher Education, Vol.5, No.2 (2015), pp.197-210.
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